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PART I A GLIMPSE INTO TIBET‟S PAST 
 
Chapter 1 Tibet: A Brief Historical Background 
 
1.1.1 Introduction 
Lying at an average height of 4000 metres above the sea level, Tibet,
1
 popularly 
known as the „roof of the world‟, is virtually cut off from its neighbours by some of 
the world‟s highest mountain ranges. It is bounded by the Himalayas in the south, the 
Karakoram in the west and the Kun Lun, Altyn and Qilian ranges in the north. The 
gorges of Salween, Mekong and Yangtze separate her from China in the southeast. 
Only in the northeastern part of Tibet, in the Kokonor area, is the plateau relatively 
more accessible. The Tibetan plateau is literally the fountainhead of Asia and the 
primary source of many of the great river systems in the continent, including Ganges, 
Indus, Sutlej and Brahmaputra, which flow through India, Pakistan, Nepal and 
Bangladesh and Salween, Mekong, Yangtze and Yellow Rivers that meander 
forcefully through China, Burma, Thailand and other Asian countries. All these 
majestic geographical features lie in the high plateau, which extends almost 2,500 
kilometres from east to west and 1, 200 kilometres from north to south, the total area 
of which is approximately 2.5 million square kilometres
2
 and constitutes 
approximately a quarter of the total landmass of the People‟s Republic of China 
(PRC).
3
 Much of this sparsely populated land has always remained remote, 
inhospitable and uninhabited terrain of mountain ranges and deserted plains;
4
 yet 
                                                 
1 Throughout the dissertation Tibet refers to the ethnographic Tibet, which encompasses the entire 
Tibetan plateau, including the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and other regions inhabited by 
Tibetan communities that lie in the neighbouring Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu 
and Yunnan. The Chinese Government, however, considers Tibet and the TAR, which the Chinese 
Government formally created in 1965, equivalently. See the maps of Tibet on pages vii-ix. 
2 The area of the present “Tibet Autonomous Region,” consisting of U-Tsang and a small portion of 
Kham, is 1.2 million square kilometres, leaving the rest ethnographic Tibet outside the TAR in the 
four Chinese provinces. 
3 Warren W. Smith, Tibet Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations, 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996, p. xxii. 
4 “The northern part of Tibet, representing about three-sevenths of the whole country, is a virtually 
uninhabited wilderness of mountain spurs and ranges, interspersed with bleak barren plans, 
stretches of soda-encrusted soil, and innumerable small lakes and pools of brackish water... A 
further two-sevenths of the country, still high and cold but tempered by a more southerly situation, 
lying approximately between latitudes 30º and 32º North, is a land of sparse grazing and rolling 
plateau, lofty ranges of snow-capped mountains, and great lakes. Here small and scattered groups of 
nomadic herdsmen, a people of extraordinary hardiness and endurance, wander with their tents, 
tending great herds of yak, sheep and goats... The remaining two-sevenths of the country comprise 
the extensive valley system of the Tsangpo and the valleys of Salween, the Mekong and the 
 2 
fertile land suitable for agriculture dots the southern, eastern and northeastern regions 
of Tibet. “Five sixths of the settled area is distributed over an arc running from west 
of Lhasa, in the Tsangpo valley, around by the east and northeast to the Kansu 
frontier,” writes Owen Lattimore.5 Due to great variety of climate, rainfall and 
temperature differences little vegetation except for grasses grow on the uplands, 
however, in the river valleys and warmer locations sufficient crops of barley, beans, 
wheat, buckwheat and peas grow. The remoteness and relative isolation of Tibet, 
extensive stretches of grazing land and limited cultivatable land might have resulted 
in a significant pastoral and nomadic economy in the central and northern plains of 
Tibet. Domestic yaks, sheep, goats and horses are the primary animals raised and 
herded by the nomads. 
 
With only few detailed studies into the ethnic origins of the Tibetan race, it is hard to 
establish conclusively the racial origin of the Tibetan nation, which Stein proclaims 
“is still a mystery,” however; it is evident that many different populations have over 
the long course of history lived in Tibet.
6
 Many Tibetologists agree that the Tibetans 
may be descendants of the semi-nomadic non-Chinese Qiang tribes (Ch‟iang) of 
Eastern-Central Asia, who around the first and second centuries were forced to 
migrate to various parts of the Tibetan plateau to escape Chinese expansionism and 
with whose language and culture Tibetan language and culture share similarities.
7
 
Other races that may have contributed to the racial makeup of the Tibetan people 
include among others Mon,
8
 who probably were one of the earliest inhabitants on the 
lofty plateau,
9
 isolated groups of Mongols, and the Tocharians, an early Indo-
European race who from as early as the beginning of the second millennium B.C. had 
                                                                                                                                            
Yangtze. These southern areas of Tibet lie on the same latitude as Cairo, and since they represent 
the only favourable agricultural lands in the whole country, it is here that the sparse population of 
Tibet...is naturally concentrated,” writes Snellgrove and Richardson in their A Cultural History of 
Tibet. David Snellgrove and Hugh Richardson, A Cultural History of Tibet, London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1968, p.19. 
5 Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, Boston: Beacon Press, 1962, p. 207. 
6 R. A. Stein, Tibetan Civilization, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1972, p. 27. 
7 Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, pp. 215-216. 
8 The exact ethnic composition of Mon is far from clear as it is a highly general term that is “applied to 
populations of various languages and descent”. See Giuseppe Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls, 
Rome: La Libreria dello Stato, 1949, p. 6. According to R. A. Stein, Mon is a general term that 
“covers all sorts of aboriginal tribes of the wooded Himalayan hills (e.g. Mishmi, Abors) and is 
possibly related to the word „Man‟ used in literary Chinese for all southern „barbarians‟. But even 
in the earliest texts mention is also made of Mon peoples in the east, along the Sino-Tibetan 
border”. Quoted in R. A. Stein, Tibetan Civilization, pp. 34-35. 
9 Warren W. Smith, Tibet Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations, p. 9. 
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lived on the borders of the Tibetan plateau.
10
 Stein even speculates traits from „Red 
Indian‟, Hellenic or Caucasian element mixed in the Tibetan race based on 
observations of people in Kongpo and Northeastern Tibet. In sum he concludes that 
“anthropologists merely distinguish two types: one distinctly Mongoloid and of slight 
build, spread throughout Tibet, and the other, of taller build, typical of Kham,” which 
accords with the western science categorisation of the Tibetan race as Mongoloid.
11
 
Whatever original kinship relations may have existed between the earliest Chinese 
and Tibetans, it is obvious that adaptation to vastly different environments has 
produced two populations with distinct physiological structures, cultural 
manifestations and racial identities. The Tibetan language belongs to the Tibeto-
Burmese family, being written in an alphabetical form, acquired from the Indian 
Devangari script in the seventh century. 
 
Despite the huge size of the land and the wide-spread population distribution, there 
exists a common language throughout much of geographical and economic Tibet, 
which acts as a cultural nexus that brings together the whole of ethnic Tibet to form a 
relatively homogenous cultural oasis. Classified as belonging to the Tibeto-Burman 
language, Tibetan is characterised by a written language that is common throughout 
ethnographic Tibet and an oral language that is epitome of diversity. Tibetan is a 
distinct language that bears no or minimal resemblance to either of Indian or Chinese 
languages. The Tibetan written language was developed in the 7
th
 century, during the 
reign of King Song-tsen Gampo,
12
 and since then has served as the only literary 
language for the Tibetans. 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Ibid., p. 9. 
11 R. A. Stein, Tibetan Civilization, p. 27. The Soviet anthropologist N. N. Cheboksarov described 
Neolithic remains found in Kansu as preserving primary Mongoloid racial characteristics... Karl 
Jettmar suggested that the Kansu “Americanoids” were possibly the ancestors of the Tibetans. Karl 
Jettmar, „The Origins of Chinese Civilization: Soviet Views‟, in The Origins of Chinese 
Civilization, ed. David N. Keightley, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983, p. 222. 
According to this thesis “Americanoids” or primary Mongoloid types, continued to exist in some 
isolated areas in the New World, in parts of Siberia, and perhaps in Tibet. Howells in, The Origins 
of the Chinese People, ed. David N. Keightley, p. 315. 
12 Song-tsen Gampo, also known as Tride Song-tsen, was the thirty-third king of Tibet. According to 
the modern Tibetan historian Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Song-tsen Gampo was born just one year 
prior to the founding of the Tang Dynasty in 617 A.D. Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political 
History of Tibet, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967, p. 25. 
 4 
1.1.2 Brief Historical background 
 
1.1.2.1 Tibetan Kings (624-842 AD) and Tang China (618-756 AD)  
Tibet and China, like any other neighbouring states, have enjoyed informal contacts 
and relations, especially across border regions, for thousands of years. However, the 
recorded history of Sino-Tibetan relations commenced in the seventh century, during 
the lifetime of Tibet‟s most famous King Song-tsen Gampo (617-650 A.D.), under 
whose rule Tibet was unified and consolidated into a powerful State. Tibet emerged as 
a formidable military power and for several centuries remained a very powerful nation 
whose army foraged into the neighbouring territories–conducting expedition into 
India in 648, annihilating the Tu-yu-hun people in 670, capturing Chinese strongholds 
in Chinese Turkistan, dominating the kingdom of Nepal, occupying whole or part of 
the Chinese territories of Kansu, Szechwan and Yunnan.
13
 Tibet‟s military campaigns 
and national interests often conflicted with her neighbouring countries, especially 
with China, which had actuated numerous battles between the two. From the time of 
Song-tsen Gampo to that of Ral-pa-chen (806-838 A.D.), Tibet and China had 
constantly engaged in conflicts. According to Prof. Dawa Norbu,
14
 fifteen battles were 
fought between the two countries, most of which were initiated by Tibet and ended in 
signing of treaties. Consequently, eight treaties were signed between China and Tibet 
in a period of little more than one hundred and twenty years, from 706 to 822 A.D., 
that decided issues ranging from the demarcation of the boundary between Tibet and 
China to extraction of tributes, from restoration of peace between the two countries to 
treatment of the two as equal.
15
 These treaties stand as testimonies to the military 
might of Tibet, which in the 7
th
 century had reached its pinnacle, and was indeed one 
of the great military powers of Asia. During its most glorious days the Tibetan empire 
extended into Chinese Turkistan to the far north, Central Asia to the west and deep 
into China. In 640 A.D., in order to avoid further wars with Tibet, the Tang Emperor 
T‟ai Tsung offered his daughter Princess Wen-cheng Kun-chu16 in marriage to Song-
                                                 
13 Hugh Richardson, Tibet and Its History, 2
nd
 revised & updated, Boulder & London: Shambhala, 
1984, pp. 29-30. 
14 Dawa Norbu was a Tibet scholar, a political analyst and an associate Prof. at the Jawaharlal Nehru 
University in New Delhi. He had written widely on the political situations of Tibet, Sino-Tibetan 
relations and other geopolitical issues. His latest book is China‟s Tibet Policy. 
15 Dawa Norbu, China‟s Tibet Policy, Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001, pp. 34-35. 
16 When Song-tsen Gampo first sought the hand of Princess Wen-chen Kun-chu to set up a marriage 
alliances with China, Tang Emperor T‟ai-tsung refused and turned down the proposal. However, 
when the proposal was extended the second time, after the Tibetan king attacked and defeated Tu-
 5 
tsen Gampo, who had already taken Nepalese Princess Bhrikuti as one of his wives,
17
 
and thus started a relationship between Tibet and China, which came to be called as 
one between “Uncle” and “Nephew”.18 
 
The next Tibetan king who had achieved an almost equal feat as Song-tsen Gampo, in 
terms of capturing lands, winning tribute and revolutionising cultural landscape, was 
Trisong Detsen (754-797), who assumed power more than a century after Song-tsen 
Gampo‟s death in 650 A.D. The ascension to the power of Trisong Detsen in 755 gave 
the Tang court a good opportunity to send a mission to renew friendship. A year later, 
in 756, the two nations had a peace agreement despite which the Tibetans continued 
with their military expansion and captured the city of Sining and continued to advance 
into Kansu.
19
 By 760 A.D., the Tibetans had conquered much of Sichuan and 
Northern Yunnan and showed no indication of letting up the military expeditions. The 
Chinese had to pay an annual tribute of 50,000 silk rolls to gain respite from the 
constant attacks. When the Chinese failed to pay this tribute in 763, the Tibetan army 
launched a fierce attack and captured the Chinese capital at Changan (Sian) and set up 
Wen-cheng Kun-chu‟s brother as the new Emperor of China, which lasted only for 
fifteen days.
20
 By 790, Trisong Detsen‟s army had conquered all of the old Tibetan 
positions along the Silk Road and by the time of his death in 797, Tibet was in control 
of vast portions of central Asia. One historical record of Western Tibet describes 
Trisong Detsen‟s reign thus: “All the countries on the four frontiers were subdued. 
China in the east, India in the south, Baltistan and Gilgit in the west, and Kashgar in 
                                                                                                                                            
yu-hun with whom China was at war in 634 and encamped an army of 200,000 men on the western 
border of China, the Chinese Emperor conceded and gave his daughter away to Song-tsen Gampo 
in marriage. For Details see, Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History of Tibet, p. 26; 
Warren W. Smith, Tibet Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations, pp. 
60-61. 
17 Dawa Norbu writes, “Usually a Tang princess was given in marriage to a barbarian chieftain whose 
fighting power the Chinese could not match. This was called, as we might recall, ho-chin policy, 
which was designed to resolve problems of war and inequality in inter-state relations. By 
establishing kinship ties with a barbarian power, the latter‟s fighting power against China was 
subdued. In so doing, it also resolved one of the major problematics of Confucian inter-state 
relations which insisted on the superiority of the Han state over all other states”. Dawa Norbu, 
China‟s Tibet Policy, p. 37. 
18 In three of the Sino-Tibetan treaties, signed in 732, 783 and 822 A.D., this kinship terminology was 
used frequently, perhaps as a diplomatic phraseology to indicate amicable relations between the two 
nations, which according to Smith “did not imply any political dominance of China over Tibet”. 
Warren W. Smith, Tibetan Nation: A History of Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations, p. 74.  
19 Ibid., p. 74. 
20 S. W. Bushell, „The Early History of Tibet from Chinese Sources‟, Journal of the Royal Asiatic 
Society, Vol. 12, 1880, p. 476. 
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the north were brought under his power”.21 There is no doubt that Trisong Detsen‟s 
rule was one of the defining moments in Tibetan history. Culturally also, his reign was 
one of the most significant and revolutionary periods of the nation because Buddhism 
was adopted as the official State religion of Tibet, the great Indian Buddhist masters 
Padmasambhava, Shantirakshita and Kamalashila were invited to Tibet to propagate 
the religion, the first Buddhist monastery in the land was constructed in Samye, the 
first batch of Tibetan monks were ordained and a group of highly learned scholars and 
translators were produced who translated a huge number of important Buddhist texts 
into Tibetan.  
 
The third great king of Tibet, Tritsug Detsen (ruled 815-838),–also known as 
Ralpachen–was also the last of the Buddhist king to rule whole of Tibet. Ralpachan 
was an extremely devout to Buddhism and following in the footsteps of his 
predecessors he made remarkable and lasting contributions to the cultural flowering 
of Tibet. During his rule, the king undertook an ambitious project of revising and 
standardising the translated Buddhist texts by inviting three Indian pandits, 
Shilendrabodhi, Dhanashila and Jinamitra, who worked with two of Tibet‟s greatest 
translators, Kawa Paltsek and Chogro Lui Gyaltsen. Together these scholars revised 
majority of the Buddhist texts, which had been translated earlier, translated many new 
texts and produced the first Sanskrit-Tibetan lexicon, titled Mahavyupatti.
22
 He also 
invited expert craftsmen from Nepal, China and Chinese Turkestan to build new 
temples. Politically, Tibet under Ralpachen successfully signed a peace treaty with 
China in 822, which was inscribed on three stone pillars; one erected at Gugu Meru to 
demarcate the borders between the two nations, one in Lhasa where it still stands, and 
the third one outside the palace gate of the Chinese Emperor in Ch‟angan.23 The treaty 
“reaffirmed the boundaries established by the 783 treaty of Ch‟ing-shui and restored 
the former relationship of mutual respect and friendship”.24 The stone pillar25 placed 
in front of the Jokhang temple in Lhasa reads as follows: 
 
                                                 
21 Charles Bell, Tibet Past and Present, New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 1992, p. 28. 
22 Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History, p. 49. 
23 Ibid., pp. 49-50. 
24 Ibid., p. 49. 
25 The stone pillar, which stands in front of the Jokhang temple in Lhasa, is a four sided monolith 
pillar with inscriptions detailing the treaty in dual language of Chinese and Tibetan on one side, a 
historical introduction in Tibetan on another, bilingual lists of the names of the personnel who 
witnessed the treaty on the remaining two sides. 
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The Sovereign of Tibet, the Divine King of Miracles, and the great 
King of China, Hwang Te, the Nephew and the Maternal Uncle, have 
agreed to unite their kingdoms…26 
 
Tibet and China shall guard the land and frontier, of which they have 
hitherto held possession. All to the east of the frontier is the country of 
Great China.  All to the west is certainly the country of Great Tibet. 
 
Henceforth there shall be no fighting as between enemies, and neither 
side will carry war into the other‟s country. Should there be any 
suspected person, he can be arrested, questioned, and sent back. Thus 
the great Agreement has been made for uniting the kingdoms, and the 
Nephew and Uncle have become happy. … At Che-shung-shek Chinese 
territory is met; below this China will show respect. At Tsen-shu-hwan 
Tibetan territory is met; above this Tibet will show respect.  
 
The Nephew and Uncle, having become intimate, will respect each 
other according to custom… There shall be no sudden anger and the 
word „enemy „shall not even be mentioned… 
 
This Agreement, that the Tibetans shall be happy in Tibet and the 
Chinese in China and the great kingdoms united, shall never be 
changed. The Three Precious Ones,
27
 the Exalted Ones,
28
 the Sun and 
moon, the Planets and Stars have been invoked to bear witness. Solemn 
words were also uttered. Animals were sacrificed and oaths taken, and 
the Agreement was made. 
 
 
Is this Agreement held to be binding? If this Agreement be violated, 
whether Tibet or China violates it first, that one has committed the sin. 
Whatever revenge is taken in retaliation shall not be considered a 
breach of the Agreement. In this way, the King and Ministers of Tibet 
and China took oath and wrote this inscription of the Agreement in 
detail. The two great Kings fixed their seals. The Ministers, considered 
as holding the Agreement, wrote with their hands. This Agreement shall 
be observed by both sides.
29
 
                                                 
26 The term “unite” here must be understood as uniting the two nations in agreement or treaty. 
27 Refers to the three Buddhist refuge known as the Three Jewels, which are Buddha, Dharma and 
Sangha. 
28 Refers to beings who have achieved the third level of Mahayana path or higher. 
29 Charles Bell, Tibet Past and Present, p. 271. 
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The treaty shows that during the reign of the Tibetan kings, China and Tibet were 
equal; each a separate state with its own territory. The monolithic stone pillar bearing 
the inscriptions of the treaty stands as an enduring evidence of the military might of 
the Tibetan empire and the political dominance it once achieved. Dr. Yihong Pan and 
Prof Christopher Beckwith reached the conclusion that the Tang China was forced to 
abandon its traditional superiority and treat Tibet on an equal basis.
30
 Even semi-
official Communists historians admit, “of course, we do not deny the fact that both the 
Tang and the Tubo (Tibet) were independent states at that time, and the Tang did not 
have official rule over Tubo”.31 The death of Ralpachen at the hands of his ministers 
in 836 and the assassination of Darma, the elder brother of Ralpachen who took the 
throne after the demise of Ralpachen, six years later, heralded the end of long lineage 
of royalty and “the heroic age of the Chosgyal (Religious-Kings)”.32 Following that, 
the unified and strong nation of Tibet fragmented into many principalities. “The 
Tibetans retreated from their Central Asian and South Himalayan empire into their 
mountainous carapace bounded by the Karakoram, the Kuen Lun, and the Himalayan 
ranges; and they never again stuck their heads outside those limits,” and left 
considerable numbers of ethnic Tibetans outside the borders of political Tibet.
33
 The 
subsequent hundred years or so witnessed minimal relations between Tibet and China 
except for trifling border skirmishes every now and then. By then Tibet‟s focus was 
directed toward India and Nepal from where a strong religious and cultural influence 
started to pour into Tibet through which a major spiritual and intellectual renaissance 
came. 
 
1.1.2.2 The Buddhist Revolution in Tibet (842-1247) and the Song Dynasty (960-
1126) 
For the next four hundred years Tibet remained a fragmented state with no central 
authority–a period rife with confusion and internal conflicts, which the Tibetan 
                                                 
30 Yihong Pan, „The Sino-Tibetan Treaties in the Tang Dynasty‟, T‟oung Pao Vol. LXXVIII, 1992, 
pp. 124-5; Christopher I. Beckwith, The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia: A History of the Struggle 
for Great Power Among Tibetans, Turks, Arabs, and Chinese During the Early Middle Ages, 
Princeton, NJ.: University Press, 1987, p.22. 
31 Wang Jiawei & Nyima Gyailcain, The Historical Status of China‟s Tibet, Beijing: China 
International Press, 1997, p. 13. 
32 Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History, p. 53. 
33 Hugh Richardson, Tibet and Its History, p. 33. 
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historians label as “the dark fragmented period” (sil-bur-gyur-ba). This period is 
considered, by many Tibetan Buddhist scholars, as one of Tibet‟s darkest historical 
moments as the Buddhist culture, which developed and flourished so much under the 
patronage of the Tibetan kings, declined in the Central Tibet following Darma‟s 
severe persecution of Buddhist monks and monastics. Thereafter, for almost seventy 
years Buddhism was suppressed in the Central Tibet and the light of Buddhism was 
dimmed to a mere flicker during those dark decades. Yet Buddhism survived in the 
extreme corners of Tibet–Amdo and Kham in the east and Ngari in the west–from 
where the renaissance efforts later emerged. After the collapse of the Yarlung dynasty 
some of the Yarlung lineage dispersed to western parts of Tibet where they 
established small states, specifically in Purang, Guge and Maryul.
34
 The rulers of 
these polities did attempt to maintain and revive the religious and cultural vibrancy of 
Tibet. The traditional account has it that Tsana Yeshe Gyaltsen, a descendant of O-
sung, sponsored and sent ten promising young men to Amdo for religious training, 
who received ordination as monks and returned back to Samye after years of training 
to revive Buddhism in Central Tibet.
35
 In Ngari, a western region in Tibet, Tsenpo 
Khore, another descendent of the Tibetan kings and the throne holder of the region, 
built Toling monastery, sent twenty one lads to Kashmir to study Buddhism from 
which two became renowned translators who left indelible marks in the Tibetan 
literary fields with their translation efforts. Later, he himself became a monk and took 
the name of Lha Lama Yeshe Od. It was his great-nephew, Changchub Od, who 
brought Atisha to Tibet in 1042 and the religious restoration truly flourished in 
Tibet.
36
 The fall of Yarlung dynasty in Tibet was followed by a decline and toppling 
of Tang dynasty in China in 907, which eventually led to fragmentation of China, 
particularly along the peripheral border regions where small states emerged as 
independent entities. Tibet and China, in their states of disintegration, remained 
incommunicado as far as governmental exchanges were concerned for the next three 
hundred years. Inside Tibet, some of the Yarlung lineage had dispersed to western 
parts of Tibet where they established small states, specifically in Purang, Guge and 
Maryul.
37
 
 
                                                 
34 Giuseppe Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls, Rome: La Libreria dello Stato, 1949, p. 3. 
35 Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History, p. 55. 
36 Ibid., p. 56. 
37 Giuseppe Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls, p. 3. 
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1.1.2.3 The Sakya Lamas of Tibet (1244-1358) and the Mongol Empire (1207-
1368) 
At the beginning of the 13th century, the Mongol soldiers under the command of 
Genghis Khan were on their way to capture and conquer the Tangut state, which was 
located in the present-day Kansu and Qinghai provinces of China. Fearing that the 
Mongol invasion would reach Tibet, the leading nobles and abbots of Central Tibet 
despatched a delegation to the Mongol leader with an offer of submission in 1207. 
Genghis Khan accepted the offer, which came with a promise of huge payment of 
tribute, and did not send his troops to Tibet. However, the Tibetans stopped sending 
the tribute after the death of Genghis Khan who died in 1227 and thus invited the 
wrath of his grandson, Godan Khan, who in 1240, sent troops under Dorta
38
 against 
Tibet that resulted in the death of some five hundred monks and civilians and the 
destructions of Reting and Gyal Lhakhang monastery.
39
 This invasion did not last long 
as Dorta and his troop withdrew from Tibet the next year in 1241. Several years later, 
in 1247, the renowned Buddhist master Kunga Gyaltsen travelled to Lanchou to meet 
with Godan Khan, the encounter of which heralded the beginning of a special 
relationship between the Mongol leaders and the Tibetan Buddhist masters. Kunga 
Gyaltsen, commonly known as Sakya Pandit, became a spiritual teacher of the 
Mongol prince and his subject, while the prince vested in him temporal authority over 
thirteen myriarchies of Central Tibet, probably as a ploy to win Tibet‟s submission. 
Later, Phagpa, one of the two nephews of Kunga Gyaltsen who accompanied him on 
his trip to Godan Khan‟s camp, became the religious teacher of Kublai Khan and 
conferred upon the Mongol prince numerous religious instructions and initiations into 
rites of Buddhism. The Mongols conferred upon Phagpa temporal authority over all of 
U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo, the three regions of Tibet collectively identified as Chol-
kha-sum, and in 1260, Kublai Khan appointed Phagpa as “National Preceptor” (kuo-
shi). The relation between the Mongol Khan and the Tibetan lama came to be known 
popularly as chö-yön or “patron-priest” relation.  
 
The Mongol Khan ruled Tibet indirectly as a special domain of lamas and Buddhism 
and the Sakya Lamas relied on the Mongol (Yuan) military support to rule Tibet. The 
                                                 
38 Shakabpa mentioned that thirty thousand troops were sent to Tibet but it was not mentioned in other 
sources. Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History, p. 61. 
39 Ibid., p. 61. 
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chö-yön relationship model was employed by many subsequent Tibetan noble families 
and Tibetan lamas in maintaining relation with the Mongol powers and later with the 
Manchu emperors. The success of such relationship depended on two essential 
factors: provision of military protection and support by the Patron to the Lama in 
maintaining control over the Lama‟s jurisdiction, and the bestowal of the Lama‟s 
religious guidance, instructions, blessings and spiritual nourishment to the Patron, his 
family and his ministers, and the common subjects. The Mongols were instrumental in 
establishing the Buddhist ecclesiastical system as the dominant political authority in 
Tibet. 
 
The waning of Sakya Lama‟s rule in Tibet corresponded with the decline of Mongol 
Yuan dynasty in China following Kublai Khan‟s death in 1295. The Sakya rulers 
continued to hold on to the power and ruled Central Tibet for another fifty or so years, 
but amidst internal schism caused by the four sons of Sakya ruler Danyi Zangpo Pal 
(1262-1322). In 1350, Changchub Gyaltsen (1302-64), a powerful myriarch, seized 
control over the province of U in Central Tibet, which not only marked the beginning 
of the end of Sakya power in Central Tibet but more importantly Tibet‟s gaining of 
independence from the Mongols. To the east, China won her independence in 1368 
under the leadership of Chu Yuan-chang–the establisher of the native Ming dynasty. 
 
1.1.2.4 The Post-Sakya Tibet (1337-1565) and the Ming China (1368-1644)  
Established in 1368 by Chu Yuan-chang (1328-1398), the Ming dynasty became the 
first native Chinese rulers to rule over China since the Tang period (618-756). The 
period is described as “one of the great eras of orderly government and social stability 
in human history,” during which peace reigned for about 276 years.40 By studying the 
model of Tang domestic and diplomatic policy the Ming fashioned a comparatively 
stable government based largely on Confucian principles. According to research done 
by Elliot Sperling, the early Ming emperors adopted the Yuan policy as the most 
suitable method of dealing with Tibet.41 Communist historians, Wang Jiawei and 
Nyima Gyailcain, also averred that “the Ming Dynasty basically followed the system 
                                                 
40 John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: Tradition and 
Transformation, London: Allen and Unwin, 1973, p.177. 
41 Eillot Sperling, Early Ming Policy Toward Tibet, Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1983, p. 38 
as quoted in Warren W. Smith, Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan 
Relations, pp. 101-108. 
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introduced by the Yuan Dynasty in exercising rule over the Tibetan areas”42 of Amdo 
and Kham regions since no Ming influence in the U-Tsang and Ngari existed at that 
time. The Ming emperors never claimed authority in Tibet and were content with the 
superficial aspects of that relationship, particularly relating to the Inner Tibet 
comprising of Kham and Amdo regions. With the Mongols still posing the greatest 
threat to the early Ming Kingdom, the Ming leaders were keen on avoiding any extra 
threat coming from Tibet, especially in the form of Tibet-Mongol alliance, which 
could spell doom for the newly formed dynasty. Therefore, the Ming did not entertain 
any real interest in Tibet beyond maintaining China‟s tribute relations with Tibet and 
other tributary states, which could explain why the Ming dynasty “refrained from 
sending troops to subdue Tibet or from garrisoning troops in Tibet”43 when the Central 
Tibet was in turmoil for almost 130 years. Fairbank writes: 
 
Upon gaining the throne, Hung-wu immediately tried to re-establish the grand design 
of the Chinese state in his foreign relations as well as at home. He sent envoys to the 
peripheral states, Korea, Japan, Annam (Vietnam), Champa, Tibet, and others, 
announcing his accession. Tribute missions soon came from these states and from 
others to which Mongol expeditions had been sent almost a century earlier, on the 
established routes of China‟s overseas trade.44 
 
The political climate in the post-Sakya period was rife with widespread instability and 
incessant power struggles among the ambitious feudal units who sought the backing 
of different Buddhist sects by patronising them. Ambitious myriarchies, such as 
Nedong, Yazang, Thangpoche and Yadrok rushed to grasp the political power and fill 
the void left by the collapse of the Sakya government. This constant power conflict 
and sectarian strife lasted for over 150 years until Changchub Gyaltsen consolidated 
the entire U-Tsang and Ngari under his rule and established himself as the overall 
ruler of Tibet in 1350. He revived, to some extent, the glories of the early Tibetan 
warrior kings in cultural and religious spheres, devised new criminal rules, issued a 
book of instructions on tax collecting, border defence, epidemic control and instituted 
major changes in administrative divisions of the State. Although there aren‟t clear 
                                                 
42 Wang Jiawei and Nyima Gyailcain, The Historical Status of China‟s Tibet, Beijing: China 
Intercontinental Press, 1997, p. 33. 
43 Ibid., p. 33. 
44 John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: Tradition and 
Transformation, Rev. Edition, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989, p.195. 
 13 
historical records of the extensiveness of Changchub Gyaltsen‟s rule, Tibet scholar 
Richardson claims that all of Tibet was under Changchub Gyaltsen‟s control,45 so too 
did historian Shakabpa.46 However, Communist historians ignore Changchub 
Gyaltsen–and three successive nationalistic regimes who ruled over Tibet–describing 
him as “one of the 13 wanhu (10,000 households) officials who were given their 
official position during the Yuan Dynasty”.47  
 
There is very little historical evidence of Tibet becoming a part of the Ming dynasty. 
Contrarily, Tibet‟s three nationalist regimes of Phamo-drupa (1358-1434), Rinpung 
and Dewa Tsangpa, refused to visit the Ming court to receive titles bestowed to them 
or send tribute missions. A map of Chinese empire from 1654, drawn by Wang Fen, a 
Chinese legal officer in the Ming court, clearly shows all the names and sizes of 
Chinese provinces but does not include any region of Tibet, “not even the easternmost 
regions of Amdo”.48 Shakabpa argues that the Chinese allegation that the Ming 
Dynasty inherited claim over Tibet from the Mongol predecessors was invalid and 
historically baseless. Chronologically, he writes, the Mongols gained control over 
Tibet prior to their conquest of China and Tibet gained independence from the Khans 
before China won hers.
49
 In short Ming court seems to have considered Tibet as one 
of its tributary states, like Japan, Korea and Vietnam, but not a territorial part of the 
Ming Middle Kingdom. 
 
1.1.2.5. The Gelugpa‟s Rule (1642-1950) and the Manchu Empire (1662-1912) 
The Gelugpa‟s rule over Tibet followed a long period of political chaos and acute 
power struggle between the burgeoning Gelugpa forces and Kargyupa power. 
Consequent series of conflicts between predominantly Gelugpa territory of U and 
Kargyupa dominated Tsang, to establish a sectarian hegemony, lasted from 1537-
1642, for over 100 years. In 1639, Gushri Khan, a devout believer and staunch 
supporter of the Dalai Lamas and the Gelugpa sect, marched his troops against the 
                                                 
45 Hugh Richardson, Tibet and Its History, p.35.  
46 Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History, p.81. 
47 Wang Jaiwei and Nyima Gyailcain, The Historical Status of China‟s Tibet, p.41. 
48 The Mongols and Tibet, Dharamsala: Department of Information and International Relations (DIIR), 
1996, p.26. Professor Fairbank notes that China under “the Ming was divided into 15 provinces” 
administratively, whose names and sizes are depicted on China‟s map of the period reproduced in 
his book (p. 186), but does not appear to include Tibet. John K. Fairbank, Edwin O.Reischauer and 
Albert M. Craig, East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, 1989, p.185. 
49 Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History, p. 73. 
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chief of Beri at the behest of Sonam Chospel, the Fifth Dalai Lama‟s chief attendant. 
The chief of Beri was a supporter of Bon religion, who was colluding with the Tsang 
rulers to upend the Gelug influence in the Central Tibet. Gushri Khan‟s military 
campaign in the eastern parts of Tibet was successful and it brought all of Kham 
under his control by the end of 1640. Instead of returning back to his territory in 
Kokonor region after the military expedition, the leader of the Qoshot Mongols 
brought his troops to Central Tibet to fight against the Tsang ruler. With the backing 
from Gushri Khan‟s military force, U openly entered into the war with the Tsang and 
captured both Shigatse, the Tsang capital, and Karmapa monastery. Thus was the 
external opposition to the Gelugpa power eliminated and 308 years of Gelugpa 
hegemony with the Dalai Lama as the supreme head heralded. The Fifth Dalai Lama, 
Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso, was led in state and enthroned in the main hall of Shigatse 
as both the spiritual and temporal leader of Tibet. After a span of more than eight 
hundred years Tibet was once again unified under a single ruler. Not only the central 
regions of U, Tsang and Ngari but also Kham was integrated into the Tibetan polity 
and governed by representatives of Gaden Phodrang.
50
 Yet the time remained 
tumultuous and internecine conflicts continued to pest the land in the form of revolts 
from Tsangpa and Karmapa supporters. Moreover, Amdo eluded Gaden Phodrang‟s 
rule as Gushri Khan wanted to cling to it because of its proximity to Kokonor region, 
where Gushri Khan had his power base, and this created the political precedent for 
later separation of Amdo from Central Tibet.  
 
To the east the Manchus had overthrown the declining Ming power by 1644 and had 
established the Qing Dynasty. The Fifth Dalai Lama continued to maintain a close 
relationship with the Mongol warriors whose military protection Gaden Phodrang still 
needed but he also established relations with the Manchu Emperors.
51
 The Shun-chih 
Emperor of China despatched several envoys to Lhasa between 1649 and 1651 
bearing invitation from the Emperor for the Fifth Dalai Lama to visit Peking. The 
Fifth Dalai Lama responded by making a long and arduous journey to Peking in 1653 
and re-established the Chö-yön (patron-priest) relationship that had existed with the 
Mongol Yuan rulers. The description of the encounters between the Fifth Dalai Lama 
                                                 
50 Gaden Phodrang is the name of the Dalai Lama‟s institute, which was set up during the Fifth Dalai 
Lama. 
51 Manchu were descendants of Jurchen tribes conquered by the Mongols in 1234, who inhabited the 
territories that still retain their name, Manchuria. 
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and the Chinese Emperor were recorded in great detail by the Dalai Lama himself in 
his autobiography.
52
 For instance the Fifth Dalai Lama writes that “the Emperor sat on 
top of a wooden stool, which was on top of the Throne, which was as high as a man‟s 
waist. I sat on a seat, which was a little lower than the Emperor‟s Throne and which 
was situated not far from one whole fathom‟s length from the Emperor‟s Throne”.53 
Moreover, when tea was served the Emperor asked the Fifth Dalai Lama to drink first 
but the Dalai Lama deferred stating that it was not proper and so the two drank at the 
same time.
54
 These subtle conventions in the meeting protocol exhibit the “hierarchy 
of authority relations” according to Dawa Norbu, who characterised the relation 
between the two rulers as “symbolically, subtly and delicately „near equal‟”.55 Yet the 
Dalai Lama did not perform kowtow, the usual protocol for any foreign dignitary 
receiving an audience with the Emperor, when he met the Manchu Emperor and sat 
on a higher throne than the Emperor during religious functions. The Fifth Dalai Lama 
writes: 
 
From this spot, when I had covered the distance covered by 4 arrow-lengths, I 
dismounted form my horse. The Emperor descended from his throne and advanced 
for a distance of 10 fathoms (gzu-dom). He seized my hand with his hand. An 
interpreter was installed, and he (the Emperor) enquired after my health.
56
 
 
Dawa Norbu presents the Dalai Lama-Manchu Emperor relation from the Tibetan 
perspective as a continuation of the same relationships that Tibet‟s rulers enjoyed with 
the Mongol Khans–from “Khubilai Khan to Altan Khan, from Altan to Gushri, from 
Gushri to Manchu Emperor”–which assumed a primary religious nature of Chö-yön.57  
 
The Fifth Dalai Lama, known to his people as the Great Fifth, was highly successful 
                                                 
52 Considered as one of the most popular historical works in Tibetan, the Fifth Dalai Lama‟s 
autobiography, titled dpyid-kyi rgyal-mo‟i glu-dbyangs or „The Songs of the Queen of Spring‟, is a 
historical account that emphasises the history of Tibet‟s political leaders. A complete English 
translation of the book, by Zahiruddin Ahmad, was published as A History of Tibet by Indiana 
University Oriental Series no. 7, Bloomington, 1995, and partial translations could be read in G. 
Tucci‟s Tibetan Painted Scrolls, Vol. 2, Rome, 1949, pp. 625-651. Kristina Lange‟s „Einige 
Bemerkungen zur Chronik des Fünften Dalai-Lama als Literaturdenkmal‟, Acta Orientalia 
Hungarica, vol. 41, no. 2, 1987, pp. 277-300. 
53 Zahiruddin Ahmad, Sino-Tibetan Relations in the Seventeenth Century, Roma: Instituto Italiano per 
il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1970, p. 176 
54 Ibid., p. 176. 
55 Dawa Norbu, China‟s Tibet Policy, p. 74. 
56 Zahiruddin Ahmad, Sino-Tibetan Relations in the Seventeenth Century, pp. 175-176. 
57 Dawa Norbu, China‟s Tibet Policy, p. 75. 
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in unifying Tibet, which prior to his ascension to power was ridden with tumultuous 
struggles among different religious sects, powerful regional chiefs and ruling families. 
No doubt he had the backings of the Mongols but his organisational skills and 
leadership quality, erudition and political acumen, skill in foreign affairs and his 
ability to command the devotion of his people all contributed to his success as the 
political and religious leader of the entire Tibetan nation. He was also a very versatile 
and prolific writer and produced works on such diverse subjects as history, poetry, 
Buddhist philosophy, logic, esoteric tantra and even a manual for governing a nation. 
The Great Fifth passed away in 1682 while the construction of the Potala palace, a 
monument which still stands majestically in Lhasa, was still underway and his passing 
away “set in train a series of events which finally brought about Chinese intervention 
in Tibet”.58 
 
The Desi (Regent) of Tibet at the time of the Dalai Lama‟s death was Sangye Gyatso–
a highly educated man who was adept at handling administrative works–who was 
appointed as the Regent of Tibet at the age of twenty seven by the Great Fifth himself. 
Sangye Gyatso kept secret the demise of the Dalai Lama for fifteen years and carried 
out the administrative functions of running the country and continued building the 
Potala. Within a few years of the Dalai Lama‟s death, the Sixth Dalai Lama 
Tsangyang Gyatso was discovered in Mon area, and by 1688 the young boy was 
brought surreptitiously to Nankartse where he was trained and educated. In 1697, at 
the age of fifteen Tsangyang Gyatso was enthroned in the newly constructed Potala 
Palace. The young Dalai Lama‟s radically different behaviour from his predecessors 
was a great cause for concern and caused much consternation to the Desi, who in his 
desire to keep the young Tsangyang Gyatso on spiritual path employed various 
devious means including violence which resulted in the death of one person. Growing 
estrangement with the Sixth Dalai Lama, pressure from the Mongol chiefs, 
particularly Lhasang Khan–the grandson of Gushri Khan and the leader of the Qoshot 
Mongols–who was severely critical of the Desi‟s governance, and other factors 
compelled Sangye Gyatso to resign from the Regency in 1703. However, he remained 
behind the scene and continued to bear immense control over the administration of the 
country until his death at the hands of Lhasang Khan‟s men two years later. Lhasang 
                                                 
58 Hugh Richardson, Tibet and Its History, p. 46. 
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Khan then assumed full political control of Central Tibet and stationed his army in 
Lhasa. Before long the Qoshot chief grew very critical of the Sixth Dalai Lama‟s 
behaviour and eventually put him under arrest and exiled him to the Kokonor region 
where Tsangyang Gyatso passed away under mysterious circumstances. The news of 
the Dalai Lama‟s arrest and demise generated an intense amount of resentment against 
Lhasang Khan among not only the Tibetans but also among the Dzungars and the 
Mongols of the Kokonor. To add more fuel to the burning fire of anger Lhasang Khan 
declared that Tsangyang Gyatso was not the true reincarnation of the Fifth Dalai Lama 
and appointed a monk as the Dalai Lama. 
  
In 1717, the Dzungars invaded Tibet on the pretext of removing Lhasang Khan from 
the power and put an end to his rule over Tibet. Militarily, the Dzungar expedition 
was very successful as they finished Lhasang Khan and captured the holy city of 
Lhasa. This new development was perceived by the Qing court as fraught with great 
danger for the Qing power and having potential for “a successful founding of a 
Mongol Empire including Tibet under a common religion–a fear that had long 
haunted him”.59 The Emperor sent military expedition to Tibet consisting of several 
thousand men–the first military adventure of the Qing army into Tibet–in 1718 and 
was obliterated by the Dzungar force at the Kalawusu River. However, a second 
despatch of larger force consisting of two armies under the command of the 
Emperor‟s fourteenth son and a third army to attack the rear of the enemy succeeded 
in expelling the Dzungar out of Lhasa
60
 and thus provided the Qing Emperor K‟ang 
Hsi a significant foothold in Lhasa, which became “the foundation of nearly two 
centuries of Manchu overlordship of Tibet”.61  
 
The Manchu army brought the Seventh Dalai Lama with them and installed him at the 
Potala palace in 1720 and since then, until the end of the Qing Dynasty in 1912, it 
maintained a military presence in Tibet. The Manchus instituted major changes in the 
political structure of the Tibetan government such as removing the indigenous civil 
government that had existed in Lhasa and replacing the office of Desi by Kashag, a 
council of ministers. The council governed Tibet under the supervision of the Chinese 
                                                 
59 Tieh-tseng Li, The Historical Status of Tibet, New York: King‟s Crown Press, 1956, p. 39. 
60 Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
61 Hugh Richardson, Tibet and Its History, p. 50. 
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garrison commander stationed in Lhasa, who frequently interfered with the Kashag‟s 
decisions, especially those concerning Chinese interests.62 When the K‟ang Hsi 
Emperor died in 1722 his son, Yung-cheng, succeeded him to the throne. In a policy 
of retrenchment the new Manchu ruler withdrew the Manchu military garrison from 
Lhasa in 1723 and for several years Manchu military presence was not felt. However, 
civil war broke among the Tibetan council ministers and on the pretext of protecting 
the Dalai Lama and stopping the civil war the Yung-cheng Emperor despatched a 
large imperial army under the command of two Manchus, Jalangga and Mailu. This 
return of the Manchu military presence in 1728 and establishment of Imperial 
Residents called Ambans63 in Lhasa and Shigatse signalled the beginning of a long 
Manchu presence in Tibet, which actually lasted for 184 years until 1912 when the 
last Ambans were expelled from Tibet during the Thirteenth Dalai Lama‟s rule.  
 
The nature of the Qing relationship with Tibet remained one between two states, or an 
empire and a semi-independent peripheral state but not in the nature of a central 
government and an outlying part of that same state. The Qing dynasty, like the 
previous conquest dynasty, the Yuan, distinguished Inner Asia from China in both 
political status and administrative divisions. China, the “interior empire” for the Qing, 
was regarded as a subjugated state; Inner Asian tribes and states, or the “exterior 
empire,” were treated as dependent allies during the early Qing Dynasty. Tibet‟s 
inaccessibility and the difficulties involved in imposing direct administration control 
contributed to the Qing preference to maintain Tibet‟s semi-autonomous status within 
the empire. The eventual complete assimilation of the Manchus with the Han Chinese 
resulted in the former losing its ethnic identity and language. Tibet, which was 
indirectly ruled by the Manchus for many years, came to be regarded as a protectorate 
of China and ultimately as Chinese territory. Additionally, the Qing‟s administrative 
divisions of Tibet into several distinct regions separated Kham and Amdo from the 
ethnographic Tibet and created two politically and conceptually separate regions that 
were no longer part of what the Chinese thought of as “Tibet”. Despite later Chinese 
claims, Tibet did not become an “integral part of China” during the Qing Dynasty 
even though it remained a dependent state of the Qing Empire for more than a 
                                                 
62 Luciano Petech, China and Tibet in the Early XVIIIth Century: History of the establishment of 
Chinese Protectorate in Tibet, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972, p.78. 
63 Ibid., pp.255-7. Ambans were conventionally described as the permanent imperial representatives of 
the Manchu Emperors in Lhasa since 1728. 
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hundred years. The fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1912 which led to the transformation 
of the Qing Empire into Chinese Republic does not necessitate Tibet becoming a part 
of China. 
 
1.1.2.6 Tibet in the Twentieth Century 
All the Dalai Lamas from the eighth to the twelfth had very short lives, with the 
exception of the Eighth Dalai Lama who lived for forty six years.
64
 However, the 
tumultuous time that started during the Sixth Dalai Lama continued throughout the 
life time of the Seventh and persisted right up to the last days of the Eighth Dalai 
Lama. It was further exacerbated by the Gurkha invasions of Tibet in 1788 and again 
in 1791. After the Eighth Dalai Lama the ruling of Tibet rested entirely in the hands of 
the succeeding Regents for the next ninety years mainly because of the early demise 
of the next four Dalai Lamas. With the coming of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama (1876-
1933) to power all of that changed and Tibet once again was ruled by a strong leader 
of the Great Fifth‟s calibre. Born in 1876 in Thakpo Langdun in Southeast Tibet, the 
new Dalai Lama was recognised as the unmistaken reincarnation of the Twelfth at the 
age of two. Although the Manchu Emperor had ordered, in 1792, that the succeeding 
Dalai Lamas and Panchen Lamas must be selected through the golden urn process,
65
 
the Regent and the Tibetan ministers used only the traditional methods without 
employing the golden urn system in choosing the Thirteenth Dalai Lama.66 He 
                                                 
64 Jampal Gyatso, the Eighth Dalai Lama (1758-1804), lived for forty six years but did not assume full 
temporal power of the nation as his Regent continued to govern the country in his stead at the 
request of the Dalai Lama himself. The Ninth Dalai Lama, Lungtok Gyatso (1805-1815), lived for 
only ten years and Tsultrim Gyatso, the Tenth incarnation (1816-1837), passed away at the age of 
twenty. The subsequent two Dalai Lamas, Khedup Gyatso (1838-1855) and Trinley Gyatso (1856-
1875), also had early death at the age of eighteen and nineteen respectively. Inder L. Malik, Dalai 
Lamas of Tibet: Succession of Births, New Delhi: Uppal Publishing House, 1984, pp. 39-42. 
65 After the second Gurkha invasion, the Emperor Ch‟ien-lung initiated several changes in Tibet 
among which the main ones were: 1) The Manchu Residents in Tibet were given the same rank as 
the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, 2) The Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama‟s direct access to 
the Emperor was curtailed and instead were made to approach the Emperor through the Residents, 
3) The succeeding Dalai Lamas and Panchen Lamas were to be chosen by the drawing of lots if 
there were more than one claimant. For the third purpose a golden urn was made and sent to Lhasa, 
which will be used in drawing the lot. Tieh-tseng Li, The Historical Status of Tibet, pp. 53-58. 
66 There were several different accounts about the process of selecting the Thirteenth Dalai Lama. 
Tieh-tseng Li writes that in the case of the Thirteenth Dalai the drawing of lots was suspended since 
there was only one claimant. Li, The Historical Status of Tibet, p. 58. However, according to 
Rockhill the child from Thakpo was selected as the new Dalai Lama from the three claimants based 
on lottery process. W. W. Rockhill, „Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and their Relations with Manchu 
Emperors of China: 1644-1908‟, T‟oung Pao, XI, 1910, p. 71. Shakabpa on the other hand writes 
that although there were three claimants the small boy from Thakpo was unanimously selected after 
many religious tests and hence the lottery was done away with. (Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A 
Political History, p. 192) 
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assumed temporal power in 1895, at the age of nineteen, and became the first Dalai 
Lama who wielded all the power and actually ruled Tibet since the Great Fifth some 
two hundred years earlier.67 Meanwhile, in China the Qing Dynasty had been 
weakening because of foreign imperialists‟ designs on China and the growing Han 
nationalism against Manchu‟s rule. The Chinese suffered a major defeat in the First 
Anglo-Chinese War–commonly known as the First Opium War–of 1840 with the 
consequence of cession of Hong Kong and war indemnity of twenty one million 
dollars but more inimical was the loss of prestige that the Manchu regime suffered. 
The Qing Dynasty‟s authority continued to decline and by the time Thupten Gyatso 
assumed full control over Tibet, China was reeling under foreign domination, having 
recently suffered a great defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War, which further 
accelerated the fall of the Qing and enfeeble its influence in Tibet. Thus, the Manchus 
could not exercise its power in Tibet at the time of the Dalai Lama‟s ascension to 
power. 
 
Geopolitically speaking, the Great Game was already being played between Great 
Britain, Russia and to some extent China to expand their sphere of influence in Inner 
Asia and Tibet–a backdoor to India–became the object of international interest. By the 
end of the nineteenth century, Russia‟s Drang nach Osten appeared to the world at 
large and specifically to England to be “one of those world-forces which nothing can 
deflect, nothing sublimate, nothing mollify”.68 The Russian‟s swift advance to the 
east, Tibet‟s ambiguous borders with India and China‟s weakening hold over Tibet, 
which was causing the Tibetans to disregard the Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890 
between Britain and China and the Trade Regulations signed between the two 
countries, were some of the “tactical considerations which obliged the Government of 
India...to do something about Tibet”.69 The British Government of India (GOI), on 
numerous occasions, attempted to enter into negotiations and seek trade privileges 
with the Tibetan authorities who steadfastly avoided any dealings with the British. 
However, prompted by deep fear of losing independence and generally suspicious of 
                                                 
67 The Seventh and Eight Dalai Lamas, had reached maturity and had assumed temporal power, but 
none since the Great Fifth had effectively exercised that power. Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of 
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foreigners the Tibetan officials refused to entertain any discussions with the British. 
Taking advantage of Tibet‟s rather unique situation the Tibetan authorities used a two-
way excuse in avoiding having any direct contacts with the British. The direct 
approaches by the British were discouraged by the Tibetan officials stating that the 
British would require imperial authority to establish relation with Tibet and indirect 
approaches through Chinese Residents were disregarded as invalid. In a 
correspondence to the Secretary of State the Government of India in the Foreign 
Department writes, “We seem...in respect of our policy towards Tibet, to be moving in 
a vicious circle. If we apply to Tibet, we either receive no reply, or are referred to the 
Chinese Resident. If we apply to the latter, he excuses his failure by his inability to 
put any pressure upon Tibet. As a policy this appears to us both unproductive and 
inglorious”.70 The initial trade interests displayed by the British Government of India, 
however, gradually turned into a strategic and political pursuit by 1900, a year in 
which it became clear to the British that the Dalai Lama was establishing contact with 
the Russians. The following year, in June 1901, a mission of eight prominent Tibetan 
statesmen headed by Dorjieff reached St. Petersburg and had audience of the Russian 
Emperor and Empress. The Russian newspaper Novoe Vremya interprets this 
“rapprochement” step as a natural one for the Dalai Lama, “as Russia is the only 
Power able to counteract the intrigues of Great Britain, who has so long been 
endeavouring to obtain admission to Tibet, and only awaits an opportunity to force an 
entrance”.71 In the subsequent year, a rumour floated about a secret treaty between 
China and Russia over Tibet, in which China would relinquish her interest in Tibet to 
Russia in return for Russia‟s support for the Chinese Empire, Russia would extend her 
support as soon as her interests in Tibet have been secured and would despatch 
officers in Tibet and control Tibetan affairs.
72
 The rumours and China Times report 
about a story detailing the clauses of the agreement, created a thick cloud of suspicion 
in the hearts and minds of the British authorities despite being emphatically denied by 
both the Russians and the Chinese. 
 
Under such circumstances the British deemed it necessary to establish a formal 
relation with Tibet and in 1904, a British trade expedition was sent to Tibet under the 
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command of Colonel Francis Younghusband.
73
 The Tibetan resistance was easily 
defeated by the better equipped British soldiers and the troops entered Lhasa, where 
the British concluded a treaty with Tibetan representatives at the exclusion of the 
Amban who admitted to Younghusband that he was powerless to forge any 
negotiation on behalf of the Tibetans.74 The 1904-British expedition to Tibet ended the 
country‟s policy of intentional isolation and exposed the tenuousness of China‟s claim 
of their authority over Tibet. It also provoked the Thirteenth Dalai Lama to leave 
Lhasa for Urga and from there to Peking and an inevitable Chinese attempt to recover 
its position. In her weakened position China was willing to recognise some, if not all, 
of the provisions of the Lhasa convention, but was intent on denying Tibet‟s right to 
conclude international agreements. Britain‟s continued recognition of Chinese 
suzerainty over Tibet gave China a right to participate in any treaty that Tibet signed 
with Britain.75 In an effort to persuade China to cooperate and accept the 1904 treaty, 
Britain entered into negotiation with China. Adhesion Treaty between Britain and 
China was, thus, signed in 1906 in which China agreed to pay the indemnity 
obligations of Tibet set down in the Lhasa Convention and to convert what had been 
an agreement between Britain and Tibet into one between Britain and China. The gist 
of the Adhesion Treaty was that China would pay the war indemnity and allow Britain 
commercial rights in Tibet, and that Britain would agree not to interfere in China‟s 
administration of Tibet if China excluded all foreign powers from Tibet. The treaty 
implicitly recognised Chinese suzerainty over Tibet by considering China not a 
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“foreign power” in relation to Tibet.76 The Lhasa Convention established the right of 
the Tibetans to conclude treaty with other foreign country and, therefore, theoretically 
forms a legal basis for international recognition of Tibet as an independent State. But 
the 1906-Peking agreement relegated Tibetan affairs as concerns of China and 
allowed the Chinese to view the Adhesion Treaty not as recognition of the Lhasa 
Convention of 1904 but rather as a repudiation of it and hence recognition of China‟s 
“traditional authority” in Tibet.77 Moreover, treaties between Britain and Russia, 
signed in 1906 and 1907,78 not only prevented Russian interference in Tibet but also 
introduced the concept of Chinese “suzerainty” over Tibet. Bolstered by international 
recognitions of its right in Tibet, however loosely defined,79 China began to take steps 
to reassert its authority.  
 
During the Dalai Lama‟s absence from Lhasa, China sent a large expeditionary force 
into Eastern Tibet with the objective of converting that part of Tibet into Chinese 
territory. The exiled Dalai Lama did not have alternative but to mend his relations 
with Peking and he accepted a lowering of his status in favour of the Amban and was 
allowed to return to his seat in 1909. Mistrustful of him, however, the Chinese sent in 
troops which reached Lhasa in 1910 and the Dalai Lama once again fled Lhasa and 
this time to India. Although the Chinese troops gave chase to capture the Dalai Lama, 
he was able to escape to India protected by small bands of Tibetan armies. This 
unprecedented invasion by the Manchu troops was a turning point in relations 
between Tibet and China. Previous imperial military expeditions had come to assist 
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the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan Government at their invitation. However, this time, the 
Manchu Emperor attempted to establish his authority in Tibet by force and remove the 
increasing British influence in Tibet. Yet this strategy turned out to be an abortive 
political manoeuvre because the Qing Dynasty collapsed soon after in 1911 and the 
Chinese Residents and his garrisons were forced to depart Tibet eventually after 
plenitude of skirmishes and fights between the Chinese troops and the Tibetan 
resistance forces. The Dalai Lama left Kalimpong in 1912, where he was residing 
during his exile, but arrived in Lhasa only in early the next year. In the meantime, 
Yuan Shih-kai, the new President of the Chinese Republic, in a telegraph message, 
apologised to the Dalai Lama for the excesses of the Chinese troops and stated that 
the Dalai Lama‟s title would be restored. To that the Dalai Lama replied that “he was 
not asking the Chinese Government for any rank, as he intended to exercise both 
temporal and ecclesiastical rule in Tibet. Thus the god-king made clear his declaration 
of Tibetan independence”.80 Mongolia also proclaimed its independence from China 
in 1912 and a year later Mongolia and Tibet signed a treaty recognising each other‟s 
independence.81 A report compiled by International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) states, 
“Tibet‟s position on the expulsion of the Chinese in 1912 can fairly be described as 
one of the de facto independence and there are … strong legal grounds for thinking 
that any form of legal subservience to China had vanished. It is therefore submitted 
that the events of 1911-12 mark the re-emergence of Tibet as a fully sovereign state, 
independent in fact and law of Chinese control”.82 
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1.1.2.7 Simla Convention 
Britain in the meantime realised the importance of Tibet as a buffer region between 
India and the external powers in the north. An ideal situation would be an independent 
Tibet that stands between the British India and Russia and China; however, Britain 
was not ready to support a completely independent Tibet, which if left to their own 
device, the British feared, might attempt to bolster its relation with Russia and thus 
bring the burgeoning power of Russia even closer to Indian frontiers. Moreover, such 
political manoeuvre would have drastic impact of damaging the relation between 
Britain and China. What the British sought was a way to limit Chinese influence in 
Tibet without hampering the British commercial interests in China; what they 
proposed was an autonomous Tibet under Chinese suzerainty, with the division of 
Tibet into two political entities of Outer and Inner Tibet with the Inner zone under the 
sovereignty of China and the Outer zone as autonomous. The Simla Convention of 
1913-14 could be considered as the culmination of several British attempts to settle 
the vexing Tibet question and define Tibet‟s border with China and India so as to 
secure a more stable northern frontier. The tripartite conference, convened in October 
1913 in Simla, saw Tibet, China and Britain sitting together to draw the borders of 
Tibet and decide the fate of the mountainous nation. Both China and Tibet presented 
their positions with historical supports and evidences–Tibet declaring itself as an 
independent state and China claiming overall sovereignty over Tibet. The convention 
accepts among other things the suzerainty of China over Tibet and makes a clear 
distinction between Inner and Outer Tibet, with the former under Chinese control and 
the later having autonomy. It also accepts to abstain from interfering in the 
administration of Outer Tibet, including the choosing and installation of the Dalai 
Lama, which shall remain in the hands of the Tibetan Government. Moreover, the 
Government of China shall not engage in activities to convert Tibet into a Chinese 
province. After more than eight months of deliberations, discussions and debates the 
three parties signed the Simla Treaty on 3 July 1914. The Chinese plenipotentiaries 
initialed the document but refused to ratify it on the grounds that the border provisions 
laid down were not acceptable. Only Britain and Tibet agreed bilaterally to be bound 
by the provisions of the convention.
83
 Tibet in the following years was restrained in 
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claiming full independence, even when independence existed in fact, out of fear of 
losing the British guarantee for Tibetan autonomy and the British commitment to 
secure China‟s ratification of the Simla Convention. Britain was similarly restrained 
in recognition of Tibet‟s de facto independence since it continued to recognise 
Chinese suzerainty de jure.  
 
The Thirteenth Dalai Lama passed away in 1933. During his lifetime Tibet‟s status 
had evolved from a dependency of the Qing Empire to a de facto independent state. 
The Dalai Lama attempted to achieve political unity and independence for Tibet by 
modernising
84
 and centralising a medieval internal administration; he attempted to 
transcend Tibet‟s feudal relationship with China by acquiring a new political patron in 
Britain capable of protecting Tibet against the ambition of China to transform its 
suzerain authority over Tibet into full sovereignty. Central Tibet under the Thirteenth 
Dalai Lama achieved a political autonomy equivalent to independence. 
 
In 1937, the reincarnation of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama was discovered in Amdo and 
in 1939 was brought to Lhasa and installed as the Fourteenth Dalai Lama. The 
Chinese Government was invited to send a representative to observe the ceremonies 
of installation, as were the governments of India, Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. 
However, the Chinese Government construed the participation of its representative as 
the official recognition and installation of the reincarnation, a version of events denied 
by Tibetans and other participants.85 During the regency period prior to the new Dalai 
Lama‟s attainment of majority, two Tibetan governmental institutions namely Kashag 
                                                                                                                                            
to withhold the recognition of suzerainty and with it the understanding that Tibet was part of 
Chinese territory”.  
84 The 13
th
 Dalai Lama attempted to strengthen Tibetan military by raising taxes for the support of the 
army. However, it created resistance from the large estate holders, particularly monastic estates that 
had not previously been required to pay taxes, and from the Panchen Lama‟s estate in Shigatse, 
(who fled to China in 1924, disrupting the Dalai Lama‟s attempt to create Tibet unity. The Panchen 
was not allowed to return to Tibet during his lifetime). The religious leadership labeled 
modernisation as a threat to the dominance of Buddhism, forcing the Dalai Lama to demote pro-
modernisation. According to Goldstein, “in one of the pivotal policy decisions of modern Tibetan 
history, the 13
th
 Dalai Lama gutted the heart of the reforms program by acts such as demoting the 
entire group of pro-modernisation officers and closing the English school. Overnight, Tibet lost its 
best chance to create a modern polity capable of coordinating international support for its 
independent status and defending its territory”. Melvyn C. Goldstein, “Tibet, China, and the United 
States: Reflections on the Tibet Questions,” The Atlantic Council, April 1995. 
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without reference to the Chinese Government. See Hugh Richardson, Tibetan Precis, Calcutta: 
Government of India Press, 1945, and Melvyn Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951, 
pp. 310-311, 314-324, 325-330. 
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and Tsongdu (National Assembly) took responsibility for Tibetan affairs and the two 
institutions handled negotiations with a Chinese representative sent to offer 
condolences on the Thirteenth Dalai Lama‟s death. China proposed that Tibet should 
accept Chinese sovereignty in exchange for autonomy in everything except foreign 
affairs and defence; however, the Kashag and Tsongdu maintained that Tibet was an 
independent country and demanded the return of Tibetan administration of Chinese–
controlled areas of Eastern Tibet. This Tibetan stance was maintained throughout the 
1930s and 1940s.  
 
During the Second World War, Tibet maintained its neutrality even though China was 
a combatant. This position occasioned the first Tibetan diplomatic contacts with the 
United States when Tibet refused permission to transport war supplies across Tibet 
from India to China. An American mission to Tibet in 1943 was informed of the 
Tibetan claim to independence, in response to which they suggested that Tibet might 
attempt to achieve recognition of its independence in a post-war peace conference. 
After the end of the war in 1945, Tibet attempted to do so by sending a “Victory 
Congratulations Mission” to India, China, the United States and the United Kingdom. 
The Tibetans were encouraged by a post-war statement by Chiang Kai-shek in which 
he had promised Tibet the right to self-determination.86 The Tibetans had also been led 
to believe that a 1945 Chinese constitutional convention would confirm that position. 
However, the Tibetans found their attendance as observers at that convention 
construed by China as Tibet‟s participation as a part of China. China also protested the 
travel of the Tibetan mission to other countries, after which the US and UK agreed to 
receive the mission only at their New Delhi embassies. 
 
In 1948, Tibet sent a trade mission to India, China, the United States and the United 
Kingdom, intended to purchase gold to back up the Tibetan currency. However, in 
response to Chinese protest, the US and UK were careful to explain that their 
receiving of the Tibetan mission was not to be interpreted as diplomatic recognition. 
Moreover, in the previous year Tibet participated in a semi-official Asian Relations 
Conference in India despite Chinese protests. In sum, prior to the 1950 Chinese 
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invasion, Tibet had achieved de facto independence and all of the requirements of de 
jure independence except for formal international recognition. The ICJ, in its 1960 
report found that: 
 
  Tibet demonstrated from 1913 to 1950 the conditions of statehood as 
generally accepted under international law. In 1950 there was a people and a 
territory, and a government which functioned in that territory, conducting its 
own domestic affairs free from any outside authority. From 1913-1950 foreign 
relations of Tibet were conducted exclusively by the Government of Tibet and 
countries with whom Tibet had foreign relations are shown by official 
documents to have treated Tibet in practice as independent State.
87
 
 
Tibet‟s claim to independence was based upon the principles of national self-
determination, even though Tibetans did not articulate their claim in those words. 
Tibet‟s territorial and political claim at Simla was based on national criteria of 
ethnicity and culture. The historical basis for the Tibetan claim was the Treaty of 822, 
by which China and Tibet recognised each other‟s territorial boundaries according to 
what then reflected both political control and ethnic identity. Tibet‟s claim to Kham 
and Amdo was hampered, however, as was Tibet‟s overall sovereignty, by the legacy 
of Tibet‟s relationships with the Mongols and Manchu empires. Tibet, in the 20th 
century could still claim to exercise some indirect control and a larger degree of 
spiritual influence over Eastern Tibet, but Tibetan claims were now compromised by 
Yuan and Qing administrative divisions of Tibet. Nevertheless, Tibet under the 
Thirteenth Dalai Lama achieved an unprecedented degree of national unity with 
Central Tibet, presented its case for independence and for inclusion of all Tibetan 
cultural areas within a Tibetan polity, and maintained a military and diplomatic 
defence against the encroachments of the Chinese. 
 
In contrast to the Tibetan claim to territorial sovereignty based on the right to national 
self–determination. The Chinese claim to sovereignty over Tibet was based upon 
imperialist rights of conquest, whether by the Mongols, the Manchu or, in Kham, by 
Chao Erh-feng. For the Chinese, Tibet‟s ethnic nationalist claims were irrelevant and 
were not thought of as any basis or justification for political independence. Tibetan 
nationalism was equated with barbaric resistance to the advance of civilisation. The 
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Chinese regarded the expansion of Chinese culture as a natural and inevitable process 
of civilisation replacing barbarism. China‟s position after 1919 was that no 
concessions in regard to Tibet were possible since any compromise of Chinese 
sovereignty over Tibet was unacceptable to the Chinese people. Chinese negotiations 
over Tibet up to that time had revealed, however, that they regarded Tibet not as an 
“integral part of China,” but as a dependency potentially lost to a foreign imperial 
rival. The rise of Kuomintang (KMT) Government in 1928 ended the era of tripartite 
negotiations over the status of Tibet. The KMT refused to accept British mediation in 
China‟s relations with Tibet.  
 
And Britain, which knew that Tibet was de facto independent, continued to recognise 
Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. Britain‟s role as mediator of Tibet‟s status and excluder 
of other foreign influence from Tibet was dependent upon Tibetan “autonomy” under 
Chinese “suzerainty”. British support of Tibetan autonomy was helpful to the Tibetans 
in maintaining that autonomy, but Britain‟s continuing recognition of China‟s 
“suzerainty” over Tibet allowed China to maintain its claims even when their actual 
authority was nonexistent. British patronage for Tibet also allowed China to 
characterise Tibetan desires for independence as machinations of the British. The 
British‟s definition of China‟s role in Tibet as “suzerain” gave a name to a status 
previously undefined and, therefore, to some extent served to perpetuate that status. 
Neither Chinese “suzerainty” nor Tibet‟s “autonomy” were acceptable to Lhasa. The 
terms were British impositions on an unwilling and unarmed Tibet, as the appropriate 
status–based not on actual history but on British imperial security and commercial 
imperatives.  
 
Tibet functioned as an independent state on the eve of China‟s military invasion in 
1949, possessing all the major attributes of statehood recognised under international 
law: a well-defined territory, a population inhabiting that territory, a government, and 
the authority to form international relations and enter into treaties with other states. 
With the landmass of 2.5 million square kilometres, Tibet‟s six million people were 
governed by a chos-sid zung-drel (a dual religious-political) government headed by 
the Dalai Lama, Kashag and Tsongdu. The judiciary system, which was based on the 
ethical principles formulated by Song-tsen Gampo in the 7
th
 century, developed by 
Jangchub Gyaltsen in 14
th
 century, extended by the Fifth Dalai Lama in 17
th
 century 
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and the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in 20
th
 Century, was administered by the Magistrates 
appointed by the Tibetan Government. Moreover, the Government of Tibet levied 
taxes, issued its own currency, printed postage stamps, commanded army and 
conducted all the government affairs. Since the 18
th
 century Tibet had maintained 
diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with a number of its neighbouring 
countries including Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Mongolia, China and British India and to 
a certain extent with Russia and Japan. The most obvious demonstration of Tibet‟s 
independent foreign policy in the twentieth century was the neutral stance that Tibet 
maintained throughout the Second World War, who despite strong pressures from 
Britain, the U.S. and China did not permit passage of military supplies through Tibet 
to China, particularly during Japanese blockade of strategically vital “Burma Road”. 
Tibet also had entered into bilateral agreements with her neighbours. In January 1913, 
Mongolia and Tibet signed a formal treaty recognising the independent status of each 
other.88 Nepal not only concluded peace treaties with Tibet but also maintained 
Ambassador in Lhasa and later in 1949 when it applied for a membership at the UN, 
as a proof its statehood, it formally declared its independent diplomatic relations with 
many countries including Tibet, the United Kingdom, the United States, India and 
Burma. 
 
                                                 
88 “Text of Russo- Mongol Treaty,” in Alastair Lamb, McMahon Line: A Study in relation between 
British India, China and Tibet, 1904 to 1914, Vol. 2, London: Routledge & K. Paul; Toronto: 
Toronto U.P., 1966, p. 606. 
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Chapter 2 Tibet: 1950-1959 
  
1.2.1 The “Peaceful Liberation” or the Invasion of Tibet 
The fact that Tibet was an independent nation in 1949 did not deter the People‟s 
Liberation Army (PLA) from invading Tibet after the Communist Party of China 
(CPC) came to power on 1 October 1949. No sooner had the Communist regime 
declared the formation of the People‟s Republic of China, General Zhu De, 
Commander-in-Chief of the PLA, declared Tibet as part of the PRC and made known 
the PLA‟s intention to “liberate” Tibet and Taiwan.89 The severe criticisms by New 
China Daily, a Communist official paper and the forerunner of People‟s Daily, against 
Tibetan Government‟s precautionary and timely measures of expelling all Chinese 
from Central Tibet in the wake of Kuomintang‟s defeat could be taken as precursors to 
coming events. The paper declares that: 
 
 The affair of expelling the Han Chinese and Kuomintang officials at 
Lhasa was a plot undertaken by the local Tibetan authorities through the 
instigation of the British imperialists and their lackey–the Nehru 
Administration of India. The purpose of this “anti-Chinese affair” is to 
prevent the people in Tibet from being liberated by the Chinese People‟s 
Liberation Army.
90
 
 
On 24 November 1949, Radio Peking announced that the Panchen Lama, who was 
only twelve at the time, had appealed to Mao to “liberate” Tibet.91 A barrage of similar 
radio propaganda from Beijing and Sichuan hit the Tibetans,92 which clearly revealed 
the Communist regime‟s intentions; Tibetans should either accept peaceful liberation 
                                                 
89 Robert Ford, Captured in Tibet, London: George Harrap, 1957, pp.11, 21. Robert Ford was 
employed by the Tibetan Government as a radio operator for two years. While working for the 
Tibetan Government he was captured by the Chinese in the aftermath of the battle of Chamdo and 
“re-educated” in a Chinese prison for five years. 
90 „No Foreign Aggressors Will be Allowed to Annex China‟s Territory‟, New China Daily, 2 
September 1949, as quoted in Warren W. Smith, Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism 
and Sino-Tibetan Relations, p. 265. 
91 The reincarnation of the Ninth Panchen Lama, who died in exile in 1937, although, was discovered 
by the Panchen Lama‟s entourage in exile in Xining, did not receive confirmation from the Lhasa 
Government, who had another candidate of their own. Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa writes that the 
followers of Panchen Lama surrendered to the Chinese Communists, sending congratulations to 
Mao and requesting that Tibet be liberated, in exchange for the recognition by the Chinese of their 
candidate as the actual incarnations. “Memorandum submitted to the International Commission of 
Jurists by Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa,” in ICJ, Tibet and the Chinese People‟s Republic: A report to 
the International Commission of Jurists by its Legal Inquiry Committee on Tibet, Geneva: 
International Commission of Jurists, 1960, p. 316. 
92 Robert Ford, Wind between the Worlds, Berkeley: Snow Lion Graphic, 1987, p. 3.  
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through negotiation or face armed intervention and forceful takeover. With great 
urgency and immediacy the Tibetan Government in Lhasa responded that they had no 
wish to be “liberated”93 and despatched a three-member team headed by Shakabpa, in 
December 1950, to inform the Chinese of Tibet‟s intention to maintain its 
independence.94 Although initially the Tibetans desired to meet with the Chinese 
representatives in Hong Kong, the refusal of diplomatic visas to visit Hong Kong 
compelled the Tibetan delegation to negotiate with the Chinese ambassador to India. 
After several days of talk the Chinese ambassador Yuan Chung-Hsien finally asked 
the Tibetan delegation to accept Tibet as a part of China and allow China to handle 
matters concerning Tibet‟s national defence. While the Tibetan delegation waited for 
the expected negative answer from the Tibetan Government, the Chinese armed forces 
attacked Tibet from Kham on 17 October 1950.
95
 Two divisions of the PLA, the 52
nd
 
Division from the north and the 53rd Division from the south, launched a full-scale 
attack from Eastern Tibet and advanced until the boundary of Xikang, which lies 100 
kilometres to the east of Lhasa. The eastern regions of Tibet started to fall one after 
the other under the vicious attacks of the PLA. On 19 October, Ngabo Ngawang 
Jigme,
96
 Commander of the Tibetan troops and the Governor of Eastern Tibet, 
surrendered to General Wang Chimi and subsequently he sent messages of the fall of 
Chamdo. In the face of imminent occupation of Tibet, the Tibet National Assembly 
offered full ruling power to the fifteen year old Dalai Lama.  
 
The Tibetan Government‟s appeal to the United Nations on 11 November 195097 
resulted with an inclusion of an item on Tibet, entitling „Invasion of Tibet by Foreign 
Forces‟, in the Agenda of the General Assembly.98 Yet, the request from El Salvador 
                                                 
93 Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History, p. 299. 
94 Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History, p. 300; Ambassador in India to the Secretary of 
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95 Ibid., p. 300. 
96 Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme was later appointed as the head of the Tibetan delegation that signed the 17 
Point Agreement with China in May 1951. He later became the Vice Chairman of National People‟s 
Congress Standing Committees. 
97 “Cablegram from Kashag (Tibetan Cabinet) and the National Assembly of Tibet,” (Lhasa, 
Kalimpong), 11 Nov. 1950, UN Doc. A/ 1549, 24 Nov. 1950, in Tibet in the United Nations, New 
Delhi: Bureau of H. H. the Dalai Lama, p. 3. 
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dated 17 November 1950 addressed to the President of the General Assembly by the Chairman of 
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on behalf of Tibet was not supported either by India, who believed that peaceful 
resolution was still possible,99 or Great Britain, with whom Tibet had concluded 
several treaties. China‟s timely intervention with an assurance of resorting to a 
peaceful way to resolve the Tibetan debacle dissuaded India from pursuing the matter 
any further at the UN.100 The Indian delegate at the UN explains thus:  
 
In the latest note received by his Government, the Peking Government had 
declared that it had not abandoned its intention to settle those difficulties by 
peaceful means… The Indian Government was certain that the Tibetan 
question could still be settled by peaceful means, and that such a settlement 
could safeguard the autonomy which Tibet had enjoyed for several decades 
while maintaining its historical association with China. His delegation 
considered that the best way of obtaining that objective was to abandon, for 
the time being, the idea of including that question in the agenda of the General 
Assembly.
101
 
 
Based on India‟s position, the General Assembly‟s General Committee voted 
unanimously on 24 November to postpone consideration of the Tibetan issue. The 
Dalai Lama described the collective sentiments of the Tibetan people when he wrote 
that “we felt abandoned to the hordes of the Chinese army”.102 China‟s ploy of halting 
the advance of the PLA and calling on the Tibetans to negotiate was succeeded in 
defusing international criticism of its actions. The Tibetan Government could do little 
but express “grave concern and dismay” at the UN inaction on Tibet‟s behalf.103 The 
                                                                                                                                            
the Delegation of El Salvador,” UN Doc. A/1534, 18 Nov. 1950, in Tibet in the United Nations, p.4. 
The supporting memorandum reiterated the status of Tibet as an independent country. A draft 
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124, in Tibet in the United Nations, New Delhi: Bureau of H.H. the Dalai Lama, p.11. 
102 The 14
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 Dalai Lama, My Land and My People: Memoirs of the Dalai Lama of Tibet, New York: 
Potala, 1977, p. 86. 
103“Text of Cablegram dated 8 December 1950 received from the Tibetan delegation [Kalimpong],” 
UN Doc. A/1658, 11 December 1950, in Tibet in the United Nations, p.15. The Tibetan message 
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failure of Tibet‟s appeal to the UN amalgamated with the rising fear of further 
Chinese onslaught compelled the Dalai Lama and his government to move its base in 
Dromo, a medium size town close to the Indian border. 
 
1.2.2 The PLA Attacks: China‟s Imposition of Terms on Tibet 
Imminent Chinese military attack and dismal support from the international 
community left the Tibetan Government with no alternative but to send a five-member 
delegation–led by Ngabo Ngawang Jigme–to Beijing in April 1951 to negotiate with 
the Chinese Government. The delegation met with the Chinese team under Li Weihan, 
Chairman of the National Minorities Commission of the National People‟s Congress 
and Chairman of the United Front Work Department. According to the Tibetan 
Government, their delegation was authorised only to put forward the Tibetan stand
104
 
and learn the Chinese response, but not authorised to use “full powers” and conclude 
any agreement as claimed in the Chinese White Paper. In fact, the delegation was 
specifically instructed to refer all important matters to the Government in Dromo.
105
 
 
Despite Beijing‟s claim that the Tibetan delegation were under no duress it was clear 
that constant threat of military actions loomed large in their minds while the 
negotiation was proceeding.
106
 The Tibetans were denied permission to contact their 
government at Dromo on the issue of admitting that Tibet was a part of China, which 
the Chinese explained was not necessary as “other nations also regarded Tibet as a 
part of China”.107 Faced with no other choice the Tibetan delegates signed the 
“Agreement of the Central People‟s Government and the Local Government of Tibet 
on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet,” (Annex 1), on 23 May 1951, 
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without getting opportunity to refer to their government in Dromo.
108
 The Dalai Lama 
later described the process by which the “agreement” was signed thus: 
 
As soon as the first meeting began, the chief Chinese representative 
produced a draft agreement containing ten articles ready made. This was 
discussed for several days. Our delegation argued that Tibet was an 
independent state, and produced all the evidence to support their argument, 
but the Chinese would not accept it. Ultimately, the Chinese drafted a 
revised agreement, with seventeen articles. This was presented as an 
ultimatum. Our delegates were not allowed to make any alterations or 
suggestions. They were insulted, and abused and threatened with personal 
violence, and with further military action against the people of Tibet, and 
they were not allowed to refer to me or my government for further 
instructions.
109
 
 
Although the agreement was signed by both the parties, only the Chinese affixed the 
seals of its government on the documents since the Tibetan delegation maintained that 
they did not have the appropriate seals.
110
 The Chinese had the Tibetan Government 
seals newly made in Beijing and forced the delegation to seal the document, the 
account of which was later corroborated by Ngabo Ngawang Jigme in 1992 at a press 
conference in Beijing.
111
 The Tibetans and their supporters accuse the Chinese 
Government of forging the Tibetan Government seal on the documents and argue that 
the agreement was invalid. On 26 May 1951, Radio Peking announced the “peaceful 
liberation of Tibet” and signing of the 17-Point Agreement, which sent waves of 
shock and alarm throughout Tibet, and prompted a series of debates among the 
officials of the Tibetan Government who were thrown into quandary regarding Tibet‟s 
ability to preserve its cultural and political identity by accepting China‟s demands. 
The Chinese Government‟s promise not to change the Tibetan institutions and 
traditional practices convinced many that acceptance of the Chinese terms was in the 
best interest of Tibet. The Dalai Lama and his government returned to Lhasa at the 
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end of July 1951 and on 28 September 1951 the Tibetan Government formally 
accepted the 17-Point agreement. On 25 October the Dalai Lama sent a letter to Mao 
accepting the 17 Point Agreement.  
 
1.2.3 Sino-Tibetan Agreement: Incorporation of China‟s Term 
The 17-Point Agreement did not address the issue of Tibetan territorial boundaries. 
Tibetans naturally assumed that all Tibetan cultural areas were treated alike under the 
provisions of the 17-Point Agreement. The Chinese, however, defined “Tibet” as only 
the territories of Central Tibet that lies under the direct rule of the Dalai Lama‟s 
government and decreed that the 17-Point Agreement should apply only to that area. 
Soon after the acceptance of the 17-Point Agreement the PLA started occupying 
Lhasa and Central Tibet. Initially, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) observed 
great caution in implementing its policy in Tibet and substantially adhered to the 
provisions of the 17-Point Agreement or at least their interpretation of the agreement. 
Generally, it can said that before 1954 China confined itself to activities aimed at 
impressing Tibetans without affecting Tibetan autonomy or altering the basic 
structure of the society. However, as the PLA gained more thorough control over the 
Tibetan regions, the CCP initiated numerous changes including the creation of 
territorial divisions, which in essence contradicted its “national regional autonomy” 
system and in actuality became a contributing factor to the later Tibetan revolts. The 
CCP‟s plans for the future “Tibetan Autonomous Region” included only the regions in 
Central Tibet, but not the territories in Eastern Tibet which would be carved and 
divided amongst Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Yunnan and Sichuan. Even 
though the Communist rulers attempted to justify the plans for such administrative 
divisions based on historical realities, which to some extent was legally valid, they 
could not conceal the strategic interests of placing as much territory as possible within 
Chinese provincial administration. These eastern territories in Kham and Amdo 
provinces constituted what the British termed as “Inner Tibet” and had been annexed 
and incorporated into the above mentioned Chinese provinces long before the 
Communist came to power.112 Yet, the people of Kham and Amdo resented the 
divisions as much as the people of Central Tibet because of their unquestioned loyalty 
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to the Dalai Lama as supreme head of Tibet. 
 
The exclusion of eastern parts of Kham and all of Amdo from the Chinese defined 
“Tibet” left more than half of the ethnic Tibetan territory, perhaps the richest half in 
terms of natural resources, and two-thirds of its population in Chinese provinces and 
thus outside the provisions of the 17-Point Agreement. Despite these major changes 
the Chinese nevertheless claimed that they had neither altered the political system in 
“Tibet”, nor the authority of the Tibetan Government. The PRC‟s policy of patching 
up the ethnic Tibetan areas of Eastern Tibet with Chinese provinces turned out to 
become a significant factor in the eventual Tibetan revolts against the Chinese rule. 
Another clause of the Agreement that the whole Tibetan nation was so sensitive about 
was the maintenance of the status and the functions of the Dalai Lama, which the 
Chinese promised in Point 4. However, despite the promise that “the Central 
Authorities will not alter the established status, functions, and powers of the Dalai 
Lama,”113 constant attempts were made to reduce the status of the Dalai Lama by 
instituting reforms that were portrayed as democratic reforms. In Kham and Amdo, 
experiments with agricultural and pastoral reorganisation were conducted in the early 
1950s. The properties of those, who did not collaborate with the United Front, were 
seized and confiscated. These led to the growing resentment against the “barbaric 
Chinese forces” which eventually spilled over as revolts exploded in every part of the 
Easter Tibet. 
 
1.2.4 Revolt in Central Tibet 
By the end of 1954, China had not only tightened its hold over Tibet but also had 
legalized its claim through an agreement with India, known popularly as the 
Panchsheel Agreement, or the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, in which India 
formally recognised China‟s sovereignty over Tibet.114 The strategic importance of 
Tibet prompted the PLA to construct highways in Tibet immediately after the invasion 
and by the end of 1954 two highways–2,143-kilometre-long Sichuan-Tibet highway 
and 1,160-kilometre-long Qinghai-Tibet highway–were completed to transport 
military equipments and personnel, thus enabling quick reinforcements in case of 
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rebellions and less reliance on local supplies for the army. The completion of these 
two highways marked a huge shift in Chinese policy in Tibet. In the following year, 
the PRC adopted a resolution to establish Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous 
Region of Tibet (PCART) and transfer the political authority from the Tibetan 
Government to the Chinese controlled Preparatory Committee. To the Tibetans this 
move was a clear violation of the Article 4 of the 17-Point Agreement.115 
 
In 1955, Mao, apparently believing that Chinese control was now secure in almost all 
of the minority nationality areas, decided that minorities should be included in the 
“High Tide of Socialist Transformation”, planned for 1956. With the exception of 
Tibetans residing in the TAR, the rest of the Tibetan people including those living in 
Kham and Amdo areas were involuntarily included in the socialist transition 
programs, which introduced “democratic reforms” in Kham and Amdo that involved 
class struggle against leaders, intellectuals, religious masters through public 
denunciation termed as thamzing (struggle). The attacks against their traditional 
systems, especially their religion and religious masters, invited the wrath of the 
Tibetan people of both the areas who took arms and revolted against the Chinese. The 
revolts in Eastern Tibet soon proliferated and spread to other areas and by the summer 
of 1956 full-scale guerrilla warfare was raging in Eastern Tibet.  
 
On 22 April 1956, the PCART was formally inaugurated in Lhasa and a contingent of 
8000-member delegation from Beijing headed by Chen Yi and Wang Feng arrived in 
Lhasa. Chen Yi remarked that the establishment of the PCART was a “new milestone 
for the Tibetan nationality on the road to unity and progress”.116 The Tibetans were 
openly hostile to the Commission and it was seen as an alien institution established in 
direct confrontation with the Tibetan Government. The Dalai Lama in his welcome 
speech of the PCART warned the PRC about the need to bring the reforms slowly and 
to respect and protect the religious way of life of his people. He averred that Tibet was 
not ready for any rapid „democratic reforms‟ and was still a long way from 
socialism.117 The situation in Tibet deteriorated rapidly while the Dalai Lama was on a 
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visit to India in 1956. While in India the Dalai Lama met with Prime Minister Nehru 
in Delhi and clearly expressed his concerns about the explosive situation back in Tibet 
and admitted that he was contemplating seeking political asylum in India. However, 
Nehru was against the idea and advised the Dalai Lama to return back to Tibet to 
work for his country and people. 
 
In the meantime, Mao made promises of “no reforms” in the TAR for another five to 
ten years if the Tibetans so wished.118 Not surprisingly this promise, like the 
provisions of the 17-Point Agreement, did not apply to Eastern Tibet. Once the Dalai 
Lama had returned back to Lhasa the “democratic reforms” were carried out with 
renewed vigour in Eastern Tibet, thus worsening the repressions, which forced tens of 
thousands of Tibetans to flee to Central Tibet. Within a year the uprising had spread to 
Central Tibet and two years later Tensung Dhanglang Magar (Voluntary Force for 
Defending the Faith), a joint force of Mimang Tshongdu (People‟s Assembly)and 
Chushi Gangduk (Four Rivers Six Ranges), was founded, which waged many battles 
against the Chinese army. As the situation inside Tibet grew more and more tense, 
rumours began to circulate that the Chinese were planning to kidnap the Dalai Lama 
and in March 1959, tens of thousands of Tibetans assembled in front of Norbulingka, 
the Dalai Lama‟s summer residence, seeking to protect their leader. This huge 
gathering exacerbated the charged situation leading to Chinese assault on the civilians 
that resulted in days of intense fighting between Tibetans and Chinese troops. The 
Norbulingka palace was shelled and thousands of people were killed. The mass 
Tibetan uprising initiated by Tibetan civilians demanding for Tibet‟s independence 
was put down with force and martial law was declared for the first time in the history 
of Tibet.119 
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Chapter 3 Tibet: Post 1959 
 
1.3.1 Tibet at the United Nations: Three Resolutions 
On 25 July 1959, the International Commission of Jurists, under the Chairman of 
Purshottam Trikamdas–a leading Indian lawyer and a senior advocate at the Supreme 
Court of India–published a preliminary report on Tibet, entitled The Question of Tibet 
and the Rule of Law. Based on evidences gathered it concludes that actions contrary 
to Article 2 (a) and (e) of the Genocide Convention of 1948 were carried out in Tibet, 
which points to “a case of a systematic intention...to destroy in whole or in part of the 
Tibetans as a separate nation and the Buddhist religion in Tibet”.120 Although, the 
Secretary-General of ICJ concluded that Tibet‟s legal status “is not easy to appraise” 
and “cannot be fitted into a logical category,” he nevertheless asserts that “Tibet has 
been to all intents and purposes an independent country and has enjoyed a large 
degree of sovereignty,” which would make it difficult for the PRC to claim domestic 
jurisdiction in Tibet.
121
 Whatever the accuracy of the report might be, its content was 
accepted and used as the main body of evidence during the debate at the UN General 
Assembly. 
 
As noted earlier, the Tibetan issue had been raised and debated in the UN in 
November 1950.
122
 However, due to India‟s assurance that a peaceful settlement 
could be reached between Tibet and China no particular resolution was passed on 
Tibet in the United Nations in 1950. On 9 September 1959, the Dalai Lama formally 
appealed Tibet‟s case to the United Nations, informing the UN that no peaceful 
resolution had been achieved. The appeal reiterated Tibet‟s status as a sovereign state, 
based upon the Thirteenth Dalai Lama‟s declaration of independence in 1912, the 
signing of 1914 Simla Convention with Britain, Tibet‟s neutrality during the Second 
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122 “Text of the Cablegram from Kashag (Cabinet),” Kalimpong, 11 November 1950, UN 
Doc.A/1549, in Tibet in the United Nations, p. 3. 
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World War and the recognition of Tibetan passports used by the 1946 Tibetan Trade 
Delegation. Shortly after the Dalai Lama‟s appeal, the General Assembly adopted the 
Resolution on the Question of Tibet (APPENDIX 2). 
The General Assembly...considering that the fundamental human rights 
and freedom to which the Tibetan people, like all others, are entitled 
include the right to civil and religious liberty for all without distinction. 
Mindful also of the distinctive cultural and religious heritage of the people 
of Tibet and of the autonomy which they have traditionally enjoyed. 
Gravely concerned at reports, including the official statements of His 
Holiness the Dalai Lama, to the effect that the fundamental human rights 
and freedoms of the people of Tibet have been forcibly denied them. 
Calls for the respect for the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people 
and for their distinctive cultural and religious life.
123
 
A year later, in August 1960, the ICJ published the findings of its Legal Inquiry 
Committee
124
 in a book titled, Tibet and the Chinese People‟s Republic. The 
Committee examined three main issues, viz., the question of genocide, Tibet‟s legal 
status and Tibetans‟ human rights. The Committee concluded that there was sufficient 
evidence of human rights violation and cultural genocide being committed in Tibet.125 
In regard to the question of Tibet‟s legal status, the Commission concluded that:  
Tibet was at the very least a de facto independent State when the 
Agreement on Peaceful Measures in Tibet was signed in 1951, and the 
repudiation of this agreement by the Tibetan Government in 1959 was 
found to be fully justified... Tibet demonstrated from 1913 to 1950 the 
conditions of statehood as generally accepted under international law. In 
1950 there was a people and territory, and a government which functioned 
in that territory, conducting its own domestic affairs free from any outside 
                                                 
123“Text of the Resolution adopted by The General Assembly at the 14th Session on the Question of 
Tibet,” in Tibet in the United Nations, p. 230; ICJ, Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law, p. 
359. The resolution can be also viewed at the UN General Assebly‟s weblink:  
      http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/141/76/IMG/NR014176.pdf?OpenElement  
124On the recommendation of its 1959 preliminary report, the International Commission of Jurists 
constituted a Legal Inquiry Committee on Tibet, composed of eleven international lawyers, headed 
by Purshottam Trikamdas (including two additional members from India and one each from 
Ceylon, the Philippines, Ghana, Norway, Burma, Malaya, Thailand and the United Kingdom). The 
committee was instructed to “examine all such evidence obtained by this Committee and from other 
sources and to take appropriate action thereon and in particular to determine whether the crime of 
Genocide – of which there is prima facie evidence – is established and, in that case, to initiate such 
action as is envisaged by the Genocide Convention of 1948 and by the Charter of the United 
nations”. 
125 ICJ, Tibet and the Chinese People‟s Republic, 1960, p. 3. 
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authority. Tibet surrendered her independence by signing in 1951 the 
Agreement on Peaceful Measures for the Liberation of Tibet. Under that 
Agreement the Central People‟s Government of the Chinese People‟s 
Republic gave a number of undertakings, among them: promise to maintain 
the existing political system of Tibet, to maintain the status and the 
function of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, to protect freedom of 
religion and the monasteries and to refrain from compulsion in matter of 
reforms in Tibet. The Committee found that these and other undertakings 
had been violated by the Chinese People‟s Republic and that the 
Government of Tibet was entitled to repudiate the Agreement as it did on 
March 11, 1959.
126 
On 19 December 1961, the Tibet issue came up for discussion in the General 
Assembly once again and this time it was discussed by a number of states in the 
context of a subjugated people who is entitled to the right to self-determination. The 
second resolution on Tibet was passed by a vote of 56 in favour , 11 in opposition and 
29 abstinences, despite strong oppositions from the Soviet Union and her allies. 
(APPENDIX 3) The resolution acknowledges the happenings inside Tibet: 
Gravely concerned at the continuation of events in Tibet including the 
violation of fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people, suppression 
of their distinctive cultural and religious life which they have traditionally 
enjoyed, 
Noting with deep anxiety the severe hardships which these events have 
inflicted on the Tibetan people as evidence by the large-scale exodus of 
Tibetan refugees to the neighboring countries, 
Considering that these events violate fundamental human rights with 
freedoms set out in the charter of the United Nations and the Universal 
Declaration of Human rights, including the principle of self-determination 
of the peoples and nations... 
Solemnly renews its call for the cessation of practices which deprive the 
Tibetan people of their fundamental human rights and freedom including 
their rights to self-determination.
127 
                                                 
126 Ibid., p. 6. The ICJ‟s Purpose was not “to attempt a definitive analysis in terms of modern 
international law of the exact juridical status of Tibet,” but to determine whether the question of 
Tibet was entirely within the domestic jurisdiction of China or was a legitimate concern of the 
United Nations. The Committee determined that “Tibet‟s status was such as to make the Tibetan 
question one for the legitimate concern of the United Nations even on the restrictive interpretation 
of matters „essentially within, the domestic jurisdiction‟ of a state”. 
127 Question of Tibet, Resolution of the General Assembly Sixteenth Session (1961), 20 December 
1961, in Tibet in the United Nations, p. 311; ICJ, Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law, p. 360. 
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The issue of Tibet came in front of the United Nations for the third time when El 
Salvador, Ireland, Malaysia, Malta, Nicaragua, Philippines and Thailand introduced a 
draft resolution in August 1965 with essentially the same language as the previous 
two resolutions. The debate on Tibet was characterised by an ideological split along 
Cold War lines with the Socialist bloc accusing the United States and her allies of 
raising the “non existent issue of Tibet”. India for the first time spoke in favour of a 
UN resolution on Tibet–a shift in position attributable to the 1962 border war with 
China. India explained that her former opposition to discussion of Tibet in the UN in 
1950 was due to assurances received from China that it would “settle the problem by 
peaceful means”. The final vote on the resolution was approved by a vote of 43 in 
favour, 26 in opposition, and 22 abstinences.
128
 (See Appendix 4)  
1.3.2 Post-Mao Era 
The death of Mao Zedong and Chou En-lai paved the way for Deng Xiaoping‟s rise to 
power and with it began a new era in relations between the exile Tibetan leadership 
and Beijing. The new leadership rejected the Maoist orthodoxy in favour of more 
flexible and pragmatic policy to win the minority groups. Soon after his emergence as 
the national leader, Deng Xiaoping showed serious interests in normalising relations 
with the Dalai Lama. As part of the liberalisation policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping 
China made a number of unilateral gestures such as releasing the Tibetans imprisoned 
since 1959. Announcements were made that the exile Tibetans, including the Dalai 
Lama, will be allowed to return to China and Tibetans living inside Tibet can visit 
their relatives abroad. Contacts with the exile community were initiated by Deng, who 
despatched a message for the Dalai Lama through his brother Gyalo Thondup stating 
that apart from the question of total independence all other issues could be discussed 
and all problems could be resolved.
129
 This became the basic condition of all the 
future talks between the two parties. 
                                                                                                                                            
The resolution can be viewed at:  
      http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/167/76/IMG/NR016776.pdf?OpenElement  
128 United Nations General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Resolution 2079 (XX), 18 December 1965, 
ICJ, Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law, p. 361. The Resolution can be also viewed at:  
      http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/218/42/IMG/NR021842.pdf?OpenElement  
129 According to Dawa Norbu, the condition was stated as follows, “The basic question is whether 
Tibet is a part of China or not. This should be kept as criteria for testing the truth... So long it is not 
accepted that Tibet is an integral part of China, there is nothing else to talk about,” in Dawa Norbu, 
China‟s Tibet Policy, p. 316. This condition has been widely interpreted as being: “anything, apart 
from independence, can be discussed”. 
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At Deng‟s invitation the Tibetan Government-in-Exile sent three fact-finding 
delegations to China in 1979 and 1980, who reported back to the Dalai Lama the 
prevailing conditions inside Tibet. The visits revealed that the Chinese proclamations 
of socialist progress in Tibet had little substance. The living standard of the Tibetan 
people was poor, economic development was minimal, and the destruction of religion 
and monasteries almost total. The Chinese were even less successful with the 
ideological transformation of the Tibetan people, who despite listening to Chinese 
Communist propaganda and ideological pronouncements for twenty years still 
retained strong faith and trust in the Dalai Lama. The overall impact of the 
delegations was precisely the opposite of what Beijing had hoped. 
130
 
The CCP leaders, realising that the conditions inside Tibet were not as they had been 
led to believe by the Chinese cadres in Tibet, convened the first Tibet Work Meeting 
in early 1980. Soon after, in May 1980, the Party Secretary Hu Yaobang and Vice 
Premier Wan Li made an unprecedented fact-finding visit to Tibet. Hu was shocked 
and dismayed by the rampant poverty that he observed in Tibet.
131
 Upon his return to 
Beijing, Hu Yaobang immediately announced a six point reform program for the 
TAR. 
 
1. Tibet must be given full rights to exercise regional autonomy. 
2. There would be a period of recuperation during the first three years of which 
people in Tibet would be exempt from paying taxes and meeting state purchase 
quotas. 
3.  A flexible economic policy suited to Tibet‟s special conditions should be 
adopted. 
4. A greater part of the state subsidy should be used for development of agriculture 
and animal husbandry. 
5. Tibetan culture, language and education should be developed following socialist 
orientation. 
6. The Party‟s policy on minority cadres should be implemented and should 
promote unity between Chinese and Tibetan cadres.
132
 
                                                 
130 For Detail reports of the three fact-finding delegations see, Dept. of Information and International 
Relations (CTA), From Liberation to Liberalization, Dharamsala, 1982. Tenzin N. Tethong, 
“Reports on the Second Delegation to Tibet,” p. 103; Jestun Pema Gyalpo, “Three Months in Tibet: 
A Personal Viewpoint,” p. 113 and Phuntsog Wangyal, “The Report from Tibet,” p. 153. 
131 Jigme Ngabo, „Behind the Unrest in Tibet‟, China Spring, vol. 12, no.1, January-February 1988, p. 
26. 
132 New China News Agency, “Six Requirements for Tibet,” 30 May 1980, translated in SWB, 1980, 
no. FE/6436/B11/1-6, 4 June 1080. 
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This landmark public statement was preceded by Hu‟s acknowledgement of the 
Chinese Party‟s failure in Tibet at a meeting attended by more than 4,500 leading 
regional and Communist Party members and Tibetan members of the CPPCC. He 
says:  
 
We feel that our party has let the Tibetan people down. We feel bad. The 
sole purpose of our Communist Party is to work for the happiness of the 
people, to do good things for them. We have worked nearly thirty years, but 
the life of the Tibetan people has not notably improved. Are we not to 
blame?
133
 
 
Hu is said to have equated the previous 20 years of Chinese effort to develop 
Tibet as equivalent to throwing money into the Lhasa River and compared the 
situation in Tibet with colonialism.
134
  
  
In March 1981, in a formal letter to Deng Xiaoping, the Dalai Lama while applauding 
Hu Yaobang‟s efforts to remedy the situation, criticised the conditions in Tibet.135 In 
response to that Hu Yaobang presented a five point proposal on July 28 of the same 
year. The proposal was meant to serve a multipurpose: first of remedying the 
grievances of the Tibetan people, but also to counter any criticism from the Dalai 
Lama about conditions that his delegation had witnessed and to entice the Dalai Lama 
to return to Tibet. The five points were:  
 
1. The Dalai Lama should have confidence in China‟s new entered period of 
stability and economic change. If he doubts the reforms, he should observe the 
changes for the next few years. 
2. The Dalai Lama and his representatives should not raise the history of repression 
that followed the suppression of the 1959 rebellion. 
3. The Chinese government sincerely welcomes the Dalai Lama and his followers 
to return to the motherland. China hopes that the Dalai Lama would contribute 
to upholding China‟s unity and promote solidarity between Han and Tibetan 
nationalities. 
                                                 
133 Wang Yao, “Hu Yaobang‟s visit to Tibet, May 22-31, 1980,” in Robert Barnett & Shirin Akiner 
(ed.), Resistance and Reform in Tibet, p. 288. 
134 Jigme Ngabo, „Behind the Unrest in Tibet‟, p. 26. 
135 The full version of the letter was published in Tibetan Review, 1993, vol. XXVIII, no.10, pp. 9-14. 
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4. The Dalai Lama would have the same political status and living conditions as he 
had before 1959. He may be appointed Vice-Chairman of the NPC. But it would 
be not necessary that he should not live in Tibet or hold any position in Tibet as 
there are younger Tibetans who have taken office and are doing their jobs well. 
He may visit Tibet as often as he likes. 
5. When the Dalai Lama returns he may make press statements, and arrangements 
would be made to receive him by a suitable minister and issue a press release.
136
 
 
The five-point proposal clearly reflected the Chinese government‟s preferred view 
that the Tibet Question was fundamentally a dispute between China and the Dalai 
Lama rather than between the government of China and the Tibetan “Government-in-
Exile”. The proposal outlines the specific conditions under which his return would be 
acceptable and what his status would be, thus reducing the Tibet question to a 
personal matter of the Dalai Lama. Beijing strongly hoped that the return of the Dalai 
Lama would provide legitimacy to the Chinese occupation of Tibet, end the 
international dialogue over Tibet and persuade the Tibetan masses to genuinely accept 
themselves as being part of the People‟s Republic of China. As shall be seen in the 
next chapters China has steadfastly held on to this strategy of personalizing the Tibet 
issue. 
 
By 1984, Hu Yaobang‟s initiatives were criticised for encouraging a resurgence of 
nationalism in Tibet. The Second Work Forum of 1984 adopted a new strategy of 
developing economy as measures of maintaining stability and integrating Tibet into 
China. Thus, the Work Forum launched an open-door policy that required the 
introduction of large number of Chinese cadres and “experts” into Tibet and permitted 
entry of thousands of petty entrepreneurs, irrespective of local concerns about 
growing Chinese population in Tibet.
137
 The failure of dialogues and Beijing‟s 
persistent aggressive policies in Tibet compelled the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan 
Government-in-Exile to “internationalise” the Tibet issue and seek support in the 
western countries. In several high level meetings with the US Congressmen and the 
European Parliamentarians, the Dalai Lama unveiled his Five Point Peace Plan and 
                                                 
136 Xizang Qingkuang Jianjie (Summary of Conditions in Tibet), Zhonggong Xizang Zizhiqu 
Dangwei Xuanchuanbu Bian (TAR CCP Propaganda Department) July 1985, p. 32, cited in Tashi 
Rabgey and Tsetan Wangchuk Sharlho, Sino-Tibetan Dialogue in the Post Mao Era: lessons and 
Prospect, East-West Center, Washington, 2004, p. 6. 
137 Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho, “China‟s Reforms in Tibet: Issues and Dilemmas,” Journal of 
Contemporary China, vol. 1, no. 1, 1992, p, 54. 
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the Strasbourg Proposal, which finally brought the Tibet issue on international stage. I 
shall go into more detail about these issues in the later chapters. Such was the state of 
Tibet when it entered into the last decade of the last millennium.  
 48 
 
PART II TIBET ISSUE IN THE LAST DECADE 
 
Chapter 4 Sino-Tibetan Relation from 1990-2000: the Internationalisation of the 
Tibetan Issue 
 
Since the initiation of the Deng‟s new policy towards Tibet in 1979, the Dalai Lama 
had sent four fact-finding delegations to inner and outer Tibet, and two exploratory 
teams to Beijing in 1982 and 1984.
138
 The reports of the fact finding delegations 
showed that the so called development claimed by the Chinese government had little 
substance and that the years of repression of all aspects of Tibetan culture and the 
endless propaganda on the superiority of Chinese socialism had not eradicated 
Tibetan nationalism and their faith in the Dalai Lama.
139
 Similarly, the result of the 
two exploratory teams made no progress towards any substantive negotiations.
140
 
Under these circumstances with no other means to bring Beijing to the negotiation 
table, the Dalai Lama felt compelled to internationalise the Tibet issue and seek 
Western support in resolving the Sino-Tibetan problem. 
 
                                                 
138 Xinhua (Chinese language), “Xi Zhongxun Receives Dalai Lama‟s Representative,”  30 November 
1984, translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,  SWB FE/7817/BII/1, 4 December 1984. 
139 Reports of the fact finding delegations to Tibet, From Liberation to Liberalization, 1982. 
140 The exploratory teams of the Tibetan government-in-exile who visited China in 1982 and 1984 
made a proposal containing two major points: 1) The unification of the ethnic and cultural Tibetan 
areas into one autonomous unit; and 2) A higher degree of autonomy than that was offered to 
Taiwan in the PRC‟s Nine Point Proposal. China‟s response in 1982 was that Tibet had already 
been “liberated” in 1950 and was on its way to socialism whereas Taiwan is yet to be liberated. 
Stated in „Policy Towards the Dalai Lama‟, Beijing Review, 15 November 1982. When the Tibetan 
delegation reminded that the Chinese Communist Party, at the First All-China Congress of Soviets 
on the Question of National Minorities (November 1931), had recognised the right of the national 
minorities to self-determination Chinese response was, “We [the CCP] were a child at that time but 
now we are grown up,” citied in Dawa Norbu, China‟s Tibet Policy, p. 321. To the second Tibetan 
exploratory team China mentioned that though the areas inhabited by the Tibetans are adjacent they 
have not been unified for a long time, thus the local economy and socio-cultural aspect of Inner 
Tibet have developed differently from Outer Tibet. China argued that the unification of Kham and 
Amdo provinces with the TAR would bring no economic and cultural benefits because of the 
vastness of the land and difference in the socio-cultural development. They further added that 
unless the demand for a Greater Tibetan Autonomous Region is dropped “we cannot have 
negotiations”. This intransigent stand has been conveyed by various Chinese Officials to the Dalai 
Lama‟s Representatives in 1981, 1982 and 1984. Stated in Dawa Norbu, China‟s Tibet Policy, p. 
322, citing views conveyed by Jiang Ping (Deputy Head of the Central Committee United Front), to 
the representatives of the Dalai Lama 1984; See also „Policy Towards the Dalai Lama‟ in Tibet: 
Today and Yesterday, ed. Su Wenming, Published by Beijing Review, 1983, pp. 67-70, The article 
was a reprint of political editorial An Zhiguo which first appeared in Beijing Review, vol. 25, no. 
46, 15 November 1982, pp. 3-4. 
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2.4.1. Collapse of Beijing-Dharamsala Dialogue and its Consequences  
The first major initiative to internationalise the Tibet issue was launched on 21 
September 1987 when the Dalai Lama announced the famous Five-Point Peace Plan 
addressed to the US Congressional Human Rights Caucus. He made it known to the 
world that the Chinese refusal to negotiate forced him to appeal to the international 
community for their support. In that speech the Dalai Lama described Tibet as an 
“independent state under illegal occupation”. He criticised the Chinese for reducing 
the Tibetan issue which concerned the six million Tibetan people to the issue of his 
own personal status.
141
 The United States‟ sympathy for Tibet appeared in an editorial 
in New York Times which urged the State Department to stand up for decency in Tibet. 
Few days after the Dalai Lama‟s speech, eight members of Congress142 wrote a joint 
letter addressed to Zhao Ziyang, who succeeded Hu Yaobang as Party Secretary, 
commending the peace proposal as an historic step toward resolving the question of 
Tibet and urging China to accept it as a basis for negotiation.
143
 
 
It is obvious from this act of the Congress members that there was an overwhelming 
support for the Tibet issue in the US Congress. However, the US State Department, 
which disapproved the Dalai Lama‟s five-point proposal, had a different stand on 
Tibet. In clarifying its position one State Department official labeled the Senate‟s 
account of the situation in Tibet as “inaccurate, incomplete, and misleading”.144 
Furthermore, another member of the State Department said that the possible benefits 
                                                 
141 The 14
th
 Dalai Lama, Five-Point Peace Plan for Tibet, New Delhi: Bureau of His Holiness the 
Dalai Lama, 1988, p.4. The first point of Five-Point Peace Plan talks of the Chinese security 
concerns. The Dalai Lama urges that his concept of a peace zone is “in keeping with Tibet‟s 
historical role as a peaceful and neutral Buddhist nation and buffer state separating the continent‟s 
great power. It would also be in keeping with Nepal‟s proposal to proclaim Nepal a peace zone and 
with China‟s declared support for such a proclamation. The peace zone proposed by Nepal would 
have a much greater impact if it were to include Tibet and neighbouring areas”. However, 
converting Tibet into a zone of peace would require the withdrawal of Chinese troops and military 
installations from the Himalayan regions which, according to him, could be achieved under an 
international agreement that would not only satisfy China‟s legitimate security needs but also build 
up trust among the Tibetans, Indians, and the Chinese people. He also warned the Chinese to stop 
their population transfer policy before the Tibetans become just a tourist attraction and “relic of a 
noble past”. 
142 Guangqiu Xu, The United States and the Tibet Issue, Asian Survey, Vol. 37, November, 1997, p. 
1068. The author is a scholar on Sino-US relations. His articles have appeared in many international 
journals such as Modern Asia Studies, Journal of Contemporary History and Asian Survey. He is 
the author of several books. 
143 „United States, Public Law 100-204, 22 December 1987‟, DIIR, International Resolutions and 
Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 to 2004, 4
th
 ed., DIIR, Dharamsala, March 2005, p. 158. 
144 On October 6, 1997, the Senate passed an amendment with a 98 to 0 vote highlighting its 
Congressional concern over the human rights abuses in Tibet. Elaine Sciolino, „Beijing is Backed 
by Administration on unrest in Tibet,” New York Times, October 7, pp. A1 and A9. 
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of the Senate action for the Tibetan people were “insufficient to outweigh the almost 
certain damage to the U.S.-China bilateral relationship”.145 A week later, in October 
1987, J. Stapleton Roy who was then the deputy assistant secretary of state for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs and later the US ambassador to China, in his testimony 
before the House of Foreign Affairs Subcommittee clarified the State Department‟s 
position on Tibet. He criticised the Dalai Lama‟s actions, complaining that the Dalai 
Lama had abused the US hospitality by engaging “in activities inconsistent with his 
status as a respected religious leader” and reminded him his visa had been issued 
solely on religious grounds.
146
 The spokesman asserted that though the US support 
for human rights was “unwavering,” it was not in the interest of the US to link Tibet‟s 
human rights issue to any particular political program. He further emphasised that 
neither the US nor any member of the UN had recognised Tibet‟s independence, a 
clear indication of divergent positions taken by the US State Department and the US 
Congress on the issue of Tibet. 
 
The Chinese reacted to the Dalai Lama‟s Five-Point Peace Plan proposal by issuing a 
detailed rejection of the proposal.
147
 In an article carried by Beijing Review the PRC 
stated that the status of Tibet was “a question which simply does not exist”. The Dalai 
Lama‟s plan, they said, was nothing more than a “continued preaching of the 
independence of Tibet”.148 In a memorandum, dated 17 October 1987, sent to the 
exile Tibetan Administration, Yang Minfu, the then director of the United Front Work 
Department, blamed the Dalai Lama for instigating the demonstrations in Lhasa.
149
 
Although it did not make any direct comments on the Dalai Lama‟s Five-Point Peace 
                                                 
145 Ibid. 
146 State Department Bulletin, vol. 87, no. 212a, December 1987. 
147 This was issued by the State Nationality Affairs Commission on 28 September 1987, stated in 
Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in The Land of Snows, p. 523, n 61. 
148 „China Opposes Dalai‟s Statement‟, Beijing Review, 5 October 1987, p. 6. 
149 On 27 September, a pro-independence demonstration was staged in Lhasa by the Drepung monks. 
The brutal suppression of the demonstration triggered another protest on 1
st
 October by a group of 
monks from Sera monastery, which was later joined by the lay Tibetans. The demonstration turned 
violent when the Chinese police started firing on the unarmed crowd. For details „Demonstration 
Disrupt Peace in Lhasa,‟ Beijing Review, 12 October, 1987, p. 5; Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho, 
„China‟s Reforms in Tibet: Issues and Dilemmas,‟ Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 1, no. 1, 
Fall 1992, p. 55; Defying the Dragon: China and Human Rights in Tibet, London: Tibet 
Information Network and Law Association for Asia and the Pacific Human Rights Standing 
Committee, 1991, p. 21; An official Chinese account of the demonstration was given in Beijing 
Review, March and April 1989, stated in Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in The Land of Snows, p. 
523, n. 65 and for footages on the Lhasa demonstrations view the documentary film, Tibet: Cry of 
the Snow Lion, an Earthworks/Zambuling production , directed and photographed by Tom Poesay, 
2004. 
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Plan, it however, warned the Dalai Lama not to make a “mistake by placing hopes on 
external support”.150 The memorandum declared that the future course of policy in 
Tibet would depend on the Dalai Lama, and his continuous engagement in splittist 
activities could force the Chinese to adopt sterner measures in Tibet.
151
 The despatch, 
nevertheless, concluded that the Dalai Lama was still welcome to return under the 
terms of Hu Yaobang‟s five-point policy of 1981.  
 
A year later, on 15 June the Dalai Lama announced the Strasbourg Proposal in which 
he, for the first time, made a public acknowledgement stating that his Government-in-
Exile would accept the Chinese sovereignty over Tibet in exchange for a genuine and 
well-defined autonomy. The proposal elaborated on some of the points first raised by 
the Tibetan exploratory teams in 1982 and 1984. As far as the Dalai Lama was 
concerned, the Strasbourg Proposal represented a compromise solution to the Tibetan 
problem that meets with Deng Xiaoping‟s precondition for negotiation of not 
bringing the “question of Tibetan independence”. But the proposed solution was still 
not acceptable to the Chinese government who, nevertheless, showed some interest in 
talks. An official news briefing on 23 June 1988 carried a comment from the Chinese 
Foreign Office spokesman which rejected “independence, semi-independence or even 
independence in disguised form” for Tibet and also the Dalai Lama‟s demand for an 
“associate” status for Tibet.152 However, since the official comment rejected any form 
of independence the Chinese practically rejected the Dalai Lama‟s proposal as it 
envisions a form of semi-independence. Similar public messages were issued by 
many other Chinese ambassadors in abroad. Nevertheless, the messages made no 
specific conditions except that the Strasbourg proposal cannot be the basis of 
negotiation, but in a conciliatory gesture, the choice of selecting the date and the 
                                                 
150 „Memorandum from Yang Minfu to the Exile Tibetan Administration, Beijing, 17 October 1987‟, 
Dharamsala and Beijing: Initiatives and Correspondence 1981-1993, 2
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DIIR, 1996, p. 26. 
151 Ibid., p, 25. 
152 Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), 24 June 1988, stated in Dawa Norbu, China‟s Tibet Policy, p. 
436, n. 27; Yet another source give a different version of the event. According Kasur (Former 
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Phone Interview with Sonam Topgyal on 11.12.2005.  
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venue was left to the Dalai Lama.
153
. On 23 September 1988, the official reply to the 
Strasbourg Proposal was delivered by the Chinese Embassy in India to the Dalai 
Lama‟s Representative in New Delhi154 However, in the second message despite the 
difference in the wordings it was evident that China remained intransigent on the 
essential points of the negotiation, sticking to guidelines set up by Deng Xiaoping 
and Hu Yaobang.  
 
Taking up on the Chinese messages, on 27 July the Exile Tibetan government 
publicly announced that the talks would be held in January 1989 in Geneva. It also 
presented the list of the six members of the negotiating team, including the names of 
the two overseas representatives of the Dalai Lama to assist the team and a Dutch 
lawyer as a legal advisor.
155
 Subsequent to that the second Chinese message carried 
three points: 1) Beijing would not talk to the members of the exile Tibetan 
government; 2) The infeasibility of the Strasbourg Proposal as the basis for 
discussions since the Beijing Government viewed that the new proposal had not 
relinquished the concept of Tibet‟s independence; and 3) Non-involvement of any 
foreigner in the team. The fact that the message was addressed to the Dalai Lama 
personally implied that China was bent on excluding the Exile Government and to 
exhibit that the ongoing dialogue was one between the Chinese government and the 
Dalai Lama, but not with the Dalai Lama as the head of the Tibetan Government-in-
Exile. The Exile Tibetan Government‟s response delivered to the Chinese embassy on 
25 October 1988 by Alak Jigme
156
 was based primarily on the earlier messages which 
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Press Release from the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi, India, 28 September 1988, stated in Tsering 
Shakya, The Dragon in The Land of Snows, p. 426, n 96. 
155 According to the Exile Tibetan Government Michael van Walt van Praag (scholar of international 
law), a Dutch lawyer, was appointed as the legal advisor in accordance with the international norms 
for negotiations. However, critics exist in the Exile Tibetan community of his involvement in the 
Tibetan internal affair and accused him of influencing the Dalai Lama in formulating the Strasbourg 
Proposal since the option he had advocated in his book The Status of Tibet, 1987, have some 
similarities with the Strasbourg Proposal; see Jamyang Norbu, „In Deng‟s New World An Illusion 
Dies‟, Tibetan Review, 1989, vol. 24, no. 8, pp. 13-17. In a letter to Tibetan Review, 1989, vol. 25, 
no. 11, pp. 22-23, Michael van Walt van Praag denied of such involvement. Jamyang Norbu is a 
novelist, playwright and a leading political writer on Tibet. Norbu has authored a number of articles 
and books, including the Buying the Dragon‟s teeth and Illusion and Reality. He won the 
Crossword Award for English Fiction, 2000. He was a former member of the Tibetan resistance 
movement in Mustang on the Nepal-Tibet border and was also the co-founder director of the 
Amnyen Machen Institue in Dharamsala. 
156 The Tibetan official reply to the Chinese initiative of holding talks was delivered by Alak Jigme to 
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contained no specific conditions.
157
 However, the Chinese embassy did not respond 
right away.  
 
Meanwhile Yang Mingfu, the head of the United Front Department at a meeting with 
Gyalo Thondup in Beijing expressed China‟s displeasure at the Exile Tibetans action 
to announce the venue and names of the delegates. He accused the exile government 
of appointing members in the team who were officials of the exile Tibetan 
administration, which according to China had engaged in “splittist activities”. He 
added that Strasbourg proposal cannot be the basis for talks. Nevertheless, he showed 
positive gesture in holding talks to resolve the issue mutually. However, in November 
1988, Chen Xin, the then Vice-Minister of State Nationalities Affairs Commission, in 
a strong criticism denounced that the Dalai was not sincere towards the proposed 
talks of 1989 in Geneva as he himself was not taking part in the talks. Chen stated, 
“We have never recognised the Government-in-Exile headed by the Dalai Lama. That 
is why we will only hold talks with the Dalai Lama himself and will not hold talks 
with a so-called “government” delegation sent by the Dalai Lama”. The inclusion of a 
foreigner in the Tibetan delegation was said to have breached the principle adhered to 
by the Beijing government.
158
And this same line was repeated by Ngabo four months 
later at the Second Session of the National People‟s Congress. Ngabo said that the 
Dalai Lama was still welcomed to return to China as long as the Dalai Lama eschews 
Tibet‟s independence and works for the unity of the country.159 The Dalai Lama in his 
letters to Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, sent in September 1992 lamented that 
“with a flexible and open attitude, we accommodated the Chinese Government‟s 
requests and agreed to send representatives to Hong Kong.
160
 Unfortunately when 
                                                                                                                                            
the Chinese Embassy on 25 October 1988, Tibetan Review, vol. 23, no. 11 (November 1988), p. 4. 
Alak Jigme at his meeting with Zhao Xingsong, a councilor from the Chinese Embassy in New 
Delhi, was asked two questions: 1) Whether the Dalai Lama would participate in the talks; and 2) If 
a Dutch International lawyer was a member of the team. In order to procure direct information from 
Alak Jigme regarding this matter I requested for an interview with him which he refused suggesting 
me to consult officials journals published in the vicinity of that time. 
157 Phone interview with Kasur Sonam Topgyal.  
158 Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong), 25 November 1988, stated in Dawa Norbu, China‟s Tibet Policy, p. 
332, n. 31. 
159 „Ngabo Reiterates China‟s Policy Toward Dalai Lama‟, Xinhua (Beijing), 31 March 1989.  
160 On 18 November 1988, the Chinese Government rejected Geneva as a venue for talks and 
expressed its preference for Beijing or Hong Kong as possible venues. They set conditions that the 
Tibetan negotiating team could not include “a foreigner”, that the team should have older people, 
including the Dalai Lama‟s younger brother Gyalo Thondup. The Tibetans explained that the 
foreigner was only a legal advisor and not an actual member of the negotiating team and that Gyalo 
Thondup would also be included as an advisor to the team. Memorandum to Deng Xiaoping and 
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both sides had finally agreed on Hong Kong as the site for preliminary discussions, 
the Chinese Government refused to communicate any further and failed to live up to 
its own suggestion”.161  
 
It is worthwhile to note how China had failed to live up to its own suggestion and 
maintained the flexibility that it displayed in the earlier messages but at the same time 
Tibetans inclusion of a foreigner albeit as an advisor gave China a good excuse to 
accuse the Tibetans of being insincere and a reason to be more suspicious of the 
Tibetans‟ intention. However it cannot be concluded as an intentional act on the 
Tibetan part since my conversations with the staffs of Tibetan Exile Administration 
revealed that, despite their studied silence on the issue of trust, there was some 
distrust among the Tibetan leadership with the Communist regime.
162
 And it is quite 
understandable given the fact that Chinese themselves have violated the Seventeen 
Point Agreement which was achieved under duress and lacked the witness of a third 
party to that treaty. Other past experiences with the Communist regime also 
contributed to the realisation of the expediency of a third party which manifested in 
the inclusion of a foreign lawyer as an advisor to the negotiating team. The proposed 
meeting in Geneva 1989 did not take place and with that the Sino-Tibetan dialogue 
initiated in 1979 ended with no tangible results for both parties. 
 
In the meantime, inside Tibet demonstrations took place frequently since 1987 and 
Chinese authorities hardened its policy which disrupted the proposed talks. Hardliners 
in the Chinese government used the turmoil in Tibet as ammunition to attack the 
liberals for their relatively lenient policy towards Tibet. A consequence of the 
hardening of the policy was the dismissal of Wu Jinghua,
163
 who was known for his 
                                                                                                                                            
Jiang Zemin from His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 1 September 1992‟ (translated from Tibetan), 
Dharamsala and Beijing: Initiatives and Correspondence 1981-1993, p. 73. 
161 Ibid., p. 72, (pt. 10). 
162 In the past three years during my research trips to India and Nepal I had conversations with a 
number of staffs who were and are currently in the Exile Tibetan Administration which made me 
come to the conclusion that there is widespread distrust with the Communist regime‟s Tibet policy. 
163 Wu Jinghua, succeeded Yin Fatang, the First Party Secretary of the TAR in 1985. He was the first 
Party Secretary in the TAR, who was not a veteran military cadre and during his term, the liberal 
minded Wu Jinghua, called on the Communist Party to respect the fact of the Tibetans universal 
belief in Buddhism and warned that any attempt to undermine their belief would be met with 
resistance. Even the late Panchen Lama is said to have described Wu as „one of the best officials of 
Tibet. Being a Yi minority himself, Wu was reported to be sympathetic to the Tibetans‟ problems. 
Until Wu Jinghua, the Party Secretaries of the TAR had been of Han nationality. 
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liberal stand, as the Party Secretary of the TAR. He was replaced by Hu Jintao,
164
 the 
present President of the PRC and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of 
China, a hardliner under whose term martial law was imposed in TAR in 1989. This 
move can be identified as a significant change in the Chinese leaderships‟ stand 
towards Tibet. Another important factor which angered the Beijing authorities was the 
Dalai Lama‟s refusal to accept the invitation extended by the Chinese Buddhist 
Association to attend the commemorative ceremony in Beijing for the late Panchen 
Lama. Some scholars opined that had the Dalai Lama visited Beijing it would have 
given him an opportunity to meet with the Chinese officials and helped in resuming 
the interrupted talks.
165
 However the Tibetan Government-in-Exile interpreted the 
invitation as China‟s attempt to bypass the Exile government by proposing to meet 
directly with the Dalai Lama.
166
 According to some Tibetan officials
167
 there were 
other reasons which dissuaded the Dalai Lama from accepting the invitation. First, 
there is no tradition of observing commemorative ceremony for deceased Lama in the 
Tibetan Buddhist culture. Secondly, the invitation was sent on a short notice just a 
week before the ceremony was to be held and last, the Tibetans‟ apprehension for the 
safety of the Dalai Lama who represents their only hope as the controversy of the late 
Panchen Lama‟s mysterious death was fresh in the mind of the Tibetans. Another 
factor which contributed to the Tibetans‟ doubts over the Chinese sincerity was the 
Chinese refusal to allow the Dalai Lama to attend the Panchen‟s funeral ceremony in 
Shigatse while approving the invitation for the Commemorative ceremony in Beijing. 
Even if the Dalai Lama had accepted the invitation it remained uncertain whether he 
could have met with high officials of the Chinese government since many leaders 
who engineered the invitation were later purged from their position.
168
 Whatever the 
                                                 
164 Hu Jintao served as the Party Secretary in the TAR from 1988-1992. Hu Jintao was accused for the 
deaths of several Tibetan activists during the political crack down in the early 1989.  
165 Melvyn Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997, p. 90. The author described the Dalai Lama‟s decision not to 
accept this invitation as one of the most important missed opportunities on the part of the Dalai 
Lama. 
166 Warren W. Smith, Tibetan Nation: A History of Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations, p. 617, 
from his personal communication with Lodi Gyari, Washington, February 1995.  
167 Phone interviews conducted in December, 2005 with Tsegyam, the current Director of the Tibet 
Religious Foundation in Taipei, Namgyal Shastri, a reporter for the Voice of America, Tibetan 
Section and Tendar, a staff at the Tibet Office in New York, Lobsang Shastri, a member of ATPD 
and Dakpa Namgyal Khyunglho, a former member of ATPD who was in for the 4
th
 Fact Finding 
Delegation to visit Tibet which did not take place due to Chinese refusal. 
168 Tashi Rabgey and Tsetan Wangchuk Sharlho, Sino-Tibetan Dialogue in the Post-Mao Era: 
Lessons and Prospects, East-West Center Washington, 2004, p. 50, n. 23. 
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case may be the fact that the power had shifted to the hardliners and the policy had 
hardened is undeniable.  
 
Besides the above mentioned factors, an external factor which had contributed to 
hardening of Beijing‟s Tibet policy was the normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations in 
1986 that allayed Beijing‟s fear of the USSR‟s support for the Dalai Lama. Based on 
Phuntsok Tashi Takla‟s169 account, it is clear that China was cautious of Soviet 
intervention in the Tibet issue and therefore to prevent such opposition, it took 
initiatives to resolve the Tibet problem in the early 1980s
170
 in particular, to prevent 
the Dalai Lama from falling under the Soviet Union‟s influence. Evidently, Beijing 
perceived external interventions including military supports from India
171
 and the 
Soviet Union for the Dalai Lama. Beijing government, primarily for strategic 
considerations tried to initiate the return of the Dalai Lama in the early 1980s
172
 
However, the normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations made Beijing feel free of any 
external threat which led to the adoption of harder measures against Tibet. 
 
The Dalai Lama had repeatedly announced that he was not seeking the 
“independence” of Tibet. However, the Chinese noted that both the Dalai Lama‟s173 
Five-Point Peace Plan and the Strasbourg proposal were based on the assumption that 
                                                 
169 Phuntsok Tashi,Takla, Mi-tshe‟i byung-ba brjod-pa (An Account of the Life‟s Event), Vol. 3, 
Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1995, pp. 140-141. Phuntsok Tashi Takla was 
the interpreter for the Tibetan delegation who signed the Seventeen Point Agreement in 1951. After 
coming into exile Takla served the Tibetan Government-in-Exile for many years, holding various 
posts, among others the Minister of the Department of Security. He visited Tibet in 1979 as a 
member of the First Exploratory team to Tibet and then again in 1982 and 1984, he traveled to 
Beijing as a three member Tibetan delegation to hold exploratory talks on the future of Tibet. He 
visited Beijing for the third time in December 1986, after his official retirement to understand 
Beijing‟s thinking in resolving the Tibetan question.  
170 Ibid. 
171 After the Sino-Indian border war in 1962, the Indian government both openly and clandestinely 
adopted more supportive policy towards the Tibetans. India openly supported the UN resolution on 
Tibet in 1965, established a special Tibetan frontier force “Unit 22” to train young Tibetans within 
the Indian Army at Dehra Dun (the unit still exists and it has strength of about 10,000 Tibetan men 
and women), and different Indian states allocated land for the resettlement of Tibetan refugees.  
172 Phuntsok Tashi Takla, wrote in his autobiography that in 1979 the Chinese People‟s Political 
Consultative Conference decided on a four-point policy to bring back the Dalai Lama to Tibet. The 
second point of the policy, as listed in his An Account of Life‟s Events, stated that the Soviets were 
trying their best to take the Dalai Lama under their influence and if succeeded it could pose a great 
danger to China. China, therefore, must work on the return of the Dalai Lama and should not close 
the door even if the Dalai Lama could not return immediately. The policy must prevent at any cost 
the Dalai Lama forming alliance with the Soviets. 
173 The Dalai Lama‟s thoughts reflect that though Tibet was an independent nation prior to 1950, he 
accepts the reality of Chinese takeover which has made Tibet an integral part of China, and on that 
basis he is willing to negotiate with China on the future of Tibet.  
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Tibet had historically been an independent state prior to the Chinese takeover in 
1950. This according to Beijing was a distortion of history and violation of the first 
precondition for negotiation which required the Tibetans‟ implicit acceptance of Tibet 
having always been a part of China. Chinese definition of “giving up the idea of 
independence” requires unconditional acceptance of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet 
not only in present but also in past and future, which meant that the Dalai Lama had 
to admit that Tibet was an “inalienable part of China” and had never been an 
independent state in the past. The Dalai Lama‟s constant references to Tibet‟s 
independence in past are seen as “a necessary part of his continuation plan of 
separatism”.174 Therefore, to continue dialogue with China he must completely 
relinquish the very notion of independence, both in terms of Tibet‟s history and her 
future. “On the question of such major importance to the future of the Chinese nation, 
there is no room for bargaining,” says Sha Zhao.175  
 
In contrast to the Chinese response, international community applauded the Dalai 
Lama for his diplomatic initiative and appreciated the important compromise he made 
as a significant and potential step towards resolution of the Tibetan issue. Many 
Tibetans in exile, however, felt dismayed and let down by the leadership for 
relinquishing Tibet‟s independence in exchange for a genuine autonomy within the 
framework of the PRC. This was the first time that the Dalai Lama‟s decision had 
triggered loud dissenting voices in the exile community. They felt that the proposal 
not only compromised one of the most important fundamental rights of the Tibetan 
people but also discarded the essence of the Tibetan political cause. The proposal 
generated a great deal of controversy among the exile community which created 
damaging divisions in the society. There were also accusations of foreign 
involvement in the decision making process.
176
 The proposal which was aimed at 
                                                 
174 Sha Zhou, „What is It Behind The Dalai Lama‟s Plan?‟, Beijing Review, 19 February 1990, p. 22. 
The article criticised all the major points of the Dalai Lama‟s Washington and Strasbourg 
statements. The Dalai Lama‟s conception of a democratic government in Tibet is ridiculed by 
stating that “such a sentiment would be expected from a Western political figure but it is absurdity 
coming from a representative of feudal serfdom. By such sentiments, the Dalai Lama is attempting 
to sing the praise of the Western capitalist system and negate socialism”. Zhou stated that the Dalai 
Lama‟s proposal attempts to transform China‟s internal affairs into a question between two 
countries and thus lays the groundwork for an attempt to separate Tibet from the rest of China. The 
Dalai Lama‟s proposal to turn Tibet into a peace zone is also rejected. Ibid., pp. 21-23. 
175 Ibid., p.23. 
176 The Strasbourg proposal was criticised by the younger generations of Tibetans in exile as too 
conciliatory filled with unwarranted concessions. Phuntsok Wangyal, a member of the second fact-
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setting up a platform for negotiations ended up not only being rejected by China but 
was also disapproved by many Tibetans in exile. It received positive response only 
from the international community. 
 
The Dalai Lama‟s conciliatory approach in resolving the Tibet issue resulted in the 
award of Nobel Peace Prize in 1989 and with that the Tibet issue gains a new wave of 
publicity. Tibetans everywhere considered this as a major victory and an indication of 
Western support for their cause. Contrarily the Chinese interpreted it as an attempt by 
the exiled Tibetans to internationalise the Tibetan issue. However, irrespective of 
Chinese protestation and prohibition, the “internationalisation” of Tibet issue was 
inevitable once Tibet was open to the outside world. The awarding of the Nobel 
Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama eased the international leaders‟ reluctance to meet with 
the Dalai Lama. In April 1991 the US President George Bush met with the Dalai 
Lama in Washington, thus becoming the first President in the history of the US to 
meet the exiled leader. Moreover, on that occasion Bush expressed the US‟s concerns 
over human rights problem in Tibet. According to Guangqiu
177
 the meeting between 
the two leaders signified a shift in the administration‟s position since two years 
earlier the administration had refused to receive the Dalai Lama. Predictably, China 
criticised the meeting, accusing that it was “an act of gross interference in China‟s 
internal affairs”.178 After that historic meeting, the Dalai Lama gave an address to the 
Congress members in the Capitol Rotunda, where he spoke of Tibet as a “nation 
under foreign occupation” and called upon the US and other governments to link 
                                                                                                                                            
finding delegation to Tibet in 1980, „Giving Up the Struggle‟, Tibetan Review, vol. 23, no. 9, 
September 1988, pp. 9-11; and Jamyang Norbu, „In Deng‟s Grave New World, An Illusion Dies‟, 
Tibetan Review, vol. 24, no. 8, August 1989, pp.13-17 and Illusion and Reality: Essay on the 
Tibetan and Chinese Political Scene from 1978 to 1989, Dharamsala: Tibetan Youth Congress, 
1989, p. 89. Both the authors maintain that the Strasbourg proposal was a “foreign inspired” scheme 
in which the former British Prime Minister Edward Heath, the British Parliamentarian Lord Ennals, 
former American President Jimmy Carter and Michael Van Walt Van Praag played prominent roles. 
Even now many young Tibetan exiles, despite their tremendous reverence for His Holiness the 
Dalai Lama could not reconcile themselves to the notion of living with the nation that had caused so 
much misery in their homeland. Tibetan youths see that nonviolence and compromise are not going 
to work with the Chinese government, and believe that the best course to pursue their goal is a 
conventional national struggle. The best example is, the Tibetan Youth Congress, which is the 
largest non-governmental political organisation that has 71 branch offices all over the world. The 
organisation was founded on October 1970 in Dharamsala, India. Its demand for complete 
independence has been consistent and though it has never resorted to violence as a means to achieve 
independence it has kept its option open.  
177 Guangqiu Xu, „The United States and the Tibet Issue‟, Asian Survey, vol. 37, no. 11, November 
1997, p. 1071.  
178 Keesing‟s Record of World Events, vol. 37, no. 5, 1991. 
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their foreign policy with China to human rights concerns. He expressed his 
exasperation and the misgiving of his people at the Capitol when he said, “It had 
been almost three years since the Strasbourg Proposal. In that time, many Tibetans 
have expressed profound misgivings over my stand for being too conciliatory. 
Beijing did respond: but the response was negative”.179 
 
The Dalai Lama‟s speech convinced the US Congress of China‟s insincerity to 
negotiate with the Dalai Lama and prompted the US Congress to take sterner 
measures. The Senate resolution (S. Res. 107), which can be considered as one of the 
strongest resolutions on Tibet, repeated the opinion expressed by the International 
Commission of Jurists‟ 1960, that “Tibet demonstrated from 1913 to 1950 the 
conditions of statehood as generally accepted under international law,” and resolved 
to stand with the Tibetan people and the Dalai Lama as they journey towards freedom 
and assured that “all Americans are united on the goals of freedom and human rights 
of Tibet”.180 In October 1991, President Bush signed the Congress legislated bill 
which contained the most important legal pronouncement on Tibet. The Foreign 
Relations Authorisation Act for fiscal year 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-138 [H.R. 
1415]) declares that: 
 
1. Tibet, including those areas incorporated into the Chinese provinces of Sichuan, 
Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai, as an occupied country under the established 
principles of the international law; 
2. Tibet‟s true representatives are the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-
exile as recognised by the Tibetan people; 
3. Tibet has maintained throughout its history a distinctive and sovereign national, 
cultural, and religious identity separate from that of China and, except during 
periods of illegal Chinese occupation, has maintained a separate and sovereign 
political and territorial identity; 
4. Historical evidence of this separate identity may be found in Chinese archival 
documents and traditional dynastic histories, in the United States recognition of 
Tibetan neutrality during World War II, and in the fact that a number of countries 
including the United States, Mongolia, Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal, India, Japan, Great 
                                                 
179 „Address to the US Congress,‟ A. A. Shiromany, ed., The Political Philosophy of His Holiness the 
Dalai Lama: Selected Speeches and Writings, New Delhi: Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy 
Research Centre and Friedrich Naumann-Stiftung, 1998, pp. 64-67. 
180 „Senate Resolution 107, 18 April 1991‟, in DIIR, International Resolutions and Recognitions on 
Tibet: 1959 to 2004, pp. 100-101. 
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Britain, and Russia recognised Tibet as an independent nation or dealt with Tibet 
independently of any Chinese government involvement; 
5. In 1949-1950, China launched an armed invasion of Tibet in contravention of 
international law; 
6. It is the policy of the United States to oppose aggression and other illegal uses of 
force by one country against the sovereignty of another as a means of acquiring 
territory, and to condemn violations of international law, including the illegal 
occupation of one country by another; and  
7. Numerous United States declarations since the Chinese invasion have recognised 
Tibet‟s rights to self-determination and the illegality of China‟s occupation of 
Tibet.
181
 
 
Thus, while the US Congress and the State Department show similar concerns on the 
human rights abuses in Tibet, they differ considerably on Tibet‟s political issue. In 
contrast to the US Congress, the executive branch of the US government maintained 
its stand on the legitimacy of China‟s sovereignty over Tibet. At a hearing held on 
Tibet‟s political status by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July 1992, L. 
Desaix Anderson, the then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs, repeated the US position that “The United States, like all other 
governments throughout the world, considers Tibet to be a part of China, with the 
status of an autonomous region. No country recognises Tibet as independent of 
China. The United States has never taken the position that Tibet is an independent 
country, nor has it recognised the Dalai Lama as the leader of a Government-in-
Exile”.182 In response to a question regarding the 1960 US position on Tibet‟s right to 
self-determination, Secretary Anderson said that “the question, though, at that time 
was a discussion of self-determination in the context of Tibet‟s being an autonomous 
region, but not the question of whether or not it was an independent country”.183 
Whatever stand the State Department had on the Tibet question, their support for 
Tibet‟s human rights issue was obvious from annual human rights report published by 
the US State Department which cited China as responsible for “persistent abuses in 
                                                 
181 „Foreign Relations Authorisation Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Public Law 102-138 (H.R. 
1415), 28 October 1991, in DIIR, International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 to 
2004, pp. 165-168. 
182 „US and Chinese Policies towards Occupied Tibet‟, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States Senate, 28 July 1992, US Government Printing Office, 1993, p. 5; „US 
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183 Ibid., p. 8. 
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Tibet”184 and the US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Schifter‟s long speech at the 
48
th
 annual meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHCR) held in Geneva 
attacked China of its human rights issue. Beijing strongly condemned Richard 
Schifter‟s speech stating that “hostile Western forces want to willfully interfere in 
China‟s international affairs and incite a handful of separatists to split Tibet from 
China on the pretext of human rights”.185 
 
Interestingly, the Dalai Lama‟s meeting with the US President George Bush was 
followed by a succession of high profile meetings between the Dalai Lama and 
various international leaders including many Heads of States,
186
 a number of them for 
the first time. Evidently, that important encounter created a new ambience for the 
international community to welcome and receive the Dalai Lama with less fear of 
incurring Beijing‟s wrath. While in the previous year only seven world leaders had 
received the Dalai Lama, more than eighteen dignitaries met with him in the year 
President Bush received him. On December 2, 1991 British Prime Minister John 
Major met the Dalai Lama. As the Dalai Lama gains more visibility and international 
reputation through his extensive travel in the West, the question of Tibet began to get 
more attention and international support and develop a higher profile. On 23 August, 
that same year, the Tibet issue was brought up before the United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities. The Sub-Commission for the first time, since the PRC‟s 
admission in the UN, adopted a resolution entitled “Situation in Tibet”187 which 
                                                 
184 Ibid., p.8. The report mentioned that some 3,000 Tibetans were being held in prison for political 
offenses, although China claims much smaller numbers.  
185 „Human Rights Defenders Fail to Win Support‟, Renmin Ribao (People‟s Daily), 6 March 1992. 
186 In 1991, the Dalai Lama had met the following leaders of the foreign countries. March 22, Mrs. 
Mary Robinson, President, Republic of Ireland; April 16, Mr. George Bush, President, U.S.A; Aug 
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President, Latvia; Oct 4, Mr. Bronius Kuzmickas, Vice-President, Estonia; Oct 5, Mr. Zhelyn 
Zhelev, President, Bulgaria; Dec 2, Mr. John Major, Prime Minister, United Kingdom; Dec 4, Mrs. 
Margaretha af Ugglas, Foreign Minister, Sweden; Dec 5, Mr. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Foreign 
Minister, Denmark; Dec 8, Mr. Torvald Stoltenberg, Foreign Minister, Norway. Source from the 
official site of His Holiness the Dalai Lama by Office of Tibet in London.     
http://www.tibet.com/DL/leaders.html  
187 „UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minority Rights, 
Resolution 1991/10, Geneva, 23 August 1991‟, International Resolutions and Recognitions on 
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called upon the Chinese government to respect the fundamental human rights and 
freedoms of the Tibetan people. The resolution showed concerns over the continuing 
reports of violations of basic human rights which threaten the distinct cultural, 
religious and national identity of the Tibetan people. Since then Tibet‟s human rights 
issue began to appear occasionally, thus causing embarrassment for the PRC‟s 
government. However, the PRC rejected the accusations brought up against them in 
different UN Sub-commissions as distorted and fallacious. Since the Strasbourg 
Proposal failed to wield any positive response from the Chinese side and observing 
the rampant views and criticism against the proposal as too conciliatory in the Tibetan 
community the Dalai Lama, in his 10th March Statement 1991,
188
 declared the 
proposal as ineffectual and announced that if China failed to respond positively he 
would be free of any obligation to the proposal. On 2 September 1991 the Chairman 
of Kashag announced the withdrawal of the Strasbourg Proposal. However, the Dalai 
Lama and his exile government retained the proposal‟s core principles of non-
violence and negotiation to resolve the Tibet issue.
189
 
 
The Dalai Lama and the Government-in-Exile did not give up their quest for 
negotiation. On 9 October 1991, in an address at the Yale University, the Dalai Lama 
appealed to the world for support in pressuring China to allow him to visit Tibet to 
personally assess the political situation. He said, “The Chinese government‟s refusal 
to reciprocate my efforts to start negotiation has increased the impatience of many 
Tibetans, especially young Tibetans in Tibet, with the nonviolent path we follow. 
Tension in my country is increasing as China encourages demographic aggression in 
Tibet, reducing Tibetans to a second class minority in our own country... I am 
extremely anxious that, in this explosive situation, violence may break out. I want to 
do what I can to prevent this... My visit would be a new opportunity to promote 
understanding and create a basis for a negotiated solution”.190 Later that year the 
Dalai Lama sought a meeting with the Chinese Prime minister Li Peng, when he was 
in India on a state visit. But both his proposals were rejected by the Chinese 
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leadership who continued to feed the world and the exile government with the same 
official rhetoric first formulated by Deng Xiaoping in 1979. In June 1992, Ding 
Guangen, head of the United Front Work Department of the CCP Central Committee, 
through Gyalo Thondup restated the assurance that the Chinese government is willing 
to discuss and resolve any issue except total independence. He said that according to 
the Chinese government‟s view that the Dalai Lama has still not given up the notion 
of independence and that the Chinese government was interested to start negotiations 
as soon as the Dalai Lama gives up the independence of Tibet.
191
  
 
The typical Chinese modus operandi for negotiation left the Tibetans in confusion as 
to what exactly the Chinese government wants and expects. The precondition that 
stipulates the eschewing of independence was formerly accepted by the Dalai Lama 
in his Strasbourg Proposal. Yet Beijing continues to disregard the proposal of 1988 as 
a valid basis for negotiation in resolving the Tibet problem and keeps on 
reinterpreting and changing their preconditions. Beijing authorities asserted that the 
proposal still contains the notion of Tibet‟s independence and hence the Dalai Lama 
should acknowledge that Tibet is an inalienable part of China. This, however, was 
unacceptable to the Dalai Lama as his acknowledgement would legally void Tibet‟s 
past history and its de facto status prior to the Chinese takeover in 1950 as claimed by 
the International Commission of Jurists in its report of 1960. Judging from the way 
China loves to place the Dalai Lama in difficult spots and impossible confines we can 
infer that if possible China hopes to legitimise their illegal occupation of Tibet by 
using the Dalai Lama‟s authority and popularity, if not then to remain rigid and 
inflexible in terms of negotiations. As we will see later the Chinese precondition took 
yet another form when US President Clinton raised the Tibet issue at a meeting with 
Jiang Zemin in China in 1998. 
 
In a press statement in New Delhi, in September 1993, the Dalai Lama repeated his 
positions of the future Tibet. He said:  
 
For the past fourteen years, since that position was first started, I have not only 
declared my willingness to enter into negotiations, but have also made a series 
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of proposals which clearly lie within the framework for negotiation proposed by 
Mr. Deng Xiaoping. The ideas put forward during the discussions that my 
representatives had with Chinese officials in Beijing, and later made public in 
the Five Point Peace Plan for Tibet (1987) and the Strasbourg Proposal (1988), 
envisage a solution which does not ask for independence of Tibet. However, 
China had refused to enter into negotiations of any kind to seriously discuss any 
of those proposals or to constructively respond to them. Indeed, the Chinese 
Government has refused to discuss any question of substance, insisting that the 
only issue to be resolved is that pertaining to my personal return to Tibet, about 
which it has made a number of statements... 
 
As I have stated again and again, my return is not the issue. The issue is the 
survival and the welfare of the six million Tibetan people and the preservation of 
our culture and civilization.
192
 
 
A year later in his speech at the German Parliament and in his address at the 
European Parliament on October 23, 1996 the Dalai Lama said: 
 
I have tried in every way I know to find some mutually acceptable solution in 
the spirit of reconciliation and compromise. However, it has now become clear 
that our efforts are not sufficient to bring the Chinese government to the 
negotiating table. This sad state of affairs compels me to appeal to your 
government and the international community for urgent intervention and action 
on behalf of my people.
193
 
 
That same year in his address at the Tibet Support Group Conference in Bonn, 14 
June 1996, the Dalai Lama reiterated that his immediate goal is to have a meaningful 
negotiation based on his “middle way approach,”194 He clarified his reference on 
Tibet‟s status prior to 1950 as not seeking independence. He said, “We should forget 
the past and look forward to creating a good and mutually accepted future, 
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unfortunately the Chinese government continuously insists that the Dalai Lama 
should make a categorical statement that Tibet has always been a part of China. How 
is that possible? I do feel that as a simple Buddhist monk, I cannot tell such a big 
lie”.195 
 
In summer 1998, the Sino-Tibetan dialogue received a major thrust when President 
Clinton on his visit to China, took initiative to revive the dialogue between His 
Holiness the Dalai Lama and Beijing. At a press conference with President Jiang 
Zemin, Clinton raised the Tibet issue before a nation-wide television audience. Jiang 
replied, “As long as the Dalai Lama makes a public commitment that Tibet is an 
inalienable part of China, and Taiwan a province of China, the door to negotiation is 
open”.196 In his autobiography the former US President recalled the event. He writes, 
“When I urged Jiang to meet with the Dalai Lama, he said the door was open if the 
Dalai Lama would first state that Tibet and Taiwan were part of China, and added that 
there were already “several channels of communication” with the leader of Tibetan 
Buddhism. I got a laugh from the Chinese audience when I said I thought that if Jiang 
and the Dalai Lama did meet, they would like each other very much”.197 The 
precondition concerning Taiwan surfaced for the first time in the Sino-Tibetan 
dialogue, Beijing‟s last resort to silence the Dalai Lama knowing that he would never 
make such proclamations. It is the third precondition that Beijing had laid to 
circumvent the international pressure and the exile government‟s persistence. In the 
earlier Chinese preconditions it had been about the status of Tibet alone. The Exile 
Tibetan government responded vehemently by saying that the issue of Taiwan‟s status 
is for the people of Taiwan and the PRC to resolve. In November the Dalai Lama 
traveled to the United States to make a statement in response to President Jiang 
Zemin‟s precondition. On 11 November, subsequent to the meeting with President 
Clinton, the Dalai Lama told reporters that he was “willing to make commitments 
sought by China as a condition of renewing official negotiations over his Himalayan 
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homeland”.198 However, the Dalai Lama‟s choice of venue to make the 
announcement upset the Chinese as they pointed out that he went through the 
“wrong” procedure which “seriously hurts the (nationalistic) feelings of the (Han) 
Chinese people”.199 
 
Since 1988, the Dalai Lama had made his intentions known that he wants to negotiate 
for a “genuine autonomy” under the leadership of the PRC. However, his lack of any 
bargaining power compels him to seek international support to facilitate a Sino-
Tibetan dialogue. But PRC misconstrued all the international mediations as meddling 
in Chinese “internal affairs”. For the past seventeen years, the Dalai Lama has 
repeatedly said, “I do not seek independence” but China rejected all his initiatives 
accusing him of engaging in “splittist activities” and conspiring “Tibet‟s 
independence”. This strategy of Beijing astounds not only the Dalai Lama but also 
the entire international community. In early December, the Dalai Lama publicly 
acknowledged that all channels of communication had broken down.
200
 The Sino-
Tibetan dialogue, after a decade of contacts still remains to be a continuing process, 
with no substantial outcome. It is true that the Chinese leaders have always shown 
eagerness to hold talks with the Dalai Lama but at the same time they have always 
insisted that the terms and conditions for such negotiation must be a Chinese dictated 
ones and not a compromised solution. What, therefore, lacks in the Sino-Tibetan 
dialogue is the balance of power of the two negotiating teams to resolve the 
conflicting issue. Though the Dalai Lama has gained much international fame and 
prestige for his non-violent struggles, the support that he has won is yet to be 
transformed into political and diplomatic force that can impact a major change in the 
Chinese policy towards the Tibet question.  
 
After studying the documents of correspondence between the Dalai Lama and Beijing 
for several years, I came to the conclusion that the Chinese “open door to 
negotiation” has two ulterior motives: first to diffuse the international pressure and 
second to buy time until the Dalai Lama passes away which China hopes would lead 
to the extinguishment of the Tibetan cause. Beijing therefore does not seem interested 
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in reaching a compromised solution to the Tibetan issue but for propaganda‟s sake 
they insist on calling for talks with the Dalai Lama. Chinese scholars and authors 
have urged their government to hold talks with the Dalai Lama as they perceive the 
exile leader as the key to the Tibetan problem. For example, Wang Lixiong, a 
prominent Han Chinese writer who has an intimate knowledge of Tibet through his 
extensive travel to the region and has met the Dalai Lama four times, writes that the 
Dalai Lama‟s Middle Way Policy is a sincere policy with no hidden agenda and urged 
the communist power holders in Beijing, especially those who delay the settlement of 
the Tibetan issue to reconsider. He further warned Beijing that treating the Dalai 
Lama as their enemy would put itself as an opponent of the western world, since the 
Dalai Lama is highly renowned in the international arena.
201
 
 
In short I see the continuous modification of the preconditions by Beijing as ploy to 
dodge the international criticisms and wait for the Dalai Lama‟s demise. Moreover, 
the term “negotiation” carried a different connotation for Beijing which precluded a 
sincere compromise on both the parties. The Chinese version of the term negotiation 
as applied towards Tibet can be described as: 
 
The People‟s Republic of China Dalai Lama  
1. In 1979, Deng Xiaoping proposed to hold 
talks on any issue except for Tibet‟s 
independence. 
The Dalai Lama responded by announcing the 
Strasbourg Proposal in which he relinquished 
Tibet‟s independence in exchange for a genuine 
autonomy under the leadership of the PRC. 
2.  China viewed the Strasbourg proposal as 
containing independence in disguise and 
called on the Dalai Lama to acknowledge 
that Tibet is an inalienable part of the PRC. 
The Dalai Lama answered that the history cannot 
be rewritten and therefore, both the parties should 
forget the past and work on the future to resolve 
the problem. 
3. In response to Clinton‟s initiative to revive 
the Sino-Tibetan dialogue, Jiang Zemin on 
a nation wide television responded by 
demanding that the Dalai Lama should 
proclaim that not only Tibet but Taiwan is 
a province of China. 
The Dalai Lama answered that the Taiwan‟s 
status is for the people of Taiwan to decide. As 
for the Tibetans he remained steadfast that the 
future status of Tibet can be mutually discussed 
and seeks a solution acceptable to both the 
parties. However, he maintained that Tibet‟s past 
history cannot be changed as one wishes. 
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As China had expected, their last precondition had left the Tibetans and the Dalai 
Lama stunned and speechless. By throwing the ball in Tibet‟s court China once again 
succeeded in proving to the international community that they had responded to 
international initiatives. It is too early to say what the Sino-Tibet relation would entail 
since there are other international factors that influence this issue. It greatly depends 
on geopolitical structure of the world. Recent talks between the Special Envoys
202
 of 
the Dalai Lama and officials from Beijing have been resumed after more than a 
decade of stalemate. If my readings of relevant documents are correct then it can be 
safely assumed that the breakthrough came due to European parliament‟s203 warning 
that if the Chinese government did not negotiate with the exile Tibetan Government 
within three years, then the Parliament would “give serious consideration to the 
possibility of recognising the Tibetan Government in exile as the legitimate 
representative of the Tibetan people”.204 Despite four rounds of talks in three years 
since 2002 there are numerous issues that need to be ironed out before the two parties 
can sit down for real negotiations. There exist different views in the exile community 
about the ongoing talks, while some optimists see this as evidence that the issues are 
beginning to work between the two parties, many however see that China is once 
again playing for time and placate international opinion. Until now rigid boundaries 
set up by the two sides for negotiations seem to be mutually exclusive and until the 
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two parties extend the parameters and minimize critical issues of disagreement they 
would be always in the “prenegotiation stage”.205  
 
Crucial factors that are absent in the Sino-Tibetan dialogue in resolving the issue are 
balance of power, flexibility in terms of compromising fundamental preconditions, 
trust and confidence between the two parties. Another factor which could play a 
major role in facilitating the dialogue process is a strong, comprehensive and 
substantive united international support for resolution of Tibet question. Until now 
Western supports for Tibet have been centered primarily on human rights issues, 
which although have resulted in early release of many Tibetan political prisoners 
nevertheless pushed Tibet‟s political issue to the background of international dealings 
with China. If concerted efforts have been made to support political issue to a same 
degree as that of human rights issues, then international support can and will help in 
creating a genuine negotiation between the two parties. The Dalai Lama‟s Envoy in 
Europe, Mr. Kelsang Gyaltsen, in his speech to the Fourth World Parliamentarian 
Convention on Tibet, held in Edinburgh on November 18 - 19, 2005, says:  
 
“There is no doubt in our mind that the strong international concern for 
Tibet has been one of the major factors for the Chinese leaders for agreeing 
to our visits. It is, therefore, necessary that the international community 
continues to remain engaged with the Chinese government on the issue of 
Tibet. It is of great importance to continue to demonstrate strong interest in 
the progress of the ongoing process and to continue to encourage and urge 
the Chinese leadership to enter into earnest negotiations to peacefully 
resolve the issue of Tibet”.206 
 
 
Therefore, in order to bring radical policy changes towards Tibet, Western nations 
have to elevate their support level from humanitarian to political and diplomatic level. 
An ambiguous support for Tibet could be misinterpreted both by Tibetans inside Tibet 
who might view it with great expectation that could lead to open demonstrations and 
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by Beijing Government, as destabilising factor that could lead to intensification of 
policy of oppression as preemptive measures against such peaceful demonstrations.
207
  
 
2.4.2 China‟s New Tibet Policy: From Reforms to Economic Integration  
In March-April 1980, the First Work Forum on Tibet was convened by the Chinese 
government. The forum conceded that their efforts to improve Tibetans‟ living 
standard had not materialised and lamented the party‟s failure to have misused the 
capital investments, disregarding the local conditions and the availability of supplies 
which led to unsatisfactory results and heavy losses.
208
 Self-criticisms were made by 
the Party officials who highlighted the past mistakes in implementing various projects 
thus leaving many areas in Tibet extremely poor.
209
 The Forum also identified the 
leftist influence
210
 as the main cause of failure and urgency of the integration and 
development of Tibet‟s economy. In order to foster rapid development in the region 
the Central government decided to inject more capital. Additionally, the forum 
acknowledged the need for improving the relationship between the nationalities 
stressing that “if we do not seize the moment and immediately improve the 
relationship between the nationalities [Chinese/Tibetan] we will make a serious 
mistake”.211 Later in May 1980, a group of Chinese dignitaries led by the Party 
Secretary Hu Yaobang visited Tibet.
212
 At a conference held on 29 May, attended by 
5000 cadres in Lhasa, Hu, speaking for 170 minutes, criticised the Party‟s failure and 
proposed six ways to remedy the economy of Tibet.
213
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However, even with the influx of capital from the government many of the 
development projects failed to produce expected results.
214
 The authoritative Beijing 
Review while blaming the remnants of „Leftism‟ and three years of bad weather for 
the stunted growth of Tibet‟s economy acknowledged that the living standards of the 
Tibetans had not shown any kind of improvement.
215
 Chinese officials had reported 
the shortages in agricultural output in Tibet. Renmin Ribao in a candid report 
described that “no marked improvement had been brought about in the Tibetan 
people‟s livelihood”. Yin Fatang, head of the CCP in Tibet, had been quoted as 
exclaiming that “the greatest reality in Xizang was its poverty”.216 This was in spite of 
the slight increase in grain output and some additional growth in per capita output. 
Recognising the political importance of the economic growth in Tibet as a tool of 
maintaining social stability and to win more adherents to the idea that Tibet is better 
off remaining a part of China, the Second Work Forum was held in February 1984, 
targeting economic development in Tibet as its primary goal. To support their policy 
Beijing poured huge amount of money despite bleak economic return and soon the 
subsidies provided by Beijing government reached 1 billion Yuan a year. This 
economic strategy was intimately connected to the political situation of Tibet and 
China‟s fight against what they call the “splittist groups”.217  
 
The Forum decided to undertake 43 large construction projects including building up 
of communication networks, road system and power stations in the TAR to build up 
the infrastructure of the region. At a total cost of 470 million Yuan, to be borne by the 
Central government and other interior provinces, the projects were to enhance the 
economic development plans. Despite warnings from their own microeconomists, 
Wang and Bai in Poverty of Plenty, in investing so much in Tibet the Chinese 
government was willing to take the risk which they deemed as necessary.
218
 The 
projects were scheduled to be completed for the 20th anniversary of the founding of 
the TAR. Some 60,000 workers were sent to undertake these projects which boosted 
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further Chinese immigration into Tibet.
219
 Not only experts as China claims but also 
unskilled Chinese workers were brought to Tibet creating a lot of resentment among 
the local Tibetans. This sentiment was reflected by Dorje Tsetan, one of the Tibetan 
Deputy Party Secretaries, at a meeting in Beijing when he protested that the new 
Chinese immigrants would create a new challenge for the local Tibetans and 
exacerbate social tensions in the region.
220
 The late Panchen Lama is also said to have 
shown similar concerns when he complained in a statement to the Tibet Standing 
Committee of the National People‟s Congress in 1987, that “the expense of keeping 
one Chinese in Tibet is equal to that of four in China. Why should Tibet spend its 
money to feed them?”221  
 
In July 1994, the Third Work Forum on Tibet was convened in Beijing, which was 
attended by China‟s top leaders.222 The Forum was specifically held with the purpose 
of legitimising and prioritising the wide scale economic development works and 
projects in Tibet. The Forum declared that the high-speed development plans were 
drawn as measures for uplifting the backward economy of the indigenous people. 
Assimilating Tibet‟s backward economy with China‟s rapidly growing industries and 
bringing fast-paced growth deep into the hinterland of Tibet were cited as primary 
goals. On the contrary, the Tibetans felt that China was only interested in the rich 
mineral deposits of Tibet. Despite the government‟s announcement that foreign 
investments were welcomed the fact remained that only overseas Chinese and 
mainlanders could invest in the projects launched in Tibet. The implementation of the 
policies endorsed by the Central government received criticism when the Tibet Daily 
published accusations from the Tibetan cadres who emphasised that the policies were 
not moderated in line with the region‟s special needs and characteristics. The policies 
were framed in ideological terms that excluded positive involvement for Tibetans in 
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the economy.
223
 Other policies approved by the Forum includes curtailing of religious 
activity, launching highly aggressive campaign against the Dalai Lama, uncovering 
Tibetan cadres and officials suspected of concealing nationalist feelings, providing 
ideological education.  
 
The forum was purposely held to legitimise the implementation of the policies. In a 
document circulated among the CCP cadres entitled A Golden Bridge Leading into a 
New Era,
224
 the party revealed that the CCP was no longer seriously interested in 
holding dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his return to China. The conference decided 
to make economic integration of Tibet their top priority in solving Tibet‟s problems 
thereby announcing 62 major projects in Tibet. These projects were concentrated 
mainly on energy transportation, telecommunication networks, and agriculture and 
water conservation. The projects were to cost 2.38 billion Yuan, from which 75% was 
to be contributed by the Central government and the remaining by provinces and 
municipalities. Provincial firms were shown green light by the Central government to 
import their own workers or hire Chinese already in Tibet to enhance the projects. 
The Third Forum also contained allegations of the PRC that Western governments, 
especially the United States, were sources of pro-independence movement in Tibet. A 
statement on the strategic context of decisions released by the Third Forum says, 
“Since the ending of the cold war, the west, led by America, is continuously bringing 
forth the „Tibet issue‟ as their best weapon to „Westernise China‟ and to „split‟ 
China”.225 The conference in its strategic context reaffirmed: 
 
We should intensify opening up to various provinces, municipalities, and 
regions; encourage and support economic entities and individuals in the 
hinterland to set up enterprises of all kinds in Tibet; earnestly expand 
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economic cooperation and exchanges with the interior with preferential 
policies and abundant resources; and establish close organic ties between 
Tibet‟s and China‟s economies...We should take effective steps to maintain the 
current ranks of Han cadres and transfer Han and other minority cadres from 
the hinterland into Tibet... We should introduce special allowances, increase 
cadres‟ salaries and fringe benefits, and help cadres who come to Tibet solve 
such problems as housing and schooling and employment for their 
dependants.
226 
 
The Third Work Forum on Tibet advocated economic development and importation of 
Han Chinese into Tibet as solutions to the Tibet problem. Workers from different 
provinces were encouraged to go to Tibet to work on various projects and were 
provided incentives by the Central government to settle in Tibet. Increase in influx of 
Chinese immigrants has become a serious threat to the Tibetan identity.
227
 Since the 
turmoil in Lhasa convinced the Central government that their lenient policy could 
encourage the Tibetans to exercise their rights in demanding independence and 
expressing their nationalistic sentiments, the forum decided to implement even more 
rigid policies. Such restrictions imposed upon the Tibetans made the word autonomy 
inapplicable to the Tibetans.  
 
Although the CCP has not changed their verbal assurances of stating that they are 
officially open to a return of the Dalai Lama when he abandons the advocacy of 
independence they are in fact fortifying their position with the on going population 
transfer policy and the economic integration of Tibet. This policy of flooding Tibet 
with Han Chinese and integrating Tibet‟s economy was further vitalized by four Mega 
projects proposed in the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005).
228
 The Chinese name for 
Tibet is Xizang which literally means Western Treasure House and it reflects China‟s 
hope and greed for the vast natural resources of Tibet. According to reports of the 
Environment and Development Desk of DIIR and the Research and Analysis Centre 
of the CTA, more than 126 minerals were found in Tibet and significant deposits of 
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uranium, chromite, boron, lithium, boras and iron are found in various parts of Tibet. 
Reserves of oil and natural gas, gold and silver, copper and zinc are found on the high 
plateau. Large concentrations of resources are located throughout Tibet‟s traditional 
provinces including Tsaidam Basin, Nagchu, Golok, Chamdo, Chang Thang, Kardze 
and Hookah.
229
  
 
The exploitation of Tibet‟s mineral resources commenced in the mid-1950s230 but the 
huge drive for economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s expanded it exponentially. In 
its Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005)
231
 Beijing has selected four key projects to 
speed up the Western Development Plans. The key projects will become instrumental 
in expediting and intensifying the exploitation of the natural resources as within China 
domestic demands for raw materials have taken huge leaps. The four projects as we 
will see are directly or indirectly connected to Tibet. As China faces growing 
shortages in the domestic supply of raw materials, Tibet‟s rich mineral resources are 
of paramount importance. The central authorities remain firmly committed to 
developing the mineral resources of Tibet to support national development and 
industrialisation. According to the plan, the need to intensify exploitation of natural 
resources to meet domestic demand is of particular urgency, as is the need to “forge 
ahead aggressively” with the development of the western regions. The four key 
projects, West to East Gas Transfer, West to East Power Transfer, South to North 
Water Diversion and Qinghai-Tibet Railway Project, will be described in greater detail 
in the following section. 
 
2.4.2.1 West to East Gas Transfer 
Over the recent decades China‟s dynamic economy has grown exponentially and so 
did the demand for China‟s energy supply. The fact that Daqing, the largest source of 
China‟s crude oil since 1960,232 has reached a stagnation phase in the late 1970s233 
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and that no other oilfields have surpassed Daqing‟s rate of output,234 necessitates 
China to search for a new source in order to maintain their “self reliance”. The other 
main oilfields are Shengli (in Shandong province), discovered in 1962, Renqiu (in 
Central Hebei), in 1975, and Liaohe (in Liaoning), in 1967. However the combined 
output of the three oilfields had not exceeded the Daqing‟s peak output.235 According 
to the world geologists there are a host of problems that have hindered the rapid 
development of China‟s petroleum industry. China‟s excessive extraction of oil, 
adopting Soviet‟s method and lack of sophisticated technology limited the increase in 
Daqing‟s production. Furthermore complicated geological structures in Shengli and 
Dagang (the sixth largest oilfield in Mainland China) had hampered the production. 
And finally the “wastefulness of the whole extraction-transportation-processing-
conversion set-up” aggravated the inadequacies of onshore production.236  
 
As the onshore oil production began to decline, China placed its hopes on offshore 
reserves to meet the rising domestic demand for oil supply. China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation (CNOOC), in conjunction with foreign oil companies, started oil 
exploration in the Bohai Gulf near Tianjin in 1970s and in the South China Sea near 
Canton in the late 1970s. Exploration in the Bohai Gulf, which contained an estimated 
reserve of 1.5 billion barrels, led to the discovery of two productive oilfields; Haisi 
and Chengbai oilfields. Despite joint ventures with foreign oil companies such as the 
Japan National Oil Corporation (JNOC) and the Societe‟ Nationale Elf Aquitaine of 
France the oil production remained relatively small in the Bohai Gulf.
237
 The crude 
production from the South China Sea was estimated to peak at about 100,000 b/d, a 
respectable output but far short of initial hopes.
238
 Despite occasional significant 
discoveries and large scale international involvement, numerous difficulties impeded 
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the exploration and development of offshore oil reserves.  
 
In its quest for new oilfields to overcome their domestic shortages China once again 
turned to its western regions. Karamay and Tarim basin in Xinjiang (East Turkestan, 
Ch: Xinjiang Autonomous Region) and Tsaidam basin in Qinghai
239
 (Tib: Amdo, 
Northeastern Tibet, Ch: Qinghai Province), which were known to China since the mid 
1950s for their oil reserves, became the prime targets of China‟s Tenth Five Year Plan 
(2001-2005). The history of the oilfields started several decades ago when the 
Karamay and Tsaidam were discovered in the 1950s, and Tarim in 1970s. Experts 
believed that the three oilfields contain huge amount of reserves and would help 
China reduce its reliance on imported oil. According to Soviet and Chinese geologists, 
Karamay contained approximately 60 percent of Mainland China‟s oil reserves240 and 
Tsaidam was once believed by the Chinese geologists as the most promising 
oilfield.
241
 However the geographical location of the basins, shortage of water to 
inject into the wells, difficulty in transportation and lack of interest from the foreign 
investors prompted China to give more preference to the eastern and offshore oilfields 
over these Basins. Although China is still one of the leading oil producers in the 
world, its increasing consumption and the eastern oilfields‟ diminishing returns made 
China rely more heavily on imported oil. In 1999, China had imported 36.6 million 
tons of oil and more than 70.2 million tons in 2000, which shows the dramatic 
increase of Chinese demand for oil.
242
  
 
China is now the second largest consumer of oil in the world. The International 
Energy Agency‟s statistics show that China‟s oil imports will further escalate in the 
years to come exceeding 400 million tons in 2020, with the potential to rise further.
243
 
Yet China‟s oil production is estimated at only 160 million to 170 million tons a 
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year,
244
 which poses a new challenge to China in the 21
st
 century. To seek new oil 
resources as a replacement and to minimize its reliance on imported oil, China‟s 
current development projects target the western regions.
245
 Therefore in its Tenth Five 
Year Plan, Beijing places a high priority on the development of oilfields in the Tarim 
Basin in Southern Xinjiang, the Tsaidam Basin in Northeastern Tibet, and Ordos 
Basin in Inner Mongolia. The “West to East Gas Transfer” focuses on the construction 
of pipelines that takes natural gas from Xinjiang to Shanghai City
246
 and Sebei in the 
Tsaidam Basin to Lanzhau, capital of Gansu Province.
247
  
  
The construction of Sebei-Xining-Lanzhou gas transmission pipeline, a key project of 
the West-East Gas Transfer, began on 30 March 2000. The 953 kilometres pipeline 
which cost 302 million U.S. dollars starts from the Sebei gas field in Tsaidam Basin in 
Qinghai Province and runs through the provincial capital of Xining and ends at 
Lanzhou in Gansu Province. The pipeline is designed to transport 2 billion cubic 
metres of oil annually.
248
 On July 4, 2002 China kicked off another multibillion dollar 
natural gas transmission project designed to supply billions of cubic metres of gas 
each year to the country‟s east from the northwest regions. The 4,200-kilometre 
pipeline starts from Lunnan oilfield in Southern Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region 
in Northwestern China and runs through the provinces of Gansu, Shaanxi, Shanxi, 
Henan, Anhui, Jiangsu and the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, and ends at 
Shanghai and Zhejiang province
249
. The inhabitants of both the places resent these 
mega projects claiming that it benefits only China and would have serious negative 
impact on the local ecology. In a press statement released by the Department of 
Information and International Relations, T. C. Tethong, the then minister of DIIR, 
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called on the major foreign investors to stop financing the projects which represented 
China‟s exploitation of oil and gas on the Tibetan plateau. According to him this 
multimillion dollar project would despoil Tibet‟s natural resources. He added 
anxiously that the projects which had little or no benefits to the local Tibetans would 
further lead to the acceleration of China‟s population transfer into Tibet.250 
 
Similar opposition was voiced by Enver Can, the President of the East Turkistan 
National Congress based in Germany. In an open letter to the Shell director, he called 
the “Western Development Plan” as Chinese consolidation of their control over the 
region. In a harder stance he called that the projects would have severe and negative 
consequences on local Uighurs. He said that projects posed a significant threat to their 
culture and environment.
251
 Even in a written statement submitted by the International 
League for Human Rights (a non-governmental organisation in special consultative 
status) the projects were condemned as facilitators of long standing policy of 
exploiting natural resources and are environmentally destructive in nature. The 
statement warned that the projects would have grave repercussions to both ethnic 
nationalities. It says, “Nevertheless, the construction of this pipeline raises grave 
concerns about the importation of Chinese labourers to work on the pipeline, long-
term environmental degradation, and lack of compensation to Tibetans and Uighurs 
for their land, and long-term economic control over the region”.252 
 
The construction of the Sebei-Lanzhou gas pipeline was carried by PetroChina (a 
subsidiary of state-run Chinese National Petroleum Corporation) with foreign 
investments from major international oil companies including Shell, ExxonMobil, BP 
Amoco, Enron and Agip. PetroChina has invested 100 million Yuan in the 
construction of the project.
253
 China Business Weekly quoted John Ambler as saying, 
“Enron has worked closely with PetroChina in developing a 950 km gas pipeline to 
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transport gas from Qaidam Basin (Tsaidam Basin in Tibet) of Qinghai to its capital 
Xining and to Lanzhou”.254 The Tibetan Government-in-Exile and the Uighur 
organisations accused those major foreign investors for supporting projects that were 
detrimental to the local people and the local ecology. The volley of accusations from 
the Tibetan Government-in-Exile and the Uighur organisations were taken up by 
international support groups which resulted in BP‟s withdrawal in September 2001.255 
This victory for the Tibetans and their support groups did not last long as Agip singed 
a contract with China National Petroleum Corporation to become an operator of the 
gas and oil in the Sebei Block of the Tsaidam Basin.
256
 
 
The Sebei to Lanzhou pipeline, estimated to cost US$ 302 million, is one of the first 
major western corporate investments in occupied Tibet and like other extraction 
projects in contested areas, no environmental impact studies or community 
consultations were conducted by the Chinese government. The Tsaidam Basin has up 
to 1997, produced 14 million tons of crude oil and more than seven million tons of 
refined oil.
257
 In 1997 the production of oil and gas was 1.5 million tons of oil and gas 
a year, and is scheduled to reach 10 million tons a year in 2005.
258
 In Chang Thang, 
Chinese geologists are reported to have discovered oil in Lhunpula Basin, 300 
kilometres Northwest of Nagchu in Northern Tibet. At an altitude of 4,700 metres 
above the sea level this oilfield is dubbed as “the world‟s highest oilfield” by China‟s 
state news agency. The basin is stated to have deposits of 150 million tons of oil and 
gas.
259
 China National Star Petroleum plans to build at least one field with an annual 
capacity of 50,000 metric tons in the basin.
260
 Many Chinese scientists predict that the 
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region will become the major oil reserve base in the 21
st
 century.
261
 Judging by the 
rapid increase in the need for oil and natural gas China would have to relentlessly 
exploit and tap all the oil reserves including the newly discovered fields such as the 
Chang Thang oilfield. Despite all the loud claims by the government that the mega 
projects are for the development of the local economy it is hard to believe what the 
real intentions are. Since the occupation of Tibet in 1959 China has continuously 
carried out numerous reforms which Tibet hadn‟t seen in its history.  
 
2.4.2.2 West to East Power Transfer  
Hydroelectric power is one of China‟s four primary energy resources and it remains 
mostly untapped. A survey conducted in 1980 showed China‟s mean hydroelectric 
potential at 680,000 megawatts (MW).
262
 However, total installed capacity for the 
production of the hydroelectric power was only 19,481 MW in 1980, accounting 
merely 5 percent of the potential. In its First Five Year Plan, Beijing with assistance 
from the Soviet Union, mapped out strategies for the development of a number of 
rivers and established 26 hydroelectric stations.
263
 However the sudden Soviet 
Union‟s withdrawal of technical aid in 1960 left China‟s hydro program in shambles, 
leaving several major projects uncompleted, like that of Sanmen project on the Huang 
He (Tib: Machu, the river originates from Amdo Bayanhar Mountain and is 5,464 
kilometres long). This Soviet-assisted project was planned to have a capacity of 1,100 
MW but when the dam was completed in 1960, it had limited generating capacity of 
only 250 MW due to forced modification of the program caused by flood hazard 
occurred in the Guangzhong plain and at the city of Xian.
264
 
 
In the late 1970s, as a part of China‟s modernisation drive, Beijing re-intensified the 
construction of large hydroelectric power stations. Constructions of eleven hydro 
projects, each with a capacity exceeding 250 MW were carried out.
265
 Prominent 
among these projects are the Gezhouba Hydroelectric Station in Hubei on the Yangtze 
River (Tib: Drichu, which orignates from Mt. Thangla with 6,380 kilometres in 
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length) and Longyangxia Hydroelectric Station in Qinghai on the Huang He. The two 
hydroelectric plants of Gezhouba station have a total installed capacity of 2,715 MW 
and an annual output of 15.7 billion KWh and that of Longyangxia Hydroelectric 
Station has a designated capacity of 1,600 MW and a planned annual output of 6 
billion KWh.
266
 In 1980-81, though the budgets for other industries were reduced, for 
the electric power sector the budget remained largely intact. In fact there was a 2 
percent rise in the investment of hydroelectric power.
267
 Despite the construction of 
more than 90,000 hydroelectric power stations in the rural areas with the total 
capacity of 7,100 MW in 1980s, China‟s hydroelectric output remained comparatively 
low to satisfy the rising domestic demands of the nation.
268
 Therefore the Chinese 
leaders in anticipation of future power shortages explored all means to develop their 
hydropower resources by launching numerous projects including many in Tibet.  
 
Yamdrok Tso (Lake) 
Tibet‟s rivers have some of the highest hydro power potentials in the world due to its 
large quantity and steep gradients. With the calculated potential of 1305 TWh Tibet‟s 
hydropower potential comprises more than two thirds of China‟s potential.269 Tibet, 
the source of many large rivers in Asia and which ranks the fourth in the world for 
freshwater availability,
270
 naturally became the primary focus of its exploitation. In 
1985 work began at Yamdrok Lake, which is situated 100 km south-west of Lhasa.
271
 
The lake has only one little natural runoff through a small tributary of the Yarlung 
Tsangpo River; the inflow being balanced by evaporation. The plant has a capacity of 
90 MW
272
 and its construction involved drilling of 5,889 metre tunnels to drain water 
from Yamdrok Lake down to the Yarlung Tsangpo River 840 metres below, where the 
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plant was built.
273
 Although the generating capacity of the Yamdrok plant is not so 
large, it nevertheless enhances the Lhasa power grid. Xinhua News reported that the 
Yamdrok Tso plant was operational in September 1998 and it “trebled the capacity of 
the Lhasa grid”.274 The plant produces net energy either by draining the lake or by 
replenishing the Yamdrok water with the Yarlung Tsangpo in the pumping mode. But 
both operation modes have given rise to environmental concerns, since the 
limnological characteristics of the lake and the river are very different which makes 
the pumping back of the river water environmentally threatening.
275
 Besides the 
environmental impacts of the plant, the economic benefits are also dubious. A further 
aggravation is constituted by the fact that the lake is considered sacred in the Tibetan 
religious traditions.
276
  
 
The 10th Panchen Lama, who suspected an irreparable environmental damage of the 
635 square kilometres, protested strongly against the building of the power plant.
277
 
His persistent opposition to the project helped in suspending the construction for four 
years but soon after his death in 1989, the construction was resumed. The project also 
encountered international opposition due to the perceived negative impacts on the 
ecology. Lack of reservoir to catch the water pumped out of Yamdrok Tso would leave 
no alternative but to drain the water from the lake into the Yarlung Tsangpo River 
from where water will be pumped back into the lake thus mixing the water from the 
two sources. The lake water, which is oligotrophic (high in minerals and low in 
nitrates), is very different from the river, and the mixing of the two would have 
adverse ecological impacts. The difference in the pH level of the lake (9.11) and the 
river (8.13) could affect the lake‟s ecosystem. Protest came from International 
Committee of Lawyers for Tibet and the Free Tibet Campaign and other support 
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groups, which resulted in the adoption of resolution in 1996 by the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) calling on China to exchange 
information concerning Yamdrok Tso project, utilize IUCN expertise in the field of 
environmental impact assessment and consider setting up a nature reserve at the 
lake.
278
  
 
Yarlung Tsangpo River 
China in its bid to develop Tibet‟s power industry constructed several other hydro 
power plants on the Yarlung Tsangpo River, which originates from Mt. Kailash in 
Western Tibet. It flows eastward for 2,900 kilometres bending south into India as 
Brahmaputra, where it enters the Bay of Bengal. According to the Environmental desk 
of the Exile Tibetan Government, China had planned to undertake 16 hydro projects 
on the Yarlung Tsangpo alone, of which 10 projects were completed. The capacity of 
the plants varies from 120 MW to 800 KW. The history of hydro power projects on 
Yarlung Tsangpo dates back to 1979 with the completion of Gyantse Pumped-Storage 
Power Station on Nyangchu upstream generating 1,100 KW. The Pangduo power 
project on Lhasa River Basin is expected to generate 120 MW, thus becoming the 
largest hydro power plant on the Yarlung Tsangpo.
279
 Experts estimate that the “loop” 
of the Yarlung Tsangpo known as “the Great Bend” has the largest hydro power 
potential on earth at a total capacity of 70,000 MW.
280
 The river‟s gorge forms the 
longest and deepest canyon in the world which is approximated to be eight times as 
steep as and three times as large as the Grand Canyon in Colarado,
281
 descending over 
3,000 metres in approximately 200 kilometres.
282
 The “Great Bend” at the 
easternmost point of the river in Tibet is composed of two projects, one is the 
construction of the world‟s largest hydroelectric plant which will generate 40,000 
MW (more than twice the electricity produced by the three gorges dam) and the other 
is the diversion of the water which involves pumping of water from the Yarlung 
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Tsangpo northward across hundreds of kilometres of mountainous regions to China‟s 
northwestern province of Xinjiang and Gansu.
283
  
 
The plan of hydro power constructions on the Yarlung Tsangpo was discussed at the 
Global Infrastructure Fund (GIF) conference in Alaska July 1996, which envisaged 11 
dams around the “Brahmaputra loop” and construction of a tunnel that would bring 
water to a powerhouse projected as having a capacity of 48,000 MW.
284
 But for 
unknown reasons the plan was no longer publicised by the GIF. A year later in 
January 1998 the German television channel ZDF broadcasted in its programme “Die 
Welt” a feature on the Yarlung Tsangpo project in which its chief planner Professor 
Chen Chuanyu described the plan to drill a 15 kilometres tunnel through the 
Himalayas to divert the water so as to achieve an altitude drop of 3000 metres in 15 
kilometres as opposed to 200 km the river takes when on its natural course. He further 
stated that the power would pump water to north-west China over 800 km.
285
 Since 
the ZDF report no more details were made by the Chinese government. However, The 
Telegraph in October 2000 carried a story on the Yarlung project reporting on Chinese 
plans to use nuclear explosions to blast the tunnels through the Himalayas.
286
 This 
multi-billion dollar project which is tentatively scheduled to begin in 2009 will have 
far reaching consequences not only for Tibet but also for India and Bangladesh, who 
would be at the mercy of China to release water during the dry season. This project 
could have serious geopolitical implications, just as Ismail Serageldin, a former senior 
vice-president of the World Bank, warned in a statement, that “the next World War 
will be over water”.287 
 
Other Hydro Power Projects 
Other popular hydro power projects inside Tibet include: 1) Zhigung hydroelectric 
plant in Maizhokunggar (Maidroghungkar) County; 2) Megoe Tso Dam Project in 
Southeastern Tibet; and 3) Thirteen dam-cascade projects on Gyalmo Ngulchu (Ch: 
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Nu Jiang, other name, Salween which originates from Mt. Thangla with 4,500 
kilometres in length). The construction work for the Zhigung hydroelectric plant is 
reported to have started in May 2003. The plant, being built on the Lhasa River in 
Maizhokunggar County, is expected to produce 400 million KWh a year. The power 
station has a generating capacity of 100 MW and will supply power to Lhasa and 
other cities in Central Tibet.
288
 This multimillion-dollar power plant is still under 
construction and the production began in 2006. The second hydro power project is at 
Megoe Tso, the largest lake in Western Sichuan, situated in Karze (Ch: Ganzi) Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture and considered a very sacred lake by the local Tibetans. The 
plan to construct a 50.5 m high and 260.5 m wide dam on the lake has drawn strong 
oppositions from the local people as well as Chinese scientists. The dam, one of many 
on the list of Beijing‟s plans to harness Tibet‟s water resources, if constructed would 
inundate about 100 hectares of ancient forest and destroy wetlands, natural scenery 
and precious species and thus destroy natural habitat of many endangered species.
289
 
The dam planners, however, had their eyes fixed on the revenue that the hydro power 
project could bring to the local government.290  
 
The third hydro power project, the Thirteen dam-cascade project on Gyalmo Ngulchu 
(Ch: Dadu he) in Sichuan Province‟s Ngawa Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture is yet 
another controversial project that would have serious environmental implications. The 
project which is scheduled to be completed in 2006 comprises of construction of dams 
along the main stem and tributaries of Gyalmo Ngulchu River. According to an 
announcement made by the Chinese government 17,000 Tibetans will be relocated 
within the next three years to make way for the dams.291 More recently China‟s leaders 
have shown signs of making efforts to address social and environmental impacts of 
large dams. In 2004, Premier Wen Jaibao made an unprecedented move by suspending 
a project involving construction of 13 dams on the Salween River292 based on 
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projected social and environmental costs. However, the fact that the plan has not been 
canceled so far leaves the Tibetans in great consternation about its ecology. 
 
2.4.2.3 China‟s Mega-Water-Diversion Projects 
China, despite being endowed with rich fresh water resources (being fourth largest 
reserve in the world) and river systems, is nevertheless burdened by annual water 
shortages,
293
 primarily in the northern plains of China. Geographically, south China 
has plenty of water but is lacking in land while north China has abundant land but 
scarcity of water.
294
 Many factors can be attributed to this ever increasing water 
shortage crisis; increasing water consumption by the growing towns and burgeoning 
industries, excessive pumping of underground water and falling water table, uneven 
distribution of water resources and rain, high evaporation rate and lack of large scale 
water-storage facilities to name a few. In February 2001 Premier Zhu Rongji declared, 
at the National People‟s Congress meeting, that the scarcity of water resources is a 
great limiting factor to economic and social development in China. Nowhere is this 
statement more relevant than the northern plains of China, particularly, in the Huang 
(Yellow River), Hai and Huai (3-H) river basins–considered as China‟s “bread 
baskets”–that produce 67 percent of China‟s wheat, 44 percent of its corn, and 72 
percent of its millet. Moreover, the 3-H basins also produce other crops such as 
peanuts (65%), sunflower (64%), sesame (50%), and cotton (42%), and account for 
more than forty percent of China‟s cultivated area.295 The water table in the North 
China plain is falling at an alarming rate, according to a groundwater survey released 
in Beijing in August 2001,
296
 forcing the drillers to dig deeper and deeper into the 
ground to extract water, in some cases as deep as 1,000 metres.
297
 A recent study 
carried out by Beijing‟s Geological Environmental Monitoring Institute (GEMI) 
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reported that excessive pumping has mostly depleted the shallow aquifer, specifically 
in Hebei Province in the North China Plain, compelling the drillers to drill into the 
deep aquifer which could have serious consequences as the deep aquifer cannot be 
replenished.
298
 The falling of water tables leads to drying up of springs, streams and 
rivers and disappearance of lakes. 
 
The highly uneven distribution of precipitation, spatially as well as temporally, across 
China with the plains of the Huang, Huai, and Hai rivers receiving less than 15 
percent of the annual precipitation in the spring
299
 is also a major contributing factor 
in the drying of the northern regions. Scarcity of water and excessive salinity of the 
soil, a direct consequence of it, have significantly reduced productivity in 
approximately two-thirds of the cultivated land.
300
 According to Lester Brown, a 
renowned expert on environmental movement, “the water deficit in the North China 
Plain (that is, the amount by which use exceeds sustainable supply) may now exceed 
40 billion tons per year,” which is currently being filled by mining the groundwater. 
However, when aquifers get depleted the 3-H basins‟ water supply will be cut by 
nearly 40 percent.
301
 It is quite clear that water scarcity, along with other environment 
factors, is threatening China‟s grain production, which had dropped to 338 million 
tons in 2001 from the all-time high of 392 million tons in 1998.
302
 Liu Zhiren, a 
researcher at the Agricultural Economic Research Center of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, told AFP that China‟s “grain production has fallen for four years”.303 
Evidently, water shortage in these regions could have serious and disastrous 
consequences to the food production of the nation forcing the Chinese government to 
seriously look for solutions to resolve this growing problem. 
 
To address the problems of water shortages the Chinese government has been 
considering many initiatives including diversion of water from the south to the north, 
water conservation, and grain import, of which the first directly concerns Tibet. In a 
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report to the Tenth National People‟s Congress former Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji 
spoke of the government‟s projects to resolve the water shortage problems.304 He said: 
 
Remarkable achievements were made in infrastructure development. By 
concentrating our resources, we completed a number of key infrastructure projects of 
nationwide significance. We built water conservancy projects on a scale larger than 
any other time since the founding of New China. The investment in these projects 
nationwide totaled 356.2 billion Yuan for the five years, which was equal to the total 
investment in this field from 1950 through 1997 after adjusting for price changes. A 
number of key water conservancy projects were launched or completed. Work on 
reinforcing 35,000 km of river embankments was started. Over 3,500km of main 
dikes of the Yangtze River and nearly 1,000 km of dikes of the Yellow River have 
been reinforced, and their capacity to withstand floods has been greatly increased. 
The second phase of the Three Gorges water control project on the Yangtze River, 
which has attracted world attention, will soon be completed; water control facilities 
such as the one at Xiaolangdi on the Yellow River became operational, and 
construction on the South-North Water Diversion Project was begun. 
 
The plan to divert water from the south to the drier northern regions was nothing new 
to the Communist government as the contemporary world might have thought. Ever 
since the project was first proposed by Mao Zedong in the early 1950s, Chinese 
hydrologists, geographers, and soil scientists had debated over the necessity and 
desirability of diverting water from the Yangtze River toward the northern plains of 
the Huang, Huai, and Hai river basins.
305
 The Chinese Academy of Sciences and the 
Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power conducted preliminary researches on 
the availability of water for transfer, the feasibility of the project and the best possible 
route for the diversion scheme. Water diversion projects in smaller sizes had been 
developed everywhere in China to support the nation‟s irrigation systems, however, it 
was only in December 2002 that the first phase of the gigantic South-North Water 
Diversion project got underway as Zhu Rongji reported in the annual report quoted 
earlier.  
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Selecting Yangtze River as the source of water for the diversion project makes perfect 
sense as it is the longest river in Asia and the third longest in the world after Amazon 
and Nile, with average discharge of 31,900 cubic metre per second and watershed 
area of 1,800,000 squared kilometre. Majestically flowing 6,380 kilometres from 
Qinghai-Tibet Plateau to the East China Sea it is fed by the melting glaciers in the 
Tibetan plateau where the riverhead is known as Drichu, the Female Yak River. The 
Yangtze River, which accounts for four fifths of China‟s total water along with its 
watershed, supports more than 700 million people.
306
 Generally, three main routes are 
considered for the South to North Water Transfer Project (SNWT)–the Eastern Route 
in Jiangsu, the Central Route in Hubei and the Western Route in Qinghai–that will 
link the Yangtze River Basin to the drought-affected North China plains. 
 
The Eastern Route: The 1,150 km (722-mile) Eastern Route is the least complex 
segment of the SNWT project and will run through the provinces of Anhui, 
Shandong, Hebei, Tainjin, supplying water from Jiangdu City on the Yangtze River to 
Jiangsu and Shandong Province by 2008.
307
 The construction which officially began 
on 27 December 2002 involves upgrading and extending the Grand Canal
308
 and other 
already existing water resources infrastructure which makes this route the cheapest of 
the three. The project once completed is expected to divert 15 billion cubic metres of 
water to North China each year. However, the poor water quality and the requisition 
of large quantity of electricity necessary to pump water to the higher elevations north 
of Yangtze River are some of the drawbacks of the route.
309
 
 
The Central Route: The Central Route which would stretch from the Danjiangkou 
Reservoir in Hubei Province all the way to Beijing‟s YuYuantan Lake would divert 
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14 billion cubic metres annually.
310
 The construction works which started on 30 
December 2003
311
 involves construction of the 162-metre Danjiangkou dam with the 
storage capacity of 17.45 billion cubic metres, raising the dam to 176.6 metres thus 
increasing the total storage capacity to 29.1 billion cubic metres,
312
 and constructing 
tunnel under the Yellow River, and keeping water moving along the long, gentle 
gradient.
313
 According to the US Embassy Report this project would force the 
relocation of approximately 320,000 people which poses a gigantic obstacle to the 
completion of the project. Work on the 1,246-kilometre central route started in 
December 2003 and is expected to send water to Hebei, Henan, Beijing and Tianjin 
by 2010. 
 
The Western Route: The Western Route would begin at the upper reaches of the 
Yangtze in the Tibetan Plateau and transfer water to the upper reaches of Yellow 
River (Tib: Machu) to provide water to Northwestern China. The conveyance canal 
which would run over some complex geological terrains including desolate mountains 
in Western China, at altitudes in excess of 4,000 metres in regions that are frozen 
much of the year, would have diversion volume of 20 billion cubic metres of water 
annually. The extremely expensive construction with cost estimation of more than $37 
billion,
314
 twice the cost of Three Gorges Dam Project, and the extensive construction 
works mean that the Western Route is unlikely to be realised soon which nevertheless 
is scheduled to begin in 2010. 
 
In total the three routes will transfer in the excess of 44.8 billion cubic metres of 
water. Such a huge transfer of water would affect the ecosystem of the source area, 
the transit area and destination area. Experts fear that the Western Route Project 
would destroy the already threatened ecosystem in the upper reaches of the Yangtze 
River forever and increase soil erosion and desertification.
315
 Xinhua News Agency 
reported that “the project, with an estimated total cost of 500 billion Yuan (US$60.24 
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billion), has aroused global concern about land use, regional environmental damage 
and impact on agriculture along the planned routes”.316 Other possible negative 
environmental effects of the SNWT project include rising of aquifer in poorly drained 
areas with high water table, which may lead to secondary salinisation of the soil and 
along the routes of the canals fish and other aquatic life in ponds and lakes may be 
affected. Beside these environmental issues such projects inevitably cause major 
social disturbance in the relocation of tens of thousands of people. In a recent news 
article Xinhua quoted Zhang Jiyao, the Director of the South-North Water Diversion 
Project Construction Committee, as saying that “the project would involve more than 
100 counties in seven provinces and municipalities and require the relocation of 
300,000 to 400,000 people”.317 Although the World Bank argues that the 
environmental issues can be addressed and that, in some places, the project could 
actually mitigate river pollution, it also warned that huge undertakings such as these 
projects could prove futile unless China fundamentally changes the way it consumes 
and manages water.
318
 
 
Another major water diversion project under consideration and is a source of much 
consternation to India and Bangladesh is the Yarlung Tsangpo Hydro and Water 
Diversion Projects. As briefly mentioned earlier this project involves transferring 
water from the Yarlung Tsangpo River in the south of Tibet to the drier regions in the 
Northwestern China. Originating from a glacier near Mount Kailash, the Yarlung 
Tsangpo River is the largest river in Tibet that runs 2,057 kilometres in Tibet and 
flows into India and Bangladesh, where the river is the lifeline for millions of people. 
The massive diversion of the river away from its natural course would have disastrous 
consequences to the livelihood of millions of people, crop production, ecology in the 
northeastern parts of India and Bangladesh. Nutrient-rich sediments would not reach 
the river‟s delta and fish will be blocked by the dam. Xinhua confirmed China‟s 
intentions when it announced that preliminary studies of the water diversion project 
were carried out in the region in mid 2003, followed by feasibility studies in October 
of that year which had caused India to express concerns and prompted the Indian state 
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of Assam‟s Union Ministry of Water Resources to seek factual details of the 
project.
319
 The diversion project would transfer water thousands of kilometres across 
the Tibetan Plateau to the provinces of Xinjiang and Gansu. Although the Yarlung 
Tsangpo Diversion Plan would bring substantial benefits to China in terms of 
electricity and water for the dry northern plains, the overall cost to the people living in 
the riparian areas and the ecology would be huge. For the local Tibetans, such projects 
are “impositions on their land and their birthright by the occupying Chinese 
government”.320  
 
2.4.2.4 Qinghai-Tibet Railway Project 
The Qinghai-Tibet railway project, also known as Golmod-Lhasa railway, is a high 
priority, key infrastructure project that has received the backings of the highest leaders 
in Beijing.
321
 This multi-billion dollar project is an important component of the Great 
Western Development campaign initiated by Jiang Zemin, the former President of 
People‟s Republic of China, in the summer of 1999 to boost up the rapidly developing 
economy of the nation and to alleviate the economic disparity between eastern and 
western areas.
322
 In their drive to develop China‟s western regions, the State Council 
gave its final approval, in February 2001, to this mega-project to lay the tracks from 
Gormo
323
 to Lhasa in the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005), and the construction 
work began in July of the same year. Despite Beijing‟s repeated proclamations that the 
project is aimed at bringing economic development in these regions, it is intimately 
connected with the government‟s political objectives. With the successful completion 
of the project, scheduled for 2007, Tibet would be linked to China by a major 
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transportation system that would have great political, military as well as strategic 
implications. The Vice Minister of Railways Sun Yongfu, while answering to NPC 
deputies, is reported as acknowledging the “far-reaching impact [of the rail link] in 
political, economic and military terms”.324  
 
The idea to link Lhasa with major Chinese cities by railway is not a recent 
phenomenon. It was first proposed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Chinese Nationalist Party 
founder in early 1900s, who had ambitious plans to connect the former Qing empire 
by constructing 100,000 miles of railway tracks, criss-crossing the vast nation to form 
a network with three main trunk lines–eastern trunk line, central trunk line and 
southern trunk line–with the last trunk line passing through Chinese provinces of 
Yunnan, and Szechwan and into Tibet.
325
 The original program was revised and 
extended in 1918 with a network of six national systems of which the Plateau System 
would include railroads serving Tibet, Qinghai, Sikang, and parts of Turkestan, 
Kansu, Szechwan and Yunnan. Chang Kia-ngau, former Minister of Railways writes, 
“Lhasa, the political and religious center of Tibet, was chosen as the center for this 
railroad system. The lines are to radiate from Lhasa to Lanchow, Chengtu, Suifu, and 
Iden, making connections with the Northwestern and Southwestern Systems, while 
other lines are to lead from Lhasa to India and Nepal”.326 However, the grand vision 
remained unfulfilled as the Nationalist Government was drawn into war with Japan 
and civil war with the Communists which led to the Communist victory in 1949. Soon 
upon the formation of the People‟s Republic of China Mao‟s new government revived 
Sun Yat-sen‟s railway projects and built four major routes in the west327 of which 
Lanzhou-Xining line was the first railway to reach the Tibetan plateau. The line was 
further extended and the railway connection between Xining and Gormo, an 846 km 
track, was finally made in 1979 which was exclusively used by the People‟s 
Liberation Army to transport military supplies and other things until 1984.  
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Despite numerous technical and economic difficulties the PRC government continued 
with their bigger plans of connecting Lhasa to other railway systems in China. The 
push towards Lhasa was officially given the green light by China‟s State Council in 
the Tenth Five-Year Plan. The construction of the Gormo-Lhasa railway was carried 
out in the context of a larger plan of railway development which the Chinese 
government considered as a major means of transportation and communication, and 
the expansion of which is intimately connected with the growth of its economy. The 
investment of the project was initially estimated at 14 billion Yuan (US $1.7 billion) 
but later was revised and increased twice from 19.4 billion Yuan to 26.2 billion Yuan 
(US $ 3.2 billion).
328
 Such a huge investment is generally viewed as a poor investment 
since the revenue from the railway will hardly justify the huge capital investment. The 
line that generally follows the Qinghai-Tibet Highway is said to involve construction 
of 286 new bridges and 30 kilometres of tunnels.
329
 The route passes through 
earthquake prone remote areas with extremely low temperature and low atmospheric 
pressure. Roughly 780 km (485 mi) of the track runs at an elevation of 4,500-5,000 m, 
with the highest point at Dangla (Ch: Tanggula) Mountain pass reaching 5,072 m. The 
extreme geographic conditions such as low oxygen content at high elevation could 
cause high failure rates of the machinery and electric equipment and could have 
serious health effects. Moreover, frost heaving and soil thaw collapse is likely to 
affect the stability of the rail bed. These extreme conditions combined with China‟s 
lack of engineering experiences in laying tracks in such environmental conditions 
pose serious challenges to the maintenance of the tracks, bridges, and other structures 
such as station foundations. 
 
There are other grounds for disputing the railway‟s economic rationale. Tibet‟s 
population and GDP are low even by more realistic standards and the combined 
population of counties along the route, including Lhasa and Gormo, is only 
547,756.
330
 The numbers are too small to support revenue generating market base that 
is large enough to offset the railway‟s operating cost. Moreover, the current 
                                                 
328 See Reuters, „China says Tibet Railway on Track Despite Climate‟, 9 November 2001; TIN, 
„Route Proposed for Qinghai-Tibet Railway‟, TIN News Update, 24 December 1998. 
329 „Tibet Railway to Fast-track Economic Goals‟, World Tibet Network News, 23 July 2001, 
 http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2001/7/22_1.html. 
330 Qinghai Statistical Yearbook 2001 and Tibet Statistical Yearbook 2001, Beijing: China Statistics 
Press, 2001, see Crossing the Line: China‟s Railway to Lhasa, Tibet, ICT, 2003, p. 9. 
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transportation levels in the TAR and Qinghai province, with a total number of 
passengers for railway, highway and waterway amounts to only about 0.25% of 
China‟s total in 2001 and the share of freight traffic at 0.36%,331 reflect the low 
demand in the region. The 2000 census indicated that only 61,481 Tibetans lived 
outside of the TAR and the four adjacent provinces. Therefore, the question is who 
will use the railway and for what purpose. According to the China‟s Ministry of 
Railways 5 million tons of goods will be transported into the TAR by railway which is 
more than 21 times the current amount.
332
 Such speculation and projection underscore 
a broader Chinese plan and an ulterior motive of economic, political and cultural 
assimilation by China–a longstanding goal of the Communist Party.  
 
Considering Beijing‟s steadfast determination to continue with the project despite the 
economic and technical challenges and little economic benefit projections it becomes 
apparent that the Chinese government is expecting greater political rewards than 
economic. The former President of the People‟s Republic of China, Jiang Zemin, is 
quoted as saying, “Recently a project has been launched to build a railway railroad 
from Golmud to Lhasa. It will be built through permafrost area at 4,000 to 5,000 
metres elevation. Some people advised me not to go ahead with this project because it 
is not commercially viable. I said this is a political decision, we will make this project 
succeed at all costs, even if there is a commercial loss”.333 This statement clearly 
highlights China‟s motives behind the unprecedented railway project, a candid 
acknowledgment that invalidated claims by other Chinese leaders of economic 
development and the prosperity of the minorities as the primary reason for such 
development. Strategically, the mass transportation system that will penetrate Tibet 
will play a very crucial role in national integration, defence and in a more localised 
sense it will facilitate in bringing political and social stability in Tibet, a region that 
the CCP considers unstable and volatile. Wang Lixiong, a Han Chinese political 
                                                 
331 In 2001 there were 1,250,000 passengers in the TAR and 30,050,000 passengers in Qinghai 
traveling using railways, waterways and highways. The national total was 15,341,220,000. For 
freight traffic, measured in 10,000 ton units, the national total was 1,401,177, while the TAR and 
Qinghai totals were 172 and 5,042, respectively. China Statistical Yearbook 2002, China Statistics 
Press, Beijing, 2002, see Crossing the Line: China: China‟s Railway to Lhasa, Tibet, ICT, 2003, p. 
9. 
332 „Construction of Tibetan Railway Well Under Way‟, People‟s Daily, 8 November 2001. 
According to the Tibet Statistical Yearbook 2001, 232,453 tons of goods were transported into the 
TAR in 2000. See Crossing the Line: China‟s Railway to Lhasa, Tibet, ICT, 2003, p. 9. 
333 Jiang Zemin, New York Times, August 10, 2001. 
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writer, writes in „Nationalism and Tibetan Question‟ that an option for the long term 
solution to deal with the growing nationalism in regions such as Tibet could be to 
flood the region with Han Chinese and build a very stable social structure. And the 
Gormo-Lhasa railway will provide a convenient way for the government to achieve 
that. For instance, the Chinese government had used railway lines to colonise Inner 
Mongolia, East Turkistan (Xinjiang), and Manchuria in the 20th century. Chang Kia-
ngau, assessed the expansion of railway network as: “The colonisation of Mongolia 
and Chinese Turkistan would be greatly encouraged by the construction of this 
system, colonisation and railroad construction being dependent upon each other for 
their success”. 334 For instance throughout the last century, facilitated by the 
convenience of railway transportation, the immigration of Han Chinese into 
Manchuria from adjacent regions was heavy, and today the majority of population in 
Manchuria is Chinese.
335
 Similar occurrences were repeated in Inner Mongolia and 
East Turkistan. Railway from Zhangjiakou reached Hohhot and Baotou in the 1920s 
which brought millions of Chinese settlers into Inner Mongolia that has led to the 
outnumbering of the indigenous population by Han Chinese. Statistic recorded in the 
last census showed that of the 23.7 million inhabitants only 3.9 million were Mongol 
and the pace of resettlement has not slowed.  
 
In October 2005 the Qinghai-Tibet railway line was completed, a year before 
schedule, which the Chinese Vice-Premier Zeng Peiyan described as “an overall 
victory of a decisive battle”336 and Xinhua News Agency selected it as one of the top 
ten newsmakers of the year.
337
 Hailed as the world‟s longest plateau railroad, the 
Qinghai-Tibet Railway stretches 1,956 kilometres from Xining to Lhasa and runs at 
an average elevation of 4,000 metres above sea level with the highest points at 5,072 
metres, some 200 metres higher than the Peruvian railway in the Andes.
338
 The 
railway is expected to carry 75 percent of all the inbound goods and cargoes into 
                                                 
334 Chang Kia-ngau, China‟s Struggle for Railroad Development, p. 50. 
335 Until 1860, Manchuria included former Russian and Inner Mongolian territory. However, since 
1956 Manchuria has comprised Jilin, Heilongjiang and Liaoning provinces. According to a 2000 
census, the total population of the three provinces was 106.55 million, out of which 95.45 million 
were ethnically Chinese. 
336 „Good Preparations for Qinghai-Tibet Railway‟s trial operation stressed‟, People‟s Daily, 6 
January 2006, http://english.people.com.cn/200601/06/eng20060106_233215.html. 
337 „Top 10 News Stories in China in 2005‟, People‟s Daily, 30 December 2005,  
 http://english.people.com.cn/200512/30/eng20051230_231700.html. 
338 „Leaders Hail Construction of Qinghai-Tibet Railway, People‟s Daily, 16 October 2005, 
 http://english.people.com.cn/200510/16/eng20051016_214564.html. 
 98 
Tibet, reducing transportation costs considerably. The railway line will go into trial 
operation in July of 2006. Tibetans are concerned that the Gormo-Lhasa railway will 
lead to increased influx of Chinese migrants and fear that the Tibetans will become a 
minority in their own land. Drastic change in demography make-up will pose 
significant threat to the livelihoods and culture of the local people as well as to their 
prospect for achieving genuine political autonomy. In my interview with newcomers 
last year at the Tibetan Reception Center for the newcomers in Nepal many people 
expressed their deep concerns about the new railway line and what it will bring to 
Tibet. They fear that a number of Chinese immigrants would come to Tibet creating 
intense competition in the job market and the resources of the region. Tashi, a 42 year 
old butter seller from Lhasa, said that the reason for his flight was primarily because 
he was forced out of his butter selling business with the increase in the job 
competition as more and more immigrants from China enter the business. He further 
added that the Tibetans inside Tibet have no future in their own country. Tashi 
anticipated further escalation of unemployment of the Tibetans once when railway 
operation in Lhasa commences.
339
 John Ackerly, the President of International 
Campaign for Tibet, said that there was no real reason for the railroad to be built 
“other than to provide for the Chinese military and the settlers. There will be few 
benefits for some parts of the Tibetan population but the sad thing is that this will 
continue a tradition of building large infrastructure projects that the Chinese 
population needs, while ignoring the real needs of the broad population of the 
Tibetans”.340 The railway will be used for military purpose to transport military 
supplies and logistics. According to Free Tibet Campaign “the rail grants China the 
ability to establish new military bases and store nuclear weapons, airplanes and 
rockets in the region”.341 Such moves could be perceived by India as a direct threat 
which potentially could destabilise the entire region.  
 
Interviewees also told me that there have been cases where people were not 
compensated by the government for confiscating their land that fell on the path of the 
                                                 
339 Interview with Tashi, a 42 year old newcomer from Tibet in Nepal July 2005. The numbering 
system I use for my tapes include the category (TN: Tibetan Newcomer), venue of the interview 
and the tape number TN/Nepal/Tape2.  
340 Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, „China‟s Ambitious Railway‟, BBC News, 1 August 2001, 
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1468282.stm. 
341 Andreas Lorenz, „Tibet By Rail: By Train on the Roof of the World‟, Spiegel Deutschland, 20 
October 2005, http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,380808,00.html. 
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railroad and that the Tibetans in Tibet, especially in Lhasa are apprehensive that the 
operation of the railway would lead to further deterioration of the Tibetan standard of 
living. There is a widespread fear that with the influx of Chinese immigrants, brought 
in by the railway, social problems such as unemployment and crime rate will also 
increase. Aside from all the geo-strategic implications to the Tibetans in Tibet “the 
railway is a death sentence” according to Lhadon Tethong, Executive Director of 
Students for a Free Tibet, a student organisation that had campaigned vigorously 
against the Railway project. “The Chinese government already encourages Chinese 
settlers to move into Tibet in order to assimilate Tibetans and eliminate their 
resistance to Chinese rule. The railway will increase this population transfer 
exponentially, posing a dire threat to Tibetans‟ survival as a people,” she continued.342 
 
The Communist government claimed that the Tibetan people desire this new form of 
transportation system.
343
 However, Tibetans both inside Tibet and in exile express 
deep concern and opposition. They argue that the lack of meaningful consultation 
with the Tibetan populace, the predominance of military usage of the railway as 
transportation channel, the need to transport supplies to an exploding settler 
population are all indications that the railway‟s primary purpose to solidify the 
Chinese occupation of Tibet. Without changes in Beijing‟s current policy towards 
Tibet, the pattern of growth and development that has created and widened economic 
disparity between the Tibetans and Chinese will accelerate the assimilation process to 
a same degree as that found in Inner Mongolia which could seriously dilute the 
distinct Tibetan culture. As Politburo member Li Ruihan said in 1997, “expanding 
Tibet‟s economy is not a mere economic issue, but a major political issue that has a 
vital bearing on Tibet‟s social stability and progress”.344 Yet reports already carry 
Chinese plans to extend the railway line and that Lhasa won‟t be the last destination 
for the railway. Extension lines will be built to take the steel road farther west to 
Shigatse and Nyingchi according to Zhang Jianping, the Deputy Director of the 
Planning Department of China-Railway Bureau. The extension lines, Lhasa-Shigatse 
line and Lhasa-Nyingchi line, with the total length of 700 kilometres is planned to 
                                                 
342 „Tibet Activists Target Bombardier‟s Annual Meeting‟, World Tibet Network News, 7 June 2005, 
 http://www.tibet.ca.vs7.korax.net//en/newsroom/wtn/archive/old?y=2005&m=6&p=7_1.  
343 „Qinghai-Tibet Railway Kicks off,‟ People‟s Daily, 30 June 2001. 
344 Cited in Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law, International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, 
1997, p. 144. 
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start construction in 2006.
345
 Given Communist China‟s policy of expansionism the 
lines will definitely go further reaching Nepal and Indian borders,
346
 which will 
increase tension and pose security threat to the Asian sub-continent. I will discuss this 
issue in the next chapter in greater detail.  
 
2.4.3. Dalai Lama‟s Guideline for Future Tibet Polity 
While the Sino-Tibetan negotiations between the Dalai Lama‟s representatives and 
Beijing have been a slow process, changes have come rapidly in the Tibetan 
community in exile. Ever since the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) was 
established in 1960, the Dalai Lama has initiated reforms that have transformed the 
old theocratic to a democratic system in exile. Beginning on 2 September 1960, the 
first representative form of government, through the Assembly of Tibetan People‟s 
Deputies, (ATPD, the legislative body) was introduced in India.
347
 In 1961, based on 
the principles of modern democracy, the Dalai Lama prepared a draft constitution for 
the future Tibet. The new draft constitution enshrined democratic principles and 
contained provisions that accord with the contemporary international standards, but it 
was difficult for the Tibetans to accept the radical change and implement the 
constitution after centuries of rule by the Dalai Lamas, who were believed to be 
manifestation of the Buddha of Compassion. The proposal to grant effective power to 
a mere human representative thus jarred the conscience of many Tibetans. Tibetans 
therefore showed reluctance to endorse the provision which stipulated that in a free 
Tibet the Dalai Lama could be impeached by a two-third vote of the Assembly of 
Tibetans People‟s Deputies.348 However, the Dalai Lama himself insisted this 
                                                 
345 Joehaiyan, „Two extension lines of Qinghai-Tibet railway to build‟, China Tibet  Information 
Center, 16 August 2005,  http://info.tibet.cn/en/en_index/pas/t20050816_48827.htm. 
346 Andreas Lorenz, „Tibet By Rail: By Train on the Roof of the World‟, Spiegel Deutschland, 20 
October 2005, http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/spiegel/0,1518,380808,00.html;  
 Joehaiyan, „Two extension lines of Qinghai-Tibet railway to build‟, China Tibet Information 
Center, 16 August 2005, http://info.tibet.cn/en/en_index/pas/t20050816_48827.htm. 
347 The 14
th
 Dalai Lama, Freedom in Exile: the Autobiography of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, UK: 
Abacus, a Division of Little, Brown and Company, 1998, p, 182. The first elected representative 
body in Tibet‟s history – the Commission of Tibetan People‟s Deputies (CTPD) took office on 
September 2, 1960 (the name was later changed into Assembly of Tibetan People‟s Deputies). The 
Tibetan community observes this historic date as National Democracy Day. The Exile Tibetan 
Parliament before 1990 reform, consisted of two representatives each from the three provinces 
(Amdo, Kham and U-Tsang), one representative each from the four schools of Tibetan Buddhism, 
namely Nyngma-pa, Kagyud-pa, Sakya-pa and Gelug-pa, and Bonpo, the ancient Tibetan religion, 
and one was nominated directly by the Dalai Lama.  
348 Gong-sa skyab-mgon chen-po-mchog nas spyi-lo 1961-1962 gnyis-kyi gsum-bchu‟i dus-chen 
skabs bstsal-ba‟i gsung-bshad khag-gnyis dang ma‟-ongs pa‟i bod-kyi rtsa-khrims snying-don gsal-
bsgrags bskyangs pa‟i skor bod ljongs chol gsum mi mang ser skya spyi nas snyan zhu phul ba‟i 
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provision be left in, without which he thinks that there won‟t be a genuine democracy 
in the Tibetan community.
349
 Later, in 1963 a detailed draft constitution was 
promulgated. Despite strong opposition from the Tibetan communities in exile, the 
Dalai Lama insisted on the inclusion of the provision which authorised the Council of 
Regents to assume the executive power of the Dalai Lama when the National 
Assembly, by a two-third vote of its total members in consultation with the Supreme 
Court, decides that this is in the highest interest of the nation. On 10 March
350
 1969, 
the Dalai Lama made an important statement announcing that on the day Tibet regains 
its independence the Tibetan people must decide for themselves as to be governed by 
the Dalai Lama or not, and the kind of system of government they wanted. He said 
that the opinion of the Tibetan younger generation will be an influential factor in 
making this decision.
351
 
 
Further in May 1990, the Dalai Lama initiated dramatic reforms by dissolving the 
Tenth ATPD and Kashag that came up through the previous procedure, and called for 
the election of a new parliament, which was then expanded to 46 members. The 
ATPD was bestowed more constitutional powers including the power to elect the 
Kalons (Cabinet ministers), who were previously appointed directly by the Dalai 
Lama. The clause to impeach the Dalai Lama was retained.
352
 In that same year, exile 
Tibetans in the Indian sub-continent and in more than 33 other countries elected the 
11
th
 Tibetan Exile parliament.
353
 The 11
th
 parliament became a full-fledged 
                                                                                                                                            
ngo bshus bzhugs so. (A written letter sent to His Holiness, regarding the Dalai Lama‟s March 10 
statements of 1961, 1962 and the announcement of Future Tibet‟s Constitution (amendment), 
signed by the heads of the Tibetan communities in Kalimpong, Dalhousie, Darjeeling, Bomdila, 
Mysore, Mussoorie, Simla, Bhutan , Gangtok and Nepal, October 23, 1961).  
349 The 14
th
 Dalai Lama, Freedom in Exile: The Autobiography of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, p, 
182; „Guidelines on Future Tibet‟s Constitution‟, A. A. Shiromany, ed., The Political Philosophy of 
H.H. the XIV Dalai Lama: Selected Speeches and Writings, p. 277. 
350 Tibetans everywhere mark this day as the National Uprising Day, when tens of thousands of 
Tibetans in Tibet rose up to protest Chinese invasion and occupation of their country in 1959. 
According to the exile Tibetan government 87,000 Tibetans were killed when Chinese troops 
brutally crushed the uprising. 
351 „10 March Statement 1969‟, A. A. Shiromany, ed., The political Philosophy of the His Holiness the 
XIV Dalai Lama: Selected Speeches and Writings, pp. 372-374. 
352 Ibid., „Speech at Special Congress‟, May 11, 1990 Dharamsala, pp. 262-266. 
353 The Assembly of Tibetan People Deputies has 46 members and its term is for five years. Tibetan 
refugees from the three provinces of Kham, Amdo and U-Tsang elect ten Deputies each. The four 
Tibetan Buddhist schools, namely Nyngma-pa, Kagyud-pa, Sakya-pa and Gelug-pa, and the ancient 
Tibetan religion known as Bonpo elect two Deputies each. In order to ensure sufficient 
representation to the Tibetans living in Europe and America, these communities elect two, one 
Deputy each to the Parliament. Remaining three seats are reserved for Tibetan individuals of 
eminence who are nominated directly by the Dalai Lama. 
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parliamentary body, with the right to elect the cabinet which consists of eight 
members, who are responsible to the Assembly. In June 1991, the new democratic 
constitution promulgated as a result of this reform was adopted by the Assembly of 
Tibetan People‟s Deputies as “the Charter of Tibetans in Exile”. The charter enshrines 
the basic fundamental rights and also provides detailed guidelines on the functioning 
of the Tibetan government with respect to those living in exile. In that year, the exile 
Tibetan Supreme Justice Commission was also established. The Tibetan Supreme 
Justice Commission functions like a court, trying only civil cases of the Tibetan 
refugee community, as India does not officially recognise the Tibet Government-in-
Exile. Disputes are settled more or less in accordance with arbitrational procedures. 
All criminal matters go to the Indian judicial system. The Supreme Justice 
Commission of Tibetan Government-in-Exile, so far has ruled few cases and even 
though it lacks the mechanism for enforcing its rulings, the parties usually follow the 
decisions made by the Commission.  
 
In 1992, the Dalai Lama in his Guidelines for Future Tibet‟s Polity and the Basic 
Features of its Constitution made a major statement saying that, “I have made up my 
mind that I will not play any role in the future government of Tibet, let alone seek the 
Dalai Lama‟s traditional political position in the government”.354 He stated that a free 
Tibet would have an elected democratic government composed by executive, 
bicameral legislative and judicial branches. The Dalai Lama also announced that 
during the transition period, between withdrawal of the repressive Chinese troops 
from Tibet and the final promulgation of the Constitution, the administrative 
responsibilities of the state will be entrusted to the Tibetan functionaries presently 
working in Tibet. He said that during this period, an interim president will be 
appointed to whom the Dalai Lama will delegate all his political powers and 
responsibilities. The present Tibetan government-in-exile, he said will then be 
dissolved. 
 
The guidelines for Tibet‟s future polity also stated:  
Future Tibet shall be a peace-loving nation, adhering to the principle of 
ahimsa (non-violence). It shall have a democratic system of government 
                                                 
354 „Guidelines on Future Tibet‟s Constitution‟, A. A. Shiromany, ed., The Political Philosophy of 
H.H. the XIV Dalai Lama: Selected Speeches and Writings, p. 280. 
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committed to preserving a clean, healthy and beautiful environment. Tibet 
shall be a completely demilitarised nation.
355
 
 
Later in 2000, in one of the most radical and unprecedented reforms in the history of 
Tibet the Dalai Lama proposed to amend the charter of the Tibetan government so as 
to allow the direct election of the Kalon Tripa, a position which is similar to a prime 
minister, that would wield the highest political authority in the Executive Branch of 
the Tibetan government. The implementation of this reform means a guaranteed major 
shift in the Tibetan political landscape as the supreme political power would be 
transferred away from the Dalai Lama who had enjoyed undisputed leadership status 
for the past many centuries. In 2001 Tibetans all over the world, as per the legislature, 
went to polling booths and elected their first Kalon Tripa.
356
 Soon after the oath taking 
ceremony of the democratically elected first Tibetan Prime Minister on 5 September, 
the Dalai Lama told a group of journalists in Dharamsala that the Tibetans should 
learn to work in a democratic system that is independent of the Dalai Lama. He said, 
“They should work as if there is no Dalai Lama. I am actually preparing the Tibetans 
to get ready for the day when I will be no more amidst them... I don‟t want that there 
should be any break in the process or chaos after I am dead”.357 
 
The issue of the 14
th
 Dalai Lama‟s succession is a highly crucial issue for the Tibetan 
government-in-exile and the whole Tibetan population. Many bills have been passed 
in the Tibetan parliament on this subject. In an interview with Jonathan Mirsky, the 
Dalai Lama said, “If I passed away, the Tibetan people would want a Dalai Lama. But 
I have made clear that the next Dalai Lama will be born in a free country. I think the 
Tibetans will accept that and they won‟t accept a boy chosen by the Chinese”.358 For 
the majority of Tibetans inside and outside Tibet the Dalai Lama‟s word on the issue 
of his succession is final, definitive and absolute. In the Tibetan Buddhist tradition 
such is his prerogative. The Dalai Lama‟s proclamation that his successor will be born 
in a “free country” means that unless Tibet becomes “free” (whether as a sovereign 
                                                 
355 Ibid., pp. 276-286. 
356 „A Brief Biography of Kalon Tripa‟, Sheja (Exile Tibetan Government‟s monthly official journal 
in Tibetan language), September 1991.  
357 „Tibetans Learn the Power of Ballot: A Potent Weapon Against Chinese Bullets‟, Vijay Kranti, 
Border Affairs, New Delhi, October-December 2001. The author is an acknowledged expert on 
Tibet affairs. 
358 Jonathan Mirsky, „The Dalai Lama on Succession and on the CIA‟, New York Review of Books, 
vol. 46, no. 10, 10 June 1999. 
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state or a region within China which is “autonomous” in more than name) the Dalai 
Lama will not be born inside Tibet. And to forestall the historical problems of intense 
power struggle that usually ensue during the period of the Dalai Lama‟s death and his 
successor‟s maturity the charter calls for the Tibetan Parliament, in consultation with 
the Supreme Justice Commission, to elect a Regency Council that will take the 
responsibility of choosing the next reincarnation. These measures will be taken to 
remedy all the specific problems witnessed by Tibet‟s history. Unlike the past the 
Tibetan government will be administered by the Executive Branch whose head is 
elected by the people. 
 
2.4.4. Referendum in the Exile Tibetan Community: Independence or 
Autonomy? 
As the years of Sino-Tibetan negotiation showed no signs of progress, the young 
Tibetans in exile became increasingly disenchanted with the Dalai Lama‟s policy of 
the Middle Path/Way approach unveiled in 1988. Although the Dalai Lama has gained 
worldwide popularity for his non-violent struggle against China, there exist dissenting 
voices and criticism among Tibetan exiles of the leadership‟s strategy. The Tibetan 
Youth Congress (TYC),
359
 the largest NGO in the Tibetan community, is critical of 
the Dalai Lama‟s “Middle Way” approach and consistently stood for Independence. 
According to Kelsang Phunstok, the present President of Tibetan Youth Congress, the 
Dalai Lama was incorrect in giving up the struggle for independence because he felt 
that the independence is the ultimate goal for all the Tibetans in and outside Tibet. He 
said that His Holiness‟s Strasbourg proposal has left the exile Tibetans with no clear 
vision of their future goal.
360
 A former President of the TYC, Lhasang Tsering, has 
similar views on this issue. In a short interview with Lhasang Tsering, he stressed that 
independence is the only viable solution for the Tibetan struggle saying, “how can one 
live with one‟s enemy who had killed our parents, and brothers and sisters”.361 During 
my visit to India and Nepal in the last three summers I have noticed this trend of 
                                                 
359 The Tibetan Youth Congress is the largest NGO in the Tibetan Community with 71 branch offices 
world wide. The organisation was founded on October 1970 in Dharamsala, India. Its demand for 
complete independence has been consistent and though it has never resorted to violence as a means 
to achieve independence it has kept its option open.  
360 Communication with Kelsang Phunstok in August 2003. 
361 Interview with Lhasang Tsering in August 2005. He was a former member of the Tibetan 
resistance movement in Mustang on the Nepal-Tibet border and a former President of TYC from 
1986 to 1990 and was one of the co- founding directors of Amnye Machen Institute, Dharamsala. 
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thinking among many of the Tibetan youths who have graduated from different 
colleges in India. Despite their disagreement on the Dalai Lama‟s Middle Way policy, 
they still show great respect and devotion to the Dalai Lama.  
 
Interestingly, in the interviews with the Tibetan newcomers in India and in Nepal that 
I conducted in summer 2005, I have noticed that majority of them chose 
independence over the genuine autonomy when given the two choices. However, after 
explaining to them the Dalai Lama‟s Strasbourg Proposal, they changed their mind by 
saying that they would accept whatever he proposes. I feel that this is more out of 
their faith in him as all the newcomers told me that seeking of his blessing was one of 
their primary reasons for escaping Tibet.
362
 The other reason could be that unlike the 
Tibetan graduates in India, the newcomers lack the education background and 
exposure to the contemporary political developments. Whatever opinions the two may 
have, the desire for independence is obvious in the heart of both the exile community 
and Tibetans inside Tibet. It looks more out of devotion to His Holiness that many 
Tibetans follow the Middle Way Approach. 
 
The increasing frustrations among the Tibetan community did not go unnoticed by the 
Dalai Lama. In his 10 March Statement in 1994, the Dalai Lama said:  
 
I must now recognise that my approach has failed to produce any progress either 
for substantive negotiations or in contributing to the overall improvement of the 
situation in Tibet. Moreover, I am conscious of the fact that a growing number 
of Tibetans both inside as well as outside Tibet have been disheartened by my 
conciliatory stand not to demand complete independence for Tibet. Because of 
                                                 
362 Interviews with 30 Tibetan newcomers conducted in Dharamsala and at the Tibetan Reception 
Centre in Nepal, July- August 2005. Ever since the present Nepalese Monarch took over the power, 
the relation between the Nepalese government and the Tibetan Government-in-Exile have become 
constrained which eventually led to the closure of the representative office of His Holiness the 
Dalai Lama in Kathmandu. This weakening of the relationship effected lives of many Tibetans 
living inside Nepal. There have been many cases of the Nepalese border police handing back the 
captured Tibetan escapees to the Chinese police. In an interview with Wangchuk Tsering, the 
former representative of the Dalai Lama in Kathmandu, the primary cause of all these changes is 
the increasing Chinese pressure on Nepal. I myself have noticed it when I traveled to Nepal this 
summer. The Nepalese Government has stopped recognising the travel document carried by the 
Tibetans living in India, which prevented me from flying into Nepal. I, therefore, had to travel by 
bus which took almost four days. Back in 1994 when I visited Nepal, I was able to fly with the 
Registration Certificate, a document issued for the Tibetan Refugees by the Indian Government. 
Though the Chinese pressure has induced a number of changes on the surface there exists a laxity in 
executing the changed policy which enabled me to travel to Nepal by bus. 
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my statements, some Tibetans have come to believe that there is no hope at all 
of the Tibetan people regaining their basic rights and freedoms. This and the 
lack of any concrete results from my conciliatory approach towards Chinese 
government over the past 14 years have caused disillusionment and undermined 
the resolve of some Tibetans.
363
  
 
The Dalai Lama further said that, internationally his initiatives and proposals have 
been endorsed as realistic and reasonable by many governments, parliaments, and non 
governmental organisations. But despite the growing support of the international 
organisations, the Chinese government has not responded constructively. According 
to the Dalai Lama, he has “left no stone unturned” in his attempts to reach an 
understanding with the Chinese. He said that the Tibetans would have to place their 
hopes in international support, but said: “If this fails, then I will no longer be able to 
pursue this policy [of conciliation] with a clear conscience. I feel strongly that it 
would then be my responsibility, as I have stated many times in the past, to consult 
my people on the future course of our freedom struggle”.364  
 
Due to the unprecedented criticisms of the Dalai Lama‟s policy in resolving the Tibet 
issue, His Holiness suggested for a referendum in 1995 to clarify the political course 
of Tibetan struggle. For a year, the Kashag, the Assembly of Tibetan People‟s Deputy 
(ATPD) and the Election Commission jointly organised various programs to educate 
the Tibetan people in all the exile communities about the forthcoming referendum. 
The Exile Tibetan Deputies on their annual visits to the various Tibetan settlements 
across India and Nepal gave talks about the proposed referendum and did the initial 
preparations. In Europe and America, the Deputies of the respective continents took 
similar initiatives.
365
 Later in January 1997, the Kashag and ATPD jointly organised 
an extensive seminar on four of the options for the Tibetan struggle, which were the 
Middle Way, Independence, Self determination and the Satya Graha (the philosophy 
of non-violent resistance, the literal translation of the word in Tibetan is „truth 
insistence‟). The panelists Lodi Gyari (His Holiness‟ special envoy in the US) and 
Kelsang Gyalsten (His Holiness‟ envoys in Europe) spoke on the Middle Way, former 
                                                 
363 „10 March Statement 1998‟, A. A. Shiromany, ed., The political Philosophy of the His Holiness the 
XIV Dalai Lama: Selected Speeches and Writings, pp. 458-462. 
364 Ibid. 
365 Interview with Ngawang Tsultrim, the secretary of the Assembly of Tibetan People‟s Deputy, 
August 2005. 
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TYC Vice President Karma Yeshi, Karma Choephel, a deputy member, and Lhasang 
Tsering, a former President of TYC and the Director of Amnyen Machen Institute 
spoke on Independence, Kalon Tashi Wangdu (then a cabinet member) and Dawa 
Norbu, a professor at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in Delhi spoke on Self 
Determination, and Samdong Rinpoche (then the Deputy Chairman of the ATPD) 
spoke on Satya Graha. The seminar was attended by more than 250 members 
consisting of high ranking government officials, the representatives of the Dalai Lama 
in foreign countries, the deputy members, the heads of the regional Tibetan offices, 
the principals of the various Tibetan schools, heads of the regional Tibetan Freedom 
Movement and the representatives of the non-governmental organisations. The 
seminar lasted for three days.
366
  
 
In 1997 a preliminary opinion poll was conducted in all the exile Tibetan communities 
to seek out any other options besides the four main choices. The outcome of the 
opinion poll showed that 64% of the Tibetan population felt that there was no need to 
hold a referendum, and that they would support the Middle Way approach and give 
the power to His Holiness to make the decisions according to the changing political 
climate in China and the world. Based on this result, the ATPD unanimously passed a 
resolution on 18 September 1997
367
 to this effect. In a video released by the DIIR, the 
then Chairman of ATPD Prof. Samdong Rinpoche claimed that the opinions of the 
Tibetans inside Tibet were clandestinely collected. Due to its secretive nature it took 
longer time than expected to get all the information and the announcement of the 
result of the poll was delayed.
368
 Thus the Exile Government asserts that the present 
government‟s policy represents the wishes of the majority of the Tibetans in and out 
of Tibet. 
                                                 
366 Sheja, Ma v‟ongs pai v‟os sdu‟i zab sbyongs dang „zin skyong skor gal cha‟i tsogs „du gnang wa. 
(An Important Seminar on the Future Election [for referendum] and Administration, January 1997. 
I encountered problems acquiring the government documents on these events. When contacted the 
head of the Election Commission of the Exile Tibetan Government, I was informed that they don‟t 
have such materials kept in their official records. What I was able to procure were mainly from the 
newsletters and interview with the Secretary of Assembly of Tibetan People‟s Deputies and from 
individual sources. Tibetan Bulletin, July-August 1997, also carries articles on these four options 
for the referendum. 
367 „An Excerpt from the Official Resolution no. 12/4/97/46 Passed by the Assembly of Tibetan 
People‟s Deputies‟, The Middle-Way Approach: A Framework for Resolving the Issue of Tibet, 
DIIR, CTA, Dharamsala, July 2005, p. 28. 
368 Ibid., p. 36; „Middle Way Approach: A talk on Exile Tibetan Governments Future Policy by Prof. 
Samdong Rinpoche, 11/4/ 2002, a video published by DIIR, Dharamsala, India. 
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In his March 10 statement of 1998, the Dalai Lama acknowledged the support of the 
Tibetan people and committed himself to pursue the Middle Way Approach. 
 
Last year, we conducted an opinion poll of the Tibetans in exile and collected 
suggestions from Tibet wherever possible on the proposed referendum, by which 
the Tibetan people were to determine the future course of our freedom struggle to 
their full satisfaction. Based on the outcome of this poll and suggestions from 
Tibet, the Assembly of Tibetan People‟s Deputies, our parliament in exile, 
passed a resolution empowering me to continue to use my discretion on the 
matter without seeking recourse to a referendum. I wish to thank the people of 
Tibet for the tremendous trust, confidence and hope they place in me. I continue 
to believe that my „Middle-Way Approach‟ is the most realistic and pragmatic 
course to resolve the issue of Tibet peacefully. This approach meets the vital 
needs of the Tibetan people while ensuring the unity and stability of the People‟s 
Republic of China. I will, therefore, continue to pursue this course of approach 
with full commitment and make earnest efforts to reach out to the Chinese 
leadership ..”.369 
  
Since then the Middle Way policy was thus adopted as the Exile Government‟s 
policy. Like in any democratic nation, criticism against this policy still exists in the 
Tibetan community. Proponents of independence are the main critics. They argue that 
the Dalai Lama‟s announcement of the Strasbourg Proposal is a mistake from the very 
beginning. Since that would inhibit people from making rational decisions as their 
devotions to His Holiness would influence their thoughts. Lhasang Tsering, one of the 
strongest proponents for the independence, thinks it was wrong for the Exile 
government to call for the referendum, since such a referendum would lack the 
opinion of the majority Tibetans living inside Tibet. He added that the non-violent 
struggle ascribed by the Middle Way policy is tantamount to non-action. He says: 
 
My criticism about our government is that their present position is not worthy of 
the name “non-violence”. It is non-action. There is a big difference between the 
two. Sitting and hoping that the U.N. might do something, that the Chinese might 
change their minds is not non-violence. Non-violence is an active force. The 
                                                 
369 Sheja, Spyi nor gong sa skyabs mgon chen po mchog gis gsum chu‟ dus dran thengs sum chu so 
dgu thog bstsal bai‟ yongs khyab gsung „phrin, March 1998; „10 March Statement 1998‟, A. A. 
Shiromany, ed., The political Philosophy of the His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama: Selected 
Speeches and Writings, pp. 458-462. 
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government should decide that our unchanging goal is only independence and 
give each of us a task. Then it will be real non-violence.
370 
 
According to Jamyang Norbu, the proposal was from the very beginning to garner 
public support for the Dalai Lama‟s Middle Way Approach. He wrote that the teams 
of the Tibetan Parliament members and government officials toured the Tibetan 
settlements and communities to announce terms of referendum and in the process they 
clearly stated that failure to vote for the Middle Way would be equivalent to showing 
disloyalty to the Dalai Lama. He further said that the promotion of the referendum 
proposal would further divide the Tibetan community and detract effort and resources 
from the real goal of struggling for Tibetan freedom. He is of the opinion that 
Tibetans should call for a referendum only when they have the required resources to 
ensure its success.
371
  
 
Even in the TYC there are moderates who despite their continuous struggle for 
independence accept the existence of other approaches to resolve the contending 
issue. They feel that in a democratic system people are entitled to choose any viable 
solutions. Therefore the Dalai Lama‟s Middle Way Approach, regardless of 
relinquishing Tibet‟s independence, is tolerated. A former TYC executive member is 
of the view that so long as the approach is beneficial to the Tibetans, it does not 
matter what path one chooses. He gave the analogy of two railway tracks that lead to 
the same destination.
372
 In a similar tone the current General Secretary of TYC 
Tsultrim Dorje claims that “the TYC is neither supporting nor opposing the Dalai 
Lama‟s Middle Way Approach. The approach is morally praiseworthy but it is not 
applicable to China who doesn‟t believe in moral values”. However, he remarked that 
there is a growing frustration among the younger Tibetans. When asked about the 
scope of their operation, he said that he‟s not denying the TYC‟s connection inside 
Tibet.
373
 Analysing the history of the TYC, it is evident that the Tibet issue is not 
likely to die with the passing away of the Dalai Lama. In fact the TYC might take an 
                                                 
370 Lhasang Tsering, „We Don‟t Have the Mandate to Change the Goal,‟ Tibetan Bulletin, DIIR, July-
August 1997, pp. 17-19. 
371 Jamyang Norbu, „Return of the Referendum‟, 7 August 2000,  
 http://www.heartibet.org/Referendum/Guests/norbu.html. 
372 Personal Interview, August 2005. The person wants to remain anonymous. 
373 Phone Interview with Tsultrim Dorje, the present General Secretary of the Tibetan Youth 
Congress, December 2005. 
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unprecedented course in its whole history. However, this interpretation is dependent 
upon the leadership‟s capability of the TYC and the political situation of the time.  
 
In my opinion a major change is likely to occur in the Tibetan politics after the 
present Dalai Lama passes away. What now appears is that the Tibetans are torn 
between their devotion to the Dalai Lama and their desire for independence. For 
majority of Tibetans, due to their devotion and reverence to their leader, it is 
unthinkable to contradict the proposed policy of the Dalai Lama, but there is a 
growing frustration in the Tibetan community. The President of Regional TYC, New 
York branch, where the largest pocket of exile Tibetan lives outside of India, is of the 
same opinion that the Tibetan youths are feeling frustrated and restless about the 
present political state of Tibet
374
 whereas Tenzin Sewu, the President of Regional 
TYC in Switzerland, in a much milder tone, claimed that he did not perceive 
prevalence of frustration among the second generation Tibetans in Switzerland. With 
a totally different standpoint Sewu asserted that the Regional TYC in Switzerland 
does not condone violence of any kind including self perpetrated forms.
375
  
 
The self immolation of Thupten Ngodup and the six hunger strikers, who maintained 
fast for 49 days in an Unto Death Hunger-Strike in 1998, demonstrate the exile 
Tibetans commitment to their struggle for independence and their frustration for the 
lack of concrete results. In an earlier campaign in 1988, despite adamant refusal from 
the hunger strikers, the TYC called off their hunger strike campaign after the Dalai 
Lama sent a special message asking the sixteen participants to withdraw from fasting. 
Fearing that the Dalai Lama would make similar request again, in 1998 the TYC 
entreated His Holiness the Dalai Lama not to make appeal to stop the Unto Death 
Hunger Strike even before the campaign began. These incidences clearly indicate the 
emotional dilemma created by the Tibetans‟ devotion to the Dalai Lama and their 
political ideology. So far the TYC has conducted four such campaigns, the first of 
                                                 
374 Since the USA has the largest number of exile Tibetans living there and Switzerland being the 
second, in order to obtaining their views of the Tibetans living in those places I interviewed the 
Presidents of the Regional Youth Congress based in those two countries. Interview with Tenzin 
Kalden, December 2005. The President of the Regional TYC, New York branch, holds similar 
views with that of the Central Tibetan Youth Congress, India. 
375 Interview with Tenzin Sewu, the President of the Regional TYC, Switzerland, December 2005. 
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which was launched in 1974,
376
 but all the campaigns ended either on the Dalai 
Lama‟s persuasion or by verbal assurances from the UN.377  
 
The TYC‟s Unto Death Hunger Strike and the self-immolation of Thupten Ngodup in 
1998 had grabbed the International media‟s attention and prompted several Western 
Parliaments to pass resolutions on Tibet. Soon after the abrupt and forcible 
termination of the Hunger Strike by the Indian Police the European Parliament taking 
into account the actions of the six desperate Tibetans, passed a resolution on Tibet on 
13 May 1998
378
 calling on its Council and Commission to take steps to ensure the 
appointment of a special UN rapporteur on Tibet and to include without delay the 
Tibetan question on the next UN General Assembly Agenda. The resolution further 
called on the Chinese Government to open political negotiations with the Dalai Lama 
about the future of Tibet. The Parliament also endorsed the request made by 1,300 
parliamentarians to the UN Secretary General that he meets with the Dalai Lama as a 
step of UN mediation between the Chinese Government and the Tibetan Government-
in-Exile.
379
 The Hunger Strike also won sympathy and solidarity of the Australian 
Senate which expressed its concern for the fate of the six hunger strikers.
380
 The issue 
of the hunger strikers was also raised in various parliaments around the world 
                                                 
376 In 1974, a hunger strike campaign was conducted against the Bhutanese government for their 
unjust persecution of Tibetan refugees in Bhutan. This campaign was not an unto death hunger 
strike and it was organised in cooperation with other Tibetan NGOs.  
377 Till now the TYC has conducted four Unto Death Hunger Strikes. The first in 1988 with 16 
participants including an Indian youth, in New Delhi, the Second in 1998 with 6 participants in the 
first batch, in New Delhi, the third was a continuation of the second Unto Death Hunger Strike with 
3 participants in Geneva, Switzerland and the fourth in 2004 with 3 participants in New York. I 
tried to obtain direct information from the Central TYC office in Dharamsala, however, probably, 
due to office policy the TYC did not provide me with the information on the number of participants. 
But from what I heard from other sources more than 100 hundred people signed up for the 1998 
hunger strike and 20 people in the 1990 hunger strike. I feel it necessary to report here the difficulty 
that I encountered in procuring information from this organisation. Several of my emails requesting 
for information went unanswered and the ones that were answered contained only sketchy 
information. My phone calls were answered with promises which were not delivered. I could not 
fathom the exact reasons for such behavior but am assuming that it has to do with office policy. 
After a number of emails and phone calls the Secretary of the TYC gave me an interview and also 
provided some of the requested information which I am very appreciative of. 
378 In the Official European Parliament Journal, the date of the resolution is listed as „Resolution on 
Tibet, B4-0511, 0537 and 0538/98, 14/05/1998‟. http://www.mann-
europa.de/tibet/resolutionen/140598-en.pdf, I have used Thomas Mann‟s website for quoting the 
resolution passed in the European Parliament on Tibet. Thomas Mann is a member of the European 
Parliament and the present President of Tibet inter-group in the European Parliament. 
379 Ibid.; DIIR, „In a Joint Motion for a Resolution on Human Rights in Tibet‟, International 
Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 to 2004, p. 63. 
380 DIIR, „Australian Senate, Canberra-7 April, 1998,‟ International Resolutions and Recognitions on 
Tibet: 1959 to 2004, p. 209. 
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including the British, Swedish, Norwegian and Luxembourg parliaments. Vigorous 
support was promised by many nations including Government of Poland, the USA, 
Hungary and most specifically from Norway and Costa Rica who gave assurances that 
they would take up the issue of Tibet at bilateral talks that they were going to have 
with China.
381
 
 
Such actions also made some Chinese scholars such as Wang Lixiong, a Han Chinese 
historian and an intellectual, to view the Tibetan Youth Congress as a political force 
to be reckoned with and warned the possibility of TYC gaining support in the time of 
the Dalai Lama‟s death and taking control of the exile community. “If the 14th Dalai 
Lama is unable to settle the Tibet matter in his lifetime, his death will leave the 
Tibetan exiles leaderless, which will likely land them in internal disorder and low 
morale. In the worst case, forces such as the “Tibetan Youth Congress” are quite 
likely to consequently dominate the exiled Tibetans, which will sharply increase the 
violence and destruction,” writes Lixiong in „The People‟s Republic of China‟s 21st 
Century Underbelly‟.382 In an interview with Palden Gyatso, a 73 year old ex political 
prisoner who had spent 33 years in Chinese prison, he says, “We will of course follow 
His Holiness directives but living in a democratic country we have the right to choose 
what policy to adopt according to the needs of the time if the present policy did not 
yield any results”. He further stated that his demand for independence was the reason 
for his initial arrest and long imprisonment. “After spending more than 33 years in 
prison how can I forget the last words of the prison mates who died struggling for 
Independence,” he rhetorically asked.383 Such views are shared by more and more 
younger Tibetans in exile. A good example of a Tibetan youth who despite his strong 
faith in His Holiness yet disagrees with his policy is the activist Tenzin Tsundue. 
Although Tsundue speaks with great respect for the Dalai Lama, he differs on the goal 
and the method of their struggle. In an interview he had said, “The Dalai Lama 
                                                 
381 Rangzen (Official journal of the Tibetan Youth Congress), „Unto Death Hunger Strike‟, 16 May 
1998, http://www.rangzen.org/archive/98/03_march/strike/516a.html. 
382 Wang Lixiong, „The People‟s Republic of China 21st Century Underbelly‟, Zhanlue Yu Guanli, 2 
January 1999, translated by BBC Monitoring Service, published in the BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, SWB FE/D3525/G, 4 May 1999. The article can be also viewed at:  
 http://www.columbia.edu/itc/ealac/barnett/pdfs/link14-wang-lixiong.pdf. 
383 Phone interview with Palden Gyatso during his latest tour of the US in the fall of 2005. Palden 
Gyatso has written an autobiographical account of his long struggle under the Communist rule in 
Tibet in Fire Under the Snow. Ever since his escape to India he has given numerous testimonies in 
many Western Parliaments and also at the UN Commission on Human Rights. 
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advocates autonomy for Tibet under Chinese rule. He is more accommodating; he 
looks for mutual benefits. But I and others want a clear statement. What we want is 
independence from China”.384 
 
Although the present Tibetan Government-in-Exile continues with the Middle Way 
Approach, it is too early to say what the future stand on Tibet would be. The Dalai 
Lama himself has reiterated that in a democratic system of government people have 
the right to hold on to their beliefs and he thinks there is always a possibility for a 
change. He said, “My generation has now almost all gone. When the old generation is 
no longer around, things could get easier and could also become more difficult... If the 
youth organisations should resort to violence, I would resign”.385 The constant public 
statements of the Dalai Lama on resigning from the Tibetan politics if Tibetans resort 
to violence is what Tibetans fear the most. Since the TYC which struggles for 
independence has left its option for violence open, the fear of losing His Holiness‟s 
leadership restrains many Tibetans to call for independence, although independence 
was what majority Tibetans inside and outside Tibet struggled for before the 
announcement of the Strasbourg Proposal in 1988. When asked about the existing 
Tibetan youth‟s frustration about the non-violent Middle Way approach, the Dalai 
Lama answered, “Yes, it is a healthy sign. On a few occasions, youths who are a little 
militant come and argue with me, but I remain stubborn. They start crying (laughter). 
They love the Dalai Lama, but the Dalai Lama does not agree with their viewpoint, so 
they finally end up crying”.386 
 
2.4.5. Panchen Lama Controversy 
The unexpected death of the 10
th
 Panchen Lama
387
 in Shigatse in January 1989 was a 
major loss to both China and Tibet. For the Chinese, the late Panchen Lama was a 
                                                 
384 Stephen Coan, „Tenzin Tsundue: Merging Political Activism and Writing, Phayul, 18 October 
2005, 
 http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=10962&t=1. 
385 Zhang Lifen, „Dalai Lama: Holding Out Hope‟, 4 February 2003, (BBC Chinese Service), 
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2723395.stm. 
386 „Violence and Non-Violence‟, A. A. Shiromany, ed., The political Philosophy of the His Holiness 
the XIV Dalai Lama: Selected Speeches and Writings, pp. 250-253. 
387 There were rumours of the 10
th
 Panchen Lama being poisoned but the exact cause of his death is 
still unknown. The Chinese claim that the Panchen suffered heart attack which eventually caused 
his death but Tibetans were highly suspicious of the Chinese claim as the Panchen Lama had 
delivered an anti-Chinese government speech just three days before he passed away. In an interview 
on the death of 10
th
 Panchen Lama, Zoratto Bruno asked His Holiness the Dalai Lama whether the 
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political tool in maintaining stability in Tibet but for the Tibetans, he was the second 
highest spiritual leader and a great source of inspiration. Thus his death was a big 
blow to both parties. Moreover, this brought about another major contradiction 
between the Chinese government and the Exile Tibetan Government over the right to 
choose the next Panchen Lama. China claims that the Chinese government has 
overseen the selection of the Panchen Lama since the Qing Dynasty choosing a lot 
from a golden urn system established during the Qing period. Contrarily, the Tibetans 
argue that the selection of Panchen is purely a religious matter. Thereafter, the two 
parties made their own announcements regarding the process of selecting the next 
Lama. In February 1989, Premier Li Peng announced that China would not tolerate 
any outside interference, indicating that the Dalai Lama‟s involvement is not 
acceptable.
388
 Prior to that, the Dalai Lama and his Exile government made numerous 
statements claiming the right to choose the next Panchen Lama. The Exile 
government emphatically stated that traditionally only the Dalai Lama has the right to 
recognise the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama. This is also acknowledged by the 
Chinese historian Ya Hanzhang in his Biographies of the Tibetan Spiritual Leaders 
Panchen Erdenis. He writes, “By Tibetan tradition a reincarnation of the Panchen 
could not be religiously legal without the Dalai‟s recognition, and the same was the 
case with the Dalai”.389 
 
Initially the Chinese Government showed leniency in conducting the search for the 
next Panchen. Chatral Rinpoche, the head of the official Chinese Committee 
responsible for the search of the reincarnation of the 10
th
 Panchen Lama met the Dalai 
Lama‟s brother Gyalo Thondup and Sonam Topgyal (a former chief cabinet member) 
                                                                                                                                            
Tibetan Government has any plans of setting up a commission to investigate the mysterious death 
of the late Panchen Lama. The Dalai Lama replied that there was no plan for that but for religious 
reasons he wanted to give a Kalachakra Initiation in Tibet, because of the special connection the 
Panchen lineage has with Kalachakra, which would require at least 15 ritual assistance to 
accompany him. He requested for Chinese permission to allow them to go to Tibet and perform the 
initiation which the Panchen lineage has a especial connection. He said that the Chinese agreed to 
allow only 3 persons, with which it is not possible to perform the Kalachakra. He added, “In clear 
text we (Tibetans) didn‟t get the permission”. Zoratto Bruno, “Inferno Tibet. Gespräch mit dem 
Dalai Lama, Friedensnobelpreisträger 1989,‟ Anita Tykve Verlang, Büblingen, 2. Auflage 1990, pp. 
133-134. The Interview was conducted in April 1989 in Dharamsala. 
388 Tsering Shakya, „Panchen Lama – The Analysis‟, World Tibet Network News, 16 May 1995, 
 http://www.tibet.ca//en/newsroom/wtn/archive/old?y=1995&m=5&p=16_1. 
389 Ya Hanzhang, Biographies of the Tibetan Spiritual Leaders Panchen Erdenis, (translated by Chen 
Guansheng and Li Peizhu), Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1994, p. 350. 
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when they visited Beijing in 1993.
390
 It is known that Chatral Rinpoche had sent a 
letter through them to the Dalai Lama seeking his assistance for searching the new 
Panchen Lama. On 5
th
 August of the same year, the Dalai Lama responded by inviting 
Chatral Rinpoche and the other members of the search party to visit India for a 
discussion, which the Chinese refused
391
. China may have doubted this act of the 
Dalai Lama as a hidden ploy in unilaterally recognising the new Panchen Lama, 
which they feared would hamper China‟s legitimacy over Tibet. This resulted in the 
termination of the formal contact between the Dalai Lama and the search party. But 
the communication between the two parties went on clandestinely.
392
 It is widely 
believed, and indeed the Chinese themselves claimed, that the official search party 
had submitted a list of candidates for the Dalai Lama‟s approval, an act which 
contravened the Chinese instructions.  
 
On 14 May 1995, the Dalai Lama from his headquarter in Dharamsala, announced 
Gendun Choekyi Nyima, a boy from Nagchu in north-west Tibet, as the reincarnation 
of the 10
th
 Panchen Lama. China furiously denounced
393
 the Dalai Lama‟s action as 
“unlawful and invalid” claiming that the right to choose the Panchen Lama lay 
exclusively with the Chinese Government. Just few days after the Dalai Lama‟s 
announcement the boy identified by him as the 11
th
 Panchen Lama and his family 
disappeared. Despite repeated appeals from the United Nations and various 
International organisations, including the human rights organisations, China refuses to 
reveal the details of the boy and his family, and till date their whereabouts remain 
unknown to the world. The Chinese Government claimed that the boy is under the 
government supervision for his own safety. The abduction of Gedun Choekyi Nyima 
at the age of six made him the world‟s youngest political prisoner. While the 
overwhelming majority of Tibetan Buddhists recognise the boy identified by the Dalai 
                                                 
390 Isabel Hilton, The Search for the Panchen Lama, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000, p. 
209. According to the author the meeting between Gyalo Thondup, Sonam Topgyal and Chadrel 
Rinpoche took place on 17 July 1993 in Beijing under the watchful eye of a Chinese official from 
the United Front who spoke good Tibetan. At the meeting Chatral brought a request for the Dalai 
Lama‟s assistance and prayers in the search and handed them a letter for the Dalai Lama. 
391 Ibid., p. 211. 
392 Gilles Van Grasdorff, Hostage of Beijing: the Abduction of the Panchen Lama, Boston: Elements 
Books, Inc., 1999, p. 193. Gilles Van Grasdorff writes, “According to the Chinese authorities, the 
latter [Chadrel Lama] had taken advantage of his responsibilities as superior of Tashilhunpo and 
chairman of the search committee appointed by Beijing to delay the proceedings and, in particular, 
to hand secretly to the Dalai Lama the list of candidates for the succession of the Panchen Lama”. 
393 „Tibet to Seize Opportunity for Speeded Development‟, People‟s Daily, 10 March 2000, 
 http://english.people.com.cn/english/200003/10/eng20000310N102.html.  
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Lama as the true reincarnation of the Panchen Lama, Tibetans in Tibet claimed that 
they were forced to sign statements pledging allegiance to the boy selected by the 
Chinese Government.
394
  
  
Chatral Rinpoche, was arrested on 17 May 1995 and imprisoned for six years for 
“conspiring to split the country” and “leaking state secrets”. Chinese authorities 
named him as a collaborator in the Dalai Lama‟s plot to split the country through the 
choice of the new Panchen Lama.
395
 According to an information received from Tibet 
by the Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD), Chatral Rinpoche 
is under house arrest in an isolated resort (Chinese: dujian cun) south of Dib military 
camp (Tib translit: sGrib dMag Khang) in Lhasa. Despite his release in January 2002, 
the Chinese officials have not confirmed his whereabouts. They continue to state that 
Chatral Rinpoche is practicing Buddhist rituals in seclusion. Since his arrest in 1995 
no one has seen him. For almost six months, no response came from the Chinese 
authorities. The Dalai Lama‟s unilateral announcement had created a dilemma. The 
acceptance of the Dalai Lama‟s choice could be perceived as an endorsement of the 
Dalai Lama‟s authority over the Tibetan Buddhism. Therefore, China saw it more 
advantageous to denounce the Dalai Lama‟s choice and recognise their own Panchen 
Lama to demonstrate China‟s past and present claims of sovereignty over Tibet. After 
several months of deliberations, the Chinese authority came out with their own 
selection of Gyaltsen Norbu as the reincarnation of the 10
th
 Panchen Lama. Tibetans 
viewed this as an attempt by the Chinese to circumvent the Dalai Lama‟s authority. 
Currently, there are two Panchen Lamas, one claimed by the Dalai Lama and the other 
by China. While the boy who has the reverence and devotion of the Tibetan people 
remains invisible the Chinese picked boy lacks the support of the Tibetans. 
 
It is apparently not the Dalai Lama‟s involvement that angered the Chinese, as they 
allowed the search party to contact the Dalai Lama at the initial stage of the search. 
                                                 
394 „State Department Report on Human Rights, 1998‟, According to the report, “Tibetan monks have 
claimed that they were forced to sign statements pledging allegiance to the boy the Government 
selected as the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama”.  
 http://www.savetibet.org/tibet/us/reports/humanrights1998.php. 
395 The first statement acknowledging that there had been unnamed persons of responsibility at Tashi 
Lhunpo monastery who had collaborated illegally with the “Dalai Clique” appeared in Tibet Daily 
on 4 November 1995, as stated in Cutting off the Serpent‟s Head: Tightening Control  in Tibet, 
1994-1995, Tibet Information Network/Human Rights Watch-Asia, New York, 1996, p. 63. 
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But the failure of the Dalai Lama to seek their approval was considered as a challenge 
to their final authority and therefore, the legitimacy of Chinese authority over Tibet. 
China could have applied the same method to the Panchen‟s case as they did with the 
Karmapa, who was discovered by the exile members of his sect in Gangtok, Sikkim, 
approved by the Dalai Lama and later accepted by China. But they didn‟t. Why was 
then China so upset? Is it because the Panchen Lama was recognised by the Dalai 
Lama, who the Tibetans claim as their leader or is it because they foresee the 
importance of the Panchen Lama during the Dalai Lama‟s absence? Whatever the 
hidden agenda the Chinese may have, in the Buddhist tradition it is essential that a 
reincarnation receives trainings from an early age. The boy identified by the Dalai 
Lama, who is under house arrest, is not being trained in the traditional way, which is 
of major concern to the Tibetans. Due to the restriction imposed, the Tibetans in Tibet 
cannot possess the picture of Gedun Choekyi Nyima. Vijay Kranti, an Indian 
journalist during his visit to Tibet in 2002, noticed that the boy claimed by the 
Chinese lacked the support of the Tibetans. He writes, “While no Tibetan would dare 
display a photo of the Dalai Lama or Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the photos of the 
Chinese sponsored Gyaltsen Norbu too are conspicuously absent from shops, small 
bakeries, restaurants and even poster shops that dot each street in Tibetan cities. The 
Tibet people, instead, display big portraits of the late 10th Panchen Lama, which 
sends rather clear statement to be misunderstood”.396 
 
Melvyn Goldstein, a Tibetologist at the Case Western Reserve University and Co-
Director, Center for Research on Tibet, writes in his book The Snow Lion and the 
Dragon, that decision to preemptively announce the reincarnation of the Panchen 
Lama was politically inastute. While saying this I think Goldstein fails to consider the 
traditional Buddhist system of consulting divination in deciding the day of 
announcement for high lamas such as Panchen Lama. The Dalai Lama stated clearly 
in an official press release why that particular date was chosen for the announcement. 
Tenpa Tsering, the Secretary of the DIIR, said, “On 13 May 1995, a final divination 
was performed to determine whether it was appropriate to declare the recognition of 
the reincarnation of Panchen Rinpoche on the fifteenth of the third month of the 
Tibetan Lunar calendar (which corresponded to 14 May 1995) or to postpone it for 
                                                 
396 Vijay Kranti, „How Tibetans Make a Statement: An inside look at how Tibetans in Tibet show 
their allegiance in Tibet today‟, Tibetan Bulletin, Vol. 6, Issue 3, July-September 2002. 
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some time. The divination indicated that it would be better to declare it on the 
fifteenth as proposed”.397 Thinking entirely from the political aspect, Goldstein‟s 
argument appears plausible but the issue involved not merely politics. The essentiality 
of consulting divination in Tibetan Buddhist tradition can be seen in many historical 
precedents. A good example was, in 1959 when the whole Tibetan nation was 
overwhelmed by Chinese invasion, the Dalai Lama consulted the Nechung Oracle and 
performed divination to decide whether to stay or escape. Both the oracle‟s prophecy 
and the divination discouraged him from escaping. Than on 17
th
 March, the Dalai 
Lama consulted the Nechung Oracle again, wherein the oracle told him to leave right 
away. Following this guidance, His Holiness made his escape that very night. In his 
memoir the Dalai Lama writes: 
 
The following day, I again sought the counsel of the oracle. To my astonishment, 
he shouted, „Go! Go! Tonight!‟ The medium, still in his trance, then staggered 
forward and, snatching up some paper and pen, wrote down, quite clearly and 
explicitly, the route that I should take out of the Norbulinga, down to the last 
Tibetan town on the Indian border.
398
 
 
Examining the above mentioned events, one can infer the significance of the 
prophecies and divinations in determining the fate of the Tibetan nation. Even at such 
a crucial time when the whole nation was in chaos the Dalai Lama did not overlook 
the need to consult the state oracle. Also the historical evidences cannot be ignored, 
which show that the development of Panchen Lama‟s institution began with the fifth 
Dalai Lama. I, therefore, think Goldstein‟s argument fails to consider the Buddhist 
norms and sentiments. Instead he has politicised even the issues relating primarily to 
Tibetan religious matters.  
 
The denouncement of Gedun Choekyi Nyima by the Chinese authority created an 
irreconcilable gap between the two parties. From the outset China is aware that in 
religious matters the Dalai Lama‟s authority was universally accepted and that any 
attempt to challenge his spiritual prestige would provoke protest from the Tibetans. 
Nevertheless, China opted to overlook the ancient Tibetan Buddhist tradition. It is 
                                                 
397 „The Panchen Lama‟s Recognition Process‟, Dharamasala, 15 June 1995,  
 http://www.tibet.com/PL/june15d.html.  
398The 14
th
 Dalai Lama Freedom in Exile: The Autobiography of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, p. 149. 
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obvious from the recent Chinese announcements that China plans to use the picked 
boy in selecting the next Dalai Lama. The Chinese authority has declared that the 
selection of the next Dalai Lama would be performed through the “Golden Urn” 
system. Xinhua News Agency quoted Ragdi, the No. 2 leader of the Tibet branch of 
China‟s Communist Party, as saying that the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama would 
be chosen according to “historical customs and religious rituals” and would then be 
confirmed “after being ratified by the central Chinese government”.399 To forestall 
such complications, the Dalai Lama has reiterated in many public statements that his 
reincarnation would be born outside China. In 1999, the Dalai Lama told Indian 
Express that “should people prefer the old system of choosing a reincarnation -- then 
Dalai Lama‟s reincarnation will appear in a free country, and not in Chinese hand as 
the purpose of a reincarnation is to carry the work started by the previous life and yet 
not fulfilled”. “Logically,” he further adds, “the previous life escaped from Chinese 
hands so the next life should also be out of Chinese control”.400  
 
Another major suspicion China has is that the activities of the Dalai Lama are in 
collusion with the West‟s attempts to challenge the Communist Party‟s legitimacy. 
 
The Dalai intensified his activities and was busy running about, lobbying with 
a view to internationalising the Tibet problem. The West, in turn, schemed and 
plotted for and brought the Dalai clique with cash in an attempt to use the 
Tibet problem as a breakthrough point for containing, weakening, disturbing, 
and splitting China. Therefore, on the issue of the Panchen‟s child 
reincarnation, our struggle, but also an important field in our struggle against 
hostile forces in the West. This struggle is unavoidable; it will take place 
sooner or later.
401
 
 
It is clear from the announcement made on Lhasa Radio on 3 November that China 
would never compromise its position over the selection of high incarnates. According 
to Warren W. Smith, a Research Historian for Radio Free Asia in Washington, DC, 
                                                 
399 „China wants to choose the next Dalai Lama‟, CNN, 9 August 2001‟, 
 http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/08/09/dalai.china/.  
400 „Dalai Lama‟s reincarnation will not be found under Chinese control‟, Indian Express, 6 July 1999, 
  http://www.tibet.com/DL/next-reincarnation.html.  
401 “How Did the Dalai Clique Sabotage the Work of the 10th Panchen‟s Reincarnation?,” Lhasa 
Radio, 3 November 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-223, 20 quoted in Warren W. Smith, Tibetan Nation: A 
History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1996, p. 653. 
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China has no intention of making up with the Dalai Lama. He writes, “China‟s 
disregard for the political capital they might have gained by manipulation of a 
popularly accepted Panchen Lama demonstrates that the Chinese Government was 
intent upon confrontation with the Dalai Lama at any cost”.402 Moreover, the PRC‟s 
campaign which began in 1996 to elicit statements from foreign states revealed 
China‟s true intention regarding Tibet. Washington Post reported that Boris Yeltsin 
was the first foreign leader to make such statement when he recognised that Taiwan 
and Tibet were “inseparable” and “inalienable” part of China, in exchange for the 
PRC‟s recognition of Chechnya as an internal affair of Russia.403  
 
From the current contention between the two protagonists over the Panchen Lama it is 
likely that there would appear two Dalai Lamas when the present Dalai Lama passes 
away in exile.
404
 In doing so China must not forget that their claimed Dalai Lama 
would lack the support of the Tibetans. It is up to China whether to respect the Tibetan 
Buddhist tradition or to politicise the Tibetan religious issue by picking a boy to 
challenge the Tibetan religious institution. The present Chinese campaign to eradicate 
the Dalai Lama‟s influence in Tibetan religion and politics could cause huge 
repercussions with violent protest from every part of Tibet. The continuous Chinese 
intolerance of the Tibetan religion led to further imposition of restrictions on the 
religious freedom in Tibet, specially aimed at the Buddhist institutions. Tibetan cadres 
and religious figures were compelled to denounce the Dalai Lama‟s interference in the 
Panchen‟s recognition,405 to show their loyalty towards the Communist Party. China 
                                                 
402 Warren W. Smith, Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations, 
p. 653.  
403 „China, Russia Swap Support, Sign Array of Agreements‟, Washington Post, 26 April 1996. 
404 From an official document of Research and Analysis Center, Security Department, Central Tibetan 
Administration containing Phuntsok Wangye‟s letter to Hu Jintao dated 12 April, 2005. (Thereafter 
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the welfare of Tibetans made him a target of the Chinese Communist counter-revolutionary 
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autobiography, A Tibetan Revolutionary: The Political Life and Times of Bapa Phüntsok Wangye, 
by Melvyen C. Goldstein et al., CA: University of California Press, 2004. 
405 Robert Barnett, „Paper Presented at the History of Tibet Seminar, St Andrew‟s University, 
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in their drive to weaken the strong religious hold in Tibet makes patriotism a 
mandatory requirement to practice religion freely: “A qualified believer should, first 
of all be a patriot. Any legitimate religion invariably makes patriotism the primary 
requirement for believers”.406 After years of protest from the Exile Tibetan 
Government and the Tibetan Support Groups worldwide, and queries from the 
UNHCR and numerous Western nations, China has still has not disclosed Panchen‟s 
whereabouts. At one time rumour circulated that the Panchen might have died in 
Chinese custody, however this rumour could not been substantiated by any evidence. 
The following year China adopted stern measures by prohibiting Tibetans from 
possessing the Dalai Lama‟s picture; in Lhasa house searches were conducted to 
confiscate the Dalai Lama‟s picture. These actions escalated the worsening of the 
religious suppression in Tibet which I will touch on more in the next chapter.  
 
2.4.6. Flight of the Karmapa Lama in Exile 
Since the demonstration and riots of 1987 to 1989, China‟s State control over the 
monasteries in Tibet increased manifold. It reached the height of its severity in 1994, 
when the Third Work Forum on Tibet identified the “Dalai clique” as the “root of 
Tibet‟s instability” and defined the struggle against the Dalai Lama and his clique as a 
contradiction between “us and an enemy”.407 A passage from a document of the Sixth 
Enlarged Plenary Session of the Standing Committee states: 
 
As the saying goes, to kill a serpent, one must first cut off its head. 
 
The struggle between ourselves and the Dalai clique is not a matter of 
religious belief nor a matter of the question of autonomy, it is a matter of 
securing the unity of our country and opposing splittism. It is a matter of 
antagonistic contradiction with the enemy, and it represents the 
concentrated form of the class struggle in Tibet at the present time. This 
struggle is the continuing struggle between ourselves and the imperialists 
since they invaded Tibet a hundred years ago. We must safeguard the 
achievements of the democratic reforms and of the Open Reform Policy. As 
long as Dalai does not change his splittist standpoint, we have nothing else to 
                                                                                                                                            
Scotland, August 2001. 
406 „Why China Picked Its Own Panchen Lama‟, Tibetan Review, January 1996, p. 5. 
407 „Document No.5 of the Sixth Enlarged Plenary Session of the Standing Committee [of the Fourth 
Congress of the Tibet Autonomous Regional Branch of the Chinese Communist Party]‟, excerpted 
in Appendix C of Cutting the Serpent‟s Head, TIN/HRW-Asia, p. 150. 
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do but to continue this struggle right up till the time we achieve victory.  
 
The guidelines and principles of our struggle against the Dalai clique are 
these: we must persevere [in stating] that Tibet is a part of China and by 
holding this banner high and clear, we must wage a tit-for-tat struggle 
against them. We must prepare for a long-term struggle, but at the same 
time, according to our present situation, we must work hard and grasp 
things well. Work in our region must be done seriously, and the 
international struggle must also be solved well. In this argument we should 
hit the nail on the head, and make more foreign friends in order to smash 
the Dalai clique into pieces. The Central Committee‟s policy towards Dalai is 
this: If Dalai admits that Tibet is a part of China and is inseparable from China, 
if he changes his mind and gives up Tibet being independent, and stops all his 
splittist actions to divide the motherland, then we welcome him back to the 
motherland from exile as soon as possible. But he cannot claim independence, 
semi-independence or independence in a disguised form. On the question of 
safeguarding the unification of the motherland there is nothing to bargain 
about.
408 
 
The Tibet Work Forum of 1994 identified the Tibetan religious centers as the 
vanguard of the disturbances in Tibet and therefore adopted stricter measures against 
the religious community to undermine the Dalai Lama‟s influence. More restrictions 
were imposed on the monks and nuns. The Standing Committee of the Sixth Plenary 
Session went on to state: 
 
This wind of building monasteries and of recruiting new monks and nuns 
just as they wish should be stopped entirely. In future to build a new 
monastery, permission must be received from the Religious Affairs Bureau 
of the TAR. No monastery is allowed to be built without its permission. 
Those monasteries where the numbers of monks have already been set still 
need to be limited as much as possible, and are not allowed to go beyond 
that limit. The excess monks should be expelled, and those monasteries 
which have not set a stipulated number of monks and nuns should set a 
number as soon as possible. 409 
 
Furthermore, the announcement of the 11
th
 Panchen by the Exiled Leader added more 
                                                 
408 Ibid., p. 156. The sentences in bold are omitted from the public version of Document No.5 of the 
Sixth Enlarged Plenary Session of the Standing Committee.  
409 Ibid., p. 158. 
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fuel to the Chinese wrath. The dispute over the Panchen reincarnation led to the 
Chinese Government‟s implementation of loyalty test for the Tibetan cadres and the 
religious figures. The test required them to denounce the Dalai Lama‟s interference in 
the Panchen Lama‟s recognition, accept the Chinese selected Panchen Lama and 
reject the Dalai Lama‟s choice. Phagpalha Geleg Namgyal, a senior religious figure 
and Chairman of the TAR branch of the Chinese People‟s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC), issued a dire warning that all the CPPCC members irrespective 
of their ranks and statuses should make it a point to condemn the Dalai Lama both 
orally and in writing that would clearly indicate their political dispositions.410 The 
CPPCC attempted to make patriotism to China as a requirement for freedom to 
practice religion.411 
 
The announcement of the Third Work Forum forced the government officials to 
dispossess pictures of the Dalai Lama and other religious objects. In April 1996 an 
announcement was made banning the public display of photographs of the Dalai 
Lama as “part of an escalating effort to remove the Dalai Lama from his dominant 
position in Tibetan Buddhism”. The announcement condemned the Dalai Lama as 
being “no longer a religious leader who can bring happiness to the masses but a guilty 
person of the motherland and the people”.412 The photographs of the Dalai Lama were 
removed from monasteries, temples, and other public areas. In May 1996, in certain 
areas, the campaign even reached private houses where it was enforced by conducting 
house searches.413 
 
The successive failures of their initial attempts to suppress the religious communities 
made China realise the exigency of harsher campaigns to purge the religious beliefs 
and suppress the religious institutions. Therefore, in 1996 the TAR Communist Party 
announced a “patriotic education campaign” in the monasteries. According to a 
transcript obtained by TIN, Chen Kuiyuan, the Party Secretary of the TAR, in his 
address to the members of the Tibet People‟s Congress on 14 May said, “There are 
                                                 
410 Speech to the 11th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the TAR Committee of the CPPCC, 
Tibet Television, 24 November, 1995; SWB, November 28, 1995. See also „Anti-Abbot Campaign 
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few die-hard reactionaries in the monasteries who are hell-bent on following the Dalai 
Lama... In order to beat the splittist and sabotage activities of the Dalai Clique and 
protect the normal religious life of the masses of religious devotees, we must carry out 
a carefully differentiated rectification of the monasteries within our region”.414 To 
execute the previously instituted regulations higher level work teams were initially 
sent to the three major monasteries–Gaden, Sera and Drepung. The work teams 
conducted months long re-education program in the monasteries, including the task of 
registering and deregistering of the monks.415  
 
The adopted regulation was met with fierce resistance from the religious 
communities. There are ample instances where monks refused to obey the Party edict. 
Protests broke out in the three major monasteries, and the demonstrators were given 
prison sentences.416 Despite these protests, the Chinese authorities did not hesitate to 
extend this restriction throughout the TAR.417 Various plans were drawn up to re-
organise monasteries and “establish a normal order,” to eliminate strongholds for 
splittist activities and to retain the leadership power in the hands of patriotic and law-
abiding monks. These initiatives were to be implemented in all the monasteries under 
the guise of patriotic education campaign. Ragdi, the second highest Tibetan official 
in the TAR, said, “In the light of the actual security situation in the region, we shall 
conduct a patriotic education campaign among all monasteries and temples in the 
region”.418  
 
The re-education campaign is carried out by work teams consisting of personnel from 
the Public Security Bureau. They visit the religious centres and instruct the monks and 
nuns on six main topics viz. the history of Tibet, crushing the separatists, 
contemporary policies, policies on religion, law, and ethics for the masses. In the 
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course of their training sessions, the work teams examine and expel those whom they 
consider as unpatriotic. Further the clergy members are forced to take a five-point 
loyalty test which includes “a statement regarding the historical unity of Tibet and 
China, a denunciation of the Dalai Lama, and the recognition of the Chinese 
appointed Panchen Lama”.419 The Democratic Management Committees which 
manages the monasteries‟ affairs since late 1950s were given the task to carry out the 
regulations set up by the work teams. Other restrictive measures were introduced such 
as setting age limitations for the admission of monks and nuns and enforcing a 
mandatory retirement age of 65 years. Later the campaign was extended to the lay 
communities and by 1998 it was further extended to Qinghai, Sichuan and Gansu 
provinces, Tibetan areas outside the TAR. In early 1996, another campaign was 
launched. The “Strike Hard” campaign which was first initiated in China in 1983 to 
fight against domestic crime was used as a political weapon to crush the Tibetan 
nationalists in Tibet. The campaign targeted former political prisoners, Tibetan monks 
and nuns, involving intensive „patriotic re-education‟ sessions and strict controls 
within the monasteries and nunneries. It has resulted in 2,827 expulsions, 165 arrests, 
nine deaths and 35 voluntarily leaving their monasteries and nunneries.
420
 In essence 
the Strike Hard campaign continued the re-education program which the Chinese 
government claimed to have closed in year 2000. 
 
Thus religious restrictions were carried out in whole of the TAR and in the Tibetan 
areas outside the TAR, regardless of the monasteries involvement in the uprisings 
after 1959. Tsurpu monastery, the main seat of the Karma Kagyu Lineage (one of the 
four Tibetan Buddhist Schools), located in Toelung Dechen, the county of Lhasa 
municipality which had no records of any involvement in political activities was not 
spared from the campaign. Prior to 1959 the Tsurpu monastery is said to have more 
than 500 monks but currently there are around 300 monks living there. According to a 
monk who knows the monastery intimately, during the three-year campaign, about 30 
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monks were expelled from the Tsurpu monastery, due to the applied age limitation.
421
 
Although Karmapa Ogyen Trinley Dorje
422
 himself did not have to go through the re-
education program directly, the authorities in Lhasa sent teachers to instruct Karmapa 
on Chinese language. The monk said, “It is hard to say what intentions the authorities 
had as the Karmapa‟s flight took place soon thereafter”.423 However, his dramatic 
flight, which Time magazine termed as the most significant flight, to India in 
December 1999 demonstrates how critical the situation in Tibet was then. From exile 
in India, the Karmapa recalled in his biography, Music in the Sky: The Life, Art and 
Teachings of the 17
th 
Karmapa Ogyen Trinley Dorje, the reasons for leaving Tibet. 
“The main reasons were to receive the necessary teachings and benefit the Dharma 
and, further, to return to Rumtek
424
 and meet with my disciples abroad,” he said.425 In 
several public statements, the Karmapa also stated that he left because of controls on 
his movements and the refusal either to allow him to go to India to be trained by his 
spiritual mentors or to allow his mentors to come to him. Although the Karmapa had 
given mainly religious reasons for his flight it was clear that China‟s policy of 
repression in Tibet and their intention to use him in politics were major factors. The 
Guardian quoted him saying that he “came to suspect that there might have been a 
plan to use [him] to separate the people within Tibet from His Holiness the Dalai 
Lama,” and that he had been given “very special treatment”426 by the communist 
regime, and had even been whisked to Beijing twice. In his biography he states that, 
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“two unidentified Chinese men with knives were found hiding under a blanket in the 
library, which had a door leading to the Karmapa‟s quarters,”427 Some people 
speculate that this incidence could be a reason for his flight to India. 
 
In the wake of the Karmapa‟s defection the Chinese authorities restricted access to 
Tsurphu monastery and increased patriotic education activities there. TIN reported 
that the three monks who were on duty the night of escape were arrested and 
interrogated and the Karmapa‟s parents were placed under surveillance. According to 
a TIN‟s report, in January 2001 the conditions at Tsurphu remain tense, with a 
permanent police presence and intensified restrictions on monks that appear to be 
aimed at discouraging them from following their spiritual teacher into exile. The TIN 
further reported that no new monks were being permitted to join the monastery. The 
Karmapa‟s flight to India caused a huge embarrassment for the Chinese leaders who 
always claim that Tibet has religious freedom. The China‟s strategy to use high level 
lamas in implementing government policies and to undermine the Dalai Lama‟s 
influence over the Tibetan populace suffered a major setback when the Karmapa left 
Tibet. Less than two years ago another leading lama, Argya Rinpoche, who was based 
at the Kumbum monastery in Qinghai, a province of Western China largely populated 
by ethnic Tibetans, also escaped and is now in the West. 
 
Examining the Chinese policies of the mid 1990s it is apparent that China has no 
intention of resolving the Tibet issue. By targeting the Tibetan religious institutions 
and clergy members China is displaying its determination to eradicate the very root of 
Tibetan strength, its religion and people‟s faith in the Dalai Lama who according to 
China is the splittist of the mainland. Yet it is obvious from the strategy employed by 
the Chinese government that they are not willing to compromise on Tibet since they 
think the solution to that problem seems finally within its grasp. While the Chinese 
profess to be ready at any time to allow the Dalai Lama to return unconditionally, 
China engages in all kinds of acts to eradicate the Dalai Lama‟s political influence, as 
well as religious. But the question is how can China succeed in removing Tibet‟s 
problems by destroying its religion? Can China sever the strong bond that has been 
forged between the Dalai Lamas and the Tibetan people over many centuries? Isn‟t 
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China‟s current policy of forcing Tibetans–especially monks and nuns–to denounce 
His Holiness the Dalai Lama and pledge loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party 
counterproductive? Phuntsok Wangyal, an ardent Tibetan Communist who held 
important positions in the Communist Government especially during the Chinese 
takeover of Tibet in the 1950s, recently in April 2005 wrote a letter to Hu Jintao 
urging the Communist leaders to reconsider China‟s religious policy inside Tibet. He 
wrote that the escape of the two leading lamas Argya Rinpoche and Karmapa Lama 
are big losses to the mainland by stating that Buddhism is rooted deeply in the lives of 
Tibetan people and the high lamas play a very significant and influential role in their 
social and religious lives.
428
 However, it is up to Beijing to consider whether the Dalai 
Lama is a solution or a problem. 
                                                 
428 Phuntsok Wangye‟s letter to Hu Jintao dated 12 April 2005. 
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Chapter 5 Tibet in the International Arena 
 
2.5.1. International Response to the Dalai Lama‟s Future Tibet Policy 
The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama on 10 December 1989 
generated a new wave of interest in the International community on the Tibet issue. 
The International opinion which was then characterised by unquestioning acceptance 
of the Chinese version of reality about Tibet underwent a big change in favour of 
Tibetan exiles. Moreover, the Dalai Lama‟s Strasbourg Proposal, which de-
emphasised the Tibetan nationalistic demand for independence, was well received by 
the international community and garnered much support for his proposal. The fact that 
the Cultural Revolution in Tibet had caused irreparable damage to the Tibetans‟ 
cultural heritage, the ruthless suppression of the Lhasa uprisings from 1987-1989 and 
the Tiananmen massacre in 1989 exposed the CCP‟s atrociousness, and brought to 
light Tibetan tragedy to the outside world. Consequently, the Tibetan exiles and the 
Chinese supporters for democracy in China gained international support and 
solidarity.  
 
Even before the announcement of the Strasbourg Proposal there were some western 
countries who had attempted to raise the Tibet issue in their parliaments since 1960s. 
Petra Kelly‟s written question lodged in the Bundestag (Lower House), asking the 
German Government to clarify its stance on the Tibetan issue,
429
 indicated the 
growing support for the Tibetans. The issue received similar interests in the United 
States. For instance on 24 July 1985, ninety-one members
430
 of the US Congress 
signed a letter to Chinese President Li Xiannian asking him to initiate direct talks with 
the Dalai Lama and on 18 June 1987, the US House of Representative approved an 
amendment attached to the State Department‟s spending authorisation‟s bill, accusing 
China of its military invasion of Tibet which had led to the death of over 1,000,000 
Tibetans and caused political instability, and human rights abuses in Tibet. This 
                                                 
429 Tsewang Norbu, „The Green Partiy Raises The Issue of Tibet in the West-German Parliament‟ 
Tibetan Review 1986, vol. 21, no. 8, pp. 8-10. 
430 Tibet Justice Center, Legal Materials on Tibet, „Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1988-89, Washington, DC‟. 2nd edition, CA: Berkeley, May 1997, p. 248. The book contains a 
comprehensive collection of United Nations resolutions and reports, national and regional 
governmental resolutions and reports from non-governmental organisations. Also included are 
Tibetan treaties and relevant Tibetan proposals and statements, as well as Chinese documents on 
Tibet. The Tibet Justice Center was established in California in 1989 as the International 
Committee of Lawyers for Tibet.  
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amendment after further revision was passed by the US House of Representatives and 
Senate and was affixed to the US Foreign Relations Authorisation Act Fiscal Year 
1988-1989. According to Guangqiu Xu “the Senate‟s version was even stronger, 
requiring the President to determine that China was easing human rights abuses in 
Tibet before any arms sales to China could be approved. It also implied that Tibet 
ought to be an independent state”.431  
 
This growing international support despite its gradual beginning gained momentum 
after the Dalai Lama‟s announcement of the Five Point Plan and the Strasbourg 
Proposal. As I go through the international responses to the Dalai Lama‟s proposed 
solution in greater detail, we will see how the Tibet issue, which was once sidetracked 
and neglected during the Cold War, re-appeared in the international political arena.  
 
2.5.1.1 Responses in the United States 
Two years after the first US Congressional support in 1985, the United States once 
again embraced the Tibet cause by approving the Foreign Relations Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 by President Ronald Reagan on 22 December 1987. 
The Foreign Relation Authorization Act of 1988 and 1989 states: 1) “The United 
States should make the treatment of the Tibetan people an important factor in its 
conduct of relations with the People‟s Republic of China” (B, pt.2); 2) “should urge 
the Government of People‟s Republic of China to actively reciprocate the Dalai 
Lama‟s efforts to establish a constructive dialogue on the future of Tibet” (B, pt.4); 
and 3) “should urge the People‟s Republic of China to release all political prisoners in 
Tibet” (B, pt. 8). The US Government was directed to consider the PRC‟s treatment of 
Tibetans, with respect to transfer of any defence articles or defence services to the 
PRC, and to provide “Migration and Refugee assistance” to the displaced Tibetans 
should the Secretary of State makes a positive determination “whether the needs of the 
displaced Tibetans are similar to those of displaced person and refugees in other parts 
of the world”. The Act also established a program of providing no less than 15 
                                                 
431 Guangqiu Xu, „The United States and the Tibet Issue‟, Asian Survey, Vol. 37, November 1997, p. 
1067; Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. XLIII, Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, 
DC, 1988, p. 154. Congressional Quarterly Almanac contained a brief report on the Pell-Helms 
amendment (Senator Claiborne Pell and Senator Jesse Helms) which condemned China‟s violation 
of human rights abuses in Tibet and which required “that any notices to Congress of U.S. arms sales 
to China be accompanied by a statement that China was acting in good faith to resolve human-
rights issues in Tibet”.  
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scholarships to the Tibetans who are outside Tibet to study in the US.
432
 
 
This theme is repeated in a few other resolutions in the US Congress. The 16 
September, 1988 resolution (S. Con. Res. 129) commends the Dalai Lama‟s 
Strasbourg proposal in his quest for peace, and calls upon Beijing to “respond 
positively to the new proposal and enter into earnest discussions with the Dalai Lama, 
or his representatives to resolve the question of Tibet along the lines proposed by the 
Dalai Lama”.433 This resolution also calls on the President and the Secretary of State 
to express the US Government‟s support for the Dalai Lama‟s Strasbourg proposal and 
“to use their best efforts to persuade the leaders and the government of the People‟s 
Republic of China to enter into discussions with the Dalai Lama or his representatives, 
regarding the proposal of the Dalai Lama and the question of Tibet. Again on 15 
March 1989, a resolution (S. Res. 82) passed in the US Senate urges the 
administration to propose that a United Nations observer team monitor the situation in 
Tibet (pt. 5), urges that United States to make the treatment of the Tibetan people an 
important factor in its conduct of relations with the People‟s Republic of China (pt.6) 
and calls upon the Government of People‟s Republic of China to meet with the 
representatives of the Dalai Lama to begin initiating constructive dialogue on the 
future of Tibet (pt. 9).
434
 In that same year, a second resolution (H. Con. Res. 63) was 
passed by the US House of Congress, condemning the use of excessive and lethal 
force by the Chinese authorities in Tibet against the peaceful demonstrators and states, 
“Consistent with section of 1243 of Public Law 100-204, urges the President to 
continue to make respect for human rights (including the treatment of Tibetans) an 
important factor in the United States conduct of relations with the People‟s Republic 
of China,” (pt. 5).435 The importance shown towards the Tibet issue by the US 
legislature is reflected in the resolutions passed by the US Congress and Senate 
wherein attempts were made to highlight the Tibet issue as an important factor in the 
US‟s relation with China. In all the above mentioned resolutions–S. Con Res. 129, 
                                                 
432 „Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1988-89, in Legal Materials on Tibet, p. 248; 
DIIR, International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 to 2004, pp. 155-160.  
433 „Congressional Resolution S. Con. Res.129,‟ in Legal Materials on Tibet, p. 251; DIIR, 
International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 to 2004, pp. 87-89. 
434 „Congressional Resolution S. Res. 82‟, in Legal Materials on Tibet, p. 253; DIIR, International 
Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 to 2004, pp. 90-92. 
435„Congressional Resolution H. Con. Res. 63,‟ in Legal Materials on Tibet, p. 255; DIIR, 
International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 to 2004, pp. 93-94. 
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1988 (pt. 4), S. Res. 82, 1989 (pt. 6 and 7), H. Con. Res. 63, 1989 (pt. 5 and 6)–the US 
legislature had urged the US Government to make the treatment of the Tibetan people 
an important factor in its relations with the People‟s Republic of China and called on 
the executive branch to address and call the violations of human rights in Tibet. The 
resolutions condemn the deaths of the Tibetans, occurred as a consequence of Chinese 
occupation of Tibet in 1950 and the continuing religious and cultural persecution in 
Tibet. Moreover, a Senate joint Resolution 275 in 1990 authorised the President to 
designate 13 May 1990 as the “National Day in support of Freedom and Human 
Rights in China and Tibet”.436  
 
Despite Washington‟s numerous initiatives urging China to negotiate with the Dalai 
Lama, the PRC paid no heed, which according to Dawa Norbu led to the Washington‟s 
toughened stand on Tibet vis-a-vis China. Norbu further states, “The American 
message to the PRC seems to be this: „either negotiate with the Dalai Lama for 
autonomy or we will support the Tibetan struggle for freedom‟”.437 In the 18 April 
1991 resolution (S. Res. 107) the US Senate resolved that “as the Tibetan people and 
His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet go forward on their journey towards freedom 
the Congress and the people of the United States stand with them” (pt. b); and “it is 
the sense of the Senate that all Americans are united on the goals of freedom and 
human rights for Tibet” (pt. c). This resolution further declared the US recognition of 
Tibet‟s independence by citing the International Commission of Jurists‟ Report which 
states, “Tibet demonstrated from 1913 to 1950 the conditions of statehood as 
generally accepted under international law”.438 On 28 October 1991 both the Senate 
and the House of Representatives passed the most important legal statement on Tibet. 
The Foreign Relations Authorisation Acts for Fiscal Year 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 
102-138, [H.R. 1415]), approved by President Bush on 28 October 1991, declared that 
“Tibet, including those areas incorporated into the Chinese provinces of Sichuan, 
Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai, is an occupied country under the established principles 
of international law (pt.1); Tibet‟s true representatives are the Dalai Lama and the 
Tibetan Government-in-Exile as recognised by the Tibetan people” (pt.2); and finally 
calls for Tibetan people‟s right to self-determination by recalling that “numerous 
                                                 
436 DIIR, International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 to 2004, pp. 96. 
437 Dawa Norbu, China‟s Tibet Policy, p. 275. 
438 DIIR, „S. Res. 107, 18 April 1991‟, International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 to 
2004, pp. 100-101. 
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United States declarations since the Chinese invasion have recognised Tibet‟s right to 
self-determination and the illegality of Chinese occupation of Tibet” (pt.7).439 A 
similar but milder form of this statement was made in the section A4 of the Foreign 
Relations Authorisation Act for Fiscal Year 1988 and 1989, Public Law 100-204 
(1987), which accepts that beginning October 7, 1950, the Chinese Communist army 
invaded and occupied Tibet. 
 
In most of the US Congress resolutions and in public laws, the condemnation of 
human rights violations in Tibet and support for Tibetan human rights appeared 
prominently. For instance the 18 March 1992 resolution (S. Res. 271) resolved that 
“the United States Government should vigorously condemn Beijing‟s human rights 
abuses in occupied Tibet in all appropriate international forums” (pt. 2); and “the 
United States Government should raise human rights abuses in Tibet with senior 
officials of the People‟s Republic of China,” (pt. 3).440 A year later, on 27 May the 
House of Representatives resolved (H. Con. Res. 106, 1993) to urge the President to 
raise “at the highest levels of the Government of the People‟s Republic of China, the 
issue of Chinese population transfer into Tibet in an effort to bring about an 
immediate end to that government‟s policy on this issue”.441 Then again on 13 
December 1995, a Senate Joint Resolution 43 “urges the Government of the People‟s 
Republic of China to respect the wishes of the Tibetan people by supporting the 
selection of the new Panchen Lama by His Holiness the Dalai Lama” (pt. 2); “work to 
ensure the safety of the new Panchen Lama as selected by the Dalai Lama” (pt.3); and 
calls for the US government to “sponsor and aggressively push for the passage of a 
resolution regarding the human rights situation in China at the annual meeting of the 
United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva scheduled for March 1996” (pt. 
4).
442
 On 11 March 1997 a resolution (S. Res. 19) was passed calling on China for the 
immediate and unconditional release of Ngawang Choephel
443
 and other prisoners of 
                                                 
439 „Foreign Relation Authorisation Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993,‟ in Legal Materials on Tibet, 
p. 258; DIIR, International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 to 2004, pp. 165-166. 
440„Senate Resolution 271, [March, 1992],‟ in Legal Materials on Tibet, p. 259; DIIR, International 
Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 to 2004, pp. 104-106. 
441 DIIR, „H. Con. Res. 106, 27 May 1993‟, International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 
1959 to 2004, pp.107-108. 
442„Congressional Resolution S. J. Res. 43‟, in Legal Materials on Tibet, p. 285; DIIR, International 
Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 to 2004, pp. 114-117. 
443 Mr. Ngawang Choephel, a 34-year-old Tibetan musician and ethnomusicologist, whose family fled 
Chinese oppression to live in exile in India in 1968, was detained in August 1995 by the Chinese 
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conscience in Tibet and urged the US Government to take prompt action to sponsor 
and promote a resolution that specifically addresses political prisoners and 
negotiations with the Dalai Lama at the United Nations Commissions on Human 
Rights regarding China and Tibet.
444
  
 
In 1998, four resolutions were passed in the US Congress, including the May 22 
resolution (H. Con. Res. 283) and the September 17 resolution (S. Con. Res.103). In 
the first resolution the Congress made an important move by calling on the President, 
as a central objective of the 1998 presidential summit meeting with Jiang Zemin in 
Beijing, to work toward securing an agreement to begin substantive negotiations 
between the Government of the People‟s Republic of China and the Dalai Lama or his 
representatives (pt. 5) and called on the PRC to release the 9-year-old Panchen Lama 
from detention (pt. 4).
445
 The September 17 resolution carried Congress‟ grave 
concern over the findings of the International Commission of Jurists report on Tibet, 
December 1997, which declared that “in 1997, the People‟s Republic of China labeled 
the Tibetan Buddhist culture, which has flourished in Tibet since the seventh century, 
as a „foreign culture‟ in order to facilitate indoctrination of Tibetans in Chinese 
socialist ideology and the process of national and cultural extermination”. The same 
resolution supported the recommendations made by the Report which calls on the 
PRC to enter into discussion with the Dalai Lama or his representatives, to end 
practices such as transfer of Chinese people into Tibet which threaten to destroy the 
distinct cultural, religious and national identity of the Tibetan people. It, furthermore, 
called on the President to continue his effort to secure agreement to initiate 
substantive negotiations the between the PRC and the Dalai Lama (pt. 6).
446
 Two 
similar resolutions were also passed, one in February 1999
447
 expressing the sense of 
the Senate regarding the human rights situation in the People‟s Republic of China and 
                                                                                                                                            
authorities while working on a film project about traditional Tibetan performing arts as a student of 
Middlebury College in Vermont, USA. He was held incommunicado for over a year before he was 
charged of espionage in October 1996 and sentenced to 18 years in prison. Eye witness report 
indicated that he was beaten and tortured while in the prison. The Chinese authorities could not 
provide with any incriminating evidence against Mr. Choephel. He was released on medical ground 
after six years of imprisonment due to strong international pressure.  
444 „Congressional Resolution S. Res. 19, (1997),‟ in Legal Materials on Tibet, p. 288; DIIR, 
International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 to 2004, pp. 118-121. 
445 DIIR, „H. Con. Res. 283‟, International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 to 2004, pp. 
127-130. 
446 Ibid., „S. Con. Res. 103, 17 September 1998‟, pp. 131-134. 
447 Ibid., „S. Res. 45, 12 February, 1999‟, pp. 135-136. 
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the other in March 2000
448
 urging that the 10 March 2000 be recognised as the Tibetan 
Day of Commemoration in solemn remembrance of the Tibetans who died during the 
Lhasa uprisings and in affirmation of the inherent rights of the Tibetan people to 
determine their own future (pt. 1). 
 
In terms of material assistance the Americans for the first time openly allocated not 
less than 30 scholarships to Tibetan students and professionals who are outside Tibet 
(Sec. 225, a) as approved in the Public law 101-246 (16 February, 1990);
449
 the Public 
law 101-513 (5 November 1990) provided $500,000 to Tibetan refugees
450
; the Public 
law 102-391 (6 October 1992) provided $1,500,000 to the Tibetan refugees
451
 and the 
Public law 103-87 (10 June 1993) provided $ 2,000,000 assistance for the Tibetan 
refugees.
452
 In 1990, the Public law 101-649 (29 November) granted 1,000 immigrant 
visas to qualified displaced Tibetans in India and Nepal.
453
 Two radio services in 
Tibetan language, Voice of America and Radio Free Asia, were launched on 25 March 
1991
454
 and 2 December 1996
455
 respectively following the directives of the 
Congressional Resolutions.
456
 On 31 October 1997, a Special Envoy for Tibet was 
appointed following the Foreign Relations Authorisation Act for fiscal Years 1996 and 
1997.
457
 The Special Envoy who shall have the personal rank of ambassador and has 
the special functions of promoting substantive negotiations between the Dalai Lama 
or his representatives and senior members of the Government of the People‟s Republic 
of China, good relations between the Dalai Lama and his representatives and the 
United States Government, including meeting with the members of the Tibetan Exile 
                                                 
448 Ibid., „S. Res. 60, 9 March, 2000‟, pp. 137-139. 
449 Ibid., „Public Law 101-246 H. R. 3792, 16 February 1990‟, p. 162. 
450 Ibid., „Public Law 101-513, 5 November 1990‟, p. 163. 
451 Ibid., „Public Law 102-391, 6 October 1992‟, p. 167. 
452 Ibid., „Public Law 103-87, 10 June 1993‟, p. 168. 
453 Ibid., „Public Law 101-649, 29 November 1990‟, p. 164. 
454 Historical highlights of Voice of America can be read at this website.  
 http://www.voa.gov/textonly.cfm?tableName=tblVOAHistory&articleID=10008&sectiontitle=VO
A%20History&textonly=1  
455 „Different voices: the Media in Tibet,‟ TIN, 3 May 2000, 
  http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a398254452d57.htm#america.  
456 DIIR, „Foreign Relations Authorisation Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, 16 February 1990‟, 
International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 to 2004, pp. 161-162. This resolution 
contains directive to launch the Voice of American radio service for Tibetan language and „Foreign 
Relations Authorisation Act for Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, 25 April 1994‟ contains directive to 
launch the Radio Free Asia for Tibetan language, pp. 169-176. 
457 Ibid., „Foreign Relations Authorisation Act for Fiscal Years 1996 and 1997, 8 March 1996‟, pp. 
177-184. 
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Government.
458
 Gregory B. Craig was appointed as the first Special Envoy for Tibet. 
Presently the post is held by Paula J. Dobriansky. 
 
Observing the resolutions I have mentioned, it is apparent that the American public 
support for Tibet‟s cause has developed over the past several decades. But this must 
not be interpreted as unanimous support of the US State Department. Although the US 
State Department shares similar views with that of the US Congress on the issue of 
human rights violations in Tibet, on Tibet‟s political issue their views differ 
considerably. However, the consistent Congress support on Tibet issue remains 
ineffectual and overshadowed by the extensive economic interest the US government 
has in China. As long as China‟s dominating market continues to attract the 
investment from the big Western companies, the political issue of Tibet would always 
take the back seat. As Dawa Norbu states, “In such cold calculations, political and 
economic interest are paramount and human interest issues like Tibet are 
peripheral”.459 Even though the American public, represented by the Congress, show 
solidarity to the Tibetans, no concrete outcome in resolving the Tibet issue has 
resulted from the numerous resolutions because of the Executive Branch‟s reluctance 
to anger China. Different Presidents of the United States have handled the Tibet 
Question differently based on their political agenda, the geopolitical structure of the 
world and the administration‟s relation with the Beijing government.  
 
Examining the past 63 years of US- Tibet relationship, it is clear that the United 
States‟ stand on Tibet issue has shifted from time to time depending on the changing 
geopolitical climate of the world and the US policy towards China. Given the fact that 
the US contended for Tibet‟s independence and expressed support for it in 1949, 1961, 
and 1991, the Sino-US détente that led to the freezing of US –Tibet relation in the 
early 1970s–mid 1980s displayed the unpredictability of the US policy on Tibet. 
Therefore, the future American stand towards Tibet will be determined by Sino-US 
relations and its policy towards China. In the next section I will discuss how the Tibet 
issue is received in the European Community. 
 
 
                                                 
458 Ibid., p. 177. 
459 Dawa Norbu, China‟s Tibet Policy, p. 277. 
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2.5.1.2 Responses in the European Community 
The Dalai Lama‟s future Tibet policy was well received by the European community 
as well. In this section we will observe that most of the resolutions passed on Tibet in 
the European Parliament also addressed the Tibet‟s human rights issue but the political 
question of Tibet did not go unnoticed. In the beginning resolutions, the European 
Communities‟ stand on the Tibet issue appears weak but with passage of time it 
started to take firmer stand. The 14 October 1987 resolution
460
 expressed its concerns 
over the Tibet matter by especially focusing on the ongoing human rights abuses by 
the Chinese authorities in Tibet. The resolution urged the Chinese government to 
respect the rights of the Tibetans to religious freedom and cultural autonomy (pt.1) 
and to consider the Dalai Lama‟s Five Point Peace Plan which the Parliament viewed 
could form a genuine basis of a settlement (pt. 2). And this theme was repeated in 
resolutions of 1988 (Council of Europe Written Declaration No. 173, ADOC5960.R, 
October 21),
461
 1989 (European Parliament Resolution on Human Rights in Tibet, 
March 15)
462
 and 1991 (European Parliament resolution on human rights in China and 
Tibet, September).
463
  
 
In addition to the previous mentioned issues the Parliament did not overlook 
important matters such as the genuineness of political authority granted to the Tibet 
Autonomous Region, the massive Chinese population transfer to Tibet, the Chinese 
military presence in Tibet and the Tibetan peoples‟ right to self-determination. For 
instance the 15 December 1992 European Parliament Motion on Tibet
464
 
acknowledged the insufficiency of the legal autonomy presently granted to the Tibet 
                                                 
460 I used Thomas Mann‟s official website which contains the resolutions on Tibet passed in the 
European Parliament. Thomas Mann, a member of the European Parliament and President of the 
Tibet Intergroup in the European Parliament, has used the Official Journal of the European 
Communities as the source of these materials. Official Journal of European Communities, 
„Resolution on the situation in Tibet, 15 October 1987‟, No C 305/114, 16.11.87. http://www.mann-
europa.de/tibet/resolutionen/151087-en.pdf. The dates of the resolutions in the Official Journal of 
the European Communities are a day later than other sources such as the DIIR source and the Tibet 
Justice Centers. 
461„Council of Europe Written Declaration No. 173 on the Situation in Tibet (1988)‟, in Legal 
Materials on Tibet, p. 295.  
462 Ibid., p. 296; DIIR, International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet:1959 to 2004, p. 9; 
Official Journal of the European Communities, No C 96/140, 16 March 1989,  
 http://www.mann-europa.de/tibet_resolutionen.php  
463 „European Parliament Resolution on human Rights in China and Tibet, September 1991‟, in Legal 
Materials on Tibet, p. 297; DIIR, International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 to 
2004, pp. 11-12. 
464 „European Parliament Motion on Tibet, 1992‟, in Legal Materials on Tibet, p. 298; DIIR, 
International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 to 2004, pp. 14-20.  
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Autonomous Region (TAR) by the Chinese Government and regretted that even this 
limited autonomy exists only in “law but not in fact” (pt. E). The motion called for the 
Tibetan people‟s right to self-determination (pt. B) and had supported the Dalai 
Lama‟s demand465 for the reunification of whole of ethnic Tibetan areas by noting that 
most of the Tibetan population live outside the TAR and that the fate of these people 
must also be taken into account (pt. N). It further called on the Chinese government to 
immediately reverse the policies that encourage the mass transfer of Chinese to Tibet 
which violate the Tibetan people‟s right to self-determination (pt. 5). This point 
implies the right of the Tibetan people to decide democratically on levels and patterns 
of immigration. The motion expressed extreme concern over the continued military 
occupation of Tibet by Chinese troops and reported deployment of Chinese nuclear 
missiles in Tibet (pt. J).  
 
Although the European Communities‟ initial support towards the Tibet issue was mild 
compared to the US Congress‟ but it reached a new platform in 1993 when the 
European Parliament passed the 24 June resolution
466
 which officially expressed deep 
regrets for cancelling the Dalai Lama‟s planned address to the United Nations World 
Conference on Human Rights in Vienna as a result of Chinese pressure (pt. 7). This 
resolution called for an economic development policy which benefits Tibetans rather 
than stimulating the influx of Chinese into Tibet (pt. 9). It further called on the EC 
Ambassadors to China to draw up an in-depth report on their visit to Tibet and to 
forward this report to the European Parliament (pt. 4). The resolution called for a 
resumption of talks between the Dalai Lama and the Beijing Government and to seek 
                                                 
465 The call for reunification was a major demand made by the Dalai Lama in many of his proposals 
including the Strasbourg Proposal, 1988, which declared, “The whole of Tibet known as Cholka-
Sum (U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo) should become a self-governing democratic political entity 
founded on law by agreement of the people for the common good ..”. Even the previous exploratory 
teams of 1982 and 1984 put forward the same demand. However it was not acceptable to the 
Chinese Government and it still remains a major issue of contention between the two protagonists. 
The recent talks which resumed in 2002 between the Chinese government and the Exile Tibetan 
delegations, even after four rounds of talks, could not come to a satisfactory agreement on this 
point. I can see the gravity of this demand from both perspectives, as for Tibetans this demand 
pertains to a fundamental issue since a large portion of staffs and leaderships in the Exile Tibetan 
Government are from those contended areas and many newcomers from those regions that I have 
interviewed in Nepal and India have their total loyalty towards the Dalai Lama and look for his 
leadership. Thus it becomes morally hard for the Dalai Lama to ignore their plight. As for the 
Chinese government such a reunification would be “administratively impossible” since the 
combined area of the Inner Tibet and the Outer Tibet is so vast.  
466„European Parliament Resolution on Repression in Tibet, June 1993‟, in Legal Materials on Tibet, 
p. 302; DIIR, International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 to 2004, pp. 24-26.  
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a genuinely autonomous solution for Tibet (pt. 10). That same year in September 
another resolution
467
 was passed which for the first time associated the human rights 
issue in Tibet with the European Communities‟ economic and commercial ties with 
the PRC, which declared that the economic relation between the two parties would 
depend upon the Chinese government‟s respect for human rights in Tibet and in China 
in general (pt. 3).  
 
It is interesting to note the subtle change in the way the European Parliament 
identifies the representatives of the Dalai Lama. For instance in the resolutions passed 
since the early 1990s the European Parliament has started using the phrase Tibetan 
Government-in-Exile instead of the Dalai Lama‟s representatives wherever relevant. 
Although it is beyond my research topic to say what the implications of such changes 
in recognising the exile community would mean, nonetheless, I find it note-worthy 
considering the fact that any nation has been reluctant and sceptical in employing such 
phrases in their official documents. In the following resolutions we would see that the 
European Parliament had used the phrase “Tibetan Government-in-Exile” when 
referring to the exile Tibetan community which was previously termed as “the 
representative of the Dalai Lama”. The 17 May 1995 resolution urged the Foreign 
Ministers of the Member States and the Commission to call for a substantive dialogue 
between the Tibetan Government-in-Exile and the Chinese Government, without 
preconditions, in order to find a constructive solution to the situation in Tibet (pt. 8), 
asserted the Tibetans‟ rights to self-determination as contained in the international law 
and the UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (pt. E) and called on its 
Commission to make the granting of aid to China conditional on respect for 
fundamental human rights and freedoms, particularly in Tibet (pt. 6). It further called 
on its Commission to recognise that the Panam Project
468
 was a part of PRC‟s scheme 
to feed the new Chinese settlers in Tibet and therefore goes against the interest of the 
                                                 
467 Both in Legal Materials on Tibet, „European Parliament Resolution on Detention of Tibetans, 16 
September 1993‟, p. 304 and Official Journal of the European Communities, „Resolution on the 
detention of the Tibetans Gendun Rinchen, Lobsang Yontam and Damchoe Pemo and other 
violation of human rights in Tibet, No.C268/145‟, the date is given 16 September 1993. But 
International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 to 2004, the resolution was passed on 15 
September 1993, p. 27. 
468„European Parliament Resolution on 4th World Conference on Women, 17 May,‟ in Legal Materials 
on Tibet, p. 306; DIIR, International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 to 2004, pp. 29-
32; Official Journal of the European Communities, „Resolution on Tibet, B4-0768 and 0826/95, 
18/05/1995‟.  
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local Tibetan people by encouraging the settlement of Chinese citizens in Tibet and 
forcing the economic integration of Tibet into China (pt.1).  
 
Despite its initial mild support for the Dalai Lama and the Tibet issue, the European 
Community in 1995 passed a few resolutions which can be considered as earnestly 
supporting resolutions. The resolution of 13 July 1995 
469
 reaffirmed the illegal nature 
of the Chinese invasion and occupation of Tibet and declared Tibet‟s de facto status 
before the invasion by China in 1950 as recognised by many countries (pt. C), it also 
recognised and condemned the large-scale settlement of ethnic Chinese in Tibet, 
abortions, forced sterilisation of women, political, religious and cultural persecution 
which the European Parliament viewed as attempts by the Chinese authorities to 
destroy the Tibetan identity (pt. D). The European Parliament in its harder stance 
invited the Commission and the Council to intervene with the Chinese government to 
emphasise the seriousness of the continued oppression of the Tibetan people and how 
it would damage the European Union and the PRC‟s relation (pt. 3), called on the 
European Union to support any measures to resolve the Sino-Tibetan problem by 
means of political dialogue which follows the guidelines that the Dalai Lama had 
proposed (pt. 4) and expressed its support in establishing a permanent contact with the 
Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile (pt. 5). The next resolution passed that same year (14 
December 1995),
470
 called on the Chinese authorities to respect the religious tradition 
of the Tibetan people by accepting the boy chosen by the Dalai Lama as the 11
th
 
Panchen Lama (pt.2) and condemned the Chinese government‟s acts of politicising the 
issue which the European Parliament considered as strictly religious matter 
throughout the history of Tibet and according to the Parliament would lead to serious 
unrest in the Tibetan society (pt. B and C). In that same resolution the Parliament 
recommended that the final decision to move on with the European Union Panam 
Project in Tibet should not be made until the requests in this resolution are fulfilled 
(pt. 7). Based on International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 to 2004, 
two resolutions
471
 had been passed in the European Parliament in 1996 on human 
                                                 
469„European Parliament Resolution on the Disappearance of the Panchen Lama, 13 July, 1995‟, in 
Legal Materials on Tibet, p. 309; DIIR, International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 
to 2004, pp. 35-36. 
470„European Parliament Resolution on Panchen Lama and Religious Freedom in Tibet, 14 December 
1995‟, in Legal Materials on Tibet, p. 309; DIIR, International Resolutions and Recognitions on 
Tibet: 1959 to 2004, pp. 37-38. 
471 DIIR, „On the resolution on China and Tibet submitted to the United Nations Commission of 
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rights issue, deploring the Chinese widened ban on possessing and displaying the 
pictures of the Dalai Lama (pt. A). In the 1997 resolutions the European Parliament 
urged its Council to leave no stone unturned in bringing the two parties to reach an 
agreement which satisfies the legitimate request of the Tibetan people (13 March 
Resolution 1997, pt. 3) and to employ all political and diplomatic means to ensure that 
a resolution on the human rights situation in occupied Tibet and in Inner Mongolia 
and East Turkistan is adopted by the UN Commission on Human Rights (19 February 
1997, pt. 4).  
 
As the human rights situation in China continued to worsen, especially in the disputed 
areas of Tibet, Inner Mongolia and East Turkistan, the European Parliament in 1997 
passed a resolution declaring that the Parliament did not see any justification for 
lifting the EU arms embargo which was imposed on China in 1989 (pt. 25).
472
 In yet 
another stronger resolution, the European Parliament called on its Council and 
Commission to appoint an EU special representative for Tibet,
473
 followed shortly by 
the European Parliament‟s resolution of 13 May 1998,474 wherein the EP recognised 
the TYC‟s Unto Death Hunger Strike in Delhi and the self immolation by Thupten 
Ngodup as actions reflecting the desperations felt by the Tibetans due to the lack of 
concrete outcome from the various contacts and the international supports, called 
upon the Council and Commission to take steps to ensure the appointment of a special 
UN rapporteur on Tibet (Pt.1); urged its Member States to take steps to ensure that the 
Tibet question is included on the agenda of the UN General Assembly without delay 
(pt.2); and endorsed the appeal made by 1,300 members of parliament from around 
the world to the UN Secretary General that he meet the Dalai Lama as a first step in a 
UN-sponsored process of mediation between the Chinese Government and the Tibetan 
Government-in-Exile (pt.3). 
 
The year 2000 witnessed a major breakthrough in the history of exile Tibetan 
                                                                                                                                            
Human Rights and the position of the EU countries, 18 April 1996‟, and „Resolution on human 
rights in Tibet, 23 May 1996‟, International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 to 2004, 
pp. 39-41. 
472 Ibid., „Resolution on the Commission communication on a long term policy for China-Europe 
relations, 16 June 1997‟, p.54. 
473 Ibid., „Resolution on the Appointment of an EU Special Representative for Tibet, 16 January 
1998‟, pp. 61-62 
474 Ibid., „Resolution on Tibet, 13 May 1998‟, pp. 63-65. 
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community as an unprecedented resolution was passed by the European parliament on 
6 July which called on “the governments of the member states to give serious 
consideration to the possibility of recognising the Tibetan Government-in-Exile as the 
legitimate representative of the Tibetan people, if within three years, the Beijing 
authorities and the Tibetan Government-in-Exile have not, through negotiations 
organised under the aegis of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, signed an 
agreement on a new Statute for Tibet”.475 Tibetans in exile consider this resolution as 
the second greatest victory for their cause next only to the awarding of Nobel Peace 
Prize to the Dalai Lama. Nine Days after the resolution was passed the National 
People‟s Congress‟ Foreign Affairs Committee responded by issuing a statement in 
which it condemned the resolution as “European Parliament‟s act of brutal 
interference in China‟s internal affairs”.476 Few months before the Parliament passed a 
resolution
477
 wherein it supported the whole content of the Dalai Lama‟s five point 
peace plan (pt. 2) and took account of the Chinese refusal to allow Mrs. Mary 
Robinson, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to have access 
to Tibet (pt. B). In the 20 January Resolution, the European Parliament considered the 
flight of Karmapa Lama to Dharamsala, India, as an indication of continuous religious 
repression in Tibet. Thus, the European Parliament‟s support for Tibet issue, though 
started with a mild beginning, grew stronger and more productive. Many Tibetans 
both official and non-officials are of the view that the ongoing rounds of talks 
between Beijing and Dharamsala are in some ways prompted by the recent European 
Parliament‟s resolution of 2000. 
 
2.5.1.3 Other Nations 
Although major international supports for the Tibet issue came from the US and the 
European Parliament, other nations have also consistently condemned China‟s human 
rights violations in Tibet and supported the Dalai Lama‟s peace initiatives. The 
international supports came mostly after 1989, the year when His Holiness was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, which could be taken as a clear indication of the 
international solidarity for His Holiness‟ non-violent struggle for Tibet. However, the 
Communist regime‟s ill treatment of its people and the cruel suppression of the 
                                                 
475 Ibid., „Western China Poverty Reduction Project and the future of Tibet, 6 July 2000‟, pp. 71-73. 
476 „China Opposes EP Resolution on Issue of Tibet‟, People‟s Daily, 16 July 2000. 
477 DIIR, „European Parliament resolution, 13 April 2000‟, International Resolutions and 
Recognitions on Tibet: 1959-2004, pp. 69-70. 
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unarmed Tibetans in the demonstrations in 1987-1989 and the brutal massacre of 
thousands of pro-democracy Chinese students opened the world‟s eye to the 
Communist regime‟s brutality and provided a strong validation to the Tibetans‟ claim 
of Chinese atrocity inside Tibet. The combination of these events led to the rise of 
stronger international sympathy for the Tibetans and the pro-democratic students. 
Various nations passed resolutions in their parliaments criticising the Communist 
regime‟s human rights abuses in Tibet, and supported the Dalai Lama by calling on 
Beijing to start negotiation with any preconditions.  
 
In the 1990s Australian Parliament passed several resolutions in support of Tibet with 
primary focus on the deplorable human rights condition and religious freedom. The 
1990 Australian Senate Resolution commends the Dalai Lama and his representatives 
for consistently abiding to the non-violent means and urges China to “enter into 
earnest discussions, without precondition” with the Dalai Lama and his 
representatives.
478
 Four years later on 10 November 1994, during the Chairman of 
China‟s National People‟s Congress, Qiao Shi‟s official visit to Australia, the Senate 
expressed its grave concern for the deterioration of human rights situation in Tibet and 
the lack of fundamental human rights and freedoms in Tibet. The Senate requested the 
Chinese Government for a commitment to issue visas to exiled Tibetan women from 
any part of the world to attend the United Nations World Conference on Women that 
was held in Beijing in 1995.
479
 The Chinese government, however, denied visa to 
more than eighty Tibetan women entitled to participate in the NGO Forum and the 
nine who were given visa were put under unseemly surveillance and assault.
480
 The 
following year prompted by allegations that the United Nations Secretariat was 
prohibited from mentioning His Holiness the Dalai Lama in a book to be published to 
mark the 50th anniversary, the Australian Senate on 29 June 1995 called on the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs to use his influence to urge the UN not to put such 
censorship in its publication.
481
 Respecting Tibetan people‟s religious sentiments both 
                                                 
478 „Australian Senate Resolution on Tibet, 1990‟, in Legal Materials on Tibet, p, 289; DIIR, 
International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959-2004, p. 198. 
479 „Australian Senate Resolution on Tibet, 1994‟, in Legal Materials on Tibet, p, 291; DIIR, 
International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959-2004, p. 201. 
480 „Press Release from the Department of Information and International Relations Dharamsala, 9 
September 1995‟, World Tibet Network News, 10 September 1995, 
 http://www.tibet.ca//en/newsroom/wtn/archive/old?y=1995&m=9&p=10_3.  
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the House of Representatives and the Australian Senate noted the announcement of a 
new Panchen Lama by China as an attempt to overrule the Dalai Lama‟s prerogative 
and expressed dismay over China‟s actions which the two Houses agreed as 
representing “further erosion of the international principle of freedom of religion”. 
The Resolution which is passed on November 30, 1995 urged China to respect the 
Tibetan people‟s wishes and support the Panchen Lama as recognised by the Dalai 
Lama.
482
 The Australian Senate by welcoming the United States Government‟s 
appointment of Mr. Gregory B. Craig as US Special Coordinator for Tibet called on 
the its Government to emulate the constructive move by the USA and appoint 
Australian Coordinator for Tibet in a similar role,
483
 Other nations that had supported 
and passed resolutions in their respective parliaments over Tibet include Germany, 
Belgium, Canada, Luxemburg, Liechtenstein, Spain, France, Austrian, Italy, Swiss, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Norway and Sweden.  
 
2.5.1.4 World-Wide Tibet Support Groups  
Another important achievement of the exile Tibetans is the newborn worldwide 
supporters from numerous NGOs and myriad groups which have now formed a 
network of Tibet Support Groups around the world. Since the late 1980s, the number 
of such groups has risen significantly. Currently, there are more than three hundred 
and fifty Tibet Support Groups (TSGs) in over fifty countries; the majority of which 
are based in Europe and North America but considerable numbers in Africa, Asia, 
Latin America, Australia and the former Soviet Republics.
484
 Students‟ participation 
in the Tibetan cause is no less significant as there are six hundred and fifty Students 
for Free Tibet (SFT) chapters sprinkled across the globe. The joint forces of these 
organisations and groups have formed what the Dalai Lama has called “the army of 
truth”485 in support of truth, justice, peace and freedom of Tibet. Initially, Tibet 
Support Groups were formed individually and separately by individuals in their own 
countries to support the Tibetan people and their cause. These groups actively oppose 
the Chinese occupation of Tibet and their brutal treatment of the Tibetans. They 
campaign to garner support from their government, initiate movements to free Tibetan 
                                                 
482 „Australian Senate Resolution on Tibet, 1995‟, in Legal Materials on Tibet, p, 292; DIIR, 
International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959-2004, p. 204. 
483 DIIR, International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959-2004, p. 208. 
484 International Tibet Support Network, http://www.tibetnetwork.org/about/.   
485 „The World Wide Tibet Support Movement: An Overview‟, Tibetan Bulletin, Vol. 8, Issue 4, July-
August 2004. 
 145 
political prisoners and work for the improvement of human rights condition in Tibet. 
 
With the increase in the international support for Tibet and formation of Tibet Support 
Groups in various countries the Tibetan Government-in-Exile felt encouraged to 
organise the historic First International Conference of the Tibet Support Group (then 
known as International Friends of Tibet). The first international conference was thus 
held from 8-9 March 1990 in Dharamsala, India, and was attended by two hundred 
and sixty delegates from twenty six countries.
486
 Many new global strategies and 
concrete initiatives were planned at the conference. The meeting decided to establish 
May 13 as Human Rights Day for China and Tibet, to set up a computer information 
network (TIBETNET), to intensify lobbying at the UN on Tibet issues.
487
 Given that 
the meeting was the first of its kind it was a big success. The second international 
meeting was held six years later from 14-17 June 1996 in Bonn, Germany. Two 
hundred and sixty five representatives of Tibet Support Groups from sixty five 
countries participated in the meeting which was graced by the Dalai Lama. The 
conference participants discussed and deliberated for two and half days on various 
strategies to win support for the Tibetan cause at international level and agreed upon 
the overall strategic objective to achieve the start of substantive negotiations without 
preconditions. The meeting expressed deep concern at the continued detention of the 
young Panchen Lama and called upon the participants to launch various campaigns 
for his release. TSGs decided to approach members of Parliament from their own 
countries to achieve observer status for Tibetan parliamentarians in the Inter-
Parliamentary Union (IPU).
488
 
 
More than 282 representatives from 52 countries assembled in Berlin for the third 
international conference of TSGs. Although the overall aim and the purpose of the 
meeting was the same as before this large gathering, held from 11–14 May 2000, 
developed effective strategies to support the struggle of the Tibetan people‟s freedom 
and justice. The representatives expressed their complete solidarity with the people of 
                                                 
486 Ibid. 
487 „Summary of Discussions held at the First International Conference of TSGs in Dharamshala from 
8-9 March 1990‟,  http://www.tibet.net/en/diir/wwtm/tsgc/intl/1/.  
488 A Report: Second International Conference of Tibet Support Groups, Bonn Germany June 14-17, 
1996, convened by Tibetan Government in Exile in co-operation with Friedrich Naumann-Stiftung, 
DIIR, pp. 134-139. 
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Tibet and pledged their total support. The meeting endorsed the right of the Tibetan 
people to determine their future destiny and recognised His Holiness the Dalai Lama 
and the Tibetan Government-in-Exile to be the sole legitimate representatives of the 
Tibetan people. By showing their concern at the deterioration of the situation in Tibet, 
the meeting severely condemned China‟s persistent violation of the Tibetan people‟s 
human rights and its refusal to enter into earnest negotiations with the Dalai Lama. 
The TSGs further endorsed the proposal made by the European Parliament “for an 
initiative to urge the Government of Tibet-in-Exile to reconsider its position on 
independence if no substantive progress has been made in negotiations with the 
Government of the People‟s Republic of China on proposals for Tibetan self 
government in the next three years. In that event, we shall fully support such a stand 
and shall launch a major campaign for international recognition of Tibet‟s claim or for 
the conduct of an internationally supervised referendum on the issue”.489 Despite the 
meetings and contacts between various Tibet Support Groups, initially there was a 
lack of good coordination among the support groups which made the campaigns and 
movements less effective. Therefore in the lastest TSGs meeting in 2003, decision 
was made to form the International Tibet Support Network to coordinate the 
movements of the TSGs around the world.
490
 As usual China did not miss accusing 
the host countries of interfering in their internal affairs and immense pressure on the 
host countries to stop the international conferences from taking place. 
 
With the support of the governments and NGO‟s the Tibetan Government-in-Exile 
has been successful in establishing representative offices in 13 countries, acting as de 
facto embassies of the Central Tibetan Adminstration. The representative offices are 
in India, Switzerland, USA, Japan, UK, Nepal (has recently shut down, Tibetans 
however believe that China was responsible for pressuring Nepalese Government), 
Hungary (also closed due to financial restrains), Russia, France, Australia, South 
Africa, Taiwan and Belgium. As can be seen from the above section, the current 
status of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile is highly dependent upon the support of the 
international communities. 
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2.5.2. Beijing, Taiwan and the Tibet Question: The Politics of Internal 
Differentiation 
This section discusses Sino-Taiwan issue in the light of Tibet‟s past experience and 
the implication on resolving Taiwan‟s issue based on the model applied for Tibet in 
1951.
491
 Given that the Communist leadership is bent on reunifying Taiwan to the 
mainland, the question of how China should proceed with this plan continues to 
occupy the collective minds of the Communist leadership. Contrary to Tibet, whose 
“liberation” took place two years after the Communist rule in China, the liberation of 
Taiwan is yet to be actualised, despite Beijing‟s half a century of political 
manoeuvering. The People‟s Republic of China‟s long-term objective is the 
reunification with Taiwan and over the years communist leaders have adopted various 
approaches varying from Mao‟s rigid rule to Deng‟s more pragmatic and conciliatory 
approach, which is still supported by the current communist leaders. In a nutshell, the 
Beijing government while offering a high degree of autonomy insists Taiwan to 
recognise itself as part of one China. Beginning with the initial issuance of “Message 
to Taiwan Compatriots,”492 by the Standing Committee of National People‟s Congress 
(NPC) on 1 January 1979; followed by “Ye‟s nine principles,” announced on 30 
September 1981 for Taiwan‟s reunification;493 Deng‟s policy of “One country, Two 
                                                 
491 Wang Hsuan-chih, The True Features of Chinese Communist “Tibet Model”, Taipei: World Anti-
Communist League, China Chapter: Asian People‟s Anti-Communist League Republic of China 
1982, p. 1. The author referred to an article by Ngapo Ngawang Jigme ( the Vice Chairman of NPC 
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my reference on the proposals made by the PRC for Taiwan reunification.) 
493 „Chairman Ye Jianying‟s Elaboration on Policy Concerning Return of Taiwan to Motherland and 
Peaceful Reunification‟, 30 September 1981. Ye, Jianying, the Chairman of the Standing 
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systems”;494 and the Anti-Secession Law, passed on 14 March 2005,495 Beijing has 
made various attempts to coax and coerce Taiwan into negotiation.  
 
The PRC while maintaining not to impose a socialist superstructure on the capitalist 
based economy of the Island, nevertheless was determined to unify Taiwan with 
China, and did not rule out the possibility of using force.
496
 This Communist stance 
was first made public at a meeting with 85 US Senators on Capitol Hill on 30 January 
1979, when Deng spoke of possible Chinese military action against Taiwan and 
Vietnam
497
 and was actually demonstrated in 1995-1996 and again in July 1999.
498
 In 
both these crises, the United States while pursuing a strategy to avoid conflict 
between the two parties sent warships to protect Taiwan in 1996 and it despatched 
two high-ranking American diplomats to Beijing and Taiwan in July 1999. The 
United States with wide Congressional support
499
 resists the Chinese determination to 
use force if Taiwan seeks independence. On many occasions the United States 
expressed its desire for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue and acknowledged 
that the issue is a matter for the Chinese themselves to decide
500
, yet at the same time 
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it continues to help Taiwan in different forms such as in trade and commerce and 
occasional sales of sophisticated weapons.
501
 This dual characteristic policy of the 
United States on Taiwan remains basically unchanged since 1979, which many 
described as the United States‟ policy of ambiguity and which according to Chu 
Shulong, a Chinese scholar on American China policy and China‟s security strategy, 
is tantamount to supporting Taiwan‟s separation and providing “Taiwan with the 
military capability to be independent”.502  
 
The consistent United States‟ policy towards Taiwan and its continuous military 
support has boosted the confidence of the Taiwan administration and to some extent 
has made them less responsive to the PRC‟s initiatives. Until the late 1980s the bone 
of contention between Taipei and Beijing was the issue of who represents the sole and 
legitimate government of China.
503
 Both the parties then agreed to the “one China” 
principle. The fundamental change in Taiwan‟s “one China” policy appeared when 
the Taiwanese constitutional amendment of 1991 placed the cross-strait relation as a 
“state-to-state” relationship, followed by President Lee Teng-hui‟s interview for 
Deutsche Welle in July 1999, wherein he asserted that “the ROC is a sovereign, 
independent state” and redefined the relation between the two parties as “state-to-
state”.504 Few years later on 3 August 2002 in a video conference speech to the World 
Federation of Taiwanese Associations President Chen Shui-bian, Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) and an ardent advocate of Taiwan independence, said:  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Communiqué and the 1982 Communiqué affirmed the United States‟ policy towards Taiwan‟s 
future to be a peaceful settlement and that it acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one 
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quantity of defence articles shall be based solely upon the judgment of the needs of Taiwan. 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Congressional Quarterly Inc. 1979, pp. 99-117; „US Unease at 
China‟s Taiwan Law‟, BBC, 9 March 2005. On 9 March BBC reported the US unease at China‟s 
Taiwan law and pointed out that the US legislation obliges it to resist any use of force by China 
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pacific/4331443.stm.  
502 Chu Shulong, „National Unity, Sovereignty and Territorial Integration‟, The China Journal, No.36, 
July 1996, p.101. 
503 Trong R. Chai, „The future of Taiwan‟, Asian Survey, vol. 26, no. 12, December 1986, p. 1310. 
504 International Crisis Group, Taiwan Strait I: What‟s left of „One Chin‟?, International Crisis Group 
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Taiwan is our country, and our country cannot be bullied, downgraded, 
marginalized, nor treated as a local government. Taiwan is not a part of any 
other country, nor is it a local government or province of another country. 
Taiwan can never be another Hong Kong or Macau, because Taiwan has 
always been a sovereign state. In short, Taiwan and China standing on 
opposite sides of the Strait, there is one country on each side. This should be 
clear.  
 
China has never renounced the use of force against Taiwan and continues to 
attempt to suffocate us internationally. This strains the goodwill of the people 
of Taiwan. China‟s insistence on the “one China principle” and “one country, 
two systems” means a change of the status quo for Taiwan. The decision to 
change the status quo for Taiwan cannot be made for us by any country, any 
government, any political party, or any single individual. Only the 23 million 
people of Taiwan have the right to decide the future, fate, and status of 
Taiwan.
505
  
 
On 12 August 2002, Chen made a similar statement asserting to face China‟s military 
threat and suppression of their space on the international stage. He said, “If we‟re on 
the right road, we must not cease walking down it. We will not be scared”.506 This 
emergence of native Taiwanese nationalism and a sense of Taiwanese identity 
replacing the old KMT „One China‟ principle pose potential dangers to the 
Communist leaders. Beijing now has to make sure that the current Taiwanese 
independence movement does not gain overwhelming international and domestic 
support which would threaten Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan; that the United 
States does not change its present stand, and that Taiwan does not develop nuclear 
capabilities. It seems unlikely that the United States will change its stand unless a 
drastic geopolitical shift occurs in that region. However, the other two have more 
possibility as the public support for pro-independence movement has increased over 
the years and evidence uncovered in October 2004 by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency showed that Taiwan may have carried out plutonium separation 
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experiments in the mid-1980s. But it should be noted that Taiwan had abandoned their 
nuclear program about twenty years ago.
507
 
 
The question then remains what courses of action Beijing might take given Taiwan‟s 
unyielding position and what historical precedents are there that might influence the 
Communist strategy and future policy? Will the PRC‟s past treatment of Tibet 
influence Taipei‟s trust in Beijing‟s sincerity about the conditions for reunification? In 
my opinion the PRC‟s policy applied to Tibet in 1951 bears close resemblance with 
the proposal offered to Taiwan. Both the proposals contained assurances of non-
interference with the local government, although the terms differ. There are also 
similarities in terms of foreign support; just like Taiwan has the United States now, 
Tibet had India then, and just as Tibet‟s fate depended on India‟s help then, Taiwan‟s 
fate too is dependent upon the United States now. I will mention the ramifications of 
Taiwan issue in the light of Tibet‟s past experiences.  
 
From Beijing‟s various pronouncement on Taiwan so far, we can discern three forms 
of “liberation”: peaceful liberation (1949-1978), peaceful unification (since 1979) and 
armed liberation (which Beijing has not ruled out in the event of Taiwan‟s declaration 
of independence or separation from the mainland).
508
 An armed liberation seems 
unlikely unless Chen‟s administration takes a drastic move towards independence 
which however is checked by the Bush administration‟s firm adherence to the 
“ambiguous policy” towards Taiwan and China.509 However, such an eventuality 
should not be ruled out, especially in the event if Taiwan declares independence or if 
Beijing‟s loses its patience with the decades long initiatives for reunification. Under 
such circumstances the only deterrent elements would be the United States and Japan 
both of whom have vested interests in the stability in the Taiwan Straits. However, it 
                                                 
507 Craig S. Smith, „Taiwan May Have Experimented With Atomic Bomb Ingredient‟, New York 
Times, 14 October 2004; George Jahn, „Taiwan Conducted Plutonium Experiments‟, Associated 
Press, 14 October 2004. 
508 International Crisis Group, Taiwan Strait I: What‟s left of „One China‟?, pp. 6-7. 
509 Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, „America‟s Two-Point Policy and the Future of Taiwan‟, Asian 
Survey, vol. 28, no. 8, August 1998, pp. 881-883. The US-People‟s Republic of China Communiqué 
of 1972, 1979, and 1982 acknowledge the China‟s “One China” principle, at the same time the 
Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 obliges the United States to provide Taiwan with required arms to 
defend itself against any military attack. The present US administration also subscribes to the same 
policy. At a hearing on Taiwan presented to the House of International Relations Committee on 21 
April 2004, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly 
reaffirmed the US Policy in „Overview of U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan‟,  
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/31649.htm.  
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is hard to say what course the two nations, especially the United States, would take 
but the situation would certainly become the litmus test for the United States‟ 
ambiguous Taiwan policy. 
 
Of the two peaceful options Beijing formally abandoned its „policy of liberation‟ of 
Taiwan in favour of peaceful reunification in 1979
510
 signifying more liberal 
intentions of the pragmatic leadership and its deference to the United States. 
However, this so called „peaceful reunification‟ requires some sort of bilateral 
negotiations for which Taipei so far had not shown any positive responses, including 
the Ye‟s nine point proposal. Though the terms have changed but the goal remains the 
same, which leads to the unification of Taiwan to the Mainland. Both the peaceful 
liberation and the peaceful unification have not discarded the use of force when 
deemed necessary by Beijing. This reflects a similar precedence in Tibet‟s liberation 
in 1951, which Beijing hailed as a peaceful liberation to unify Tibet to the Mainland 
but was actually achieved with the deployment of the PLA troops who defeated the ill 
equipped Tibetan force in Chamdo. The Tibetan government then was forced into 
negotiation and to accept the Beijing‟s dictated terms, called as the Seventeen Point 
Agreement signed between the “central Government of China” and the “local 
Government of Tibet” on 23 May 1951. Compared to the pre-industrial Tibet of 1950, 
Taiwan is highly modernised and well armed but there are elements that are common 
to both, that is an initial, limited use of force followed by a “peaceful liberation” 
leading to unification of the Mainland. In the light of such event Taiwan certainly can 
challenge more effectively than Tibet ever did, although without the United States 
military aid, Taiwan has less chances of winning such a war. However the Communist 
leaders would not wage such a war unless the Taiwanese moves towards 
independence or secession from Mainland challenges the Beijing sovereignty over the 
island.  
 
There are certain fundamental objectives which indicate Beijing‟s perception of the 
island that the communist leaders will have to consider while resolving the Taiwan 
problem. The first and foremost is Beijing‟s insistence upon Taipei‟s 
acknowledgement of the PRC‟s sovereignty over Taiwan and itself as an integral part 
                                                 
510 International Crisis Group, Taiwan Strait I: What‟s left of „One China‟?, p. 6. 
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of China. In other words, Beijing‟s condition offers a similar kind of “local 
government” to Taiwan as it did to Tibet in 1951 and repudiates any claims to 
represent the “central government” of China, as propounded by the KMT who then 
challenged the CCP‟s authority in Beijing. Secondly, radical changes had ushered a 
new form of political system in Taiwan over the past few decades which is in contrast 
to that of Communist China. Given the prevalence of pro-democracy supporters in 
China, Taiwan‟s thriving democratic system could attract more supporters and even 
influence those who do not favour communism, thus might become a threat to the 
very existence of the CCP itself. Even the CCP‟s assurances to the Taiwan 
administration do not carry much credibility as Tibet‟s past experience shows that the 
CCP, while accepting non-Communist system on one hand could undermine the 
socio-political basis on the other. This type of status cannot last as it is formulated 
primarily for tactical reasons. Thirdly, Taiwan has posed a security problem for China 
just like Tibet did years ago. The Chinese humiliation over the centuries from the 
foreign imperialists‟ occupation of Taiwan has made the Communist Chinese more 
determined not to let this happen again and prompted Beijing to unify Taiwan at any 
cost. Consequently, Beijing might take steps to curb Taiwan‟s foreign contacts and 
arms purchases. Though Beijing assures Taiwan that it can retain its armed forces it 
would eventually end up following Tibet‟s example whose troops were later 
integrated into the PLA just few years after the liberation. 
 
In many ways Beijing‟s current problems with Taiwan are similar to that of Tibet and 
hence, Beijing authorities use Tibet‟s precedence in dealing with Taiwan. According 
to the Communist‟s own perception, both Tibet and Taiwan are integral parts of China 
which have drifted away from the motherland in the past decades due to imperialists‟ 
deception. Both Beijing and Taipei concur to the first while Tibetans do not agree. 
Considering Tibet‟s unique culture and religion and Taiwan‟s industrial economy and 
social system as special characteristics Beijing had made assurances of their 
protection. Just as Chou Enlai‟s assurances made to Nehru in 1950s that the 
Communist would not impose socialism upon Tibet, Deng Xiaoping made similar 
assurances to the United States regarding Taiwan. Similarity between the two regions 
is also found in Beijing‟s willingness to grant more leniencies to Taiwan, just like it 
did to Tibet. Beijing has always been suspicious of foreign involvement and 
intervention in territories that they consider as theirs, be it Tibet or Taiwan. Although 
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Taipei accepts Chinese sovereignty over the island, it questions the legitimacy of the 
Communist regime and aspires to replace the Communist system with an alternative 
policy. Finally, both Tibet and Taiwan stand as the PRC‟s biggest ideological 
adversaries; whereas Tibet defeated Communist China‟s largest propaganda efforts 
since its founding in 1949, Taiwan has embraced democracy and is unwilling to 
change its political system.  
 
Due to all these similarities between the two cases it is no wonder Beijing used its 
Tibetan experiences and based its Taiwan policy on the Tibet Model, as can be seen 
from Ye‟s nine-point proposal. Whether it is Ye‟s nine-point proposal or Deng‟s “one 
country, two systems” model, what Beijing basically offers to Taiwan, does not go 
beyond the political boundaries of the Tibet Model, for it promises nothing more than 
“a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region” (Ye‟s Point 3), which 
is exactly same as the third point in the Seventeen Point Agreement. As for the fourth 
point of the nine-point proposal it is just a retrogression of the Seventeen Point 
Agreement as the fourth point of the latter guarantees preservation of “the existing 
political system in Tibet” while the fourth point of the Ye‟s proposal promises that 
“Taiwan‟s current socio-economic system will remain unchanged”. The only political 
deviation from the Seventeen Point Agreement is the fourth point of the proposal 
which states that “people in authority and representative personages of various circles 
in Taiwan” may share power with the Communists in ruling the state. Furthermore, 
other comparisons can be drawn from such promises as allowing the Tibetan army to 
be reorganised step-by-step into the People‟s Liberation Army–a similar term for 
Taipei, Beijing would allow it to retain their armed forces, allowing great freedom of 
religion and associated matters (Points 4, 5, 6 and 7) for Tibet and in the case of 
Taiwan freedom would be provided in terms of their business interests and people‟s 
living standards (Ye‟s Points 4, 6 and 8). 
 
Despite these similarities Beijing‟s Taiwan policy reflects the differences in Taiwan‟s 
entity from that of Tibet‟s. Taiwan shares China‟s culture, language, and ethnicity; it 
has been occupied by various foreign forces since the sixteenth century and has led a 
separate political, ideological and economic entity since 1949 in opposition to the 
Communist system. These factors have created a distinct entity for Taiwan and have 
produced differing responses from Taiwan for Beijing‟s overtures. China has 
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employed various tactics to bring Taiwan under its folds. Overtures such as “three 
exchanges,” “four interflows” and trade exchanges have failed to produce expected 
results although informal communications have been set up. To play its trump card 
Beijing has unabashedly appealed to Chinese nationalism and has called upon the 
Taipei authorities to negotiate a peaceful unification. Such peaceful offerings were 
almost always accompanied or followed by threats of military attacks. The present 
American policy of discouraging the PRC from resorting to military actions in 
resolving the Taiwan issue and China‟s increasing reliance upon American 
technology and trade might ensure Taiwan‟s safety for a foreseeable future.  
 
The current USA‟s role in the Taiwan issue is similar to India‟s in the Tibetan sense. 
India was then, what the USA is now, torn between humanistic support for the 
helpless Tibetan people and the political necessity to befriend China. New Delhi 
advised China against using military force to resolve the Tibetan question and tried to 
persuade Beijing to grant Tibet domestic autonomy. The USA is holding a similar 
policy of dissuading China from using force and seeking a peaceful resolution to the 
Taiwan question. China will vehemently object any official American mediating role 
in the negotiation between Beijing and Taipei, but the USA could still wield 
considerable influence as an informal mediator. And it can exert far more influence 
upon China than India could for Tibet. Although the structural framework for the 
Taiwan policy is based on the “Tibetan Model,” China faces serious credibility 
problem because of the way they implemented the Seventeen Point Agreement and 
acted in total violation of the agreement. Ye‟s nine-point proposal was rejected by 
Taipei because President Chiang Ching-kuo pointed to “the fate of Tibet as an 
example of what would befall Taiwan if it accepted reunification now”.511 Therefore, 
judging from Tibet‟s current situation Taiwan will certainly not dig its own grave by 
accepting the reunification policy. The final resolution of the Sino-Taiwan problem 
will be reflective of how China resolves the Tibet issue. Thus the Tibet issue becomes 
pertinent and vital to the resolution of the Taiwan issue. A wise calculation on the part 
of Chinese policy makers would help Beijing to generate trust among the Taiwanese 
people, who are currently suspicious of the Communist regime. 
 
                                                 
511 „Tibet, Taiwan and Hong Kong‟, Tibetan Bulletin, vol. XIII, no. 1, January-February 1982, pp.7-9 
and 27. 
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2.5.3. Tibet Factor in Sino-Indian Relations 
As in every relation between nations there are a number of factors that affect and 
influence the formulation and shaping of foreign policy. The Sino-Indian relation can 
also be seen from this perspective. In the late 1940s when the two Asian giants came 
to power Tibet began to impinge on their relations as both contemplated who should 
occupy the strategic buffer region between the two.
512
 Initially, the newly independent 
state of India adopted the same policy as that of the British by recognising Chinese 
suzerainty but not sovereignty over Tibet, accepting Tibet‟s power to sign treaties 
with other nations
513
 and autonomous buffer state between the two Asian giants. 
When the People‟s Liberation Army (PLA) invaded Tibet in 1951 the Indian 
government headed by Nehru protested strongly against the invasion which indicated 
India‟s preference of continuing the former British Tibet policy.514 Even in a letter to 
V. Krishna Menon (defence Minister) and K. M. Panikkar (Indian Ambassador to 
China) in 1950, Nehru had used the British terminology “Chinese suzerainty” and 
Tibetan “autonomy,” thus trying his best to avoid Chinese occupation of Tibet. 
However, as we will see the Nehruvian policy did not withstand the Chinese 
onslaught of Tibet.  
 
Opinions vary as to how strong Nehru acted to prevent Communist China from 
invading Tibet but intimate study of the period reveals that the newly independent 
India had more pressing issues of developing the economy of the nation and removing 
the sectarian strife within itself and with Pakistan.
515
 Thus, the problems in its 
                                                 
512 Before the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1951 there had been no territorial conflict between India 
and China.  
513 In 1947, despite protests from the Kuomintang regime to withdraw invitation, which India refused, 
a Tibetan delegation participated in the Asian Relation Conference. The conference was 
participated by academic and representatives from thirty two Asian countries. According to 
Goldstein the Chinese representative at the Conference tried to convince the Tibetans to be 
represented by China and also offered 10,000 rupees as “spending money” to each delegate. 
Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: the Demise of the Lamaist State, p. 
563. The Chinese succeeded in having a map that showed Tibet separate from China withdrawn and 
the Tibetan flag removed. For detail see Lamb, Alastair: Tibet, China and India 1914-1950: A 
History of Imperial Diplomacy, Hertingfordbury: Roxford Books, 1989, p. 498. See also Tsering 
Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet since 1947, pp. 2-3 and 
Dawa Norbu, China‟s Tibet Policy, pp. 283-284. In that same year the Indian government gave 
assurance to Lhasa that Anglo-Tibetan treaties and conventions would be respected as before. Dawa 
Norbu, China‟s Tibet Policy, p. 284. 
514 Nehru‟s address to the Lok Sabha, 7 December 1950, A. Appadorai, Select Documents on India‟s 
Foreign and Relations 1947-1972, New Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 457-
458.  
515 India achieved independence on 15 August 1947 but with the dismemberment of Pakistan. The All 
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northern borders along the Himalayan range took a secondary status. Although 
Nehru‟s view and initiatives may appear unclear, indeterminate and confused516 
nevertheless he tried his best, diplomatically,
517
 to keep the status quo of the 
autonomous Tibet. Nehru steadfastly pursued a peaceful resolution of the Sino-
Tibetan problem and worked hard to prevent any military invasion of Tibet. However, 
as the Communist Chinese approached their victory, Nehruvian policy started to begin 
deviating from its earlier stand on Tibet and thereby, formulated a new definition of a 
security zone by signing a series of defence treaties with its neighboring countries
518
 
which in a way could be considered as representing India‟s strategic response to the 
Communist Chinese occupation of Tibet. In 1959 Nehru publicly stated that India 
would defend Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim in case of a Chinese invasion.
519
 These bold 
statements indicated a change in Nehru‟s views on Communist China, a sign of 
trepidation of the Communists‟ moves. Though belated, Nehru did recognise the 
ulterior motives of China and acted accordingly. Had Nehru taken a stronger stand on 
Tibet before the Communist takeover and understood that his “gentleman policy” was 
                                                                                                                                            
India Muslim League demanded that a separate Muslim state should be established in an otherwise 
Hindu-dominated subcontinent. The creation of Pakistan was followed by widespread violence, 
communal riots and later wars between the two countries mainly over Kashmir. The Kashmir 
border dispute persists, having brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war in 1990, 1999, and 
2001-02. Alan Isaacs, Oxford Concise Encyclopedia, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 
444-445. 
516 FRUS, 1949, Vol. IX, p. 1082. See Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History 
of Modern Tibet since 1947, p. 24. In a press interview on 16 November 1949 Nehru is said to have 
made this remark: “In a weak sense we have accepted the fact of Chinese suzerainty [over Tibet]. 
How far it goes one does not know”. That was then the Indian government‟s view on Tibet. On 27 
October 1949 Krishna Menon, Defence Minister, wrote to the British government seeking advice 
on how India should safeguard the special position of Tibet to which the British replied with an 
eight-point memorandum emphasising that India should not recognise Tibet‟s independence yet at 
the same time India should do what they can, short of military assistance. In brief the British advice 
to India was to provide assistance to Tibet so as to encourage the Tibetans to resist without 
provoking the Communists, cited in Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History 
of Modern Tibet since 1947, pp. 25-26. 
517 Tsepon. W. D. Shakabpa, Bod-kyi Srid-don rgyal-rabs, Vol. 2, Kalimpong, Shakabpa House, 1976, 
pp. 417-18. Nehru‟s initial support for Tibet is evident from his government‟s provision of small 
scale military aid and dispatching of Indian officers to train Tibetan soldiers in Gyantse. The Indian 
government also agreed to the Tibetan‟s request for setting up a Tibetan mission in Kalimpong, 
India. These symbolic gestures show that India retained interest in Tibet. Indian government was 
fully aware of the strategic importance of Tibet for her security. For instance in 1948 Panikkar had 
warned that the Communist takeover of Tibet would bring China in direct conflict with India. He 
recognised that Tibet was great strategic importance to India. He even went to the extent of 
suggesting that India‟s recognition of Tibet‟s independence as a mean to keep away the 
Communists from Indian border. FO 371-75798, quoted in Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the 
Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet since 1947, p. 26. 
518 India signed defence treaties with following countries; Bhutan on 8 August 1949, Nepal on 31 July 
1950 and Sikkim on 15 December 1950. India declared that it would not tolerate any foreign 
interference in these countries. Charles H. Heimsath and Surjit Mansingh, A Diplomatic History of 
Modern India, Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1971, p. 202. 
519 A. Appadorai, Select Documents on India‟s Foreign and Relations 1947-1972, pp. 547-549. 
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not applicable to the Communist regime India definitely would not have to undertake 
all those treaties in haste. But the question then became what was the primary task for 
India: the economic development of the nation and the internal and external (Pakistan) 
sectarian strife or the northern security problems along the undefined borders of the 
Himalayan range.
520
 Another factor that contributed to Nehru‟s neglect of Tibet was 
the Korean crisis of 1950. As the history shows Nehru chose the former issues over 
that of the border problems which consequently led to continuous security problems 
along the Himalayan range. 
 
Before going further into the present, a brief description of the initial Sino-Indian 
relation is expedient. Prior to the occupation of Tibet by Communist China the two 
Asian giants did not have any direct contacts. It was only after the fall of Tibet that 
the two nations found themselves facing each other on numerous issues. Therefore, a 
flashback on the origin of India‟s Tibet policy becomes pertinent. The relation 
between Tibet and the new independent Indian Republic began a year before India‟s 
independence. On 12 October 1946 the Tibetan government sent a telegram 
congratulating India on the formation of its interim government in Delhi. Nehru, in 
his reply dated 16 October 1946 said, “My colleagues and I am most grateful for your 
kind message. We look forward with confidence to the continuance and strengthening 
of the close and cordial relations which have existed between our two countries since 
ancient times,”521 a reply which exhibits Nehru‟s initial view on the status of Tibet as 
a country independent of China. Another instance of Nehru‟s acknowledgement of 
Tibet as an independent country can be seen in his letter 30 January 1947 to Mahatma 
Gandhi in which he wrote that “almost every country of Asia from the west to the east 
and south, including the Arab countries, Tibet, Mongolia...will be represented by 
leading men [at the Inter Asian Relations Conference]”.522 However, depending on 
the Chinese ventures this Nehru‟s stance on Tibet underwent various changes as we 
go into more detail. In 1950 when Communist China‟s aggressive designs gained 
momentum and declared its intention to liberate Tibet, Nehru‟s determination to 
                                                 
520 The disputed areas on the Himalayan range are the Western Sector, the Middle Sector and the 
Eastern Sector. The Western Sector lies where Kashmir, Xinjiang and Tibet meet, extends over 
1,000 miles from the Karakoram Pass in the north of Ladakh to Spiti in Himachal Pradesh, India. It 
is generally known as the Aksai Chin. The Middle Sector extends 500 miles from the east of 
Ladakh encompassing Shipka la pass and the Eastern Sector lies between Bhutan and Burma.  
521 S. Gopal, Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 1, Publication Division, 1983, p. 525. 
522 Ibid., p. 111. 
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safeguard the buffer zone weakened and took a back seat. Seeking a peaceful 
resolution of the Tibet became his priority yet at the same time India backed off from 
providing arms assistance to the Tibet.
523
 That same year when Tibet appealed to the 
United Nations, India by taking a leading role discouraged the United States and 
England from raising the Tibet issue stating that for Tibet‟s own sake any provocation 
could lead to greater Chinese reprisal
524
 and based on Chinese assurances India 
convinced the others that a peaceful settlement of the Tibet question was still feasible 
which would safeguard Tibet‟s autonomy while maintaining its historical association 
with China. India found herself in a tight spot, torn between its sympathy to the 
Tibetans
525
 versus saving itself from China‟s accusation of practicing imperialism.526 
Externally India held a false belief that a peaceful solution could be reached to 
maintain the status quo but at the same time leading Indian politicians were aware that 
the negotiation had a slim chance of resolving the Tibet Question.
527
 Despite these 
skepticisms India‟s assurances led to the postponement of hearings of the Tibet issue 
at the UN.  
 
After the signing of the Seventeen Point Agreement between the “Central 
government” of the PRC and the “local government” of Tibet, in 1951, things became 
even easier for Nehru to consolidate India‟s view on Tibet‟s political stand. In 1954, 
India concluded an agreement with China, entitled “Agreement between the Republic 
of India and the People‟s Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet 
Region of China and India,” generally known as the Panchsheel Agreement,528 in 
                                                 
523 Just a year before the PLA‟s invasion of Tibet, India made its last delivery of arms to Tibet. FRUS, 
Vol. VI, 1950, p. 317. 
524 FRUS Vol. VI, 1950, p. 550-501, quoted in Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A 
Modern History of Tibet since 1947, p. 55. 
525 On 27 April, 1959, Nehru in a statement in the Lok Sabha (Lower house of the Indian Parliament), 
he said, “I stated some time ago that our broad policy was governed by three factors: 1) the 
preservation of the security and integrity of India; 2) our desire to maintain friendly relations with 
China; and 3) our deep sympathy for the people of Tibet”. A. Appadorai, Select Documents on 
India‟s Foreign and Relations 1947-1972, p. 518-519. 
526 In that same statement Nehru reported to the house of Chinese accusation asserting that, “Another 
and an even stranger allegation has been made about „Indian expansionists‟ who, it is alleged, are 
inheritors of the British tradition of imperialism and expansion”. Ibid., p.517.  
527 Bajpai, India‟s External Foreign Minister, who was well aware of the situations in Tibet told 
Henderson that government of India “had only faint hope” of the Tibetan question being resolved 
by negotiation. FRUS, Vol. VI, 1950, p. 584, cited in in Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of 
Snows: A Modern History of Tibet since 1947, p. 58. 
528 The five principles were: 1) Mutual respect for each other‟s territorial integrity and sovereignty, 2) 
Mutual non-aggression, 3) Mutual non-interference in each other‟s internal affairs, 4) Equality, and 
5) Peaceful co-existence. 
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which India agreed to accept Tibet as an integral part of China and gave up its special 
privileges
529
 in Tibet that it had inherited from the Great Britain. According to Nehru 
the agreement resolved the outstanding border issues between India and China, albeit 
it was achieved at the expense of abandoning Tibet‟s independence. For China, 
however, it was a major achievement. Chou Enlai En-Lai was aware that India‟s 
acceptance of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet by affixing Indian government‟s seal on 
the agreement was the biggest concession a foreign nation can make, when most 
nations were repudiating the occupation of Tibet.
530
 Not only did India herself 
kowtow before China by accepting Tibet as a region of China but she even exerted 
pressure on Nepal to conclude a similar treaty that relinquished Nepal‟s 
extraterritorial rights over Nepalese citizens in Tibet.
531
 Furthermore, in a much 
bolder step Nehru disowned what constituted the imperialist British‟s Tibet stand by 
juggling the words suzerainty and sovereignty and duly referring to Chinese 
sovereignty over Tibet.
532
 John Lall, the Dewan (Prime Minister) of Sikkim, quoted a 
senior member of the Embassy in his Aksaichin and Sino-Indian Conflict says that the 
mistake of replacing suzerainty with sovereignty was deliberate. Whether deliberately 
or due to naivety, the Indian leader failed to distinguish between suzerainty and 
sovereignty. In an address to the Indian Parliament in 1950 Nehru overlooked the 
difference of the two terms and pointed out the fact of Chinese sovereignty over 
Tibet. He said: 
 
I am not aware of any time during the last few hundred years when Chinese 
sovereignty or, if you like, suzerainty, was challenged by any outside country, 
and all during this period whether China was weak or strong and, whatever the 
Government of China was, China always maintained this claim to sovereignty 
over Tibet.
533 
                                                 
529 Along with the Paanchsheela agreement India also agreed to pull out its military escorts based in 
Gyantse and Dromo (Yatung), and as an expression of good will, declared its willingness to transfer 
the postal, telegraph and telephone installations operated by India to the Chinese government free 
of cost and without compensation. 
530 Times (London) correspondent (29 July 1949) commented that “if India preferred to abandon Tibet 
to its fate, Western powers were in no position to object to Chinese takeover of Tibet”. Dawa 
Norbu, China‟s Tibet Policy, p. 285. 
531 B. N. Mullik, My Years With Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal, New Delhi: Allied Publisher, 1971, p. 
65. 
532 Ajay B. Agrawal, India Tibet and China: The Role Nehru Played, Mumbai: N A Books 
International, 2003, pp. 8-9. 
533 Chanakya Sen, Tibet Disappears: A Documentary History of Tibet‟s International Status, the 
Great Rebellion and Its Aftermath, New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1960, p. 120. 
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The statement above clearly shows that in Nehru‟s mind the two terms, “suzerainty” 
and “sovereignty,” were interchangeable and the distinction of the two holds no great 
significance. Criticisms still exist in Indian politics against Nehru‟s “political instinct” 
of seeing a world war brewing in the Korean crisis while neglecting the invasion that 
happened right across the Indian border which directly affected India‟s security. In an 
interview on 23 August 1950 Nehru was asked, “Why was the settlement of the 
Korean dispute vital to her interest?” Nehru answered, “India is vitally interested 
because peace of Asia is involved”. To the next question: “Does India view with 
alarm the Communists efforts to control Tibet? If so, why?” Nehru answered, “India 
has no political or territorial designs in Tibet”.534 In India Tibet and China, Ajay B. 
Agarwal criticised Nehru for considering Korean crisis as an issue of life and death as 
it involved the peace of Asia and neglecting Tibet issue where India‟s peace was 
involved.
535
 Criticism also came from his own government officials such as Sardar 
Patel, Dr. S. P. Mukherjee but Nehru persevered to befriend China even at the cost of 
abandoning Tibet‟s political status. Mahatma Gandhi summed up the two contrasting 
views of Nehru and Patel as “one a dove trailing messages of peace in the skies of the 
world, the other India‟s watchman staring at the northern frontier,” Nehru for striving 
to end the war in Korea as well as the distrust between America and Communist 
China and Patel for focusing on China‟s moves in Tibet.536  
 
Nehru understood the agreement of 1954 between China and India as representing 
more than what was explicitly contained therein. He expected that his gentleman‟s 
deal with China would honor India‟s claim over the Indo-Tibetan border and the 
special relationships that India had enjoyed with the Himalayan states, for which India 
legally conceded and recognised China‟s claim over Tibet. Nehru definitely must 
have expected a quid pro quo on the border issue for his concessions. However, 
Chinese gratitude for India became obvious in 1962 when the two went on war over 
border disputes. Both parties perceived the significance of the agreement differently. 
For Nehru the signing of the agreement was an achievement that confirmed the 
                                                 
534 S. Gopal, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 15, pp. 375-376.  
535 Ajay B. Agarwal, India Tibet and China: The Role Nehru Played, p. 39. 
536 Raj Mohan Gandhi, Patel: A Life, Ahmedabad: Navajivan Pub. House, 1991, p. 510. 
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northern frontiers to be “a firm and definite one”537 and not open for further 
discussion.
538
 But for Chou Enlai the agreement was simply an act of recognising 
China‟s “historical right” in Tibet. On a condition that if India dissociated herself 
from Tibet and Tibetan Question China would respect India‟s special relations with 
the Himalayan states. The latter pronouncement must have been a clever calculation 
as China is well aware that in a democratic country like India public opinion cannot 
be controlled and the condition would remain unfulfilled. But the far-sighted Nehru‟s 
policy did not fathom this deliberation. A comparison of the concessions that the two 
made in the agreement reveals a great difference, what India gained was incomparable 
to that of China as China managed to put, explicitly, on the agreement all the 
concessions it was seeking whereas those India sought were not stated. A common 
judgment would have realised the loss India had endured however, Nehru did not 
realise he was outwitted by the Chinese counterpart and instead believed that his 
gentleman‟s act had resulted in a new beginning of a friendly relation, though the 
price he paid for this was a huge loss for India. The actual Chinese interpretation of 
the agreement came to light when in the late 1950s the PRC violated the oral 
agreement by disregarding India‟s vital security interests in the Himalayas and the 
military occupation of Tibet. China broke India‟s outer ring of defence by sending 
troops to Tibet and later started with Nepal penetrated India‟s inner ring of defence.  
 
The PRC policies adopted towards India can be described as a profound strategy 
compounded by surface diplomacy. This is seen from the Chinese act of forming 
alliance with Pakistan to gain strategic edge over India thereby containing India‟s 
regional supremacy in South Asia while seriously pursuing diplomatic relations with 
India whenever it feels vulnerable in Tibet.
539
 China took the advantage of using 
India‟s friendly overtures in consolidating their position in Tibet at a time when China 
was reeling under the world-wide condemnation and was militarily not sophisticated 
enough to challenge a joint Indo-American opposition. Nehru‟s recognition of Tibet 
as a part of China helped the PRC to establish full fledged legal claims over Tibet and 
had direct implications on the Sino-Indian boundary dispute which Nehru either was 
                                                 
537 Prior to the signing of the agreement all the political maps of India showed the northern borders 
extending from Kashmir to Nepal as “undefined” and the northeastern frontier as “undemarcated”. 
538 Cited in D. R. Mankekar, The Guilty Men of 1962, Bombay: Tulsi Shah Enterprises, 1968, p. 138. 
539 From 1954-58 and 1989-93 various Chinese dignitaries visited New Delhi. R. K. Jain (ed.), China-
South Asia Relations, 1947-1980, New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1981, pp. 577-85. 
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not aware of or he overlooked. As Mao himself observed in 1952 that there was no 
popular support for Communists liberation of Tibet and the social base for planting 
Communism in Tibet was almost nonexistent.
540
 Mao was apprehensive of a 
concerted effort of Indo-American force, as India by herself was not militarily capable 
of challenging the Communist takeover of Tibet. 
 
The true Chinese political manoeuvers started to materialise right after India‟s 
recognition of Tibet as part of China in 1954 when China officially started to claim 
territory along the Indo-Tibetan border based on the provisions enshrined in the 
agreement. China used official Tibetan documents, the validity of which depended on 
India‟s acceptance of Tibet as part of China, as evidence to claim territorial rights 
along the boundary. Moreover, China held the logic that both the nations being anti-
imperialists should not recognise the McMahon Line as a legally binding treaty since 
the treaty was signed with the British imperialists. In both 1962
541
 and 1960
542
, 
regarding border dispute, Tibetan official documents were used to lay claims over the 
disputed areas. While employing such external policy China did not neglect 
consolidating its foothold in Tibet by strengthening its military base, completing four 
highways connecting Tibet to China proper and Xinjiang
543
 and co-opting the 
traditional Tibetan ruling class. The past occurrences show that China was clever in 
handling both its external and internal policies simultaneously. Although from early 
on the Chinese strategists were well aware of their plans they nevertheless waited 
patiently for the right time to execute their plans. With the victory favour ing their 
side China did not miss accusing India of interfering in their internal affairs when 
Indian public showed sympathetic support for the Lhasa revolt in 1959 which was the 
                                                 
540 Mao Zedong, Selected Works, Vol. 5, Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1977, p. 64. 
541 In a letter, dated 5 November 1962, to Asian and African leaders regarding the boundary dispute 
Chou Enlai cited only Tibetan evidence to prove their claims. By declaring Aksai Chin as a part of 
Tibet‟s Zinjiang and Ngari districts Chou Enlai claimed it to be Aksai Chin as China‟s territory. 
Premier Chou Enlai‟s letter to the Asian and African Countries on the Sino-Indian Boundary 
Question, Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1962, pp. 3-4. 
542 Mr. Jagath S. Mehta, the chief Indian representatives at the 1960 Indian and Chinese officials‟ 
meeting on boundary issue, in his speech at the South Asian Seminar on “Non-Violence in the 
Modern World System,” 2 October 1995, at the India International Center, New Delhi, stated that 
the Chinese officials presented 245 items of evidence of which most were official Tibetan 
documents. See Dawa Norbu, China‟s Tibet Policy, p. 287. An extensive material on the evidence 
presented by the Chinese and Indians on their boundary claims can be seen in Report of the 
Officials of the Government of India and the People‟s Republic of China on Boundary Question, 
New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1961. 
543 Dawa Norbu, „Strategic Development in Tibet: Implications for Its Neighbors‟, Asian Survey, vol. 
19, no. 3. March 1979, pp. 245-259. 
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culmination of the Tibetan resistance movement that took place in Kham, Eastern 
Tibet, in 1952-53. The Khampa revolts in the mid 1950s might have provoked the 
Chinese to establish check-posts along the Himalayan ranges
544
 and Indian public 
support for Tibet provided China with an opportunity to intensify their border claims 
to which India responded with infuriation escalating to the 1962 Sino-Indian war. 
 
Initial Chinese border claims were concentrated exclusively in the western sector of 
the Himalayan range. China then was paranoid about a US backed India and 
Pakistan‟s threat against itself,545 through Tibet and Xinjiang, therefore, rapidly 
completed the Qinghai-Tibet Highway in 1954 and the Aksai Chin Road in October 
1957 with the establishment of military and police posts along the western sectors 
546
 
to prevent external challenges. This Chinese apprehension and infuriation against its 
western neighbours intensified, especially India who China accused of involvement in 
the Tibetan revolt which culminated in the flight of the Dalai Lama in 1959 to India. 
It has been argued that India‟s granting of asylum547 to the Dalai Lama strained the 
Sino-Indian relationship which never recovered.
548
 Since then the Sino-Indian 
relations deteriorated as the border incidents became more violent and frequent 
exchange of communications ensued. According to Dawa Norbu within six months‟ 
period, September 1959 to March 1960, the two nations had exchanged thirty notes, 
eight letters and six memoranda
549
 indicating the seriousness of the relation. The 1959 
revolt can be understood as a significant factor in the deterioration of the Sino-Indian 
relation. To both the parties the 1959 revolt had implications of violating the context 
                                                 
544 Check-posts were established at Aksai Chin, 24,000 sq. km in Ladakh, and Shipka La Pass, about 
320 sq. km in the middle sector, and some 51,200 sq. km in the eastern sector. 
545 In May and June 1959 Ayub Khan, the then President of Pakistan, is said to have called for joint 
Indo-Pakistan defence against the Chinese Communist threat. Pakistan was a member of SEATO 
and had chances of receiving the United States‟ backing. See L. J. Kavic, India‟s Quest for 
Security: defence Policies 1947-1965, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, pp. 68, 70s & 
184. 
546 China‟s precaution was not baseless as border incidents in the western sector such as Pangong 
Lake (28 July 1959), Longju (26 August 1959) and Kongka Pass (20 October 1959) occurred where 
the Chinese perceived the greatest danger of external intervention. Dawa Norbu, China‟s Tibet 
Policy, p. 289. 
547 It should be noted that at a meeting with Chou Enlai, Nehru was told that were India to grant 
asylum to the Dalai Lama China would have considered it as an international behavior and accept 
the Indian position as confirming to International protocol and would not view it as an unfriendly 
act. The reference was made when the Dalai Lama nearly sought asylum in 1950 at the event of 
Chinese invasion. Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the Land o f Snows: History of Modern Tibet 
since 1947, p. 213. 
548 S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Vol. 2, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 89. 
549 Dawa Norbu, China‟s Tibet Policy, p. 289. 
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of the Panchsheel Agreement. What India considered as humanitarian act of granting 
asylum to the Dalai Lama was perceived as an internal interference by China, thereby 
breeching the non-interference of one another‟s internal affairs. And equally to India, 
despite Chou Enlai‟s assurances, China did not respect Tibetan autonomy.550 More 
importantly China violated the Panchsheel principle of respect for each other‟s 
territorial integrity by disrespecting Indian border claims. The territorial dispute 
which is closely connected to Tibet became one of the most contentious issues to face 
China and India in present and in future as well. The Chinese claim on the disputed 
border areas was validated by India‟s recognition of Tibet as a part of China in 1954. 
The Chinese evidence on border claim, especially the McMahon Line, was based on 
the treaties that the thirteen Dalai Lama signed with the British India. Therefore, Tibet 
has remained a nexus to the Sino-Indian relations especially the border relation. 
Tension still exists though not visibly. 
 
As in every hostile relation, China and India began to play dangerous game which led 
to 1962 war. Both the parties had their own allegations. India felt that China was 
undermining India‟s international stature and taking advantage of its superior 
geostrategic position to claim its authority over the undefined territories in the 
Himalayan ranges. In the Chinese case, they saw India‟s warm reception of the Dalai 
Lama as intended scheme to embarrass China in the world‟s eye and using the Dalai 
Lama as an ace up the sleeve to establish its border claims. India pretended that Tibet 
was not a factor to the deterioration of the Sino-Indian relation however, the study of 
bilateral relation shows that had India not insisted on the recognition of the McMahon 
Line established at the Simla Convention of 1913-1914 between Tibet and British 
India, or had it not conceded Tibet‟s sovereignty to China, the border issues would not 
have arisen. Thus the crux of the contention between India and China questions the 
legality of Chinese takeover of Tibet. The growing Chinese animosity against India 
can be seen in this pretext. Just before the eve of Sino-Indian war China signed border 
agreements with Burma, Nepal in 1960, Mongolian in 1962 and Pakistan in 1963. The 
Chinese border agreement with Burma and Pakistan remains as the British India had 
                                                 
550 A. Appadorai, Select Documents on India‟s Foreign and Relations 1947-1972, pp. 521. Nehru in 
his statement to the Lok Sabha on 27 April, 1959 stated, “We hope still that the authorities of 
China, in their wisdom, will not use their great strength against the Tibetans but will win them to 
friendly co-operation in accordance with the assurances they have themselves given about the 
autonomy of the Tibet region.  
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subscribed. However, in the case of India, China remained inflexible and demanded 
that India give up recognising the treaty which is a British imperialist legacy. 
 
In 1960 China diplomatically called on India to conduct a negotiation on the border 
issues, proposing for a replacement of the 1954 agreement to which India did not 
respond. Due to limited access to official documents it is not known who actually 
intruded first in the other‟s territory. But the fact remains that Indian populace was 
deeply hurt and humiliated by the 1962 War. For the Indian masses, Tibet‟s issue does 
not merely represent India‟s security concern but had a wider significance that was 
rooted in the strong cultural and religious bonds formed over many centuries.
551
 The 
1962 war helped Nehru and his associates to change their views on China. Until the 
border war Nehru aided by Panikar was cautious not to antagonise the Chinese even at 
the cost of incurring initial losses. This can be deduced from the lack of Indian official 
support while the public overwhelmingly supported Tibet‟s cause. In fact to silence 
China of accusing Indian‟s involvement in the Tibetan revolt the Indian government 
suppressed pro-Tibetan political activities in India throughout the 1950s. Fortunately 
for the Tibetans this 1950s Indian stand on China underwent a change which led to 
Indian support for Tibet both overtly and covertly. In 1963 Indian government 
established a special frontier force to train young Tibetans and two years later in 1965 
Indian delegate at the UN for the first time openly supported for a Tibet resolution. 
The then Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri is said to have plans to recognise 
the Tibetan government-in-exile. However, that did not happen as the Prime Minister 
died all of a sudden which resulted in yet another twist in the Indian policy.
552
  
 
In the 1970s India once again flirted with the idea of appeasing Beijing so as to 
forestall any Chinese intervention in the Bangladesh war of liberation from 1970-
1971 or in the Himalayan border. Like its precedence India sang the mantra of “Tibet 
[being] a part of China,” formulated to convey the message that India still had not lost 
her faith in its northern neighbour and that India had no plans to move beyond the 
Himalayas. This friendly gesture, to its Chinese counterpart, became even more 
necessary when Sikkim was assimilated into India during Indira Gandhi‟s leadership. 
                                                 
551 A. Appadorai, Select Documents on India‟s Foreign and Relations 1947-1972, p. 521. 
552 Swarn Lata Sharma, Tibet: Self-determination among Nations, New Delhi: Criterion Publication, 
1988, p. 109. 
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For the first time India‟s diplomacy resulted in a concrete gain for India herself. 
Thereafter, India maintained a dualistic policy towards China by continuing its 
declaration of Tibet as a part of China, yet at the same time facilitated the Dalai 
Lama‟s internationalisation of the Tibet issue and its assistance to the Exiled Tibetan 
government. The two Asian rivals have their own cards to play against one another; 
China uses Pakistan, Kashmir and Northeast insurgency issues to undermine India‟s 
strength while India has only the Tibet card to play. Since 1962 war the two nations 
engaged in interfering in one another‟s domestic problems. Depending on India‟s 
relation with China and other international factors India‟s support for Tibetan demand 
for genuine autonomy oscillates.  
 
Another factor that had boosted India‟s courage in dealing with China and the Tibet 
issue was its improved relation with the Soviet Union. Subsequent to the Sino-Soviet 
border clashes along the Ussuri River in 1969 and the consequent deterioration of the 
Sino-Soviet relation, Moscow, in the early 1970s, took an unprecedented interest in 
the Tibetan cause. This led to the Soviet‟s open declaration that it would support the 
Tibetan cause if and when the Dalai Lama requested it.
553
 Whatever the rationale 
might have been, it definitely gave a wonderful opportunity for India and the Soviet 
Union to form a stronger alliance and strengthen India‟s deterrence against China. 
Nevertheless, it became a mounting pressure, which compelled China to initiate a 
serious dialogue with the Dalai Lama. At the same time, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union eased the Chinese fear of joint attacks from an Indo-Soviet alliance. Unless a 
bilateral agreement on the disputed areas along the Himalayan range is reached China 
and India are likely to live in a constant state of distrust and tension. Such a 
geopolitical condition between the two nations is detriment to the security of Asian 
subcontinent. Moreover, the current exorbitant defence expenditure by the two nations 
is a major setback for the national economy of the two nations. In the next chapter I 
will discuss in greater detail the Asian security concerns.  
 
                                                 
553 Phuntsok Tashi,Takla, Mi-tshe‟i byung-ba brjod-pa (An Account of the Life‟s Event), Vol. 3, 
Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1995, pp. 140-141. 
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PART III SITUATION INSIDE TIBET 
 
Chapter 6 Autonomy in the Tibet Autonomous Region 
 
3.6.1 Human Rights in Tibet: UN and China‟s Obligation 
To assess the conditions of human rights in China I compare the international 
standards of human rights and national norms as reflected in the nation‟s constitutions 
and how the principle in constitutions manifest in reality. In order to make this 
comparison, I will conduct a relatively close study of international human rights 
principles and the Chinese national constitution with a specific focus on the rights of 
ethnic minorities in the autonomous regions.  
 
In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) (A/RES/217),
554
 which proclaims, “All human beings are 
born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and 
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”. The 
Declaration further emphasises the right to life, liberty and security of person and 
exhorts that no one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman treatment or 
punishment. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation 
of this Declaration and no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. 
It also declared that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and 
reputation. The declaration further asserts that everyone has the right to freedom of 
movement and residence within the borders of each state, and that everyone has the 
right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. These 
rights as promulgated in the UDHR are „the foundation of freedom, justice and peace 
in the world‟ and the member nations are morally obligated to uphold and observe 
them. However, the violation of these rights exists in many countries including the 
People‟s Republic of China.555  
                                                 
554 Morsink, Johannes, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: origins, drafting, and intent, 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999. 
555 Following the issue of torture in China, raised by Amnesty International at the Sub-Commission in 
1987, the poor condition of human rights in China was brought up at the annual sessions of the 
Commission of Human rights and the Sub-Commission by its member states and the NGOs at one 
time or another. After the 1989 Tiananmen incident, in August the Sub-Commission on Prevention 
 169 
 
A brief account of China‟s participation in the international covenants on human 
rights issues shall be explored after explaining the Chinese Government‟s position on 
human rights and democracy, which will help us understand the fundamental 
contentions on the perception of human rights in the international arena. Not every 
country values the human rights in the same way. The Chinese Government, for 
instance, taking a developmentalist
556
 position considers “the right to subsistence [as] 
                                                                                                                                            
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities passed a resolution expressing concerns about the 
events of June 1989, marking the first time censuring of a Permanent Member of the Security 
Council for its human rights performance. In the 1990 session of the Commission on Human 
Rights, the Secretary General presented a report on deplorable human rights condition in China 
based on materials compiled by the Amnesty International and other groups and a debate was held 
on whether to pass a resolution condemning China. In 1991, the Sub-Commission passed another 
resolution highlighting China‟s treatment of the Tibetan people and the long-term policies 
employed by the PRC in Tibet. The following year the Secretary General submitted a report on the 
situation in Tibet to the Commission as per the request made by the Sub-Commission in the 
previous year. In that same year in the 43
rd
 session of the Sub-Commission, the Western European 
Community led by Germany drafted a resolution titled „Situation in China/Tibet which was 
eventually defeated with by a procedural motion preventing the Commission from making any 
decision on the draft. The 1993 draft resolution on China at the Commission on Human Rights was 
also defeated. In 1994, in the 50
th
 session of the Commission on Human Rights the Government of 
China was called upon to take further measures to enhance the observance of all human rights. The 
Commission also requested the Secretary General to prepare a report on China‟s human rights 
situation for its 51
st
 Session. The 1995 US draft resolution on China at the Commission of Human 
Rights was defeated by a very small margin. In the next two years China resolution did come up at 
the sessions of the Commissions however with the same negative results. In 1998 both the 
European Union and the US stopped sponsoring resolutions on China at the Commission on Human 
Rights which apparently encouraged the Chinese government to increase repression against the 
dissidents. This change in the Chinese government‟s behavior backfired with the US government 
once again proposing a draft resolution on China at the 1999 Commission on Human Rights 
meeting. However China won a no-action motion against the resolution. The 2000 meeting of the 
Commission witnessed the same result with China defeating a U.S.-sponsored China resolution. See 
Ann Kent, China, the United Nations, and Human Rights: The Limits of Compliance, Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999, pp. 58-64; Ming Wan, Human Rights in Chinese Foreign 
Relations: Defining and Defending National Interests, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2001, pp. 106-128; Summary Record of the 17
th
 Meetings Commission on Human Rights, 
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 41
st
 Session, UN 
Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/SR.17(1989), pp. 11-12; Summary Record of the 19
th
 Meeting, 
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, UN Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/SR.19 (1989), pp. 5-7; Summary Record of the 37
th
 
Meeting, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, 41
st
 Session, UN Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/SR.37 (1989), pp.4-5; Karen 
Reierson and David Weissbrodt, „The 43rd Session of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities: The Sub-Commission Under Scrutiny,‟ Human Rights 
Quarterly vol. 14. no. 2, May 1992, pp. 233-277; Reed Brody and David Weissbrodt, „Major 
Developments at the 1989 Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights,‟ Human Rights 
Quarterly, vol. 11, no. 4, November 1989, pp. 586-611.  
556 In general scholars on human rights have accepted three different views on human rights namely 
the universalism, cultural relativism and developmentalism. The Chinese government has variously 
propounded both the cultural relativist and developmentalist views of human rights. According to 
James Seymour China‟s leaders take a cultural relativist approach in matters of civil and political 
rights. See James Seymour, “Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Relation,” ed. Samual S. Kim, 
China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, Boulder: Westview, 
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the most important of all human rights, without which the other rights are out of 
question”.557 “Therefore, a country‟s human rights situation should not be judged in 
total disregard of its history and national conditions, nor can it be evaluated according 
to a preconceived model or the conditions of another country or region”.558 In 1997 
Chinese former president Jiang Zemin, while on his state visit to the United States, is 
quoted in The Washington Post as saying that “the concepts on democracy and human 
rights and on freedoms are relative and specific ones, and they are to be determined 
by the specific national situations of different countries”.559 On that same trip, in an 
interview he said, “One country‟s human rights situation cannot be separated from the 
actual conditions of that country. Undoubtedly, there can be discussion on the human 
rights issue, but I hope that the West understands that our primary issue is to assure 
that all Chinese people have adequate access to food and clothing”.560 This reflects 
the official position of the Chinese Government on human rights issues. 
  
The Chinese government‟s engagement in human rights issues occurred around the 
time of Deng‟s introduction of reform in 1978. Ironically, the Western scrutiny of 
China‟s human rights intensified around that same time. After taking the seat in the 
United Nations in 1971, the PRC strengthened its involvement in shaping the 
international human rights regime. It started attending the meetings of the UN Human 
Rights Commission as an observer in 1979 and then in 1982 became a member. It 
took part in various commissions, sub-commissions and working groups involved in 
different human rights activities. Within a period of several years the PRC became 
signatory to many conventions which I will enumerate below. 
 
The Communist government in China, since its inception, has signed and ratified a 
                                                                                                                                            
1994, p. 203. However, according to Peter Van Ness, China foreign policy expert, PRC “endorsed 
the two key principles of universality of UN human rights standards, and indivisibility of priorities 
among those standards”. He continued stating that Beijing takes developmentalist approach to the 
implementation of UN standards for less industrialised countries, and “emphasizes the economic 
agenda over civil and political rights and group rights, especially self-determination, over individual 
rights”. Peter Van Ness, „Addressing the Human Rights Issue in Sino-American Relations,‟ Journal 
of International Affairs, Issue  49, Vol. 2, winter, 1996, pp. 309-332. 
557 Information Office of the State Council of the People‟s Republic of China, „Human Rights in 
China, November 1991‟, White Papers of the Chinese Government (I) 1991-1995, Beijing: Foreign 
Language Press, 2006, p. 54. 
558 Ibid., p. 53. 
559 „Clinton, Jiang reach nuclear accord: Presidents take jabs on human rights‟, The Washington 
Times, 30 October 1997. 
560 The Washington Post, 19 October 1997.  
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number of legal obligations under conventional international law including: 1) the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide;
561
 2) the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;
562
 3) the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
563
 4) the 
International Convention on the Suppression and the Punishment of Crime of 
Apartheid;
564
 5) the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women;
565
 6) Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment;
566
 7) Convention on the Rights of Child;
567
 8) 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
568
 Despite being a signatory 
to all these conventions, the CCP has so far failed to abide by these treaties and 
continues an unabated violation of these fundamental rights in the whole of China and 
more severely in the political sensitive minority regions.  
 
3.6.2 The PRC‟s Constitution and Internal Law 
The Constitution of the PRC
569
 provides basic rights to its people and reflects many of 
the principles that are enshrined in the UDHR, and it proclaims that the citizens of the 
PRC enjoy freedom of speech and press,
570
 freedom of religious belief
571
 and that all 
citizens of the People‟s Republic of China are equal before the law.572 Citizens may 
not be arrested without the approval of people‟s court and unlawful deprivation or 
restriction of citizens‟ freedom of person by detention or other means is prohibited573 
and unlawful search of, or intrusion into, a citizen‟s home is also prohibited574 by the 
                                                 
561 The PRC ratified this convention on 18 April 1983. The source for all the United Nations 
convention ratification dates is from the UN official website: 
 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/3.htm.   
562 Ratified on 29 December 1981. 
563 Ratified on 27 March 2001. 
564 Ratified on 18 April 1983. 
565 Ratified on 4 November 1980. 
566 Ratified on 4 October 1988. 
567 Ratified on 2 March 1992. 
568 Signed on 5 October 1998 but has not yet ratified. 
569 The Constitution of PRC has been amended few times since its adoption in September 1954. The 
version that I have used was adopted in December 1982 with further revisions in 1988, 1993, 1999 
and 2004. Wherever necessary I have provided the new amendments that had been made to the 
Constitution. The full text of the Constitution with the latest amendment adopted in March 2004 can 
be also viewed at the Chinese government website. 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2830.htm  
570 Art 35. 
571 Art 36. 
572 Art 33. 
573 Art 37. 
574 Art 39. 
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Constitution. In spite of all these provisions various reports compiled and collected by 
NGOs and human rights organisations indicate the extensive violations of these rights, 
especially in the ethnic minority regions. Although all kinds of human rights 
violations are occurring in China such as religious persecutions against the Falung 
Gong practitioners,
575
 persecutions against supporters of democracy in China,
576
 
severe restrictions imposed on the press and so on, I will not venture into those but 
will rather confine myself primarily to the human rights violations perpetrated against 
the Tibetans since my research focus is on Sino-Tibetan relationship. 
 
Tibet is one of the 55 national minority groups
577
 that had been granted the 
                                                 
575 The Falun Gong, a popular spiritual movement, came out of obscurity in 1992 when its leader Li 
Hongzhi made it public. Drawn from Taoism, Chinese Ch‟an Buddhism and the ancient Chinese 
physical practice of Qigong, its principles and practices encourage the practitioners to cultivate 
mind, body and spirit. It promotes truthfulness, compassion and forbearance and development of 
body‟s vital energy for healing and fitness. Due to its health benefits the Chinese government 
endorsed the Falun Gong practice from 1992 to 1998 and even issued certificates of award to Falun 
Gong. Although it has no official membership, no subscriptions, or official temple or church, the 
Chinese Ministry of Public Security, in 1998, stated that there were 70 million followers in China 
and about 30 million abroad. As the number of practitioners increased the Chinese leadership 
started viewing it a serious political problem. In April 1999 the Chinese authorities were alarmed 
when 10,000 of its followers surrounded Zhongnanhai, the former royal palace where the 
Communist leadership lives and works, and conducted peaceful qigong exercises. The Chinese 
Prime Minister Zhu Rongji who came to listen to the woes of the people, was astonished to see a 
number of his fellow party officials among them. Three months later, on 29 July 1999, the regime 
branded the group as a “massive threat” and banned it in China. Since the official ban, the Chinese 
authorities have carried out brutal crackdowns on Falun Gong practitioners and tens of thousands of 
its practitioners have been arbitrarily detained and sent to labor camps without trial. Many of them 
were reported to have been tortured or subjected to ill-treatments in detention. Harsh punishments 
were meted out to those who have spoken out publicly about the persecution of practitioners. 
Numerous allegations were made against the CCP of inflicting live organ harvesting on the 
unwilling Falun Gong practitioners throughout China. Whenever the freedom of religion and belief 
is discussed at the UN commissions, the PRC faces hard time justifying its actions against the Falun 
Gong and other religious groups. The information contained herein are gathered from my interview 
with Dana Cheng, communication with a spokesperson of Falun Gong Mr. Erping Zhang and Hu 
Ping‟s „The Falungong Phenomenon‟, China Rights Forum, no. 4, 2003, published by Human 
Rights in China. 
576 Democracy Movement in Communist China began with the Advice and Petition movement in 
1957, followed by the April 5
th
 movement in 1976 and the Democracy Wall Movement in the late 
70s. Many activists who participated in the Wall Movement were arrested and persecuted. Xu 
Wenli and Wei Jingsheng are the two most famous veterans of pro-democracy movements who 
were imprisoned for many years for their beliefs. The latest and probably the greatest democracy 
movement in the Chinese history is the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement of 1989. See 
Xu Wenli, „The Democracy Movement in China‟, World and I, Vol. 14, February 1999; See also 
Wei Jingsheng, The Courage to Stand Alone: Letters from Prison and Other Writings, Published by 
Penguin, August 1998. I interviewed the two of the founding members of Democracy Movement in 
China, Xu Wenli and Wei Jingsheng, in April 2006. In that same month I also talked with a number 
of oversea Chinese democratic supporters, based in the US, to learn about the present state of 
democracy movement and the democratic system in China. For more detail see the next chapter, 
„Dissident Chinese Views on Tibet‟. 
577 China has 56 ethnic groups of which the Han nationality comprises the majority of Chinese 
population with 91.6 per cent. Of the remaining 55 ethnic groups Tibetans, Mongols, Manchus, and 
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Autonomous status
578
 and as such the constitutional rights provided by the PRC to the 
ethnic groups become pertinent. To safeguard the rights of the ethnic minority groups, 
the Constitution provides following rights: 1) Equal rights to all nationalities;
579
 2) 
Appropriate representation of the ethnic minorities in the National People‟s Congress 
and its Standing Committee;
580
 and 3) the right to use the spoken and written 
languages of the minorities in court proceedings.
581
 To safeguard these rights the 
Constitution accords the State Council among other things the functions and powers 
to administer and direct affairs concerning the nationalities, to protect the equal rights 
of ethnic minorities and the right of autonomy of the national autonomous areas.
582
 In 
1984 the Law on National Regional Autonomy
583
 (LNRA) was adopted by the NPC to 
provide regional autonomy to the autonomous peoples. The national regional 
autonomy provided to the minorities
584
 was first formulated in the Common 
                                                                                                                                            
Hui are the major ethnic groups. 
578 So far there is no standardised international law that regulates the conduct of a state towards its 
autonomous areas. However according to Hurst Hannum, a professor of International Law at Tufts 
University, “a fully autonomous” territory should possess most of the following powers: 1) A 
locally elected legislative body endowed with some independent legislative authority with 
competence to control or influence the primary and secondary education, the use of language, the 
structure of local government, and land use and planning; 2) A locally elected chief executive 
entrusted with the responsibility for administration and enforcement of state and local laws; 3) An 
independent judiciary with full responsibility for interpreting local laws; and 4) Joint authority over 
common matters such as ports and communication facilities, police and exploitation of natural 
resources. Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-determination: The Accommodation of 
Conflicting Human Rights, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990, pp. 467-468. 
579 Art. 4 of the PRC constitution. It claims that the state protects the lawful rights and interests of the 
minority nationalities and upholds and develops the relationship of equality, unity and mutual 
assistance among all of China‟s nationalities 
580 Art. 59 and 65.  
581 Art. 133. Compact community with larger density of minority nationality should be given the right 
to conduct hearings in the languages commonly used in the locality, with indictments, notices and 
judgments written in the languages in common use in the region 
582 Art. 89. 
583 The Regional National Autonomy Law is adopted by the Second Session of the Sixth National 
People‟s Congress on 31 May 1984 and became effective on 1 October of the same year. This law 
underlies the basic policy of the CCP to resolve the minority issues in China by applying the 
principles of Marxism-Leninism. This law can be viewed at:  
 http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=9507&PHPSESSID=6e41652125e
73876e6b4e050f86dbffa. 
584 The initial background of the minority rights can be traced back to the policies and propagandas of 
both the Nationalist Government and the Chinese Communist Party. The former Chinese 
Government, Kuomintang, had used the phrase “self-determination” in many of their documents 
including the Manifesto of the First Kuomintang National Convention. However, the phrase is 
generally interpreted as China‟s right to freedom from foreign imperialist influences. Sun Yat-sen, 
the founder of the Republic of China, strongly promulgated a unified China and the connotation of 
the phrase in his works is the right to “free alliance” of the different peoples in a free united 
Republic of China. See Leonard Shihilien Hsu, Sun Yat-sen: His Political and Social Ideals, Los 
Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1933, p. 128 and 168; See also Sun Yat-sen, The 
Three Principles of the People, Taipei: China Publishing Co., Taiwan. Sun‟s successor, Chiang 
Kai-shek, followed the same policy until 1959 when he promised the Tibetans to meet their wishes 
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Program,
585
 adopted by the 1
st
 Plenary Session of the Chinese People‟s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in 1949. The Common Program which served as a 
provisional constitution provided “regional autonomy” to areas where national 
minorities are concentrated.
586
 It further granted the national minorities the “freedom 
to develop their spoken and written languages, to preserve or reform their traditions, 
customs, and religious beliefs”.587  
 
Especially, with regard to Tibet, the Common Program, more specifically the Articles 
50 to 53, became the main point of reference of the 17 Point Agreement which later 
became the legal framework for Tibetan autonomy within the PRC.
588
 The above 
mentioned Articles of the “Common Program” appeared at various points of the 17 
Point Agreement, as parts of its Preamble and specific points. For instance the Article 
50 appeared in the Preamble of the Agreement as “all national minorities have 
                                                                                                                                            
in accordance with the principles of national self-determination once the KMT regains the 
Mainland. See Dawa Norbu, China‟s Tibet Policy, p. 264. In Chinese Communist records the 
provision of self-determination to minorities like Tibet, Mongols and Uygurs occurred as early as 
1920s and 1930s. The records even showed Communist leaders entertaining the idea of secession. 
However, it is obvious that Mao changed the Communist stance and denied self-determination once 
the Communist gained power. For details see Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and John K. 
Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1952, p. 63, 132, 243, and 313; See also George Moseley, The Party and the National 
Question in China, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (The M.I.T. Press), 
s1966, pp. 51-82. 
585 At the first Plenary Session of the CPPCC, held in September 1949 in Beijing, the delegates 
adopted three draft laws including the Common Program of the CPPCC and four resolutions: 
renaming Beijing as the capital of the PRC, adopting the Gregorian calendar as the chronological 
system of the PRC, selecting the “March of the Volunteers” as the national anthem of the PRC and 
adopting the flag with five stars as the national flag of the PRC. General Affairs Office of the 
CPPCC National Committee, The Chinese People‟s Political Consultative Conference, Foreign 
Languages Press, Beijing 2004, pp. 16-20. 
586 Article 52 of the Common Program says: “Regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas where 
national minorities are concentrated, and various kinds of autonomous organisations for the 
different nationalities shall be set up according to the size of the respective peoples and regions. In 
places where different nationalities live together and in the autonomous areas of the national 
minorities, the different nationalities shall each have an appropriate number of representatives in the 
local organs of political power. All national minorities within the boundaries of the People‟s 
Republic shall have the right to join the People‟s Liberation Army and to organise the local 
people‟s public security forces in accordance with the unified military system of the state”. Conrad 
Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and John K. Fairbank, The Important Documents of the First Plenary 
Session of the Chinese People‟s Political Consultative Conference, Peking: Foreign Languages 
press, 1949, pp. 1-20; Theodore H. E. Chen, ed., The Chinese Communist Regime: Documents and 
Commentary, New York: Praeger, 1967, p. 34 
587 Ibid., Art. 53 of the Common Program.  
588 Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Zha-sgab dwan-phyug bde-ldan, Bod-kyi srid-don rgyal-rabs, Vol.2 
(Kalimpong: Shakabpa House, 1976), p. 419. The Chinese Ambassador to India General Yuan 
Chung-Hsien handed a copy of the Common Program to Tsepon Shakabpa on 16 September 1950 
and told him that Articles 50 to 53 of the Program would be implemented in Tibet. This is also 
mentioned in the Tibet: From 1951 to 1991, Beijing: New Star Publisher, 1991, p.57.  
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enjoyed the right of mutual equality, and have exercised, or are exercising, national 
regional autonomy”. Although the Article 52 is not listed among the 17 points the gist, 
however, occurred twice in the Preamble and the second part of it occupied four of the 
17 points,
589
 and finally the Article 53 was rewritten in the Agreement as its ninth and 
the tenth points. The comparison of the two documents clearly reveals that much of 
the materials of the 17 Point Agreement were drawn from the Common Program.  
 
The LNRA allocates following powers to the autonomous peoples‟ congresses: 1) The 
self-government of the national autonomous areas are empowered to adopt special 
policies and flexible measures depending on the local conditions to accelerate the 
economic and cultural development;
590
 2) The organs of self-government of national 
autonomous areas shall guarantee the freedom to use and develop the spoken and 
written languages of the nationalities and freedom to preserve or reform their 
folkways and customs;
591
 3) The organs of self-government shall guarantee the 
freedom of religious belief to the various nationalities. No one may compel citizens to 
believe in, or not to believe in any religion;
592
 4) The people‟s congresses of the 
national autonomous areas shall have the power to “enact regulations on the exercise 
of autonomy and separate regulations in the light of economic and cultural 
characteristics;”593 5) The organs of self-government of autonomous area may alter or 
not implement if a resolution, decision, or order of a state organ at a higher level is not 
suitable to the conditions of the region after receiving approval of the state organ;
594
 
6) The organs of self-government, under the guidance of state plans, shall 
independently design and administer local economic development plans in accordance 
with local needs;
595
 7) The organs of self-government of autonomous areas in 
accordance with state education laws shall decide on education plans including 
choosing curricula, enrollment, and language of instruction, spreading compulsory 
primary education, and establishing specialised schools for the nationalities that best 
suited them;
596
 and 8) The organs of self-government in accordance with legal 
                                                 
589 The points 2, 8, 13 and 16 of the 17 Point Agreement contained the essence of the Article 52 of the 
Common Program. 
590 Art. 6 of the Regional National Autonomy Law 1984. 
591 Ibid., Art. 10. 
592 Ibid., Art. 11. 
593 Ibid., Art. 19. 
594 Ibid., Art. 20. 
595 Ibid., Art. 25 & 26. 
596 Ibid., Art. 36 & 37. 
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stipulations shall establish measures to control transient population and family 
planning.
597
 However the ground reality in many of the ethnic minority regions is 
inconsistent with the principles enshrined in the Constitution and in the Chinese 
internal laws. In response to the numerous allegations and criticisms against the 
PRC‟s poor human rights records, the Chinese government has published many White 
Papers defending the human rights condition in China.  
 
3.6.3 The PRC Government‟s White Papers: 1991 to 2005 
Beginning from November 1991 the Information Office of the State Council of PRC 
has issued forty seven White Papers
598
 till date, nineteen of which deal with human 
rights in China and six
599
 of them deal with Tibetan issues with four White Papers 
focusing on the human rights in TAR. The first on Tibet was published in September 
                                                 
597 Ibid., Art. 43 & 44. 
598 At the time of writing this paper the Chinese government has published forty seven White Papers 
since in November 1991. I have listed them here starting from 2005: 1) China‟s Peaceful 
Development Road, 2) Building of Political Democracy in China, 3) China‟s Endeavors for Arms 
Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, 4) Gender Equality and Women‟s Development in 
China, 5) New Progress in China‟s Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, 6) China‟s Progress in 
Human Rights in 2004, 7) Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China, 8) China‟s National 
Defense in 2004, 9) China‟s Social Security and Its Policy, 10) Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet, 
11) China‟s Employment Situation and Policies, 12) Progress in China‟s Human Rights Cause in 
2003 , 13) China‟s Policy on Mineral Resources, 14) China‟s Non-Proliferation Policy and 
Measures, 15) History and Development of Xinjiang, 16) Ecological Improvement and 
Environmental Protection in Tibet, 17) China‟s National Defense in 2002, 18) Labor and Social 
Security in China, 19) The Development-oriented Poverty Reduction Program for Rural China, 20) 
Tibet‟s March Toward Modernization, 21) Progress in China‟s Human Rights Cause in 2000, 22) 
Fifty Years of Progress in China‟s Human Rights, 23) Narcotics Control in China, 24) China‟s 
Space Activities, 25) China‟s Population and Development in the 21st Century, 26) The One-China 
Principle and the Taiwan Issue, 27) The Development of Tibetan Culture, 28) China‟s National 
Defense in 2000, 29) National Minorities Policy and Its Practice in China, 30) China‟s National 
Defense, 31) The Development of China‟s Marine Programs, 32) New Progress in Human Rights in 
the Tibet Autonomous Region, 33) Freedom of Religious Belief in China, 34) On Sino-US Trade 
Balance, 35) Progress in China‟s Human Rights Cause in 1996, 36) The Grain Issue in China, 37) 
Environmental Protection in China, 38) The Situation of Children in China, 39) The Progress of 
Human Rights in China, 40) China: Arms Control and Disarmament, 41) Family Planning in China, 
42) Intellectual Property Protection in China, 43) The Situation Of Chinese Women, 44) The 
Taiwan Question and Reunification of China, 45) Tibet: Its Ownership And Human Rights 
Situation, 46) Criminal Reform in China and 47) Human Rights in China. Sources: Collections of 
White Papers compiled by Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, viz., White Papers 
of the Chinese Government (1) 1991-1995, (published in 2000), White Papers of the Chinese 
Government (2)1996-1999, (published in 2000), White Papers of the Chinese Government (3) 2000-
2001, (2
nd
 edition, published in 2003), White Papers of the Chinese Government (4) 2002-2004, 
published in 2005 by Foreign Language Press, Beijing. The White Papers are also available on the 
Chinese government website: http://english.gov.cn/links/whitepapers.htms.  
599 1) Tibet: Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation, September; 2) New Progress in Human 
Rights in the Tibet Autonomous Region, February 1998; 3) The Development of Tibetan Culture, 
June 2000; 4) Tibet‟s March Toward Modernization, November 2001; 5) Ecological Improvement 
and Environmental Protection in Tibet, March 2003; and 6) Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet, 
May 2004. See footnote 598 for the sources of these documents. 
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1992, entitled, Tibet: Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation,
600
 in which Beijing 
justifies sovereignty over Tibet by providing comprehensive historical accounts of the 
two states dating from the Tang dynasty (618-907) to the present Communist rule. The 
paper claims that the royal marriage between the Chinese princess Wen Cheng and the 
Tibetan emperor Song-tsen Gampo (year) in the seventh century laid “a solid 
foundation for the ultimate founding of a unified nation,” the incorporation of Tibet 
under the Yuan dynasty in the thirteenth century, the exercising of political authority 
over Tibet by the subsequent dynasties and ultimately the liberation of Tibet by the 
PLA. The paper further proclaims that the PLA liberated Tibet from the imperialist 
aggressors and freed the Tibetan serfs from the harsh feudal system of old Tibet, 
thereby declaring “a great, epoch-making change in Tibetan history”. The second part 
of the White Paper highlights the extreme backwardness of social, political, economic 
and industrial conditions in Tibet and compares them to a rosy picture “achieved” 
under the Communist rule; obvious attempts to parry continuing thrusts from 
international NGOs and Human Rights groups on China‟s deplorable human rights 
situations.
601
 The next White Paper on Tibet, New Progress in Human Rights in the 
Tibet Autonomous Region,
602
 published in February 1998, enumerates the outstanding 
economic developments achieved after the establishment of the Regional Autonomy 
system with the plethora of support from the Central Government. Giving precedence 
to the people‟s rights to existence and development over all the other rights, the 
Central Government states that it has allocated huge amounts of investments in Tibet 
to speed up economic construction of the region.
603
 Infrastructure developments 
involving network of communications and transportation consisting of air routes and 
highways, agriculture and water conservancy, energy and telecommunications, 
municipal engineering and social welfare were carried out with assistance from other 
provinces and municipalities. It also claims that with the introduction of the new 
                                                 
600 Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, White Papers of the Chinese Government (1) 
1991-1995, pp. 212-275.  
601 The 1991 Sub-Commission resolution on Tibet called upon the Government of People‟s Republic 
of China to fully respect the fundamental human rights and the freedom of the Tibetan people and 
requested the Secretary General to transmit information on the situation in Tibet provided by the 
Government of China and by other reliable sources to the Commission of Human Rights. 
602 Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, White Papers of the Chinese Government (2) 
1996-1999, pp. 278-303. 
603 Ibid., p. 286. The White Paper provides a host of figures on the progress of the standard of living 
of the Tibetan people. For example, in 1997 the GDP of the TAR is said to have increased by 96.6 
percent compared to 1991. In that same year the total grain output reached its highest in Tibetan 
history with total output of 820,000 tons.  
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political system in Tibet the Tibetan people today enjoy the political right “to 
participate in administration of state and local affairs on equal basis” and 
“independently administer local and ethnic affairs”. With regards to other rights 
Tibetans exercise freedom of religious belief and have better educational and health 
care access.  
 
The remaining two White Papers generally speak of the huge achievements gained 
after the Democratic reforms of 1959. The White Paper of June 2000, entitled 
Development of Tibetan Culture,
604
 reports the Central Governments‟ special concerns 
towards the protection and preservation of the Tibetan culture, language and art, 
traditional medicine and Pharmacology. The White Paper claims of various progresses 
made in the entire spectrum of Tibetan culture, which was earlier monopolised by a 
handful of serf owners. The paper contains numerous statistics on the number of 
school, academic institutions, broadcasting and news publishing houses established by 
the Central Government. It states that the Central Government, being conscious of 
religious sentiment of the people, granted religious freedom by allowing people to 
observe religious festivals, reconstruction and renovation of some monasteries. The 
Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet (2004)
605
 describes the historical evolution of the 
regional ethnic autonomy, a sure guarantor for Tibetan people to be masters of their 
own affairs, and the political rights enjoyed by the Tibetans in various organs of the 
central and local government with keys positions held by the ethnic Tibetans in their 
own regions. The paper claims that Tibetans enjoy full decision-making power in 
economic and social development. Various government incentives and economic 
packages, including preferential lower interest rates on loans, exemption of taxes, 
lower rate of insurance premiums, enable the local Tibetan people to raise their living 
standard, a key goal for the 10th Five-Year plans, thus guaranteeing rapid and healthy 
progress of Tibet‟s modernisation drive. It further reiterates the preservation of 
indigenous culture, promotion of health and education with consideration for religious 
freedom as Tibet marches toward modernisation.  
 
                                                 
604 Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, White Papers of the Chinese Government (3) 
2000-2001, pp. 118-143. 
605 Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, White Papers of the Chinese Government (4) 
2002-2004, pp. 510-536. 
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The Tibetan Government-in-Exile and other institutions,
606
 in their responses to the 
Chinese White Papers, have strongly criticised the papers for its inconsistencies, 
inaccuracies and distortion of facts. However, to obtain a genuine, authentic and 
veritable account I intend to analyse these papers in greater detail by comparing them 
with the empirical reality based on my own field works (see Appendix 6, 7 and 10), 
reports by the UN special rapporteurs and internationally renowned NGOs‟ reports. 
Of all the topical issues I consider the following issues as the most crucial to the 
Tibetan people and hence will conduct comparative analyses on them. 
 
3.6.4. Current Reality inside Tibet 
 
3.6.4.1 The Real Power Wielder in the TAR 
As recounted earlier the PRC purportedly guarantees political rights to the minorities 
in its constitution and especially in LNRA of 1984. Despite these provisions the 
reality inside the TAR does not conform to the PRC‟s claims of self-government in 
the autonomous regions. In general the pivot of power in Communist China resides in 
the Party and the State, which along with the Army form the critical components of 
the Maoist State power structure. This structure is also evident at the local levels of 
autonomous regions where the Party Secretary holds the highest power. In the TAR 
until now all the Party Secretaries have been Chinese with “not a single Tibetan 
representative in the Han power structure which dominates Tibetan areas”.607 This 
fact is acknowledged in the 100 Questions About Tibet, a Beijing Review publication, 
in which they provided lack of “stipulated qualifications” as the reason for not having 
Tibetan first secretaries of any previous Party Committee of the TAR. (See Appendix 
5 for a detailed representation of Han power structure in Tibet from 1950 to 2006.) 
In the case of the Chairman of the Regional People‟s Congress of the TAR, who is 
supposedly the head of the regional government, all of them so far have been of 
Tibetan nationality, as per the Art. 17 of the LNRA. The PRC claims that the primary 
                                                 
606 The Exile Tibetan Government has published three White Papers so far of which two are direct 
responses to the Chinese White Papers. 1) Tibet: Proving Truth from Facts (1996); and 2) Height of 
Darkness: Chinese Colonialism on the World‟s Roof (2001), published by the Department of 
Information and International Relations, Central Tibetan Administration, Dharamsala (India). The 
Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) has published two reports challenging the Chinese claims which 
are: 1. Tibet: The Gap between Fact and Fabrication, May 2005 and The Wo(e)men in China and 
Tibet: A Study, October 2005.  
607 Dawa Norbu, „Han Hegemony and Tibetan Ethnicity‟, vol. 32, no. 3, International Studies, Sage 
Publications, 1995, p. 304. 
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reason for appointing a citizen of the local nationality as the Chairman of the 
autonomous region is to protect the equal and autonomous rights of ethnic minorities; 
however, it is obvious that there are other strategic and propagandistic reasons such as 
convenient implementation of the Party directives
608
 and maintaining an appearance 
of minority rule. The so called “self-government” provided to the minorities in the 
Constitution and the LNRA, which guarantee autonomy and the right to administer 
the internal affairs, is in essence ineffective as the Art. 19 of that same law explicitly 
states that the local people congress needs the approval of the Standing Committee of 
the National People‟s Congress for any new regulations or modifications to existing 
resolutions. In other words, the local legislation is dependent upon the higher organs 
which thereby nullify the basic legislation power of the self-government.  
An equally important aspect of a democratic government is the people‟s right to elect 
their representatives who in their names run the government. This right is generally 
considered as a basic right of every human being as proclaimed in the Art. 21(3) of 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states: 
 
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this 
will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent 
free voting procedures. 
The system of government in the PRC is democratic centralism, which is described as 
“centralism on the basis of democracy and democracy under centralised guidance”. 
Yang Fengchun in Chinese Government defines democracy as a system where all 
“Party organs must be elected...and can be replaced by the Party members”.609 On the 
other hand centralism is defined as the administering every government function 
under the complete supervision of the Party leadership. Liu Shaoqi in his selected 
works states that centralism means “all meetings of the Party are called by the leading 
organs, all meetings proceed under leadership, all decisions and rules are made after 
full preparations and deliberation, all elections have lists of carefully considered 
candidates”.610 Therefore the very notion of electoral rights granted to the Chinese 
                                                 
608 The appointments of the Dalai Lama as the first Chairman, and of Panchen Lama thereafter, were 
primarily to gain the confidence of the Tibetan people through which the PRC hoped to maintain its 
grip on Tibet. 
609 Yang Fengchun, Chinese Government, Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 2004, p. 29. 
610 Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi, Vol. 1, Beijing: People‟s Publishing House, 1981, p. 359. Likewise 
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citizens is debatable. In case of the autonomous regions where the self-government is 
said to exist the minority people‟s will to choose their own government is constrained 
by the limited choice of candidates who are pre-listed by the CPC. In the TAR where 
the Communist Party pre-determined the candidates based on their loyalty and the 
local Tibetans were told to vote from the listed candidates, genuine democratic 
election is nothing but a pretension. Through my own interviews with the Tibetan 
newcomers I learned that the candidates for the local people‟s congresses were pre-
selected by the Party
611
  
A careful examination of the current governing system of the TAR, the democratic 
election, the legislative and the executive power reveals that the PRC‟s claim of 
providing self-government to the minorities is unjustifiable and at odds with the 
ground reality. This also disproves the claims made in a recent White Paper that the 
“Regional Ethnic Autonomy is the fundamental guarantee for Tibetan people as 
master of their own affairs”.612 Hurst maintains that “an autonomous region should 
enjoy effective control over matters which are primarily of local concern, within the 
overall framework of the fundamental norms of the state,” and “the state must adopt a 
flexible attitude which will enable the autonomous region to exercise real power, 
precisely when that exercise of power runs counter to the state‟s inherent preference 
for centralization and uniformity”.613 However, in the TAR, whether in executive, 
legislative or the democratic electoral system it is difficult to witness the Tibetan 
minority possessing effective control over matters of local concerns and the freedom 
to exercise real power and determine its political future. In the other two “traditional 
provinces of Tibet”, Amdo and Kham, the Han hegemony of power is worse than the 
TAR since the Tibetans are in minority in those areas and they do not enjoy the 
provisions that are granted to the autonomous regions. Despite the PRC‟s designation 
of regions populated by minority nationalities in compact communities as 
                                                                                                                                            
in the present electoral system in the TAR, there exist a pre-determined listing of candidates. A 
former Party Secretary of Kolug Township, Nagchu County, claims, “We were at first appointed by 
the higher levels and then public voted for the selected candidates,” quoted in Annual Report 2001: 
Human Rights Situation in Tibet, Dharamsala: Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy, 
2002, p. 70. 
611 Almost all the Tibetan newcomers with whom I discussed the election system in the TAR 
unanimously testified to that. Interviews conducted in Dharamsala and Nepal in July-August 2005. 
612 „Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet‟, a White Paper published by the Information Office of the 
State Council of the PRC. See White Papers of the Chinese Government (4) 2002-2004, pp. 531-
536. 
613 Hurst Hunnam, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting 
Rights, p. 468. 
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“autonomous regions” the present Communist Government does not provide any 
meaningful political autonomy to these entities. The CCP holds absolute political 
control over the whole state and the constitutional provisions of “self-government” to 
the autonomous regions become ineffective in true sense. The late Panchen Lama 
lamented, “It is not that we are not able to exercise power, but that we have not been 
given any power. A servant is naked not because he does not want to wear clothes, but 
because his master has not given him any clothes”. 614 
 
3.6.4.2 Religious Rights in the TAR
615
 
The Article 18 of the UDHR says: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, 
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and 
observance.  
 
The Article 36 of the PRC‟s constitution states:  
 
Citizens of the People‟s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious 
belief. No state organ, public organisation or individual may compel 
citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they 
discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any 
religion. The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make 
use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the 
health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state. 
Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign 
domination. 
 
Likewise the Article 11 of the LNRA, an internal law of the PRC for the national 
minorities, states: 
                                                 
614 DIIR, The Panchen Lama Speaks, Dharamsala: DIIR, 1991, p. 4. This statement of the late 
Panchen Lama was given to the TAR Standing Committee Meeting of the National People‟s 
Congress held in Beijing on 28 March, 1987. 
615 Although Religious Rights come under the Civil Rights I treat it separately due to the significance 
of Buddhism in the cultural identity of the Tibetan people. In the recent decades the monks and 
nuns in Tibet have actively staged numerous demonstrations against the Chinese rule in Tibet which 
has led to harsh policies against the religious institutions in Tibet. 
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Autonomous agencies in ethnic autonomous areas guarantee the freedom 
of religious belief to citizens of the various nationalities... 
 
Additionally the Article 251 of the PRC‟s Criminal Law mentions:  
 
State personnel who unlawfully deprive citizens of their freedom of 
religious belief and infringe upon the customs and habits of minority 
ethnic groups, when the circumstances are serious, are to be sentenced to 
not more than two years of fixed-term imprisonment or criminal 
detention.
616 
 
In general five main religions are practised in China, viz. Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, 
Catholicism and Protestantism, all of which have long history etched in the Chinese 
civilisation. The current Chinese government proclaims flexibility in their religious 
policy, allowing “religious organisations to run their affairs independently, and set up 
religious schools, publish religious periodicals and run social service according to 
their needs”.617 Not surprisingly, religious freedom is one of the core issues that worry 
Communist leadership the most. Whenever the party relaxes their religious policy, 
people tend to pledge more loyalty to their religious institutions which frighten the 
party of losing their influence over the mass. On the other hand severe restrictions on 
the religious freedom tarnish the image of the Party in the international arena. Thus 
the provisions in the Constitutions and internal laws on religious freedom are 
necessary yet impractical in reality for the Party to retain their absolute power.  
 
In Tibet the religious issue is even more complicating to the Party as Buddhism is a 
significant part of the distinct Tibetan national identity and the Party suspects that it 
fosters nationalism. Secondly it is a unifying force that draws Tibetans from all the 
regions of Tibet into a collective unit which inculcates a sense of Tibetan nationhood. 
Thirdly it sustains the faith of the people in the Dalai Lama, the spiritual head of 
Tibetan Buddhist and the pan-Tibetan symbol, who according to the Party is a 
“splittist” and a “counter revolutionary”. For these reasons the CCP has been very 
                                                 
616 „Freedom of Religious Belief in China‟, a White Paper published by the Information Office of the 
State Council of the PRC, September 1992, p 37. See White Papers of the Chinese Government (2) 
1996-1999 published by Foreign Languages Press, 2000, pp. 247-248.  
617 Ibid., p. 242. 
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intolerant to religious freedom in the TAR. In the post-Mao era people in China 
enjoyed relatively more religious freedom but depending on the regions different 
degrees of freedom are granted. In sensitive areas such as Tibet and Xinjiang, where 
the CCP perceives religion as a major factor of instability, severe restrictions have 
been imposed on religious freedom. For instance right from the time of democratic 
reforms in early 1950s the monastic communities in Eastern Tibet became the targets 
of revolutionary struggle wherein spiritual masters were subjected to inhumane 
treatments and the Buddhist monasteries and religious scriptures were destroyed. In 
70,000 Character Petition, Tibet‟s second highest religious leader, the late Panchen 
Lama accused the CCP of annihilating Buddhism and taking the religious culture to 
the verge of extinction.
618
 He wrote that after the democratic reform more than 97% of 
Tibet‟s 2,500 monasteries were destroyed and 93% of Tibet 110,000 monks and nuns 
were reduced. The official explanation provided by the CCP is that the destructions 
were carried out during Cultural Revolution by “leftists” and that it happened in other 
parts of China too. However, the Panchen Lama‟s 70,000 petition stands as a 
testimonial to the falsity of the government‟s claims.  
 
The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) identified religious belief of the Tibetan 
people as the principal reason for Chinese repression against the Tibetans. In their 
1960 report, the ICJ summarised the Chinese atrocities as “acts of genocide [that] had 
been committed in Tibet in an attempt to destroy the Tibetans as a religious group”.619 
By the late seventies, when the economic liberalisation was initiated in China, Tibet‟s 
Buddhist culture and religious heritage were in ruins. The relaxation of religious 
policy after 1980 encouraged Tibetan devotees to contribute their resources for the 
restoration and rebuilding of the destroyed monasteries. This intermittent phase of 
leniency lasted but for a short while during which the religious institutions became the 
hub of the cultural revival. However by the mid eighties restrictive policies on 
religion were implemented haphazardly.
620
 The next decade did not see much 
                                                 
618 A Poisoned Arrow: The Secret Report of the 10
th
 Panchen Lama (The full text of the Panchen 
Lama‟s 70,000 Character Petition of 1962), London: Tibet Information Network, 1997, p. 52. 
619 ICJ, Tibet and the Chinese People‟s Republic, Geneva:  International Commission of Jurists, 1960, 
p. 3. 
620 Yin Ma & Xifu Ma, Questions and Answers About China‟s National Minorities, Beijing: New 
World Press, 1985, p. 75. The Document of the „National Minorities Questions Editorial Panel‟ of 
the Nationalities Affairs Commission of the NPC states, “Religion poisons the minds of people with 
fatalistic conceptions. Lamaism constituted a major impediment to social progress of every 
minority nationality in which it had sizable numbers of adherents, including the Tibetans, 
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improvement in the religious policies. In 1994 the Third Work Forum on Tibet re-
established severe policies to suppress the religious activities and curtail religious 
freedom. It identified the Dalai Lama as a root of Tibet‟s instability and carried out re-
education campaigns not only in monastic communities but also among the Tibetan 
cadres to undermine the Dalai Lama‟s influence.621 Limitations were set on the extent 
of monastic developments and the number of monks and nuns, the breach of which 
would result in severe punishment. The management committees such as Democratic 
Management Committees (DMC) interfered with purely religious matters such as 
deciding the Tibetan Buddhist reincarnations. In short the Third Work Forum set out 
few major points: 1) Ban on the construction of religious buildings without official 
permission; 2) Limitations on the number of monks and nun per monastery; 3) Re-
education of the monks and nuns; 4) Denunciation of the Dalai Lama; and 5) To 
exercise control over the selection of the members of the DMC.
622
 The dismal 
situation of religious rights in Tibet is expressed by the Special Rapporteur on 
Religious Intolerance, Mr. Abdelfattah Amor, in a report submitted by him to the 
Fifty-first session of the Commission on Human Rights where he states: “The Tibet 
Autonomous Region continues to encounter grave difficulties as far as religious 
tolerance is concerned”.623 
 
In the New Millennium, the CCP‟s religious policy in Tibet has not improved much 
and repression continued unabatedly. The Fourth Work Forum on Tibet, held in June 
2001, approved the policies laid out by the previous forum and viewed the strict 
measures applied by the TAR administration to deal with protesters as 
accomplishments. The Forum decided to use economic development to win the hearts 
of Tibetan people and remove them from the spiritual influences of the Dalai Lama. 
For the Tibetans, Buddhism is the source of inspiration and strength and the hub that 
holds the communities together. With that as it is and with the Dalai Lama as the head 
of that religion, it is not surprising that the Communist Government employs 
                                                                                                                                            
Mongolians, Moinba and Tu minorities. So it is but natural that the unjust feudal system practised 
by the Lamaism should have been abolished to the satisfaction of both believers and non -
believers.‟‟ 
621 For detail see, Cutting off the Serpent‟s Head: Tightening Control in Tibet, 1994-1995, TIN and 
Human Rights Watch/Asia, 1996.  
622 Ibid., pp. 25-34. 
623 „Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, E/CN.4/1995/91, 22 December 1995‟, in Legal 
Materials on Tibet, Tibet Justice Center, p. 68.  
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systematic tools of violence to suppress any and every expression of dissatisfaction 
and unrest from the people. It is obvious what future plans are in store for the 
religious freedom in Tibet and ironically, the fate of Buddhism in Tibet, from the 
proposal of Chen Kuiyan, the Party Secretary in the TAR from 1992-2000, to the 
Central Government. Chen wrote, “An all-out effort must be made to eradicate 
Tibetan Buddhism and culture from the face of the earth so that no memory of them 
will be left in the minds of coming generations–except as museum pieces”.624  
 
3.6.4.3 Population Transfer 
The Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
signed on 12 August 1949, states in its article 49 that:  
 
The occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own 
civilian population into the territory it occupies.
625
 
 
The PRC signed this convention in 1949 and ratified it seven years later in 1956
626
 
thus agreeing to comply with the Convention. Despite that the PRC has failed to 
observe the mandates of the convention to the letter. From the various reform policies, 
development plans and administrative strategies, it is evident that the PRC is far from 
complying to the provisions of the convention. On the contrary, reputed organisations 
such as the UN Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minority Rights,
627
 International Commission of Jurists,
628
 Human Rights 
Advocates
629
 and International League for Human Rights
630
 have alleged that China‟s 
                                                 
624 This excerpt is taken from „Statement from the Kashag‟ on the 40th Anniversary of Tibetan 
Democracy Day September 2, 2000. 
625 http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/92.htm.   
626 The Republic of China signed this convention on 10/12/ 1949 but it was ratified by the PRC on 
28/12/1956.  http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P.   
627 At the forty-eighth session of the UN Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minority Rights, the issue of Chinese population transfer into Tibet was discussed. A 
number of NGOs such as Amnesty International, Disabled People‟s International, Habitat 
International Coalition, International Fellowship of Reconciliation, International League for Human 
Rights and Law Association for Asia and the Western Pacific submitted reports on human rights 
violations in Tibet. China, in response to various criticisms, emphasised that “the Chinese 
government has never formulated and implemented the plan of emigration to Tibet”. See Secretary 
General‟s Report: Situation in Tibet, E/CN.4/1992/37, in Legal Materials on Tibet, Tibet Justice 
Center, p.13.  
628 ICJ, Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law, p. 120. 
629 „Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World, 
with particular reference colonial and other dependent countries and territories,‟ a written statement 
submitted by Human Rights Advocates to the 50
th
 Session of the Commission on Human Rights. 
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massive population transfer into Tibet is a breach of the Art. 49 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. Until 1994 the Chinese government had consistently and categorically 
repudiated all allegations of practising the policy of population transfer into Tibet 
albeit it had carried this out in earnest in the 1980s
631
 with the launch of “Help Tibet 
Prosper” campaign.632 However in that year, the Chinese government acknowledged 
the official policy of encouraging Chinese settlers into Tibet. At the opening 
ceremony of the Third Work Forum on Tibet, Chinese President Jiang Zemin states:  
 
While paying attention to promoting Tibet‟s fine traditional culture, it is 
also necessary to absorb the fine cultures of other nationalities in order 
to integrate the fine traditional culture with the fruits of modern culture. 
This will facilitate the development of socialist new culture in Tibet.
633
  
 
The need for integration of Tibet‟s tradition with the modern culture, as mentioned by 
Jiang Zemin in his speech, was translated into policies of massive importation of 
Chinese into Tibet. The Third Forum approved and legitimised the policy of 
encouraging non-Tibetan entrepreneurialism in Tibet, the policy of moving Chinese to 
Tibet and the “colonization of Tibet”. A Golden Bridge Leading into a New Era, 
which contained the summarised Third Work Forum policies, states: 
 
The focal point of the policy of opening the door wider in Tibet should 
be towards the inner part of the country... We should encourage traders, 
investment, economic units, and individuals to enter our region to run 
different sorts of enterprises... When assigning cadres from the inner 
                                                                                                                                            
E/CN.4/1994/NGO/23, 8 February 1994.  
 http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/0205adb21d46988b8025676e0038cc6f?OpenDoc
ument. 
630 „Freedom of Movement,‟ a written statement submitted by the International League for Human 
Rights to 51
st
 Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities. E/CN:4/Sub.2/1999/NGO/10, 24 June 1999. 
 http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.1999.NGO.10.En?Opendoc
ument. 
631 The first major population transfer occurred in early 1957 when the Beijing government 
announced that large numbers of civilians between 30,000 and 50,000 were being transferred to 
Tibet to resettle and reclaim wastelands. As Mary L. Niemi writes the population transfer served the 
purpose of breaking up „„counter-revolutionary‟‟ groups in Tibet and attracting Tibetans closer to 
the Chinese through intermarriage. From then on for varying purposes the Chinese government had 
continued with the population transfer policy. Mary L. Niemi, „Recent Trends in Chinese 
Communist Control of Tibet‟, Far Eastern Survey, vol. 27, no. 7, July 1958, p. 105.  
632 DIIR, Tibet Under Communist China: 50 Years, Dharamsala: Department of Information and 
International Relations, September 2001, p. 47. 
633 „Third National Work Conference on Tibet 20-23 July‟, NCNA, Beijing, 26 July 1994, in FBIS-
CHI-94-144, 27 July 1994. Quoted in ICJ‟s Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law, p. 109. 
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parts to work in Tibet we should be far-sighted and strive to have cadres 
living and working long-term in Tibet... The Central Committee has 
divided the tasks and responsibilities among other provinces within set 
time limits to support Tibet with people from all walks of life as we 
have requested. This is a new strategy corresponding to a new era in 
which we need to sum up our past experiences and find ways to perfect 
our work.
634 
 
The implementation of these population transfer policies has been a nation-wide effort 
involving inter alia Ministry of Personnel, the Government official media, the 
Provincial governments, the Provincial armies and of course the administration of the 
TAR.
635
 However, the Chinese government rejected the criticisms made by the exile 
Tibetans and the Tibet support groups by maintaining steadfastly the claims that only 
skilled workers, technicians and intellectuals were brought into Tibet to improve the 
economy of the region.
636
 Yet according to statistics, as of 1990, the total number of 
Chinese in the TAR was 80,837 (excluding the army personnel) compared to Tibetan 
population of 2.196 million.
637
 However, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile puts the 
number of Chinese living in the TAR at 1,400,000 and in the traditional Tibet at 
7,945,000.
638
 The discrepancy in the figures could be partly due to the unavailability 
of reliable statistics and partly due to the failure to include the floating Chinese 
population in Tibet, the PLA and People‟s Armed Police (PAP) in the census.639 
Several major events were responsible for the huge influx of Chinese settlers in Tibet: 
first the invasion of Tibet during which 40,000 PLA soldiers and a large number of 
                                                 
634 Cutting Off the Serpent‟s Head: Tightening Control in Tibet, 1994-1995, p. 154, 167-168. Based 
on evidence from an excerpt from „Tibet Expanding Ties to Inland Provinces,‟ Beijing Liaowang, 
18 September 1995, quoted in ICJ, Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law, it was obvious that 
the colonisation was the cornerstone of Chinese Policy in Tibet. The report says that following the 
Sichuan army, which had a head start in moving into Tibet , the Shaanxi army, Hunnan army, 
Zhejiang army and migrant workers from Qinghai, Gansu, Guizhou, Shandong, Henan and other 
provinces also moved into Tibet, for whom „„Tibet is a virgin land.‟‟ 
635 For instance in 1994, 400 students from China applied for 100 posts in Tibet which was advertised 
by the Ministry of Personnel. In February 1995 the Chinese government announced that 1000 
outstanding officials and technicians from inland China would be send to the TAR on a rotation 
basis. Various national and regional media such as Xinhua, Tibet Daily, Tibet radio promoted the 
Chinese government‟s new policy. In Lanzhou, the provincial capital of Gansu, large billboards 
urging patriotic Chinese to „„Migrate to Tibet‟‟ were sighted. Antonia J. Shouse, „Environmental 
Alert on the Tibetan Plateau‟, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 25, 1993. 
636 „China Denies Population Transfer into Tibet‟, Xinhua, 12 June 1997.  
637 China Statistical Yearbook 1992, Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 1993. 
638 These figures were given to the ICJ by the Tibetan Government-in-Exile in Dharamsala in 
December 1996. ICJ, Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law, p. 116.  
639 The actual number of Chinese troops in the TAR is believed to be 80-100,000 in an estimation 
given by Robbert Barnett, at Bundestag Hearing on Tibet on 19 June 1995. 
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cadres moved into Tibet; secondly the 1984 Work Forum on Tibet which brought an 
estimated 60,000 Chinese workers associated with the 43 projects launched at the 
Forum
640
 and thirdly the 1994 Work Forum on Tibet which encouraged mass 
migration of labourers connected with the 62 construction plans that were contracted 
to provincial and municipal firms in Chinese interior.
641
 
 
Tibetans and Tibet support groups consider the massive transfer of Chinese population 
into Tibet as the most serious threat to the Tibetan national identity and a “final 
solution to the Tibetan problem by making the Tibetan population an insignificant and 
disenfranchised minority in Tibet itself”.642 The earlier precedence of reducing the 
Mongolians into a minority in Inner Mongolia
643
 and the rapid increase of Chinese 
population in Eastern Turkestan (Ch: Xinjiang), especially after the completion of the 
Lanzhou to Urumqi railroad in 1954,
644
 send fear in the hearts of Tibetans as they 
apprehensively watch it happening in Tibet. (Closer to home is the case of Golmud, a 
vast, pastoral land inhabited by only a few hundred Tibetan nomads which was turned 
into the second-largest town in Qinghai with 200,000 inhabitants, of whom only 1.8 
percent are Tibetans.) Be that as it may, the impacts of population transfer policy are 
detrimental to the very survival of Tibetan people‟s cultural and national identity. 
Politically speaking the population transfer policy would violate the Tibetan people‟s 
right of self-determination which the UN General Assembly recognised twice in its 
Resolutions passed in October 1961 and 1965. The policy would inevitably lead to the 
dilution and dissolution of distinctive characteristics of Tibetan people. Tibetans dread 
that the much hyped “sky line,” the Qinghai-Tibet railway, would rapidly accelerate 
the process of sinicisation. According to the estimation of the researchers of Institute 
of Peace and Conflict Studies, approximately 20 million Chinese would be brought to 
Tibet by 2015 by the Qinghai-Tibet Railway.
645
 The Human Rights Advocate in its 
                                                 
640 Tsetan Wangchuk Sharlo, „China‟s Reform in Tibet: Issues and Dilemma‟, The Journal of 
Contemporary China, vol. 1, no. 1, Fall 1992, p.50. 
641 ICJ, Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law, p. 110. 
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 Dalai Lama, Five-Point Peace Plan for Tibet, 1988. 
643 Human Rights Watch/Asia, Crackdown in Inner Mongolia, New York: Human Rights Watch/Asia, 
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645 Urnashi Aneja & Atul Kumar, „Tibet: Connectivity, Capabilities and Consequences‟, Institute of 
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written statement to Commission of Human Rights says, “The effects of this dramatic 
increase of Chinese settlers on the land and indigenous people of the Tibetan plateau 
are reported to be considerable. Population transfer is closely connected with 
genocide and is at least arguably a crime against mankind, inherently discriminatory 
and fundamentally destructive of cultures whose cohesiveness is integrally connected 
to particular land”.646  
 
3.6.4.4 Civil and Political Rights 
The Article 3 to 21 of the UDHR
647
 provides the basic civil and political rights with 
Article 9 specifically prohibiting the member states from practising arbitrary arrest 
and detention which are often used by the governments to enforce their ideology and 
suppress dissenting voices. 
 
The Article 9 of the UDHR states: 
 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. 
 
The PRC‟s constitution (Art. 37) provides that: 
 
No citizen may be arrested except with the approval of or by decision 
of a people‟s procuratorate or by decision of a people‟s court, and 
arrests must be made by a public security organ. Unlawful deprivation 
or restriction of citizens‟ freedom of person by detention or other 
means is prohibited; and unlawful search of the person of citizens is 
prohibited.
648
  
 
                                                 
646 For detail see, Cutting of the Serpent's Head, published by TIN and Human Rights Watch Asia, 
1996. 
647 Article 3: the right to life, liberty, and security of person; Article 4: freedom from slavery and 
servitude; Article 5: freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment; Article 6: right to recognition as a person; Article 7: right to equal protection before 
law without discrimination; Article 8: right to an effective remedy for violation of fundamental 
rights; Article 9: freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile; Article 10: right to fair trial; 
Article 11: right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty; Article 12: freedom from arbitrary 
interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence; Article 13: right to freedom of 
movement and residence, right to leave and return to one‟s own country; Article 14: right to seek 
asylum; Article 15: right to nationality; Article 16: right to marry and to found a family; Article 17: 
right to own property; Article 18: freedom of though, conscience and religion; Article 19: right to 
freedom of opinion and expression; Article 20: right to peaceful assembly and association; and 
Article 21: right to participate in the government functions and equal access to public service. 
648 The 1982 PRC Constitution. 
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Both the international and internal laws comprise a powerful obligation on the part of 
the PRC to honour the above mentioned principles. But China is still a nation that is 
criticised by the International community for its Criminal law which contains many 
stipulations that run counter to the principles of the UDHR and ICCPR.
649
 
Examination of the PRC‟s Constitution reveals that the country enshrines the basic 
civil and political rights that are set forth in the UDHR. However, a nagging question 
remains: Why then is China one of the most criticised countries in terms of its human 
rights conditions? Although my limited knowledge on international law confines me 
from speaking expertly on the subject I still see several factors that leave the Chinese 
leadership with leeway to exercise their rigid control in violation of civil rights. First, 
within the Constitution many articles on civil rights contain clauses
650
 that clearly 
provide anchors for the State and the Party to manipulate the Constitution to keep a 
tight grip on power. Secondly, the need to protect the State unity, the Party leadership 
and the Socialist system of China overshadows everything else in the constitution 
including the civil and political rights of the citizens.
651
 Thirdly, lack of clear-cut 
delineations of individual rights–such as freedom of expression and religious belief, 
of assembly and free press–and of what constitutes violation of the State security and 
social stability leaves much room for authorities to practise arbitrary arrests and 
detentions. Frequently, individual rights have been violated in the name of protecting 
State security and social stability. Perry Link, professor of East Asian studies at 
Princeton University, describes this aspect of the Chinese system, particularly the 
vague standard of defining spying in China, in connection with the arrests of 
sociologists Gao Zhan and Li Shaomin in the early 1991.
652
 In his essay „The 
                                                 
649 The PRC has signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on 5 October 1998 
but has not ratified it yet. 
650 Article 36 of the PRC Constitution provides religious freedom but it states that using religion to 
engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair citizens‟ health or interfere with the educational 
system of the state is prohibited. However, it is not defined what constitute disruption of public 
order and impairing the health of citizens. Likewise, Article 40 guarantees the freedom and privacy 
of correspondence of citizens but stipulates that in cases of state security and criminal investigation 
public organs are permitted the censorship of correspondence. Once again what constitute breach of 
state security is not described leaving much freedom to the authorities. Other Articles and the 
Preamble speak of safeguarding the unity of country for which any action is deemed lawful. 
651 The Preamble of the Constitution contains, „„The Chinese people must fight against those forces 
and elements, both at home and abroad, that are hostile to China‟s socialist system and try to 
undermine it.‟‟  
652 „Trial of scholar jailed in China expected soon‟, CNN, 19 July 2001. Gao Zhan, a political scientist 
and permanent resident of the US, was charged with espionage and arrested in the mid of February 
of 2001. Li Shaomin, a US citizen, was also accused of collecting the materials for Military 
Intelligence Bureau of Taiwan‟s Ministry of National Defence and was later deported from China. 
 192 
Anaconda in the Chandelier: Censorship in China Today,‟653 Link explains the 
Chinese practices of vague accusations and arbitrary arrest. Link writes, “China‟s 
constitution itself illustrates this handy flexibility. It provides that citizens have 
freedom of speech, of assembly, and of the press. But its preamble also sets down the 
inviolability of Communist Party rule, Marxism-Leninism-Mao-Zedong-Thought, the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, and the socialist system. The huge space between these 
two contradictory poles (both of which, by the way, are poor descriptions of the actual 
patterns of life in China) gives leaders immense room to be arbitrary while still 
claiming to be legal”.654 
 
In Tibet the situation is even worse as any form of political or social expressions that 
symbolise the distinctiveness of Tibetan national identity, that identify and pay 
reverence to the Dalai Lama as the leader of Tibet and that go counter to the state 
policy can be dealt with harsh and swift persecutions. Thousands of Tibetans have 
been detained since the late 1987, the year when the first of a series of demonstrations 
shook Lhasa and other parts of Tibet, and especially after the martial law was imposed 
in Lhasa in March 1989. Although many have been released after short periods of 
time, hundreds including purely political prisoners continued to be in detention 
without trial. An Amnesty International report stated that in early 1992, more than 200 
prisoners of conscience and political prisoners were known to be detained and serving 
terms of “re-education through labour” without trial.655 Human Rights Watch/Asia on 
the other hand reported that in 1993 alone, a year considered as the worst year for 
political arrests and trials in China since mid-1990, Tibet alone accounted for 80 per 
cent of the total.
656
 The severity of the situations in Tibet which remained largely 
hidden from the outside world is evident from these reports. In yet another meticulous 
and detailed TIN report it was claimed that from 1987 to 2001 there were 1900 cases 
of Tibetan political imprisonment in Tibet.
657
 Detainees include Tibetan monks and 
                                                 
653 Perry Link, „The Anaconda in the Chandelier: Censorship in China Today‟, Asia Program Special 
Report, no. 102, April 2002, Asia Program, Woodrow Wilson Center Asia Program, pp. 3-7. 
654 Ibid., p.5. 
655 Amnesty International, People‟s Republic of China: Repression in Tibet, 1987-1992, (AI Index: 
ASA 17/19/92), London: Amnesty International, May 1992, p. 1 
656 Human Rights Watch/Asia, Detained in China and Tibet: A Directory of Political and Religious 
Prisoners, New York: Human Rights Watch, February 1994, p. xi. The total number of the political 
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657 Steven D. Marshall, In the Interests of State: Hostile Elements III-Political Imprisonment in Tibet, 
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nuns arrested for peacefully demonstrating and advocating Tibet‟s independence from 
China, people who were in possession of banned books on the Dalai Lama, Tibetans 
who were accused of instigating demonstrations and distributing leaflets and those 
who resisted the Communist ideological indoctrination. 
 
Few case histories will reveal the inconsistencies between China‟s Constitutional 
provisions and the empirical reality in Tibet and that China fails to uphold the Article 
9 of the UDHR to which China is a signatory. Yulo Dawa Tsering, a respected monk 
from Gaden monastery in Lhasa and a former political prisoner who had spent 20 
years in prison for participating in the March Uprising of 1959, was detained again in 
December 1987 for expressing his views on the dismal human rights situation in Tibet 
in a video interview. He was later sentenced to ten years‟ imprisonment for what the 
official Radio Lhasa called “viciously vilif[ying] the policies adopted by the Chinese 
Communist Party and the People‟s government” and spreading “reactionary views”.658 
Amnesty International considered Yulo Dawa Tsering “to be a prisoner of conscience, 
imprisoned solely on account of his peaceful advocacy of political views”. Although 
Amnesty International appealed the PRC authorities to allow an observer to his trial, 
the request was ignored.
659
 Three weeks after his release on 6 November 1994, Yulo 
Dawa Tsering is said to have met with the Special Rapporteur on Religious 
Intolerance who was visiting Tibet to appraise the religious situation there.
660
 Another 
famous Tibetan political prisoner is Tanak Jigme Sangpo, a 72 year old former 
primary school teacher who was considered an authority on Tibetan history, literature 
and language. He was initially arrested in 1959 and sentenced to three years for 
“corrupting the minds of children with counter-revolutionary ideas”.661 Tanak Jigme 
was released and arrested several times since his initial imprisonment before he was 
finally sentenced to 15-year imprisonment in 1983 for criticising the Chinese 
authority. His sentence was prolonged twice, one in 1988 and the other in 1992, to a 
total of more than three decades. Both the times he shouted pro-independence slogans 
                                                                                                                                            
Hostile Elements-A Study of Political Imprisonment in Tibet: 1987-1998 and Suppressing Dissent: 
Hostile Elements II-Political Imprisonment in Tibet, 1987-2000, which give an extensive and 
detailed account on the political prisoners in Tibet.  
658 Amnesty International, People‟s Republic of China: Repression in Tibet, 1987-1992, pp. 9-10. 
659 Ibid., p. 10. 
660 „Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, E/CN.4/1995/91,‟ in Legal Materials on Tibet, Tibet 
Justice Center, sp. 68. 
661 Human Rights Watch/Asia, Detained in China and Tibet: A Directory of Political and Religious 
Prisoners, p. 199. 
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while in prison–one on 5 October 1987 in support of mass demonstrations happening 
in Lhasa at the time and the other during a Swiss delegation‟s visit to his prison. The 
Chinese authorities quickly whisked away the delegates and explained that the 
prisoner was mad.
662
 In 2002, Tanak Jigme, Tibet‟s longest political prisoner, was 
released on medical grounds after spending 37 years in prison where he endured the 
worst forms of torture including “cold cell torture” in which the prisoner was left in a 
cell lined with cold metal sheets designed to lower the cell temperature.  
 
Among the female political prisoners, the Drapchi nuns are probably the most famous 
ones. There were 14 nuns in total who were arrested for participating in peaceful 
demonstrations and calling for Tibet‟s independence. While in prison these nuns 
composed, sung and recorded emotion laden songs which were smuggled out of the 
prison. The Chinese authorities learned about it and extended their jail terms. 
Ngawang Sangdrol, the youngest prisoner amongst them, was arrested at the age of 13 
for participating in a peaceful protest outside Norbulingka in Lhasa and imprisoned at 
Gutsa Detention Centre where “juveniles detained for political reasons... were held 
together with adult prisoners rather than in the juvenile section of the facility”.663 She 
was rearrested in 1992 for joining another protest and sent to Draphchi jail where she 
suffered unimaginable tortures that include six month solitary confinement in 
complete darkness. In July 1996, a further nine years were added to Ngawang‟s 
sentence for her “refusal to stand up when an official entered the room during a 
political re-education session”664 and shouting “Free Tibet” during a punishment 
session, bringing the total sentence term to 18 years. In 1995, the UN Working Group 
on Arbitrary Detentions declared that Ngawang had been persecuted for “exercising 
her rights to freedom of opinion” and thus called on China for her release.665 She was 
eventually released on medical grounds at the age of 24 after she had spent 12 years in 
prison.  
 
                                                 
662 Ibid., p.199. 
663 „Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment, in Particular: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment‟, a report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, submitted to the Fifty-second 
session of the Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1996/35, 9 January 1996. 
664 Information about the 14 Drapchi nuns can be viewed at Free the Drapchi 14 website:  
 http://www.drapchi14.org/drapchi14/nuns/NgawangSangdrol.php. 
665 Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, Annual Report, 1996: One More Year of 
Political Repression, Dharamsala: TCHRD, 1996. 
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The UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances in its annual 
report, E/CN.4/1995/36, on “enforced disappearances” to the Commission on Human 
Rights points out that there were 53 cases of disappearance that took place in China 
between 1988 and 1990, of which “the majority of the persons alleged to have 
disappeared were Tibetans engaged in activities in favour of Tibetan independence”. 
Nineteen of them were Tibetan monks who were reportedly arrested at the Nepal 
border and handed over to the Chinese authorities.
666
 Furthermore, a written statement 
submitted by the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, a non-governmental 
organisation in special consultative status, to the Fifty-fourth session of the Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, draws attention to the 
fact that “in Tibet, security forces routinely resort to arbitrary arrest, imprisonment 
and torture in response to non-violent protests, including displaying Tibetan flags or 
other symbols of cultural identity, holding peaceful demonstrations, possessing a 
photograph of the Dalai Lama, compiling a list of prisoners, putting up posters and 
distributing nationalistic leaflets”.667 
 
The above case histories and the reports by the Special Rapporteurs clearly show that 
in Tibet even minor offences, such as expressing views that go against the Party 
policy, are punishable by arbitrary arrest, long-term imprisonment without proper 
trials and torture, in utter violations of China‟s civil and political rights. Therefore, 
China‟s signatory status of the UN Conventions and the provisions enshrined in the 
Constitution and the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law for minorities are 
unsubstantiated show-pieces to create good international image for itself. Hence, the 
Constitutional provisions are impracticable in reality, especially in the ethnic minority 
regions.  
 
                                                 
666 „Question of Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances‟, a report of the Working Group on Enforced 
or Involuntary Disappearances, Doc. no. E/CN.4/1995/36, 21 December 1994. 
667 „Administration of Justice‟, a written statement by International Fellowship of Reconciliation to 
the Fifty-fourth session of the Sub-Commission of the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 
Doc. no. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/NGO/15, 19 July 2002. 
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Chapter 7 Economic Reforms and its Impacts 
 
3.7.1 Impacts of China‟s Reform Policies in Tibet: Modernisation or 
Marginalisation 
The Chinese “liberation” of Tibet in 1951 was followed by a plethora of significant 
changes in Tibet that have huge and far reaching impacts on the Tibetans. The post 
1959 China‟s Tibet policy is characterised by assimilation of Tibetan culture into Han 
culture, integration of Tibetan economy with the Mainland‟s economy, especially with 
Deng‟s open-market policy. A rapid transformation of Tibet‟s social structure and 
massive proliferation of Maoist ideology took place, which in essence, represent 
initiatives to change traditional Tibet into a socialist Tibet. Enormous efforts and huge 
investments were made by the Communist authorities to “modernise” Tibet which 
however is seen by the Tibetans, both in and outside Tibet as an effective mean of 
eroding the distinctiveness of the Tibetan identity and diminishing the power of the 
powerless. As such these modernisation projects are perceived by the Tibetans as 
China‟s final resort to end the decades long struggle. However, China claims that the 
modernisation of Tibet is to improve the living standard of the Tibetans and for their 
well being. 
 
The contradicting views held by the two protagonists can be best understood if we 
know how the term “modernisation” is interpreted by the two sides. The way one 
party defines the term may not be true for the other party, which is exactly the case in 
hand. For instance the ongoing projects in Tibet are claimed by the Chinese 
Government as signs of achievements as indicated by Tibet‟s March Toward 
Modernization: “The implementation of the policy of reform and opening-up and the 
state aid have strengthened and invigorated Tibetan industry, agriculture, animal 
husbandry and the tertiary industry with trade, catering and tourism as its mainstays, 
raised the overall level of industries and the level of commercialisation of economic 
activities in Tibet, and helped Tibet take another step forward in its economic and 
social development”.668 However, the Tibetan side equates modernisation with 
sinicisation of Tibet with little benefit to the Tibetan populace.
669
 Therefore, a detail 
                                                 
668 „Tibet‟s March Toward Modernization, November 2001‟, White Papers of the Chinese 
Government (3) 2000-2001, 2003. 
669 DIIR, Height of Darkness: Chinese Colonialism on the World‟s Roof, Dharamsala: DIIR, 2001. 
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study of the modernisation policies is necessary to understand the ground reality. In 
general the term “modernisation” has positive connotation of bringing development in 
economy, technology, culture, health, education and so on. However, under this guise 
policies of discrimination and marginalisation could be practised safely by the 
dominating power in disregard to the local people‟s aspirations. In my opinion any 
policies that have adverse effects on the indigenous community could not be regarded 
as modernising the community irrespective of what economic gains it might entail. 
Dean Tipps maintains that “modernization is a type of social change which is both 
transformational in its impact and progressive in its effects”.670 The progressive 
effects have to occur within the same culture in which the modernisation is 
introduced. Therefore, a careful analysis of the local people‟s perspective is important 
in examining the claims proposed by the two parties. 
 
The last fifty years of Communist rule in Tibet saw various shades of changes in the 
entire plateau of Tibet. New policies were introduced in the sphere of education, 
industry, economy, infrastructure and population that are contested by majority of 
Tibetans as policies to reduce the Tibetans to a second class people. For instance the 
education policies that devalue the traditional (Tibetan) culture and language, 
population policies that restrain the growth of Tibetan population, industrial, 
economic and infrastructure development plans that enable smooth influx of Han 
Chinese are viewed by the Tibetans as indications of a multi-frontal approach in 
transforming the Tibetan social structure which is now turning out to be “decisive 
factors [in] determining, in the long run, the outcome of the contest of wills between 
Peking and Lhasa and the future course of Tibet‟s development”.671 Although the 
reform policies also affect other important areas such as environment and ecology, 
economy and development, security and stability, but I have talked and will talk about 
impacts on these areas in the later sections of the dissertation. In this chapter I will 
focus on population policy, education and social policies that are molding Tibet into a 
new shape as reflected by the views of newcomers that I interviewed. 
 
                                                 
670 Dean C. Tipps, „Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical 
Perspective‟, Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 15, no. 2, March 1973, Cambridge 
University Press, p.202. 
671 George Ginsburgs and Michael Mathos, „Communist China‟s Impact on Tibet: The First Decade 
(I)‟, Far Eastern Survey, vol. 29, no. 7, July 1960, p. 102. 
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3.7.1.1 Population Control Policy in Tibet 
China, the world‟s most populous country, has an extremely uneven distribution of 
population
672
 with limited resources which prompted the Chinese government to 
launch family planning campaigns from 1956-57 and 1962-66,
673
 before a forceful 
program was launched in the late 1970s.
674
 Relentless campaigns were carried out 
throughout the next decades with such popular slogans as wan, xi, shao meaning late 
(wan) marriage and child bearing, birth spacing (xi) and fertility limitation (shao).
675
 
The failure to achieve the official population target by early measures compelled the 
authorities to introduce “one child policy” in 1979676 and thereafter in 1982, family 
planning became a constitutional duty with Art. 25 and Art. 49 promoting the practice 
of family planning that fits the plans for economic and social development.
677
 The 
main regulations practised under this policy are getting permission before a couple 
plans for a child; enforcing one child per couple in the urban areas and allowing a 
second child to rural couples whose first child was a daughter, while forbidding a 
third child; subjecting women to use contraceptive devices after having the permitted 
number of children and requiring the termination of unauthorised pregnancies.
678
 The 
policy has had a major impact in reducing China‟s population growth rate to about 1 
per cent per year in the late 1990s,
679
 but the large population base and the net 
                                                 
672 According to the Information Office of the State Council, 94 per cent of China‟s population live in 
the eastern part of China, particularly the southeastern region which accounts for 46 per cent of the 
nation‟s territory. „Family Planning in China‟, a White Paper published by the Information Office 
of the State Council of the PRC, August 1995. See White Papers of the Chinese Government (I) 
1991-1995, Beijing, 2000. 
673 Isabella Attane, „China‟s Family Planning Policy: An Overview of Its Past and Future‟, Studies in 
Family Planning, vol. 33, no. 1, March 2002, p. 103. 
674 „China‟s Population and Development in the 21st Century,‟ a government White Paper published 
by the Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, December 2000. See White Papers of 
the Chinese Government (3) 2000-2001, Beijing, 2003. 
675 Isabella Attane, „China‟s Family Planning Policy: An Overview of Its Past and Future‟, Studies in 
Family Planning, vol. 33, no. 1, March 2002, p. 103. 
676 After the implementation of the 1979 „„one child‟‟ policy in the whole of China, a widespread 
resistance took place which forced the Chinese government to relax it and allow the rural couples to 
have a second child.  
677 The 1982 PRC Constitution. Art. 25 states: The state promotes family planning so that population 
growth may fit the plans for economic and social development and Art. 49 states: Marriage, the 
family, and mother and child are protected by the state. Both husband and wife have the duty to 
practice family planning. Parents have the duty to rear and educate their minor children, and 
children who have come of age have the duty to support and assist their parents. Violation of the 
freedom of marriage is prohibited. Maltreatment of old people, women and children is prohibited.  
678 Human Rights in China, Caught Between Tradition and the State: Violations of the Human Rights 
of Chinese Women, New York: Human Rights in China (organisation), August 1995, pp. 35-36.  
679 Judith Banister, „Population, Public Health and the Environment in China‟, The China Quarterly, 
no. 156, Special Issue: China‟s Environment, December, 1998, p. 988. According to Beijing Review 
the birth rate dropped from 33.43 per thousand in 1970 to 21.06 per thousand in 1990. „Human 
Rights in China‟, Beijing Review, November, 1991, p. 37. 
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increase nevertheless exerted tremendous pressure upon the population of the PRC 
and as such in 1997 the Communist government announced its plans to vigorously 
promote the family planning programme in the future.
680
  
 
The family planning policies were carried out nationwide including the minority areas 
but on different scales. Documents showed that in Tibet limitations on the number of 
Tibetan children were imposed since the early 1980s,
681
 although the official 
acknowledgement of it came only in 1992.
682
 Generally there exist disagreements 
among Tibet and China scholars on the extent of the population policies and the limit 
of child birth in Tibet. Scholars such as John Avedon,
683
 Isabella Attane
684
 and Dr. 
Blake Kerr
685
 and NGOs such as Asia Watch
686
 report that restrictions of two children 
per couple are universally applied in the TAR and in neighbouring Tibetan regions 
while Avedon and Blake Kerr additionally state the implementation and the 
encouragement of “one child policy” on Tibetan cadres. On the other hand Judith 
Banister,
687
 and Zhang Tianlu
688
 state that the limit of two births is recent and 
applicable only to Tibetan cadres and workers in the TAR and Susan Greenhalgh‟s689 
survey is in sum consistent with them, albeit her account does not deal with the TAR 
                                                 
680 Peng Peiyun, Minister in Charge of the State Family Planning Commission of the PRC, in her 
address to the 23
rd
 IUSSP General Population Conference, held in Beijing, from 11-17 October 
1997, said that „„while adhering to the policy of reform and opening to the outside world so as to 
sustain a rapid and healthy development of the national economy, China must adopt the strategy of 
sustainable development, promote further its family planning programme and provide quality 
reproductive health service to the eligible couples.‟‟ „China‟s Population Policy‟, Population and 
Development Review, vol. 23, no. 4, December 1997, p. 926. 
681 Renmin Ribao, 14 March 1982, cited in TIN Background Briefing Paper: Survey of Birth Control 
Policies in Tibet, London: TIN, 30 March 1994. 
682 The PRC officials admitted in 1992 that family planning has been practised against the Tibetans 
since the mid 1980s. Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, „Tibet: Its Ownership and 
Human Rights Situation, September 1992‟, in White Papers of the Chinese Government (I) 1991-
1995, Beijing: 2000.  
683 John Avedon, Tibet Today: Current Conditions and Projects, New York: US Tibet Committee, 
1987, p. 9. 
684 Isabella Attane, „China‟s Family Planning Policy: An Overview of Its Past and Future‟, Studies in 
Family Planning, vol. 33, no. 1, March 2002, p. 104. 
685 Blake Kerr, „Refugee Accounts of Human Rights Violations in Tibet‟, Tibetan Review, August 
1989, pp. 10-11 and Blake Kerr, „Witness to China‟s Shame: How Human Rights and Families 
Suffer in Tibet‟, Washington Post, 26 February 1989, p. C4. 
686 Asia Watch Committee, Human Rights in Tibet, Washington, DC: Asia Watch Committee, 1988, 
p. 54. 
687 Judith Banister, China‟s Changing Population, Standford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1987, 
pp. 249-50. 
688 Zhang Tianlu, „Tibet‟s Population Develops‟, Beijing Review, no. 33, 1987. 
689 Susan Greenhalgh, „Shifts in China‟s Population Policy, 1984-86: Views From the Central, 
Provincial, and Local Levels‟, Population and Development Review, vol. 12, no. 3, September 
1986, pp. 491-515.  
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as such. Contrary to the above two groups Melvyn C. Goldstein and Cynthia M. Beall 
while acknowledging the existence of coercive both control measures in Lhasa 
depending on the social status and ethnicity, explicitly denied exercise of such 
measures in the farming and nomadic areas in the TAR. They write: 
 
The situation in Tibet‟s farming and nomadic areas (about 90% of the 
total ethnic Tibetan population) is clearer. We found no evidence of 
any policy restricting the number of children that herding and farming 
women can bear, although there has been publicity extolling the 
advantages of family planning and smaller families, particularly in 
areas near administrative centres.
690
 
 
This statement was interpreted by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) as 
characteristic of the early years of the policy which the ICJ termed as “flexible and 
loose, particularly in rural areas”.691 However in another report by Goldstein, Beall, 
et. al., published in 2002, the authors reaffirmed the same statement
692
 despite official 
guidelines and regulations of the TAR on family planning set up in 1985 and 1992 
respectively.  
 
The wide gap between Goldstein and others‟ assertion of non-existence of coercive 
family planning policies in rural Tibet and that of Blake Kerr, John Avedon, Isabella 
Attane, ICJ and Asian Watch, who accused China of implementing harsh birth control 
policies in Tibet including the rural areas, could be due to several factors. Firstly, the 
two authors, Goldstein and Kerr, conducted their field surveys in specific yet different 
regions of Tibet and made general inferences on the implementation of family 
planning policy based upon their findings. As such neither of their findings is 
adequate to represent the entire Tibetan area. I particularly find Goldstein‟s overly 
generalised claim that “it is not inconceivable that China will at some point attempt to 
implement a two-child limit in rural Tibet, but for the present, it is not doing so,”693 
based on his highly limited survey, as untruthful and misrepresented.
694
 Secondly, the 
                                                 
690 Melvyn C. Goldstein, Cynthia M. Beall, „China‟s Birth Control Policy in the Tibet Autonomous 
Region: Myths and Realities‟, Asian Survey, vol. 31, no. 3, March 1991, pp. 293-294.  
691 ICJ, Tibet: Human Rights and The Rule of Law, December 1997, p. 309. 
692 Melvyn C. Goldstein, Ben Jiao (Benjor), Cynthia M. Beall and Phuntsog Tsering, „Fertility and 
Family Planning in Rural Tibet‟, The China Journal, no. 47, January 2002, p. 38. 
693 Ibid., p. 38. 
694 The survey that Goldstein and others conducted, from November 1997 to August 2000, was 
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sources of information used by the two groups differed, whereas Blake Kerr, John 
Avedon, ICJ and Asia Watch relied mainly on accounts of Tibetan refugees who in the 
absence of Chinese control could narrate the happenings inside Tibet more openly and 
freely, Goldstein and others relied on sources inside Tibet who were under direct 
Chinese rule and thus could be more cautious and wary of what they divulge. Despite 
Goldstein‟s claim that the information was not censored by the Chinese government 
and that “the interviewees were not subject to questioning by local officials after their 
interviews,” it remained to be seen how much confidence and trust the researchers had 
gained from the Tibetan people they interviewed. Like Goldstein stated, population 
policy had become a highly politicised issue and as such, through my own experience 
I know this, much trust is necessary before the Tibetans would open up their true 
feelings. For instance in August 2005, while on a field trip to Nepal, I experienced 
problems winning the confidence of the newly arrived Tibetan women as a result of 
which I did not get to interview some of them.  
 
Nevertheless, from time immemorial, Tibet has never required to control its 
population or employ population policies. Historically the tradition of sending at least 
one boy from a family to monasteries and the practice of polygamy and polyandry had 
the effects of population control measures. The imposition of child limit in Tibet 
occurred for the first time in its whole history after the PRC‟s occupation of Tibet. 
The first set of guidelines was introduced in the TAR in 1985
695
 which was followed 
by 1992 official regulations on management of planned birth in the TAR.
696
 Reports 
of birth control teams performing operations on 1,467 individuals in three Lhasa 
counties in 1990 were broadcasted by Lhasa Wanbao (Lhasa Evening News).
697
 
Another account reveals the sterilisation of 3% of the 600,000 Tibetan women of child 
                                                                                                                                            
confined to four rural townships (xiang), viz. Khartse Township, Tsashol Township, Mag Township 
and Norgyong Township, in three counties (xian). The first two townships are in Lhasa Municipal 
Region and the latter two in Shigatse Prefecture. As such the data collected cannot represent the 
remaining five prefectures of the TAR and also the Tibetan areas in Sichuan, Gansu, Qinghai and 
Yunnan provinces. 
695 „Established Guidelines Relevant to Granting Birth Permits, TAR Planned Birth Steering 
Committee, Doc. 1, 28 February 1985‟, translated in TIN Doc. 2(XC), as cited ICJ, Tibet: Human 
Rights and the Rule of Law, 1997, p. 309. 
696 „The Temporary Methods for the Management of Planned Birth in the Tibet Autonomous Region, 
TAR Planned Birth Leading Group, Doc. no. 6 (1992)‟, translated in TIN Doc. 1(XL), as cited in 
ICJ, Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law, 1997, p. 309. 
697 TIN, Background Briefing Paper: Survey of Birth Control Policies in Tibet, 1994. 
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bearing age in the TAR.
698
 Planned Birth Management offices were set up in each 
village which carry out the policies by rewarding those who remained within the 
government set parameters and punishing those who violates the set regulations. In a 
report submitted to the United Nations Committee on the Status of Women by the 
Tibetan Women‟s Association (TWA) presented several cases of forced sterilisation 
and abortion practised by the Chinese government on Tibetan women in various parts 
of Tibet particularly in 1996-1998. In the summer of 1996, Nyemo County in the TAR 
witnessed sterilisation of about three hundred women. Similarly, in an interview 
conducted by TWA a newly arrived Tibetan refugee revealed that in Takar district 308 
women were sterilised between September and October 1996. The report further 
states that in Nyangdren town out of 379 married women 342 underwent sterilisation. 
Monetary penalties of 1,000 yuan were levied on those who did not comply with 
allowed official quota in Lushul town in Karze County. Such diverse and varied 
accounts indicate the presence of strict policy in many parts of Tibet. Likewise, in 
1997, sterilisation program was launched in Drongpa County in the TAR, a purely 
nomadic area, in which about two thirds of the women from approximately 300 
households in his township were sterilised.
699
 Penalties for breaching the population 
regulations include monetary fines of various amounts depending on locality and 
social status, demotion or loss of job, denial of ration, housing and education rights 
for any children that were conceived in non-compliance of official policy.
700
 
 
A State-Owned Womb,
701
 a report by TWA, identified surgical abortion and 
sterilisation as the primary methods of birth control in Tibet with infanticide as 
occasional practice. Injection of needle into the head of the foetus while it was in 
mother‟s womb and insertion of rubber tube into cervix through which knife-like 
instrument with long handle was inserted to cut the foetus were some of the practices 
                                                 
698 Xinhua report quoted in Ibid. 
699 Tibetan Women Association (TWA), NGO Post-Beijing Alternative Report on Tibetan Women: 
The Status of Tibetan Women 1995-2000, Dharamsala: TWA, April 2000, p. 12. A similar report 
was submitted to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women in 2006. 
700 TWA, NGO Alternative Report on the Status of Tibetan Women in Tibet, Dharamsala: TWA, 2006, 
p. 8. This report was submitted to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women in 2006. 
701 TWA, A State-Owned Womb: Violations of Tibetan Women‟s Reproductive Rights, Dharamsala: 
TWA, 1996. 
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described by Tibetan women who had fled Tibet.
702
 Furthermore, TIN reports describe 
that abortions were carried out even in the later stages of pregnancy which 
occasionally led to complications and even death.
703
 A Tibetan paramedic from Karze, 
a Tibetan prefecture within Sichuan, explained to TIN method of abortion that she had 
witnessed while working as interpreter in which water from the womb was removed 
to induce stillbirth.
704
 Kate Suanders, a senior news analyst with TIN, writes that the 
authorities in the TAR had despatched especially equipped mobile clinics to widen the 
implementation of family planning policy to reach even the remote places. She writes, 
“The provision of these new mobile clinics is likely to increase the outreach of birth 
control measures into the rural areas and implementation of family planning policy, 
which varies greatly from county to county”.705 
 
My own field work and interviews with newcomers from Tibet showed that the 
enforcement of the family planning existed not only in urban areas such as Lhasa but 
also in rural areas.
706
 Moreover, among the interviewees the fear of the Chinese 
reprisal against those who breach the set limitation is quite evident. Almost all of the 
adults that I interviewed were aware of the penalty for violation of the population 
regulations which I think indicates widespread promotion of family planning and the 
punitive measures for not following the birth control restrictions in Tibet. However, it 
was apparent from the interviews that different regions have different level of 
restrictions. Inability to visit Tibet to conduct research on sensitive issues such as 
coercive population control policies compels me to rely albeit some reluctance on 
                                                 
702 TIN Doc. T17 (BB); In an interview given by Dr. Tashi Dolma, a Tibetan woman from Gonghe, 
Hainan in Qinghai, she described this procedure through her own experience as she was forced to 
abort her second child which was conceived two years after the birth of the first child. Cited in 
Tears of Silence: Tibetan Women and Population Control, Dharamsala: TWA, 1995, pp. 46-49.  
703 TIN Doc. T2 (BB). 
704 TIN Doc. T8(BB). 
705 Kate Saunders, „New mobile clinics to carry out birth control policy in Tibet‟, 16 July 2003, 
 https://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=4572&t=1&c=1.  
706 I conducted the interviews in the summer of 2005 when I purposely traveled to Kathmandu in 
Nepal and Dharamsala in India. Of the forty newcomers from Tibet, that I interviewed, nine were 
adult women who were all aware of family planning policy implemented in their regions and the 
monetary and other penalties meted out to those who violated the regulations. However, all of them 
denied having any personal experiences of coercive measures. In September 2006, I interviewed 
another batch of new arrivals in Dharamsala, specifically on family planning policy in Tibet All 
five women have heard about the family planning policies and regulations and various forms of 
contraceptive measures. They were also aware of penalty for breaching the regulations. Yet, none 
had been penalized by the Chinese authorities for having more children than the allotted number 
which two out of five did. Moreover, each provided different set of information regarding the child 
limitations and the monetary fines. The only way to understand this variation is that different area 
has different set of regulations which is quite consistent with the official Chinese reports. 
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refugee accounts, articles by scholars and reports by the NGOs. For Tibetans, a 
minority group that inhabits a highly sparsely populated land, any kind of population 
control policy could become detrimental to its very survival. A strict implementation 
of the population policy for even a decade would significantly affect the Tibetan 
population. ICJ reported that the birth rate in the TAR decreased from 1.84 to 1.61 
during the Eight Five-Year Plan period (1990-1995) and the implementation of family 
planning in the TAR prevented 63,200 births during the same period.
707
 A TIN News 
Review stated that the “two child” limit was being applied to nomads and farmers in 
several counties in the TAR for the first time in 2000 which according TIN signified a 
“most significant shift in family planning policy in the TAR” from the 1992 
regulations that allowed farmers and nomads to have three to four children.
708
 
Combined with the massive influx of Chinese into Tibet, the strict implementation of 
family planning in Tibet could spell disaster because of which the Tibetans are so 
critical of China‟s population policy. 
 
3.7.1.2 Education Policy 
Generally, a nation‟s education policy dictates the survival and the growth of its 
civilisation. Tibet‟s thousands year old civilisation and culture were strongly 
influenced by the importation and proliferation of Buddhism which focused mainly on 
inner and spiritual development of people. Thus, institutionalised religious education 
became the dominant education system in the old Tibet prior to the Chinese invasion. 
With more than 6000 monasteries and nunneries acting as vibrant pools of academic 
knowledge, the spread of Buddhist scholarship was far and wide. Aside from religious 
studies, Tibetan medical science, traditional art and craft, logic, astrology, poetry and 
drama, history and hagiography were the main areas of studies. Secular schools for 
lay students were quite rare even in the major towns like Lhasa and were almost non-
existent in the small villages.
709
 Several attempts were made to modernise the 
education system during the Thirteenth Dalai Lama but without success as they were 
met with strong opposition from the monastic communities.
710
 
                                                 
707 ICJ, Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law, p. 315. 
708 TIN, „Increased restrictions on birth of children in Tibet‟, News Review: Reports from Tibet, 
London: Tibet Information Network, 2000, p. 101. 
709 There were only about seventy schools established by the Tibetan government in U and Tsang 
before 1959. Sangye Tendar Naga, „Secular Schools in Pre-1959 Tibet‟, Tibet Journal, vol. XXX, 
no. 2, Summer 2005, p. 25. 
710 During the Thirteenth Dalai Lama four boys were set to Rugby School in England (1913-1917) for 
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A radical change to Tibet‟s education system occurred after the PRC‟s occupation of 
Tibet. Although the Seventeen Point Agreement, signed on 23 May 1951, states that 
“the spoken and written language and the school education of the Tibetan nationality 
shall be developed step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet,”711 
the Chinese government in practice failed to comply with it. For instance in 
September 1951 the Education Minister Ma Xulun, while laying out the education 
plans for the minority nationality areas at the First National Conference on Minority 
Education,
712
 emphasised the importance of patriotism, unity, fraternity and support 
for the People‟s Government which eventually became the basic principles of the 
minority education policies. As described by Catriona Bass, “the overriding goal of 
education for „minority‟ nationalities was to encourage political allegiance towards 
China and enhance stability in border areas” and “this principle still underpins China‟s 
education policy in the TAR”.713 Thereafter, the first two primary schools were 
opened in 1952 in Lhasa, a secondary school in 1956 and other higher education 
institutions in the 1960s. However, the educational institutions came under severe 
attacks during the Cultural Revolution due to the change in government strategies 
resulting from power struggles at the centre of Chinese politics.
714
 During the Cultural 
Revolution the attacks on distinctive minority education were so rampant, organised 
and widespread that by 1971 when universities were reopened out of China‟s ten 
nationalities institutes only two had survived.
715
 In the TAR, concessions made in the 
Article 9 of the Seventeen Point Agreement to follow a gradualist approach of 
                                                                                                                                            
modern education; a British educationalist, Frank Ladlow was invited to start a school based on the 
British Public School System in Gyantse, a major town in the Central Tibet in 1924 and an English 
school was established in Lhasa under the tutelage of Richard Parker and two attendants in June 
1944. The initial enthusiasm for modernisation by the Great 13
th
 Dalai Lama, that could have 
brought Tibet out of its self-imposed aloofness, failed dismally with slight contributions coming 
from the four students in the areas of telegraphic networks and electricity. See Tsering Shakya, 
„Making of Great Game Players: Tibetan Students in Britain between 1913-1917‟, Tibetan Review, 
vol. 21, no. 1, 1986, pp. 14-18; Sangye Tendar Naga, „Secular Schools in Pre-1959 Tibet‟, Tibet 
Journal, vol. XXX, no. 2, Summer 2005, p. 36. 
711 Clause 9, „Agreement of the Central People‟s Government and the Local Government of Tibet on 
Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet‟, See: APPENDIX 1. 
712 The Second National Conference on Minority Education was held in Beijing in 1956. 
713 Catriona Bass, Education in Tibet: Policy and Practice since 1950, London: Zed Books, 1998, p. 
10. 
714 In 1966 all schools were closed and the Red Guards, in name of attacking the „Four Old‟; old 
thoughts, old customs, old habits and old culture, destroyed monasteries, beat and imprisoned 
monks, aristocrats and land-owners, subjected the scholars through severe „struggle sessions‟ from 
which even the 10
th
 Panchen Lama could not escape. 
715 Catriona Bass, Education in Tibet: Policy and Practice since 1950, p. 36.  
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adapting economic and education development as per the specific conditions in the 
TAR were denounced as revisionist. Textbooks for all levels of education were 
rewritten to weed out the “reactionary ideas” and include Communist ideology and 
teachers were attacked for their „absolute authority‟. 
 
A major shift in the education policy transpired with the rehabilitation and eventual 
rise of Deng Xiaoping to power. At the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central 
Committee of the CCP, convened in December 1978, the focus of the CCP shifted 
from Mao‟s „class struggle‟ to economic construction and socialist modernisation of 
China. The Four Modernization Programme
716
 was launched which impacted the 
education strategy as specialisation, especially in the field of science and technology, 
and training of high-level personnel assumed high priority. However, the Central 
government‟s heavy investments in economic and educational development were 
limited to areas that already had strong economic infrastructure in the coastal province 
in Eastern China. Underdeveloped and rural regions to the west, including the TAR, 
were slated to be developed in the second stage of economic development scheduled 
for the end of 1990s. Catriona Bass listed the following priorities as emergent of the 
new drive for quality in the education and development: developed provinces over 
less developed provinces; urban education over rural education; elite education over 
mass education; higher education over basic education.
717
  
 
In general the Constitution of the People‟s Republic of China guarantees its citizens 
the duty as well as the right to receive education (Art. 46) and the Education Law of 
the PRC provides its citizen “equal educational opportunities regardless of race, 
nationality, sex, occupation, financial status and religion” (Art. 9). Moreover, both the 
Constitution (Art. 19) and the Education Law (Art. 18) emphasise the compulsory 
primary education and direct the people‟s government at different levels to adopt all 
means to ensure primary education to children and juveniles of school age whereas it 
promote secondary, vocational and higher education. Despite setting Chinese as the 
medium of instruction for all the educational institutions, minority nationalities would 
be allowed to use the language of the respective nationality. Article 12 of Educational 
Law states, “The Chinese language, both oral and written, shall be the basic oral and 
                                                 
716 They are modernisation of industry, agriculture, science-technology and defence. 
717 Catriona Bass, Education in Tibet: Policy and Practice since 1950, p. 49. 
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written language for education in schools and other educational institutions. Schools 
or other educational institutions which mainly consist of students from minority 
nationalities may use in education the language of the respective nationality or the 
native language commonly adopted in that region”. 
 
In 1980, Hu Yaobang visited Tibet following the First Work Forum on Tibet (April 
1980) after which he announced that educational policies should take into 
consideration Tibet‟s special characteristics. Provided that “the socialist orientation is 
upheld,” he said, “vigorous efforts should be made to revive Tibetan culture, 
education and science”.718 The „Intellectual Aid Scheme for Tibet from other 
Provinces‟ was set in motion in 1984 which comprised of three components: (i) 
sending selected Tibetan children to Central China for secondary education, (ii) 
bringing teachers from other provinces in China to work in Tibet‟s schools and 
colleges on two to eight year contracts, and (iii) creating links between schools and 
colleges in the TAR and similar institutions in China to improve teaching standards 
and school management.
719
 In 1987, at the strong exhortation of the 10
th
 Panchen 
Lama and Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, the TAR People‟s Congress has drawn up a policy 
document
720
 on the use of Tibetan language in the TAR.
721
 The importance of the 
growth of Tibetan language and culture was felt so greatly by the 10
th
 Panchen Lama 
that he raised his concerns at a meeting of the Institute of Tibetology in 1988, where 
he is reported to have said, “I, for one, am concerned as to whether written Tibetan 
will be allowed to survive or die”.722 
                                                 
718 „Hu Yaobang‟s Report to TAR Regional Party Committee Cadres‟, Lhasa Radio, 30 May 1980, 
translated in BBC SWB FE/6436/BII/1, 4 June 1980. 
719 Dai Yannian, „Helping Tibet Train its People‟, Beijing Review, vol. 30, no. 42, 19 October 1987, p. 
4. 
720 The document is called „Provisions on the Study, Use and Development of Spoken and Written 
Tibetan (for trial implementation) and it allowed the use of both Tibetan and Chinese with Tibetan 
being the first language in the TAR. For more detail see Luo Qun, The Tibetan People‟s Right of 
Autonomy, Beijing: New Star Publishers, 1991. 
721 The 10
th
 Panchen Lama recounted the story of how the resolution got passed in „Tibetan religion 
and culture should be foundation of Tibetology‟, a speech given to the meeting of the Institute of 
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even quarreled with the authorities. Being a short-tempered man, I sometimes banged my fist on the 
table, making some people angry. Comrade Ngabo also spoke for this. Similarly, Phuntsok 
Wangyal, Phuntsok Tashi and others worked with us. Finally, with strong support from Comrade 
Wu Jinhua and company, we just about managed to push this resolution through. Sometime after 
that, an announcement was made to implement the resolution from this year onwards. Now it 
remains to be seen how it works.‟‟ DIIR, From the Heart of the Panchen Lama: Major Speeches 
and a Petition 1962-1989, Dharamsala, 2003, p. 73. 
722 Ibid., p. 75. 
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Although the Central and local government of the TAR implemented various 
educational policies, Tibet continued to lag behind in educational achievements. This 
was clearly evident from a 1990 Chinese census which revealed that the TAR had 
44% illiteracy rate compared to 15.88% for China as a whole.
723
 The dismal state of 
education in Tibet was acknowledged by Chen Kuiyuan, the Party Secretary of the 
TAR, in 1994, at the Fifth Regional Meeting on Education where he said, “Our region 
still lags far behind other provinces and municipalities with regard to educational 
development”.724 Surprisingly, in that same year Chen Kuiyuan revealed the political 
nature of education policies at a TAR conference on education: 
 
“The success of our education does not lie in the number of diplomas 
issued to graduates from universities, colleges...and secondary schools. 
It lies, in the final analysis, in whether our graduating students are 
opposed to or turn their hearts to the Dalai Clique and in whether they 
are loyal to or do not care about our great Motherland and the great 
socialist cause”.725 
 
Consequently, the primary political role of minority education was emphasised more 
and more in Tibet and the separate Tibetan education system was deemed unpatriotic 
and counter-productive. Repercussions of such decision on the academic life of 
Tibetan students were numerous and serious as patriotic education campaign required 
Tibetan students to denigrate their own culture and vilify their religious leader. The 
curriculum at schools was designed to fulfill the political function of implementing 
the policies formulated at the Third Forum and the Fifth TAR Conference. “The 
curriculum for both higher and basic education must depend on whether it can 
guarantee the unity and territorial integrity of the country; the curriculum is directly 
connected with the question of „stability‟ of the whole country,” wrote Yang Wanli, 
the deputy director of the Secondary School Teaching Center of the People‟s 
                                                 
723 „Census statistics for the TAR, announced on Tibet TV, 8 November 1990‟, translated in SWB 
FE/0919 B2/5, 12 November 1990.  
724 Chen Kuiyuan, Fifth Regional Meeting on Education, 26 October 1994, translated in SWB 
FE/2158 S1/1, 21 November 1996; see also Catriona Bass, Education in Tibet: Policy and Practice 
since 1950, p. 21. 
725 Chen Kuiyuan, Speech to Fifth TAR Conference on Education, 26 October 1994, cited in Catriona 
Bass, Education in Tibet: Policy and Practice since 1950, p. 21. 
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Education Publishing House (Beijing) in his paper on curriculum in 1996.
726
 
Moreover, despite the law and policy on the use of minority languages the directives 
to enforce Tibetan language policy were resisted by many leaders and officials in the 
TAR. In a place where 90 percent of the population speaks only their native Tibetan 
language, failure to implement minority language policy could and did have serious 
consequences in education, modernisation and development. A 1986 Chinese 
government publication estimated the illiteracy rate at 44.43 per cent of the Tibetan 
population
727
 which was amongst the highest in China whereas in 2003 the illiteracy 
rate has increased to alarming 54.9 per cent which is six times the national average.
728
 
Among the thousands of Tibetan refugees who cross the Himalayas to seek asylum in 
Nepal and India, majority of them are children under the age of eighteen who are sent 
by their families to receive education (in exile). A UN press release in 1999 cited a 
report published by the Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy in which it 
is claimed that 1,190 Tibetan children escaped from Tibet in 1998 alone for 
education.
729
 
 
Contrary to the Constitutional provisions on education, my own surveys
730
 indicate 
that the primary education is not free in a number of places in Tibet, the nine-year 
compulsory education policy is not upheld and a high drop-out rate is reported from 
schools across Tibet.
731
 Most of the Tibetan refugees who were mainly from villages, 
that I interviewed, told me that school fees had to be paid for primary and middle 
school education either in yuans, a minimum of which was 60 yuans, or in goods 
including food products. In rural villages the schools were usually built with monetary 
and labour contributions from the villagers themselves. Although the medium of 
instruction in primary schools was and is still Tibetan, the secondary and higher 
education are invariably conducted in Chinese which makes the learning especially of 
                                                 
726 Yang Wanli, „The Countermeasure and Particularity of Research on Teaching Materials‟, cited in 
Catriona Bass, Education in Tibet:Policy and Practice since 1950, p. 10. 
727 Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD), The Next Generation: The State of 
Education in Tibet Today, Dharamsala: TCHRD, 1997, p. 10. 
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September 2005. 
729 UN Press Releases 1999, „Commission on Human Rights Hears Further Pleas for Protection of 
Children, 19 April 1999‟, HR/CN/916. Available at  
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730 See APPENDIX 6. 
731 The drop-out rate for the junior middle school was 46% for 1994 and for senior middle school was 
17%. See ICJ, Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law, fn. 71, p. 208.  
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sciences difficult for the Tibetans. Majority of the children discontinue their schooling 
after finishing primary education for financial reasons and also due to failure in 
getting the required marks in the entrance exams. Furthermore, the Tibetan parents 
have become very pessimistic about the educational system in Tibet and see no future 
in education for their children, which has made them reluctant to invest in their 
children‟s education. However, the same parents try their best to send their children to 
India for education at a high cost and great risks for their children‟s life. Each year 
about eight hundred young Tibetan children go to India illegally, crossing the 
Himalayas on foot and braving the elements, for education.
732
  
 
The high illiteracy rate, strong resistance to the implementation of minority language 
policy in Tibet, political goals associated with education policy, disproportionate 
growth of Han Chinese population in the TAR all signal a bleak future to the 
educational, cultural and linguistic development in the TAR. The challenge for the 
Tibetans and the Chinese government is to leave the present policies behind and find a 
new synthesis that would allow preservation of Tibet‟s distinctive cultural features 
while at the same time fulfill the economic aspirations of the Communist leadership in 
Tibet. Judging by the current leaderships‟ hard-line stand a radical change in 
education policy is not in the offing. 
 
3.7.1.3 Social and Cultural Policies 
Housing Policy 
The PRC started nationalizing housing as well as land right after the “liberation” of 
Tibet in order to consolidate their control over the liberated land. For instance in 
Lhasa during the early years of occupation, the members of the PLA systematically 
searched and evicted houses occupied or owned by those who opposed the Chinese 
takeover of Tibet and expropriated the houses.
733
 By 1966 the PRC Government had 
confiscated most of the private property in Tibet, and in Lhasa more than 85 per cent 
of all traditional residential buildings were nationalised.
734
 As in other parts of China, 
                                                 
732 Communication with Tsewang Yeshe, the current Director of Tibetan Children‟s Village (TCV), 
Dharamsala, the largest Tibetan school in the Exile community, 3 October 2006. 
733 Habitat International Coalition, „An Analysis of the Situation Regarding the Right to Adequate 
Housing in Tibet‟, Annex II.3 of UN Economic and Social Committee, UN Doc.E/CN.4/1992/37, 
cited in TCHRD, Dispossessed: Land and Housing Rights in Tibet, Dharamsala: TCHRD, 2002, fn. 
cxxvii. 
734 Andre Alexander & Pimpim de Azevedo, The Old City of Lhasa: Report from a Conservation 
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the nationalised houses in urban areas of Tibet became either subsidised public 
housing or free housing for the employees of the state work units. The nationalised 
houses and buildings came under the management of municipal Housing Authorities 
who allocated flats and collected rents. However, due to lack of funding for housing 
maintenance and lack of maintenance on the part of tenants for state owned houses 
resulted in dilapidated and overcrowded housing.
735
 The process of economic 
liberalisation under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping conditioned China to move 
toward privatising of state-owned housing which encouraged returning of smaller 
properties to their owners. The 1982 Constitution of the PRC recognises “the right of 
citizens to own lawfully earned income, savings, houses and other lawful property”.736 
Further encouragement of private ownership of housing came with the issuance of 
Decision on Deepening Housing Reform in Urban Areas by the State Council which 
allowed sitting tenants the right to purchase their apartments at subsidised prices. 
However, the PRC laws do not guarantee the right to adequate housing and thus do 
not provide protection against forced evictions. The State reserves itself the right to 
evict tenants and appropriate property where it is deemed necessary in the interest of 
the State and the public. As such in major towns of Tibet, more prominently Lhasa, 
the State evicted people from their houses which the State considered fit for 
demolition. A more detailed account of the demolition of traditional and historic 
buildings will be given in the next section. 
 
Radical change in the housing policy happened in the mid to late 1990s with a shift in 
government‟s view of it–housing was no longer a core welfare benefit available to all 
citizens but rather a commodity. This has resulted in the spiraling rise in the rents, 
which put the Tibetans at disadvantaged positions. Market rents in Lhasa, for instance, 
have been estimated at 50 per cent of the average income of Tibetans living in the old 
Lhasa area. Financial constraints prevent Tibetans from constructing their own houses 
and lack of residential permits result in forcible removal of Tibetans from towns like 
Lhasa. Rampant discrimination between the Tibetans and the Han Chinese 
discouraged the Tibetans from moving into urban cities while it encouraged the 
                                                                                                                                            
Project (98-99), Berlin: Tibet Heritage Fund, 1998. 
735 Ibid.  
736 Article 13 of the 1982 Constitution of the PRC. 
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Chinese to reside and settle in Lhasa and other towns.
737
 
 
Tibet‟s Cultural Heritage 
The Chinese Communist government started the process of “democratic reforms” as 
early as 1950 in the eastern parts of Tibet. Kham and Amdo were subjected to intense 
fury and violence of the newly formed Communist Government that was bent on 
bringing socialist transformation into the lives of Tibetan populace. This was followed 
by cultural destruction, which started with depopulation, looting and razing 
monasteries to the ground and ended up with disrupting the lifestyles of Tibetan 
villagers and nomads. The “democratic reforms” accompanied by depopulation, 
looting and destruction of monasteries reached Central Tibet after the 1959 revolt. The 
aftermath of it was near total annihilation of Tibetan monasteries, the reservoir of the 
vast majority of Tibetan literatures and the epicentre of cultural vibrancy in Tibet for 
many centuries. The Cultural Revolution that followed in the wake of the “democratic 
reforms” cleansed the few monastic systems that had escaped the wrath of the post-
1959 Chinese onslaughts. In the TAR and Eastern Tibet more than two thousand 
monasteries and religious monuments were destroyed, Buddhist texts were burned or 
defiled, precious and sacred religious objects desecrated or transported to be sold. The 
religious, intellectual and cultural life of Tibet came to a grinding stop. 
 
Virtually all physical manifestation of Tibet‟s unique culture was effaced in the 
“systematic process of national and cultural extermination intended to eradicate any 
and all evidence of Tibet as a separate national or cultural identity”.738 Approximately 
95% of Tibet‟s cultural heritage was destroyed.739 Extensive and excessive 
Communist ideological indoctrination were carried out throughout the TAR and 
Eastern Tibet and the common mass were not only barred from preserving their 
culture but were made to denigrate their own traditional culture. Slightly greater 
cultural freedom was allowed in Tibet since 1979 and especially after Hu Yaobang‟s 
visit to Tibet in 1980. At the expense of government many surviving monasteries were 
partially restored and the people were allowed to rebuild local monasteries and 
                                                 
737 Scott Leckie, Destruction by Design: Housing Rights Violations in Tibet, Netherlands: Center on 
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738 ICJ, Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law, p. 121. 
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religious monuments at their own expense. Thousands of metal statues of Buddhist 
figures that were transported to China were returned back to Tibet.
740
 Relaxation in 
the sphere of religious practice and cultural landscape allowed the Tibetans to 
celebrate some religious and cultural festivals. According to Chinese government 
official reports, the government sponsored dance troupes and drama groups, built art 
and cultural centres and employed “nearly 5000 professional cultural workers, with 
Tibetans accounting for 90 per cent of the total”.741 Yet the cultural offices monitored 
cultural activities and productions to remove any elements of nationalistic content. 
 
Tibetan architectures suffered immensely with the destruction and demolition of 
thousands of monasteries, stupas and religious monuments. Secular architecture also 
suffered due to confiscation and destruction of traditionally styled houses, which were 
replaced by concrete building complexes that have neither elegance nor charm. Lhasa 
and other major Tibetan towns have been overwhelmed by new Chinese 
constructions, which were encouraged and promoted by Chinese development 
projects, so much so that the Tibetan visual character is becoming lost in many of the 
larger cities and towns. Although the total area of Lhasa has increased twenty times 
since the 1950s, to 50 square kilometres, nearly all the new constructions were meant 
for Chinese administrators, armed police, PLA and settlers. The Lhasa Development 
Plan (1980-2000), approved by the Beijing State Council in 1984, required replacing 
old and traditional housings with new residential complexes and eviction of at least 
10,000 Tibetans from old Lhasa. The subsequent implementation of the plan involved 
demolition of Tibetan residential compounds, significant historic buildings and 
residential estates in the old Lhasa.
742
 Between 1989 and 1993, more than half of 
Tibetan homes with distinctive Tibetan architectural character in Barkor, the central 
area of Lhasa, were demolished to create space for new constructions.
743
 The Tibetan 
part of Lhasa, which is now less than one square kilometre and accounting for only 
2% of Lhasa today,
744
 is located around the Jokhang temple–the only area where 
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Tibetan traditional building have survived in good number. 
 
In 1994-95, the Chinese government demolished the historic village of Shol, which 
lay at the foot of the Potala Palace, to construct a huge Chinese plaza and park. In the 
first half of 1997, an estimated twenty eight historic buildings were demolished in 
Lhasa, including the Tromsikhang Palace, one of the most important historic 
buildings which was built in the 17
th
 century by the 6
th
 Dalai Lama.
745
 Throughout the 
1990s and even at the beginning of the 21
st
 century the demolition of old and historic 
buildings continued unabated. This has raised concerns at the 27
th
 session of 
UNESCO‟s World Heritage Committee, held in Paris from June 30 to July 5, 2003. 
The Committee called for a halt to demolitions, “particularly in the Shol area” and 
requested the State Party to “inform the World Heritage Committee of its policy on 
the conservation of the historic urban fabric of Lhasa”.746 Many view the demolitions 
and urban constructions as a means to wipe out yet another important aspect of Tibet‟s 
distinctiveness and ICJ identified the destruction of Tibetan housing in Lhasa as a 
“typical occupier‟s tactic and a violation of human rights”.747 As one commentator 
held: 
 
If the Development Plan is implemented, the Tibetan quarter of Lhasa 
will effectively cease to exist. In the Plan‟s drawing for the year 2000, 
the old city has been consumed by an amorphous mass of modern 
Chinese buildings with “Tibetan characteristics”. Only the Jokhang 
and Ramoche temples, Tibet‟s oldest places of worship and the 
religious centre of the country, and a handful of historic homes have 
been earmarked for preservation as “cultural relics”–in keeping with 
the mayor‟s intention “to leave a few examples of traditional Tibetan 
architecture, here and there, as a souvenir”.748 
 
3.7.2 Environmental Impacts and Population Influx 
In this highly interconnected world it is reasonable to assume that any critical issues 
affecting a nation would have repercussions that are felt across the globe. It is 
particularly true of environmental issues and even more so within a nation. In 1998, 
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massive floods along the Yangtze River, the worst since 1954, left millions of Chinese 
people homeless, destroyed 11 million acres of the national cropland and caused the 
destruction of billions of dollars worth of property.
749
 The Chinese Government cited 
“deforestation, building of roads and the digging of mines as significant contributors 
to soil erosion that has silted up river beds, raising water levels,”750–a natural disaster 
triggered by human actions. The government banned logging in the upper reaches of 
the Yangtze River in Sichuan in some of the traditional Tibetan areas. The Yangtze 
flood became “the turning point that really brought the need for environmental 
protection in Tibet to Beijing‟s attention”.751 Prior to that, no specific environmental 
policies existed to safeguard Tibet‟s fragile ecology. In this chapter I will discuss in 
greater detail the environmental impacts and the ecological consequences of China‟s 
developmental policies in Tibet and the protective measures installed in place to 
maintain a better balance in Tibet‟s ecology.  
 
It is universally accepted that China is facing huge environmental problems. For the 
purpose of better understanding how widespread and how practical the policy 
measures implemented to preserve Tibet‟s environment are, I will briefly narrate the 
short history of China‟s environmental policies and regulations. After ascending to 
power in 1949 the Communist Party mainly focused on reconstructing the war-torn 
nation and devised plans to achieve rapid economic growth. In pursuit of rapid 
development the government cleared many hillsides and filled wetlands to make new 
farmlands, resulting in increased rates of degradation and pollution. Driven by 
unrealistic and impractical ambitions of transforming China from the primary agrarian 
economy dominated by peasants to modern industrialised communist society the CCP 
initiated the Great Leap Forward (1958-62) which had huge negative consequences on 
China‟s environment. A large number of trees were felled, denuding the local 
environment in many places, to supply fuel for steel production out of scrap metal. 
Moreover, land reclamation projects destroyed wetlands and led to increased flooding. 
The Cultural Revolution (1966-69) retained the pace of deterioration of China‟s 
environment as wanton exploitation of natural resources continued. Starting around 
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1972, modest efforts were made to deal with ecological problems after the PRC sent a 
delegation to the First United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 
Stockholm. In 1973, the Chinese government created a national environmental 
protection organ and environmental planning became included in national plans. In 
the late 1970s, amidst the intensified environmental debates of whether to consider 
the environmental impacts of economic growth or to follow the “pollute first and 
clean up later” pattern, the government promoted the Environmental Protection Law 
in 1979 for trial implementation, which was adopted only in 1989. In March 1998, the 
National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) was upgraded to the State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), a ministerial status, 
752
 when the 
Central government was heavily cutting down on its employees. This was seen as a 
clear indication that the new Jiang Zemin administration would take seriously the 
environmental problems which over the past two decades had degraded so severely. 
Ironically, in that same move SEPA‟s meagre staff of 600 was reduced by half to 300 
people. Furthermore, former premier Zhu Rongji eliminated the State Environmental 
Protection Commission, which was the overarching forum for top-level coordination 
on environmental protection, thus reducing SEPA‟s ability to coordinate 
environmental policy at the top-level.
753
 In the summer of that same year the Yangtze 
deluge came and killed thousands of people and damaged about billions of dollars 
worth of properties. In the wake of the floods the Chinese authorities called for tighter 
forest regulations and set up the National Natural Forest Protection Project to halt 
logging and encourage reafforestation in the upper reaches of the Yangtze and Yellow 
Rivers.
754
 Other major environmental issues that endanger China include resource 
degradation,
755
 population pressure,
756
 water shortages,
757
 pollution,
758
 sharp 
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reduction in forest resources, serious pollution, degradation of land and 
desertification.
759
 Despite all these gargantuan environmental problems the Chinese 
government‟s funding for environmental protection projects have remained low. 
During the ninth five-year plan (1996-2000) the Chinese government invested only 
0.8 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the environmental protection. 
Although the investment was increased to 1.3 per cent of GDP in the tenth five-year 
plan (2001-2005) which came to about $85 billion, some Chinese scientists consider it 
is far below the 2.19 per cent of GDP necessary to keep the environment from 
deteriorating further.
760
 
 
Almost all of China‟s major environmental problems, as mentioned earlier, have 
direct or indirect impacts on Tibet, her ecology and inhabitants. Population pressure in 
China has resulted in massive relocation of Han Chinese to many of the western 
regions of China, particularly Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet. Likewise, water 
shortages, especially in the northern regions of China, have prompted the government 
to divert water from the Yangtze River including its upper reaches in the Tibetan 
plateau and possible water diversion from the Yarlung Tsangpo in Southern Tibet. 
While there are many significant factors that contribute to the degradation of 
environment in Tibet I will focus on three factors that I consider are the most 
detrimental to the ecology, viz. the massive importation of Han Chinese, the 
establishment of nuclear programs and the excessive mining.  
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3.7.2.1 Population Transfer and Impact on Tibet‟s Ecosystem 
Although in the previous chapter I discussed the population transfer policy practised 
by the Chinese government, it was done in the context of political strategy to maintain 
stability. However, this policy serves a multi-purpose function of sinicisation of Tibet, 
maintaining regional stability, relieving population pressure to a certain degree. 
Richard Edmonds, a Chinese studies expert, maintains that “since 1950s, considerable 
numbers of Chinese have been relocated to the west to develop poor areas, settle the 
frontiers and reduce population pressure in the east” with serious consequences of 
degradation of semi-arid fragile ecosystems.
761
 Numerous environmental 
consequences, on pastoral grasslands, forestry, water resources and minerals, have 
resulted from the population transfer policy which was described by the Dalai Lama 
as “the most serious threat to the survival of Tibet‟s culture and national identity”.762 
Tibet, situated at a very high altitude, has a fragile ecosystem with low carrying 
capacity
763
 and as such any sudden change in the pattern of land usage, in the amount 
of pastoral grazing, in the quantity of logging and so on could have grave 
implications. Over the several decades we have seen numerous repercussions of 
excessive human behaviour in Tibet in the form of the Yangtze flooding, the 
Bangladesh flooding of 1987 and 1988, spread of desertification and degradation of 
land.  
 
3.7.2.2 Agriculture and Pastoral Grasslands 
Tibet‟s land resource comprises of extensive grasslands which make up about 70% of 
the area, with 5% forest area and only 2% cropland.
764
 Despite the small quantity, 
Tibet‟s arable lands have supplied sufficiently the essential food grain needs of the 
Tibetan populace. Agriculture, primarily highland barley-growing along with nomadic 
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dairy products has been the traditional foundation of the Tibetan economy.
765
 The 
principal croplands were located along the major rivers of Tibet in the river valleys of 
Drichu, Zachu and Gyalmo Ngulchu in Kham, the Yarlung Tsangpo valley in U-Tsang 
and the Machu valley in Amdo, with the most fertile Kham province accounting for 
85% of ethnic Tibet‟s cultivable land.766 Major crops include maize, rice, mustard, 
millet, sorghum and rape-seed with highland barley as the principal crop. With over 
80% of Tibet‟s population still practising farming, agriculture is the main occupation 
of the Tibetan people.
767
 Another important occupation of the Tibetan people is the 
pastoral nomadism in which the nomads migrate with their herds of yaks, sheep and 
goats over the vast natural rangelands that extend from Tibet‟s north western regions 
of Chang Thang (Northern Plateau) to the north eastern province of Amdo and 
Kham.
768
 The abundance of grasslands and the practice of seasonal migration by the 
nomads had facilitated retaining and recovering the fertility of the lands over many 
centuries. However, Tibet‟s traditional practices of farming and nomading have been 
disrupted severely with the Chinese occupation of Tibet and the arrival of continuous 
stream of Chinese migrants to Tibet. 
 
The importation of huge numbers of Chinese settlers in Tibet has led to a sharp drop 
in the total cultivated land per person which prompted the Chinese authorities to 
increase the area of land under cultivation by converting pastoral lands to farmland 
and boost yields per hectare on existing farmland through the heavy use of chemical 
fertilisers. Experts believe that both have grave environmental consequences of 
reducing the fertility of soil, damaging the fragile ecosystem with excessive use of 
chemical fertilisers, polluting the land with nitrate run-off and changing the traditional 
land use pattern. Until 1959 only 0.2% of land in U-Tsang was used for farming.
769
 
However, necessitated by the rise of Chinese settlers in the region, by 1991 the 
cultivated land area has increased by 50%–expanding into previous pastoral lands and 
onto marginal slopes which are prone to soil erosion. Consequently, more erosions 
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take place in the marginal slopes 
770
 and also in areas where overgrazing took place 
due to the reduction in pastoral lands.
771
 Moreover, the excessive use of chemical 
fertilisers and pesticides, as required by the government, is polluting the land and 
reducing the fertility of soil. The Tibetan nomads are facing similar problems with 
limited and inadequate use of pasture lands for their herds due to ever increasing 
Chinese presence which led to changing land use. Despite all the negative 
consequences, the Central government, instead of checking the population influx, is 
encouraging the migration in the name of economic developments of the local areas. 
 
3.7.2.3 Forestry and Wild Life Population 
Tibet‟s high plateau contains vast arid land, fertile river valleys and ancient forests 
that cover 5 per cent of the land. The major forested areas which covered over 25.2 
million hectares prior to 1950 lie in the southern regions of Dram, Kyirong, Pema 
Koe, Kongpo, Nyingtri, Tawu, Metog and Monyul, in the eastern regions of Drayab, 
Zogong, Kandze, Potramo, Dartsedo, Nyarong and Ngaba, and the southeast areas of 
Dechen, Balung, Gyalthang, Mili, Lithang, Zayul, Markham and Dzogang. 
772
 The 
Tibetan Plateau is blessed by one of the oldest forest reserves in Central Asia which 
are filled with over 100,000 species of plants that grow on high localities, 532 species 
of birds and other rare animals such as golden monkey, giant panda, white lipped deer 
and takin.
773
 The traditional mode of conservation was based on the Buddhist 
principles of interdependence and compassionate outreach for all beings. Such ethical 
belief helped sprout symbiotic relationships between the Tibetan people and their 
natural habitat and had helped preserve Tibet‟s rich resources. China, on the other 
hand, has a long history of ecological degradation with large-scale deforestation 
dating back to the 14
th
 century Ming period during which all the forests in the central 
region of the Huang River valley and the Xiang River valley were seriously 
reduced.
774
 With the forestry sector playing an important role in the economy of the 
nation, providing 40 per cent of rural household energy, almost all of the lumber and 
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wood products for the large construction sector and material for domestic pulp and 
paper industry, China continues to rush along the path of massive denudation of their 
greeneries. China‟s Ministry of Forests estimates that each year 500,000 hectares of 
forest area is lost.
775
 
 
“Men are a foe to the woods, in proportion to their numbers,” thus wrote J. Robertson 
in 1808.
776
 This is never truer anywhere than in Tibet where the huge influx of 
Chinese settlers has led to deforestation and substantial reduction in forest cover. 
Urbanisation and commodification, new roads and new fields; all require clearing of 
huge forest areas for woods, land, and fuels. The mounting flow of Chinese settlers 
into Tibet has increased the total population in the traditional Tibet to 13.5 million and 
the strain on the local ecology has increased manifold. Although the effects of 
population increase is taking its toll, the worst is due to planned commercial felling of 
trees, mainly timber, which is responsible for the 46 per cent reduction in forest area 
in Tibet. “After the industrial world made its way onto the Tibetan plateau via Chinese 
modernisation the forests have been reduced nearly by half. This is mostly through 
planned commercial timber extraction,” wrote Daniel Winkler.777 In 50 years of 
occupation some 70 state logging enterprises have felled a total of 120 million cubic 
metres of wood from the forests of Eastern Kham (Sichuan) alone. In other parts of 
Tibet deforestation has been proceeding at similar pace. For instance in Ngaba (Ch: 
Aba) and the Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefectures forest cover decreased from 
29.5 per cent in the 1950s to 14 per cent in the 1980s which has left eight out of 
eleven forest factories in Ngaba district with exhausted resources. The World Watch 
Institute reports estimate a loss of 85 per cent of forest cover from the Tibetan Plateau 
to the Yangtze River basin.
778
 
 
Along with the decline in the forest areas and pasture lands the wildlife population of 
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the region is falling as they lose their natural habitats. Other human activities such as 
mining, construction, and expanded croplands leave less and less land for the wildlife. 
Directly affecting the wildlife is hunting and poaching that are done for commercial 
gain. The PLA brigades often go for hunting and machine-gun herds of wild animals 
across the plateau for fun and for animal parts. The Environment and Development 
Report of the People‟s Republic of China reported that up to 5000 plant species of 
higher order are on the verge of extinction and estimated 312 precious animals and 
plants are listed for priority protection which includes such endangered species as 
high-nosed gazelle, giant panda, Tibetan antelope, Yunnan snub-nosed monkeys and 
Manchurian tiger.
779
 Many of the listed plants and wildlife are found primarily in 
Tibet.  
 
3.7.2.4 Water Resources 
With the growing scarcity of fresh water evident everywhere,
780
 Tibet‟s importance as 
the source of ten major river systems in Asia will grow even more in the 21
st
 century. 
Rivers from the Tibetan Plateau run through some of the world‟s most populous 
regions, feeding roughly 47 per cent of world‟s population. Hundreds of millions of 
people in China, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Vietnam, Burma, 
Cambodia, Laos and Thailand depend upon Tibetan watersheds and rivers for their 
survival. China‟s two largest rivers, the Yangtze River and the Yellow River, have 
their headwaters in Tibet‟s northeastern and eastern provinces. Net hydrological flows 
in Tibet total 627 cubic kilometres per year and it makes roughly six percent of Asia‟s 
annual run-off. And the availability of fresh water in Tibet ranks fourth in the world 
with 104,500 cubic metres per year. The primary origins of many of these rivers are 
the gigantic expanses of glaciers, a total area of 42,946 square kilometres, that cover 
Tibet‟s high mountains and groundwater sources.781 These perennial sources form 
stable or base flows that are crucial for sustaining hydrological regimes. 
 
Each year when the spring sun melts the snow on the mountains and when the 
monsoon arrives between July and September, the major rivers flowing out of Tibet 
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flood; replenishing the topsoil of downstream valleys with mineral rich silts and thus 
maintaining the fertility of downstream ecosystems. The fertile river valleys of 
Brahmaputra, Yellow Rivers and Mekong are cases in point. However, every now and 
then the floods turn catastrophic and disastrous and cause much destruction including 
huge loss of human lives. For example, the floods in Bangladesh in 1987 and 1988 
and the Yangtze floods of 1998. From the occurrences of recent decades it appears 
that catastrophic floods are becoming more regular and more disastrous, indicating 
that human interference in hydrological systems, continuing deforestation and 
industrial emissions of global warming gas are affecting the weather patterns. 
 
Economic development and industrialisation in the TAR are starting to pollute Tibet‟s 
land and water resources which could have far-reaching implications. A government 
report released by the TAR administration in 1996 stated that in that very year 41.9 
million tons of waste was released in the Lhasa River.
782
 With the Chinese 
government investing so much in the development of Tibet‟s industries Lhasa will 
soon follow the path of China‟s other cities. Whereas industrial development is still 
relatively young and the population density low, mining which is one of the “four 
pillar” industries in the TAR has become a major source of pollution. Chemical 
pollutants such as sulphuric acid, cyanide and heavy metals from the mining activities 
are released into rivers of which more will be discussed later. Another constant source 
of highly toxic pollutant is the nuclear wastes that had been dumped and buried in the 
high and barren places in Tibet at the height of China‟s nuclear race in the 1960s and 
1970s, specifically wastes generated by the Ninth Academy.
783
 The headwaters of the 
Yellow River are close to the sites of the Ninth Academy. 
 
Tibetans fear that the Han Chinese encroachment will undermine not only their 
unique cultural identity but also their environment. Elizabeth C. Economy succinctly 
describes the Tibetan sentiments thus: 
 
According to at least one report, much of Tibet‟s environmental 
degradation appears to have come at the hands of Han settlers, 
including rampant deforestation–up to 40 per cent of Tibet‟s old-
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growth tropical and subtropical mountain forests have already been 
clear-cut and shipped east. Rare plant and animal species are becoming 
extinct as Chinese officials exploit them for foreign markets, and the 
grasslands are suffering as Chinese demand for meat has led to 
overstocking of yak, goat, and sheep and the loss of Tibetan traditional 
herding and grazing practices.
784 
 
3.7.3 Nuclear Wastes 
Prompted by a confrontation with Washington in 1954-55 over the offshore islands of 
Quemoy and Matsu in the Taiwan Strait, Mao authorised a full-scale effort to make 
China a nuclear power.
785
 In 1958, the Chinese Government established the Beijing 
Nuclear Weapons Research Institute, which was replaced by the Northwest Nuclear 
Weapons Research and Design Academy–later came to be known as the Ninth 
Academy.
786
 With initial assistance from the Soviet Union, China entered the nuclear 
age at breakneck speed and succeeded in developing nuclear weapons within a period 
of ten years. China tested its first atomic bomb in 1964 at Lop Nor.
787
 In rapid 
succession China tested its second to fourth nuclear bombs employing different 
testing modes, such as air-drop test, using thermonuclear material and guided 
missile,–displaying a great versatility. Since 1970, China has exploded nuclear 
weapons at the rate of about one per year.
788
 However, from the late 1950s China‟s 
relations with its neighbouring states started deteriorating and hostilities mounted. In 
1958, a second Taiwan Strait crisis led to U.S. nuclear weapons deployments on 
Taiwan.
789
 In 1960, the Soviet Union and China broke off relations and in1962 war 
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broke out between China and India over border issues. Sino-Soviet clashes along the 
Ussuri River in 1969 further intensified the fears of the Beijing leaders and made 
urgent the exigencies of moving industrial bases to remote regions of China in what is 
known as “the Third Line facilities”. Between 1964 and 1971 China carried out 
massive construction programs in the remote areas of southwestern and western 
provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Gansu, Ningxia and Qinghai, to create a 
“huge self-sufficient industrial base area to serve as a strategic reserve in the event of 
China being drawn into war”790 with the Soviets or the Americans. The Third Line 
facilities envisaged more modern and complete nuclear fuel cycle infrastructure for 
nuclear weapons than the one built based on Soviet model.
791
 The Ninth Academy 
was one of the facilities moved in the Third Line to Haiyen county which is one of the 
four counties in Habei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. Right before the time of the 
announced “closure” of the Ninth Academy, a missile production centre, located at 
Drotsang which is 63 km east of Xining, was set up to manufacture anti-frigate 
missiles which are tested in Tibet. The facility which is seen as a surrogate of the 
Ninth Academy was massively expanded in 1995.
792
 
 
The construction of the Ninth Academy, like other facilities, was carried out in a short 
period of time without proper waste disposal methods. Initially waste was dumped in 
shallow, unlined landfills from which waste could easily seep into the ground, more 
so as years went by, polluting the underground watershed and series of natural 
acquifers underneath and nearby the Ninth Academy. However, it is still hard to know 
much about the nature and quantity of radioactive waste generated by the Ninth 
Academy. Whether the Ninth Academy produced high-level nuclear waste due to its 
small reactor as it claimed or engaged in low-concentration fuel reprocessing, it 
would entail significant nuclear waste, disposed in a “roughshod or haphazard 
manner” in adjacent land or water sites.793 High smokestacks observed at the plant 
indicated need to disperse gases more effectively which could be plutonium or 
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uranium in gaseous form. His Holiness the Dalai Lama denounced “China‟s use of 
Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and dumping of nuclear waste” in his 
Five Point Peace Plan for Tibet. Because of its proximity to the headwaters of the 
Yellow River, the Ninth Academy posed the biggest threat to the purity of China‟s 
second longest river. With poor waste management and high mercury waste content of 
nuclear weapons factories China is said to have dumped huge amounts of mercury 
into the river.
794
 Thus, the Ninth Academy posed a huge threat to the population of 
local areas and millions of people living in the downstream regions of the Yellow 
River. 
 
Another nuclear hazard to the Tibetan Plateau comes from the storage of nuclear 
wastes. In 1984, the Washington Post carried a report stating that China has agreed to 
store voluminous quantities of radioactive wastes from European nuclear reactors. 
The paper went to say that China would be paid up to US $6 million to dispose 4,000 
tons of used nuclear fuel over a period of sixteen years.
795
 China agreed to store West 
German nuclear waste for deliveries of nuclear power plant by German companies 
and also with Taiwan they made a deal to dispose Taiwan‟s spent fuel rods for foreign 
exchange. However, pressure from the German Green Party prompted both the 
Chinese and the German government to deny that the plan was implemented. In 1992, 
according to Greenpeace Waste Trade Update Baltimore in collusion with the TAR 
arranged to store toxic sludge in Tibet
796
. These wastes are likely to be stored in 
Xinjiang Province or on the Tibetan Plateau.
797
 Before the construction of the new 
Qinghai-Tibet railway, lack of transport infrastructure prevented China from 
transporting hazardous materials and dumping nuclear wastes. However, the new 
railway which passes through vast, barren, and cold areas of Tibet could be used to 
take toxic wastes deep into the heart of Tibet. 
 
3.7.4 Mining 
The third major environmental degrader in Tibet is the government‟s promotion of 
excessive mining. Prior to the Chinese occupation mining of mineral resources was 
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minimal and mechanised industrial-scale mining was unheard of. However, the 
situation changed dramatically after the incorporation of Tibet into the PRC which 
brought the land and resources under the direct State control. Exploration works 
began in the early 1950s in Eastern Tibet, particularly in the Tsaidam Basin, located in 
Tsonub Mongolian and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (M&TAP) in Qinghai 
Province, which is blessed with promising oil fields, salt lake resources and gold 
mines. The Qinghai Salt Industry claimed that Tsaidam has the largest potassium-
magnesium deposit in the whole of China.
798
 The opening of Xining-Golmud railway 
in 1984 facilitated the exploitation works at various mines in the regions including the 
Tsaidam Basin. Furthermore, under China‟s Western Development Campaign, 
Tsaidam Basin acquired a greater importance for attracting foreign and domestic 
investments in the region, especially in regards to the development of oil and gas 
fields. 
 
Tanjianshan in Dachaidan, which has estimated reserves of 52 tonnes, is the largest 
gold producer in Qinghai Province. The deposit which was discovered in 1989 is 
under the administration of Qinghai‟s No. 1 Geology Exploration Unit and Dachaidan 
administrative committee (county-level) both of whom have jointly formed the 
Dachaidan Jinlong Mining Development Company. The Australian company Sino 
Mining International, after the first phase of exploratory drilling plan and investment 
of $2.1 million, pronounced that the deposit could produce as much as 2.8 tonnes of 
gold per year once fully operational.
799
 However, the company pulled out of the 
project in February 2001 stating that the project would not be sufficiently 
profitable.
800
 The same company, however, signed a contract with Deyang Mineral 
Resource Development Company to explore for gold in the Jinkang area, located in 
Kakhog (Ch: Hongyuan) county, Ngaba (Ch: Aba) Qiang and Tibet Autonomous 
Prefecture (Q&TAP), Sichuan. In Sichuan Province, Dongbeizhai deposit is the 
largest known gold resource with 52 tonnes of gold reserves.
801
 Other smaller gold 
mines are scattered throughout Tibet. 
 
                                                 
798 TIN, Mining Tibet: Mineral Exploitation in Tibetan Areas of the PRC, London: TIN, 2002, p. 20. 
799 Project information of the Sino Mining Limited‟s exploratory works in Tibet in 2000 can be 
accessed at www.sinomining.com.au.  
800 „Sino Minning Ltd has no current plans to develop mine asset in Tibet‟, Australia Tibet Council 
Media Release, 5 February 2001. 
801 Cited in TIN, Mining Tibet: Mineral Exploitation in Tibetan Areas of the PRC, p. 27. 
 228 
Copper mining is another profitable venture that the TAR administration has been 
promoting since the mid-1990s. The TAR has the largest copper deposits in China 
after Jiangxi Province, which are concentrated mainly in the copper belt that runs 
through Chamdo Prefecture (the TAR) into Dechen TAP (Yunnan) and into the edge 
of Kardze TAP (Sichuan). Yulong in Chamdo Prefecture has the largest known deposit 
in this belt with estimated 6.5 million tonnes of prospective reserves. The Western 
Mining Company based in Xining was awarded the contract to develop Yulong copper 
mines and is expected to produce 100,000 tones by 2010.
802
 Another promising 
copper deposit is in Saishithang in Tsolho (Ch: Hainan) TAP in Qinghai Province. 
Tsolho reportedly has 62 per cent of the Qinghai‟s copper reserves of which 
Saishithang accounts for the largest copper mine.  
 
The Chinese Government is investing heavily in the mining industry in Tibet. The 
Government has launched several mining projects during the Eighth (1991-1995) and 
Ninth Five Year Plans (1996-2000). The “43 Development Projects” approved at the 
Second Work Forum on Tibet and the “62 Development Projects” launched at the 
Third Work Forum on Tibet had many large schemes that were aimed at expanding 
and speeding up the mining industry. From its young industrial stage in the 1990s the 
mining industry has developed so much that it is now considered as one of the pillar 
industries of Tibet‟s economy.803 The emphasis on rapid economic development 
forced the industry to expand at a rapid pace all across Tibet. From the uranium mines 
in Kanlho Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture to the chromite mines in Lhoka, the copper 
deposits in Chamdo and Amdo to the oil and gas fields in Tsaidam Basin and Chang 
Thang, the minerals are extracted as much as the growing industry can handle. For 
instance, Shar Lung chromite mine in Nagchu region in Kham is now exhausted due 
to over production with more than 60,000 tons of chromite ore extracted between 
1978 and 1979 and 300,000 tons of the ore between 1980 and 1985. Copper mines in 
Yulong and Saishithang are mined heavily to curtail China‟s copper imports. 
 
“Of all the economic activities in the world‟s mountains, nothing rivals the destructive 
power of mining,” declares a World Watch Paper.804 Although the environmental 
                                                 
802 Ibid., p. 31. 
803 Chinese government website: http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/67819.htm.  
804 Derek Denniston, High Priorities: Conserving Mountain Ecosystems and Cultures, World Watch 
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consequences of mining are unreported by the Chinese authorities in Tibet it is fairly 
extensive. Destabilisation of fragile mountain slopes, deforestation and degradation of 
pastures, water contamination and air pollution are taking destructive tolls on Tibet‟s 
ecology. Many pastoral lands have been transformed into mining zones thus 
devastating the subsistence of nomads. More than 17,000 nomads were compelled to 
look for a new livelihood when a huge uranium deposit was discovered in Riwoche, 
Kham in 1990.
805
 Hundreds of thousands of litres of polluted water from mining in 
Tibet flow into major rivers like the Yangtze. At an International Symposium in 
Qinghai in 1998 Chinese environmental scientists Song Xinyu and Yao Jianhua, from 
the Commission for the Integrated Survey of National Resources, reported dismal 
pollution control measures at mines in the Tsaidam Basin. They stated, “There are few 
measures to prevent pollution, with the result that wastes pour into the rivers, 
endangering livestock, contaminating lakes downstream”.806 Wastes from liquid 
mercury used in the processing of uranium at Lang Gio Uranium Mine are dumped 
into the Yellow River.
807
 Because of the severely polluted state of China‟s river 
systems He Bochuan cried, “A Clean River? What‟s That?”808 With the Chinese 
Government emphasising the modernisation and industrialisation of Tibet it is almost 
impossible to imagine the extent of environmental consequences of developments. 
 
Although the Chinese government has declared many areas in Tibet as nature 
reserves; the largest of which is located in north west of Tibet in a high cold semi-
desert of Chang Thang with extension of over 247,000 sq. km, the nature reserves are 
mostly understaffed and lack authority to enforce laws and prevent exploitative 
activities. This low status of the environmental agencies which is common throughout 
China reduces the effectiveness of these agencies. Moreover, inter-agency rivalry, lack 
of cooperation among the different agencies responsible for the management of the 
reserves caused inefficiency in their work and often prompted exploitative activities 
by the agencies themselves for fund. Thus, the World-Wide Fund for Nature labels 
                                                                                                                                            
Paper 123, Washington, D.C.: World Watch Institute, February 1995, p.35. 
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807 DIIR, Tibet 2000: Environment and Development Issues, p. 96. 
808 He Bochuan, China on Edge: The Crisis of Ecology and Development, pp.181-184. 
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many of the reserves as “paper parks”.809 In this chapter I have chosen only three 
major factors that are contributing to the exponential degradation of Tibet‟s 
environment as it is unthinkable to treat the topic, in an exhaustive manner, in a single 
chapter. China, with latent crisis ready to explode with increasingly severe 
deterioration of the environment, has passed numerous national environmental laws 
and regulations; and by 2001, seven environmental protection laws and more than 123 
administrative regulations have been passed. Complementing them are more than 20 
technical environmental regulations issued by the State Council and the 100 
environmental rules and methods and 350 standards formulated by SEPA and other 
State Council ministries and agencies.
810
 Yet the environmental laws are often too 
broad and ambiguous and the regulations too vague to provide much guidance on 
implementation.
811
 Moreover, insufficient authority and lack of co-ordination between 
the institutional actors,
812
 the Chinese leaders‟ constant emphasis on increasing 
production, and the State ownership of many factories responsible for pollutions all 
culminate to prevent the effective implementation of environmental laws and 
regulations in China.
813
 Unless, the Chinese Government works in earnest to redress 
these issues the fate of not just 1.3 billion Chinese but 47 per cent of humanity would 
be at stake. 
 
3.7.5 Chinese Development Plans Threaten Peace in Asia 
Geostrategically, Tibet has always held a crucial position in Central Asia with the 
dominant powers formulating their strategic calculations to occupy the region, which 
indicated the supremacy of a dominant country‟s power over others. George 
Ginsburgs and Michael Mathos write, “He who holds Tibet dominates the Himalayan 
piedmont; he who dominates the Himalayan piedmont threatens the Indian 
subcontinent and he who threatens the Indian subcontinent may well have all of South 
Asia within his reach, and with it all of Asia”.814 Similar caveats were issued by a 
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group of Indian politicians headed by Jayaprakash Narayan who urged their 
government to consider the relevance of Tibet to the security of many Asian nations 
including India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Burma, the Soviet Republics of Central Asia 
and Sikkim.
815
 The same person on a previous occasion warned the Indian people of 
the seriousness of Tibet‟s situation in regard to its neighbouring Asian states, 
particularly India.
816
 China, on the other hand, viewed Tibet as both the strategic 
“fortress” on its southwest frontiers against imperialism and revisionism817 as well as 
the „soft strategic underbelly‟818 that poses great danger to China‟s entire security 
system. Even the official Chinese media of the time described Tibet as a strategic 
focal point where China confronted its two big enemies, Soviet Union and India,
819
 
who in Chinese eyes had formed alliance based on their common hostility towards 
China. Furthermore, the Chinese viewed that the Tibetan resistance had the potential 
to invite foreign intervention that could open the floodgate to sustained violence in the 
strategic region. In the light of these factors we could understand the early Chinese 
policies which encouraged the construction of roads throughout Tibet from 1959 to 
mid 1970s. China‟s First Five Year Plan (1953-1957) allocated $4.23 billion820 on 
“transportation and communications” of which evidently a large amount was spent for 
road constructions in Tibet. Recognising the region‟s strategic importance the Chinese 
made huge investments in Tibet during the first two decades of occupation which 
were primarily slated for road building and other infrastructural build up. Chang 
Chih-I, the then Deputy Director of the United Front Work Department of the CCP, in 
his book on national minorities writes: 
 
With respect to communications and transportations the greater part of 
the new highway construction throughout the country since Liberation 
has been located in the frontier regions of the motherland and in areas 
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inhabited by national minorities, and in the national minority areas the 
amount of highway restored and improved far exceeds that newly 
built. The highway routes involving major engineering were, among 
others, the following: Kangting-Tibet, Tsinghai [Qinghai]-Tibet, 
Tsinghai [Qinghai]-Sinkiang, Chengtu-Apa, Lanchow-Langmuszu, 
Kunming-Talo, Lhasa-Shigatse, Shigatse-Gyangtse, and Phari-Yatung. 
821 
 
Of the above listed highways most are in Tibet proper, with few on the Tibet-Sinkiang 
(Xinjiang) border areas. Recently, China completed yet another major infrastructural 
project, when it launched the Qinghai Tibet Railway successfully, that gave a huge 
boost to the region‟s transportational systems and which apparently is causing great 
consternation among its neighbours.
822
 In this chapter I will elaborate primarily on the 
various infrastructural developments in Tibet that have major strategic implications 
for its neighbouring states and how they are affecting the peace and stability in the 
South Asian countries. 
 
3.7.5.1 Early Infrastructural Developments: Major Trunk Roads in Tibet 
Historically, lack of proper transportation and communication systems had been the 
biggest obstacles in China‟s attempt to gain full control over Tibet. However, this 
setback was eventually removed when Communist China, by giving the highest 
priority to the construction of the trunk roads in Tibet, completed 91 highways and 
300 permanent bridges in the TAR alone by 1975, thus connecting 97% of the 
counties in the TAR by paved roads.
823
 The constructions of the highways that linked 
Tibet with China began in the early 1950s and till date five major highways have been 
built. The Sichuan-Tibet Highway which runs from Chengdu in Sichuan to Tibet‟s 
capital Lhasa, have an extension of 2,413 km and passes through most of the major 
towns in Eastern Tibet. The construction works began in 1950 and was completed 
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after almost four years of hard labour without modern equipments. This highway 
which is probably the highest highway in the world crosses fourteen mountain ranges 
and twelve major rivers. The second is the Qinghai-Tibet Highway, also known as the 
“lifeline of the autonomous region,”824 which runs from Xining in Qinghai and passes 
through Amdo, Gharmo, Nagchukha before reaching Lhasa. It was completed in 1955 
and extends over 1,965 km and runs at an average altitude of 4,000 metres above sea 
level. The two highways in Eastern Tibet were purposely constructed for military use 
and they facilitated an easy takeover of Tibet by the Communist troops in the 
1950s.
825
  
 
The third major trunk road is the Sinkiang (Xinjiang)-Tibet highway, the continuation 
of Sichuan-Tibet highway, that starts from Lhasa and goes through Shigatse, Sakya, 
Lhatse and Rutok in Ngari (Western Tibet) before it reaches Yarkand in Xinjiang. The 
work began in 1956 and was completed within a year. In 1959, a shorter route that 
joins Lhasa and Yarkand via Gartok was improved. Both of these roads are considered 
as of “strategic importance to the Chinese army in [their] attempt to control Tibet and 
may have been one of the contributory causes of the Sino-Indian conflict”.826 The 
fourth trunk road is the Yunnan-Tibet highway which runs from Hsiakuan (Xiaguan) 
in Yunnan Province to Mangkam in Tibet and merges with the Sichuan-Tibet highway 
that goes to Lhasa. The construction work on the 315 km-long highway was started in 
1967 and was only completed almost ten years later in mid 1976. This could be partly 
due to the Cultural Revolution which might have disrupted the works. The China-
Nepal Highway,
827
 also known as the “golden passageway,” starts from Shigatse (Ch: 
Xigaze) and passes through the towns of Lhatse, Tingri and Nyalam before reaching 
the Friendship Bridge in Dram (Ch.: Zham) on the Sino-Nepal border. From there the 
736 km highway continues onto Kathmandu, Nepal. This stretch of highway which 
was constructed in three years since the initial work began in June 1962 has 
significant military importance as it is viewed as “a land bridge between different 
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parts of Asia”828 and China. These networks of highways brought Lhasa and other 
parts of Tibet very close to mainland China and other autonomous regions; linking 
Tibet with Xinjiang to the northwest and Qinghai to the northeast, Yunnan to the 
southeast and Sichuan to the east. Driven by “political passion for road building,” the 
Chinese government relentlessly built more than 40,000 km of highways that include 
15 trunk lines and 315 feeder lines on the highest plateau of the world.
829
 (See 
Appendix 8 for comparison of length of roads in the early 1950s with the recent 
decades.)  
 
Strategically, the Sichuan-Tibet highway is one of the most important highways in 
Tibet as it gives the PLA easy access to some highly critical locations on the Tibetan 
borders. This highway branches off into three different routes from Shigatse. One 
links Xinjiang with Tibet, the second connects Nepal with Tibet and the third leads to 
Nathula, in the Tibet-Sikkim border areas, passing through Gyantse, Phari and 
Dromo. The trijunction Nathula area between Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan is considered 
a highly strategic spot that is prone to any foreign invasions given the earlier 
precedence of the Younghusband Expedition (1904) entering Tibet through this pass. 
Moreover Chinese reluctance to recognise India‟s sovereignty over Sikkim until 2003 
indicated the strategic values of the region. Furthermore, numerous skirmishes had 
taken place in the region between the armies of the two countries which culminated 
into the 1962 Sino-Indian war. These highways in the southern parts of Tibet thus 
have great potential to transport Chinese army and military supplies to strategic 
locations in times of emergency. In short, the five highways increased the connectivity 
of Tibet with China which ensured complete Communist control of Tibet and 
facilitated the transportation of the PLA throughout Tibet including the border areas. 
Although the roads remain the primary lines of transportation and communication, the 
twenty first century saw an important and effective additional means of transportation, 
i.e., the railway.  
 
3.7.5.2 21
st
 Century: An Era of Railways in Tibet 
On 1 July 2006 an unprecedented event occurred in the history of Tibet‟s 
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transportation system when the Qinghai-Tibet Railway was launched, materialising 
the decades long dream of both the Nationalist and the Communist Government of 
China. President Hu Jintao at the opening ceremony of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway 
called this achievement as an “historic opportunity for the economic and social 
development in Qinghai province and Tibet Autonomous Region”.830 However, few 
years back in response to a query about the economic feasibility of the Qinghai-Tibet 
Railway, the former President Jiang Zemin termed the Qinghai-Tibet Railway plan as 
a “political decision,”831 that would be carried out despite what economic loss it might 
incur. This statement reveals the strategic significance of the railway. Therefore, 
regardless of the variation in the Chinese leaders‟ claims the fact remains that the 
railway is an effective mode of transportation which in times of emergency could be 
used to deploy arms and armies. Although economic potentials of the railway cannot 
be ignored, one must not sidetrack the strategic implications, considering the 
Communist Government‟s announcement to extend the railway lines832 further into 
the Southern regions of Tibet that lie around the fuzzy undemarcated international 
borders which is causing much speculation amongst the Indian defence strategists.
833
  
 
The Qinghai-Tibet Railway is the most important strategic development since the 
1950s. Dubbed as the highest railway on earth, the 1,956 km long railway (from 
Xining to Lhasa) scales the Kunlun mountain, enters the Kunlun Mountain Tunnel 
which is 1,686 metres long, crosses Tangula pass at 5,068 metres
834
 and traverses 550 
kilometres of frozen earth. At present trains from seven different cities run on the 
Qinghai-Tibet Railway bringing passengers from Beijing, Chengdu, Lanzhou, Xining, 
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Chongqing, Shanghai and Guangzhou to Lhasa. The first four trains began their 
operations on 1 July 2006 while Chongqing-Lhasa train started on the next day on 2 
July. Shanghai-Lhasa train and Guangzhou-Lhasa train started later on October 1 and 
2 respectively. All these trains run from Lhasa on alternative days except for the 
Beijing-Lhasa train which runs daily to and from Lhasa. 
 
The Beijing-Lhasa train, numbered T27, starts from Beijing West (xi) and passes 
through the stations of Shijiazhuang, Xi‟an, Lanzhou, Xining, Golmud 
(Gormo/Geermu) and Naqu (Nagqu) before finally arriving in Lhasa. The train takes 
47 hours 30 minutes to traverse the 4,064 km long route. Although the return train that 
leaves Lhasa for Beijing is numbered differently (T28), it passes through the same 
cities. The second train which is the Chengdu-Lhasa train, numbered T22/23, leaves 
Chengdu and runs through Guangyuan, Baoji, Lanzhou, Xining, Golmud and Nagu 
(Nagqu) before reaching its final destination, Lhasa. Taking 48 hours and 10 minutes 
to cover the distance of 3,360 km the train makes the return journey with a different 
number, T24/21, and takes half an hour longer. The K917 Lanzhou-Lhasa train moves 
through Xining, Haergai (Hairag), Keke (Hoh Yanchang), Delinga, Golmud, 
Tuotuohe, Anduo (Amdo), Naqu (Nagqu), Dangxiong (Damxung) and arrives in 
Lhasa. The 2,188 km journey is covered in 28 hours and 45 minutes. The return train, 
numbered K918, takes 30 hours and 13 minutes to reach Lanzhou via the same tracks. 
The Xining-Lhasa train, numbered N917, is yet another train to roll into Lhasa after 
passing through various cities of Haergai (Hairag), Keke (Hoh Yanchang), Delingha, 
Golmud, Tuotuohe, Anduo (Amdo), Anduo (Amdo), Naqu (Nagqu) and Dangxiong 
(Damxung). The train covers a distance of 1,972 km in 26 hours and 23 minutes. Like 
the other trains the Xining-Lhasa train, numbered N918, makes the return trip in 
slightly longer period of time. The Chongqing-Lhasa train, numbered T222/223, 
makes several stops, at Guang‟an, Dazhou, Xi‟an, Baoji, Lanzhou, Xining, Golmud 
and Naqu (Nagqu), on its way to Lhasa. With the travel time of 47 hours and 8 
minutes the train covers a distance of 3,654 km on each run. The T224/221 
Chongching-Lhasa train makes the return trip in 48 hours and 50 minutes. The two 
most recent trains to operate on Qinghai-Tibet Railway are the Shanghai-Lhasa train, 
numbered T164/165, and the Guangzhou-Lhasa train, numbered T264/265, which had 
their debut in October. The Shanghai-Lhasa train runs through Wuxi, Nanjing, 
Bengbu, Zhengzhou, Xi‟an, Lanzhou, Xining, Golmud and Naqu (Nagqu), before 
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screeching to a halt in Lhasa. It travels a distance of 4,373 km in 51 hours. The train 
numbered T166/163 makes the return journey through the same routes. The latest 
addition on the Qinghai-Tibet Railway is the Guangzhou-Lhasa train, which traverse 
through Changsha, Wuchang, Zhengzhou, Xi‟an, Lanzhou, Xining, Golmud and Naqu 
(Nagqu) before reaching Lhasa. Covering a distance of 4,980 km, the train has a 
longer route than any other train to Lhasa. The T266/263 makes the return journey on 
the same route in 58 hours. (See Appendix 9 for the schedule of the trains.) 
With seven trains running at least twice a week into Lhasa, the connectivity of the 
Tibetan plateau with other major Chinese cities has increased substantially. Apart 
from the obvious consequences of exponential growth in the mass movements and 
tourism, the trains have the capability to transport military logistics and assist in rapid 
deployment of men and materials. The railway line from Lanzhou to Lhasa will 
extend the Lanzhou Military Region‟s reach quite close to the Himalayan borders. 
Moreover, the thirty regiments of the PLA present in Golmud and the five divisions in 
Chengdu can be brought to Lhasa in a short time. From the recent Chinese official 
announcements it is evident that China has plans to extend the railway to Shigatse in 
the next year. The project to lay a 270 km extension shall be completed in three 
years.
835
 According to another Chinese source Beijing is weighing other plans to 
extend the railway tracks to Nyingchi in Nyingchi Prefecture and Yadong (near the 
Nathula pass) in the next ten years.
836
 Such an extensive railway network, especially 
to the Sino-Nepalese, Sino-Bhutanese and Sino-Indian borders,–which the Chinese 
claim will “step up trade with Nepal and India, and turn Tibet into the frontier for 
Southern Asian economic communication”837–must not be viewed purely from the 
economic aspects. Without denying the economic windfalls that might entail from the 
railways, we should be mindful of other ramifications.  
Delving into the past histories of the concerned regions would reveal the strategic 
importance of the planned railway extensions. Nathula pass, for instance, is on the 
Sikkim-Tibet border and it connects Yadong County with Sikkim. Until recently the 
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Chinese Government had refused to accept it as a part of India.
838
 In the past five 
decades the region had witnessed border skirmishes between the two nations and a 
serious confrontation during the 1962 war and in 1967. Another highly contested area 
is the Indian northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh (which was previously known as 
North Eastern Frontier Region). Right after the occupation of Tibet, China claimed 
that Arunachal Pradesh was a part of China. A decade of talks between India and 
China failed to resolve the issue which eventually led to the 1962 war in which China 
captured most of the area now called Arunachal Pradesh. Although the Chinese force 
withdrew from the captured areas, the Chinese Government did not give up their 
claims over the region. Due to proximity of these regions to the trunk roads and the 
planned railway extensions we have to weigh the strategic significance of the new 
infrastructural developments taking place on the Tibetan plateau.  
It is self-evident that neither of the two countries feels secure as long as Tibet remains 
under the occupation of the other nation with the enemy forces along the borders. 
Similar observations have been made by many Indian strategists who view the 
Chinese rule in Tibet as the termination of the buffer zone that was Tibet. Sureshwar 
D. Sinha, a retired officer of the Indian navy, stated at the International Convention on 
Tibet and Peace in South Asia that “for thousands of years India and China were at 
peace and that was because Tibet was a virtual buffer zone. This period of peace was 
only halted when Tibet was over-run by China and its army came up to the Indian 
borders”.839 He further asserted that a fully militarised Tibet with Chinese forces 
would make Nepal‟s attempt to become a peaceful buffer zone meaningless and 
futile.
840
 Not only that the presence of Chinese military forces in Tibet has compelled 
India to keep up militarily with China at ever increasing defence expenditures. “Both 
[China and India] are forging new, offensive military strategies underpinned by 
growing economies and expanding defence budgets and are seeking new allies in 
Asia,” writes John M. Malik, an expert on South Asian policy.841 During the 
International Convention on Tibet and Peace in South Asia, mentioned above, held in 
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New Delhi from 12–14 August 1989 and led by former Defence Minister George 
Fernandes, a multitude of prominent Indian leaders including former Presidents, 
ministers, defence personnel, diplomats and members of Indian parliament, gathered 
to discuss strategic policies concerning Tibet, India and China and formulate 
recommendations for the Indian government. A similar international convention was 
held from April 9-11, 1960 when Jayaprakash Narayan convened „The Afro-Asian 
Convention on Tibet and Against Colonialism in Asia and Africa‟, in New Delhi. It 
was attended by many outstanding Indian politicians and participants from nineteen 
countries. Prior to that „All India Tibet Convention‟ and „Convention on Tibet‟ were 
held in May 1959 in Calcutta and June 1959 in Madras respectively. Another 
significant series of conferences was the Himalayan Bachao Sammelans (Save the 
Himalayan Conferences) initiated during the early 1960s “to make the Indian people 
aware of the importance of the Himalayas for their national security”.842 These events 
highlight the serious considerations accorded by the Indian leaders and think tanks to 
the Tibet related issues. Therefore, it is pertinent here to look at the history of the 
vacillating bilateral relations between China and India that has left the two nations in 
perpetual state of distrust and mutual suspicions. 
 
3.7.5.3 Sino-Indian Relations: Tensions and Bilateral Efforts 
The end of the Great Game between Britain and Russia saw a new political order 
taking shape in the Asian continent. By 1950 nationalist governments had emerged in 
the two great and ancient civilisations of India and China. Their sizes, resources and 
the organisations made them excel amongst their small neighbours who either came 
into existence as products of decolonisation and thus whose own legitimacy is 
questionable or were engaged in internal strife. This gave an opportunity for the two 
Asian giants to forge ahead in all spheres, most importantly in economy, industries 
and military strength. Yet the same opportunity fostered a strong sense of competition 
between the two nations which added to the earlier difficult issues, most significantly 
the Chinese rejection of the British drawn McMahon Line (1914) separating Tibet and 
India, India‟s acceptance of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees since 1959 and 
the border disputes stemming from the 1962 Sino-Indian border war which resulted in 
                                                 
842 Jaya Jaitley, Tibet and Peace in South Asia, 1991, p. 1. 
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Chinese occupation of 14,500 square miles of Indian territory in Jammu and Kashmir. 
Since the 1962 war, Sino-Indian relations have been comprised of distrust, hostilities 
and mutual antagonism. Both countries adopted strategies of containing the other 
from achieving regional predominance in South Asia by establishing alignments with 
other Asian countries. China extended its sphere of influence by forming alliances 
with Nepal, Bangladesh and of course with the well-known enemy of India, Pakistan, 
which further exacerbated the rivalry. India, on the other hand, responded by forming 
closer ties with Vietnam and other Indo-China countries. Moreover, each side 
increased its border troops after the 1962-war. India started a new border police force 
known as Indo Tibetan Border Police Force (ITBP)
843
 on 24 October 1962. On the 
other side China‟s troops increased from a mere few thousands before 1962 to 
100,000 to 200,000 troops in Tibet.
844
 The growing tension in the region eased a little 
when in 1976 the bilateral relation between the two giants took an upward turn. 
However, no agreements were reached in resolving the sensitive issues. Other issues 
also rocked the already vacillating relation between the two Asian giants; strong 
nuclear arms race between the two countries and China‟s transfer of nuclear and 
missile technology to Pakistan.  
 
Several years later in 1979 and again in 1981, exchanges took place at Foreign 
Ministry level whereby both parties acquiesced to seek solution to the long-standing 
border disputes which resulted in eight rounds of talks between 1981 and 1987; all 
without success. While in the midst of this stagnated and stretched-out period of talks, 
China allegedly intruded Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh
845
 which 
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further deteriorated the Sino-Indian relations and escalated tension that eventually led 
to skirmishes across the border. Streams of accusations and warnings flew from both 
nations. The seventh round of talk was held as planned in July 1986 but did not result 
in any substantive agreement on important issues. An important turn of event occurred 
following the seventh round of talks when the Indian Parliament conferred full 
statehood to Arunachal Pradesh on December 8-9, 1986, which the Chinese perceived 
as a possible legal erosion of their claim. However, tension was somewhat defused 
after the eighth round of talks with both sides agreeing to upgrade the level of talks to 
a political level. After a period of six months, in December 1988, Indian Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi made the first official visit by an Indian Prime Minister to 
China since 1954. Reciprocal visit was made by Premier Li Peng in December 1991. 
Despite these high level visits and the series of talks from 1981 to 1988 the disputed 
border issues remained too difficult and complicated to solve.  
 
In May 1992, Indian President Venkataraman visited China, during which the Chinese 
President Yang Shangkun pointed out the need for cooperation between India and 
China to avoid being “left behind” and “bullied by others”.846 These visits contributed 
to the ongoing gestures of Sino-Indian reconciliation and culminated into the signing 
of the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility by Indian Prime 
Minister Narasimha Rao and Premier Li Peng in September 1993. This was seen as a 
major breakthrough in Sino-Indian relation.
847
 The two nations celebrated the fortieth 
anniversary of the signing of the Panchsheel Agreement in 1994 and two years later, 
in November 1996, at the height of Sino-Indian cordiality Jiang Zemin made an 
official visit to India, thus becoming the first President of the PRC ever to do so, 
during which the two nations agreed to cut down the number of troops along the Line 
of Actual Control (LAC), by signing the Agreement on Confidence Building 
Measures (CBM).
848
 Not only that the growing Sino-Indian détente was apparent in 
                                                 
846 Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing-dong Yuan, China and India: Cooperation or Conflict?, 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003, p. 24. 
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1996. The historic treaty was signed on 29 November 1996 by Indian External Affairs Minister I. 
K. Gujural and Chinese Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in the presence of Indian 
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other fields such as cooperation in the exploration of space, nuclear energy, science 
and technology and so on, with the two sides signing agreement whereby China 
agreed to supply uranium fuel for the Tarapur nuclear power plant under International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.
849
 The improved relation also reflected 
well on the trade between the two nations as it increased manifold, from US$129 
million in 1991 to US $3.59 billion in 2001, in little more than a decade.
850
 However, 
as J. Mohan Malik writes the closeness of the two Asian powers “should not lead one 
to assume that all the hurdles in the relationship between India and China have been 
overcome”851 since the core border disputes, the original casus belli, have not been 
resolved. The temporary friendship between China and India, developed to create a 
common front to face the western military dominance, stands on a fragile ground of 
unresolved border disputes, stiff economic and military competition and nuclear arms 
race. 
 
In May 1998 the newly elected Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government, in a radical 
“nuclear option” policy change, tested five nuclear devices at Pokhran in the 
northwestern state of Rajasthan. In the afternoon of the day the nuclear tests were 
carried out, Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee made a nation-wide statement 
in which he assured his countrymen that “the Government is deeply concerned...about 
the nuclear environment in India‟s neighbourhood. These tests provide reassurance to 
the people of India that their national security interests are paramount and will be 
promoted and protected”.852 In a letter sent to the US President Bill Clinton, 
explaining the reasons for carrying out the nuclear tests, Vajpayee explicitly stated the 
existing Chinese threat against India and the emerging Pakistani power as a risk to 
Indian security:  
 
I have been deeply concerned at the deteriorating security 
environment, specially the nuclear environment, faced by India for 
                                                 
849 Hamish McDonald, „Nuclear Pay-Off: China to Supply Enriched Uranium to India‟, Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 19 January 1995, Vol. 158, Issue 3, p.22. 
850 Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing-dong Yuan, China and India: Cooperation or Conflict?, p. 
150. 
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Martin‟s Press, 1995, p. 131.  
852 „Indian Official Statement on the Nuclear Tests, 11 May 1998‟, in Institute of Peace and Conflict 
Studies (Databases-Documents), 
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some years past. We have an overt nuclear weapon state on our 
borders, [China,] a state which committed armed aggression against 
India in 1962. Although our relations with that country have improved 
in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due 
to the unresolved border problem. To add to the distrust that country 
has materially helped another neighbour of ours [Pakistan,] to become 
a covert nuclear weapons state. At the hands of this bitter neighbour 
we have suffered three aggressions in the last 50 years. And for the last 
10 years we have been the victim of unremitting terrorism and 
militancy sponsored by it in several parts of our country, especially 
Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir.
853 
 
Beijing expressed „deep concern‟ over the first batch of nuclear tests conducted on 
May 11 and stated that such tests were contrary to international trends. But this mild 
response became charged with strong condemnations and accusations after the famous 
letter of Vajpayee to the US President that implicitly recognised China as a major 
threat to Indian security was published by New York Times. The Chinese government 
reacted with strong rhetoric and accusations. A wave of criticisms appeared in the 
Chinese official newspapers with harsh accusations and strong condemnations. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement on May 14 calling the tests as acts of 
“outrageous contempt”: 
 
In disregard of the strong opposition of the international community, 
the Indian government conducted two more nuclear tests on May 13 
following the May 11 tests. The Chinese government is deeply 
shocked by this and hereby expresses its strong condemnation. This 
act of India‟s is nothing but outrageous contempt for the common will 
of the international community for the comprehensive ban on nuclear 
tests and a hard blow on the international effort to prevent nuclear 
weapons proliferation. It will entail serious consequences to the peace 
and stability in South Asia and the world at large.
854
 
 
The year 1998 revealed that the deep rooted mutual suspicions between the two 
nations had remained unabated despite all the rapprochement attempts, friendly 
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overtures and military exchanges. It also proved that years‟ efforts in building bilateral 
relation could easily be overshadowed by their mutual distrust whenever radical 
changes took place especially in the field of national defence. Indian Defence 
Minister George Fernandes labeled China as India‟s “potential threat number one”855 
and defended India‟s nuclear testing as countermeasures against the nuclear power 
China which had India encircled by states such as Pakistan and Myanmar which are 
its military alliances. J. Mohan Malik writes that Beijing has pursued “a policy of 
containment of India and encirclement by proxy” and provided military arsenal to all 
of India‟s neighbours. He argues that “on the Indian subcontinent, China has never 
played a peace-maker‟s role”.856  
 
3.7.5.4 Tibet Constant in the Sino-Indian Equation 
No matter how close the relation between India and China become there is one 
constant discordant element that frustrates them–the Sino-Indian border dispute, 
which resulted from the Chinese occupation of Tibet. From the Indian point of view, 
especially the defence planners, every strategic development in Tibet implies China‟s 
growing expansionist ambitions, which must be watched closely. The Chinese 
military presence in Tibet backed by numerous missile bases and convenient modes of 
transportation viz. the trunk roads and the railway lines, in times of emergency, is 
viewed as direct threats to India. On the other hand Beijing perceives India‟s 
hospitality toward the Tibetans as an implicit support for Tibetan liberation movement 
and remains apprehensive of India‟s sheltering of the Dalai Lama. Beijing frequently 
accuses India of harbouring the Tibetan refugees and allowing the Tibetan 
Government-in-Exile to function on Indian soil.  
 
Other factors that alarm the Indian defence personnel are the installations of Chinese 
missile and nuclear bases and airfields in Tibet. However, China has consistently 
denied the presence of missiles in Tibet. But reports have indicated the presence of 
nuclear facilities in Tibet as early as 1971.
857
 Tibetan Review, in March 1974, 
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identified Nagchu as the location of the first nuclear base in Tibet.
858
 Five months 
later a report carried by the Russian Novosti Press Agency (NPA) made the same 
claims adding that China has “more than 200 atom and hydrogen bombs ready for 
action” which were deployed in Tibet.859 The presence of radar and tracking stations 
near the Indian borders were also reported by the same source which was later 
confirmed by both Indian intelligence and American aerial detection.
860
 R. R. 
Subramanian identified CSS-1 medium-range ballistic missiles (Dong Feng DF-2) 
and CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (DF-3) as the first Chinese missiles 
that were deployed in the mountainous locations in Tibet.
861
 Other reports showed that 
China had transported CSS-2 ballistic missiles to areas in Nagchu
862
 and CSS-3 (DF-
4), China‟s first Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile, in Tsaidam Basin.863 According to 
a US intelligence evaluation, “China has targeted India since the 1970s, and currently 
has sixty-six nuclear missiles that can reach all of India‟s major cities and military 
areas”.864 India‟s 2000-2001 defence annual report carry similar reports that “every 
major Indian city is within the reach of Chinese missiles and it is reported that this 
capacity is being further augmented”865 by the inclusion of submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles.  
 
All these information certainly give valid reasons for India to be sceptical about 
China‟s military intentions. However, lack of transparency and the obsessively 
secretive nature of the Communist regime make it difficult to ascertain the true 
situation of China‟s missile deployment and targeting policy, and therefore to assess 
the extent of China‟s threat to its South Asian neighbours. Nevertheless such reports 
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do carry weight as they provide a measure of deterrence against attacks on China and 
alarm the neighbouring countries. With extensive networks of highways and feeder 
lines, railway lines and airfields, missile and military installations, Tibet would remain 
a major Chinese military base for years to come and thus would remain a wedge 
between the two Asian giants. 
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PART IV SELF DETERMINATION 
 
Chapter 8 Self-Determination: Legitimate Right of the Tibetan People 
 
So many, over such a long period of time, have drawn much aspiration and hopes 
from the right of all peoples to self-determination. Perhaps no contemporary 
international norm has inspired as much contestations or garnered as much support as 
the right of national self-determination. The principle of national self-determination 
became an obvious instrument that was used in the re-division of the disintegrated 
territories of the Western Empires by the victorious powers.
866
 After World War II, at 
the pinnacle of the implementation of this principle scores of colonial nations 
achieved independence. Outside the colonial context Finland and Poland seceded 
from Russia and more recently Bangladesh, Eritrea, Yugoslavia and East Timor won 
their independence after invoking the right to self-determination. Yet, due to a vague 
and imprecise meaning of self-determination, there is neither consensus among the 
legal experts and scholars on international politics on the content and scope of that 
right, nor consistency in the Charter of the United Nations which while proclaiming 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples at the same time 
opposes any form of disruption of national unity and the territorial integrity of a 
member state. Despite such complexity and contradiction, I consider it a right worth 
pursuing and a path worth embracing for the Tibetans in resolving the Tibet issue. I 
propose it as a more pragmatic and feasible recourse for the Tibet question while 
remaining mindful of two essential conditions for the achievement of self-
determination: 1) It is “generally resolved on the concrete plane of political struggle 
and not on the abstract level of relative rights;”867 and 2) It is dependent “to a great 
extent on the external support from one or more of the Great Powers”.868 To 
demonstrate the feasibility and pragmatism of the right to self-determination in the 
Tibetan case I shall look into the evolution of the right, the treatment of this right by 
the two Communist states of Russia and China in their nationality policies, the 
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support that Tibet case has received from international bodies and world leaders, and 
the support from dissident Chinese for the right to self-determination of Tibetans. 
 
As the ambiguity of the right to self-determination resides primarily in the vague 
language of the United Nations Charter and other resolutions when using the terms 
“nation”, “peoples” and “self-determination,” it is expedient to identify different 
interpretations of these terms. Therefore, in this chapter I will analyse the principle of 
national self-determination, its contents and applications in four parts: 1) In its 
evolutionary period; 2) In the United Nations Charter; 3) In the context of Soviet 
Russia; and 4) In the context of Communist China. While doing this, I will try to 
identify the basic elements which constitute the core factors in determining a nation‟s 
right to self-determination. At the same time I will examine various interpretations of 
the terms “nations” and “peoples,” in their relevant historical settings and will 
highlight the changes occurred to the meaning of these terms in the progression of the 
nationality policy [of the Communist nations]. In the end I will discuss whether 
Tibetans fulfill the requirement of being a nation in order to make claims for the right 
to self-determination and list the characteristics that make Tibetans a nation. 
 
4.8.1 Evolution of Self-Determination 
Self-determination, which is said to have originated from the German word 
Selbstbestimmungsrecht,
869
 like other political ideas, does not have an exact moment 
of birth but instead has evolved over many centuries. The crystallisation of the 
principle could be detected from the eighteenth-century Europe‟s shocked reactions to 
the treatments of Corsica by Genoese and Poland by her three great-power neighbours 
viz. Russia, Prussia and the Habsburg Empire.
870
 Corsica, which was then under 
Genoese rule, had waged guerrilla warfare for its independence for over thirty years. 
In 1768, as a permanent solution to the problem, Genoese republic sold the island to 
France for two million livres without the consent of Corsicans. In the case of Poland, 
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the vast and heterogeneous land which attracted the greedy eyes of her neighbours, 
dismemberment and partitions–in 1772, 1793 and 1795, led to its complete extinction. 
The shocking reactions displayed by the European public to these incidents indicated 
a significant change in the attitude of the people.
871
 Striking comments and criticisms 
came from great political thinkers of the time too. Edmund Burke viewed the sale of 
Corsica as akin to mere property transaction and commented: 
 
Thus was a nation disposed of without its consent, like the trees on an estate.
872
  
 
Similarly, Rousseau wrote: 
 
It is making fools of people to tell them seriously that one can at 
one‟s pleasure transfer peoples from master to master, like herds of 
c[h]attle, without consulting their interests or their wishes.
873 
 
Diagnosing Poland‟s troubles, Rousseau, in his Considerations sur le gouvernement 
de la Pologne, attributed the lack of strong cohesive commitment of the Polish people 
to their fatherland as its main factor. He stressed the vital importance of 
 
national institutions which form the genius, the character, the tastes, 
and the customs of the people, which make them what they are and 
not something else, and inspire that warm love of country founded 
on habits impossible to uproot.
874
 
 
Thus, two great political thinkers of the time articulated the essential concept of 
national self-determination in their own ways–Burke focusing on the development of 
„an organic‟ political theory as opposed to the individualist approach of the time and 
Rousseau emphasising the need for amour de la patrie, which Cobban translated as a 
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concept of nationalism, a trend of ideas that „leads straight to the nineteenth-century 
theory of national self-determination‟.875  
 
However, the concept of nationalism and democratic ideals which are the principal 
foundations of the national self-determination
876
 manifested itself in more concrete 
form in 1789 under the impact of the French Revolution. The Revolution, which 
embodied the notion that people aren‟t mere individuals but rather are one whole 
entity called nation, brought supreme authority to the people and made it “the single 
active principle in the state”.877 The theory of the Divine Rights of the Monarch 
received a fatal blow and got supplanted by the theory of the Divine Rights of the 
People. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789), one of the 
fundamental documents of the Revolution, states: 
 
The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. 
Nobody, nor any individual can exercise authority which does not 
expressly emanate from it.
878
 
 
The French Revolution thus inspired the spread of new ideals of democracy and 
growth of nationalism throughout Europe by “opening a fresh chapter in the history of 
nation state”879 and forming a “necessary connection between the state as a political 
unit and the nation as a cultural one”.880 Between 1848 and 1870, the principle of 
nationality reached its pinnacle of success and was expressed in a series of plebiscites. 
Initially, the French revolutionary government adopted it in good faith for its 
unification with the papal town of Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin in 1791, Savoy 
and Nice in 1792-93 but eventually it was applied as a political subterfuge in the 
annexations of the Belgian Communes and the Rhine Valley in 1793.
881
 The 
plebiscite was also used in the national unification of Italy in which Emilia, Tuscany, 
Sicily, the Kingdom of Naples, Marches and Umbria were unified with Sardinia in 
1860 to form the new Italian kingdom. The same method was employed in the 
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acquisition of Venetia and Rome in 1866 and 1870 respectively.
882
 Similarly, Great 
Britain applied this method in her cession of the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1863
883
 
and a year later at the Congress of London the chief powers confirmed plebiscite as 
the only solution of the Schleswig problem, and was included in the Treaty of Prague 
between Prussia and Austria in 1866.
884
 Furthermore, growth of the principle of self-
determination was boosted even more by the growing nationalism which was inspired 
by increasing assimilationist policies pursued by Ottoman, Austrian, German and 
Russian empires. The increasing nationalism fueled the concept that every nation 
must be free and entitled to organise its own state. Consequently, many new nations 
were formed and existing states were dissolved in those periods. Hence, scholars 
describe this historical process stimulated by the principle of self-determination as “a 
history of the making of nations and the breaking of states,”885 as well as “of the 
breaking of such nations and the remaking of new states”.886 
 
In the second half of the nineteenth century forces of liberal nationalism in Europe 
weakened and a policy of denationalisation towards minorities developed in many 
states. During this period imperialism advanced rapidly due to aggressive nationalism 
which caused the natural recession of the principle of national self-determination. The 
plebiscite which had been a successful mode of expression of national self-
determination suffered a major setback when Prussia annexed Schleswig in 1867, 
with total disregard to the Treaty of Prague, and Alsace-Lorraine in 1871. The 
principle of national self-determination was on the decline with attacks coming from 
the reactionary forces in the Western world who pushed for militant imperialism as 
well as from the left wings who under the influence of socialist ideology denounced 
both nationalism and democracy. Sarah Wambaugh writes, “In the economic and 
strategic rivalries of the late nineteenth century the international plebiscite, with its 
underlying principle of the right of peoples to determine the sovereignty over the 
territory in which they live, was as much ignored as during the Napoleonic period and 
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the Congress of Vienna”.887 After 1870 only two plebiscites were conducted; one in 
1877 between Sweden and France in the Island of Saint Bartholomew and the other in 
1905 in Norway to decide the issue of separation from Sweden. The British historian 
William Lecky summarised the point, in 1896, thus, “On the whole, the doctrine of 
the absolute and indefeasible right of nationalities to determine their own form of 
government seems to me now less prominent among the political ideas of the world 
than it was in 1848 and, at the period of the emancipation of Italy”.888 
 
The twentieth century began with the great empires of Central and Eastern Europe, 
primarily Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Turkey, seriously pursuing the 
expansionist policy which became the greatest barrier to the progress of national self-
determination.
889
 The whole world was split up between the great imperial powers 
with Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia ruling Eastern Europe, Great Britain and 
Russia controlling majority of the Asian continent, and Africa being ruled by the great 
European powers. Although the principle of national self-determination was still 
thought to be valid, the implementation and the universal acceptance of the principle 
occurred after the end of the World War I in 1918. Prior to the Russian Revolution, 
the Allies could not formulate a general recognition of the principle of nationality and 
self-determination as these liberal political ideals would conflict with the Tsarist 
imperialist who ruled over many subject nationalities. But the overthrow of the Tsarist 
regime in 1917 minimised the differences when the Russian Provincial Government 
announced “the establishment of a permanent peace on the basis of the self-
determination of peoples”.890 This turned out to be the decisive factor affecting the 
Allied policy on the national question which led to the outburst of „the dammed-up 
waters of nationality‟ and made self-determination a universally accepted principle 
after the war.
891
 
 
At the end of 1917 the Allied Powers felt it expedient to provide a coherent set of war 
aims to settle the aspirations of the freedom-seeking disaffected peoples based on the 
                                                 
887 Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War: With a Collection of Official Documents, Vol. 
1, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1933, p. 3. 
888 Quoted in Cobban, The Nation State and National Self-Determination, p. 47. 
889 Ibid., p. 48. 
890 A. J. Mayer, Political Origins of the New Diplomacy 1917-1918, New York: Random House, 
1970, p. 75. 
891 Alfred Cobban, The Nation State and National Self-Determination, p. 50. 
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principle of national self-determination. The concentrated efforts on producing the 
war aims resulted in three major announcements from Russia, Britain and America,
892
 
each containing important references to self-determination, of which the American 
President Woodrow Wilson‟s Fourteen Points, declared on 8 January 1918, became a 
crucial factor in developing the official Allied policy of national self-determination. 
Although the phrase “self-determination” had not been explicitly mentioned in the 
Fourteen Points the basic components, the right of nationalities and the interests of 
populations, of the principle are highlighted. Five weeks later in his address to the 
Congress given on 11 February 1918, President Wilson made a forthright 
commitment to the principle and declared that “„self-determination‟ is not a mere 
phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore 
at their peril”.893 Outlining his Four Principles, a codicil to the Fourteenth Point, 
President Wilson states: 
 
Second, that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from 
sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns 
in a game... Fourth, that all well defined national aspirations shall be 
accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without 
introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and 
antagonism.
894 
 
As the war came to an end, the Allied declarations on the need to employ national 
self-determination gradually grew in strength and frequency. Through streams of 
propaganda and also under pressure from President Wilson, the Allies had committed 
themselves „up to the hilt‟ to the principle of self-determination which naturally 
inspired all nations to expect a peace settlement based on the principle.
895
 The 
principle of national self-determination was used repeatedly, although in limited and 
unsystematic fashion, in the process of the peace settlements about which I am not 
going to go into detail here. Yet the application of the principle for the settlement of 
territorial disputes between nations and within nations was assumed to be applicable 
                                                 
892 The three announcements were made by Leon Trotsky, the People‟s Commissar for Foreign 
Affairs for the Russian government, on 29 December 1917, the British Prime Minister Lloyd 
George on 5 January 1918 and the American President Woodrow Wilson on 8 January 1918. 
893 James Brown Scott, (ed.), President Wilson‟s Foreign Policy: Messages, Addresses, Papers, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1918, p. 268. 
894 Ibid., pp. 371-372. 
895 Alfred Cobban, The Nation State and National Self-Determination, p. 56. 
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only in the European context, more specifically in the territories taken from the 
defeated powers, and not in the colonial possessions in Africa and Asia.
896
 Thus, in 
the first quarter of the twentieth century, it is reasonable to claim that national self-
determination became a well established political principle as well as an oft-time 
employed political instrument, at first in defining the war aims and then in carrying 
out the peace treaties.  
 
Although obstacles
897
 and complications abound the practical application of the 
principle of self-determination, especially when it conflicted with the interests of 
Allied powers, it nevertheless-played deciding roles in the resolution of post-war 
settlements including the provision of secession to Czechs and Slovaks from Austro-
Hungarian Empire and independence to Finland and Poland.
898
 Furthermore, in 
formulating compromised solutions to the questions of Saar Basin,
899
 the Shantung 
province,
900
 and so on, the Allies considered not only the financial demands of the 
victor nations, in this case France and Japan respectively, but also were mindful of the 
national element of the concerned territory.
901
 In all of these instances the nationality 
element was accorded enormous considerations in finding the solutions, just as the 
Memorandum on Territorial Settlement envisioned as early as autumn 1916 which 
called on “the principle of nationality to be one of the governing factors in the 
consideration of territorial arrangements after the war”.902  
                                                 
896 Lung-chu Chen, „Self-Determination as a Human Right‟, W. M. Reisman & B. H. Weston (ed.), 
Toward World Order and Human Dignity, New York: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan 
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897 Alfred Cobban has identified three major obstacles: 1) Allies‟ lack of intention to apply self-
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899 France demanded Saar basin, a land predominantly populated by Germans, as war reparations. Yet 
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58-59. 
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sovereignty to China”. Alfred Cobban, The Nation State and National Self-Determination, p. 59  
901 Derek Heater, National Self-Determination, pp. 57-64. 
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Considering all the attention that had been devoted to nationality, either in rhetoric or 
policy, what is the definition of a nation? How do we distinguish one nation from 
another? As the receiver of the right to self-determination nation must be something 
which is definable and identifiable. Yet in the aftermath of World War I, the peace 
settlements were conducted and the right to self-determination given but without a 
guiding definition of nation or nationality. Despite continued attempts, no theorist or 
scholar could structure an objective definition which could unequivocally differentiate 
one nation from another. Distinguishing characteristics, unique features, or tangible 
attributes were sought in vain which could accomplish the job of defining a nation. 
Language, race, territorial contiguity, economy, and religion are but some of the 
objective properties used to classify a nation. But nation is too fluid a concept to be 
objectified in such a way. Plethora of exceptions could be found to every proposed 
test. The English and French writers of the time held the view that nationality was 
mainly a subjective fact of individual‟s political or social consciousness, a 
psychological marker that is national consciousness, whereas the German and Central 
European thinkers searched primarily for objective tests.
903
 Some favoured the 
subjective feature rather than objective one, arguing that any territorial community 
whose members are conscious of themselves as members of the community and desire 
to retain their identity as a community could be considered as a nation. Criticism to 
this line of thought came from thinkers such as Burke and Charles Maurras who 
argued that nationality does not happen by the will of people, for people had no 
choice in their birth. But these critics could not prescribe an objective test that would 
work. As shall be seen later Joseph Stalin combined both the objective and subjective 
elements in defining nation. 
 
4.8.2 Self-Determination in the United Nations 
During World War II, the American and the British leaders once again invoked the 
principle of self-determination as one of the objectives of Anglo-American policy in 
the Atlantic Charter. Signed by Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in 
August 1941 the Charter includes the following principles: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
pp. 31-32. 
903 Alfred Cobban, The Nation and National Self-Determination, p. 107. 
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First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other; 
Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord 
with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; 
Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of 
government under which they will live; and they wish to see 
sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have 
been forcibly deprived of them.
904 
 
With this declaration the principle of self-determination, unlike during the World War 
I phase, acquired a more “universal appeal akin to that of human dignity and was 
correlated with the maintenance of world public order”.905 Few years later on 26 June 
1945, at the United Nations Conference on International Organisation held in San 
Francisco, the international community formally recognised the principle of self-
determination as vital to international security and peace and decided to uphold its 
application to all peoples, regardless of racial or geographical factors by signing the 
Charter of the United Nations.
906
 Although the Dumbarton Oaks Proposal, the 
preliminary proposals to the United Nations Charter, contained no mention of self-
determination, the actual Charter contained references to it. Article 1(2) of the Charter 
identified developing “friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” as one of its purposes. 
Likewise Article 55 states that the United Nations shall promote a number of goals 
“with a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are 
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples..”.907 
 
Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not mention the principle 
of self-determination, both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), the two International Covenants on Human Rights, proclaim the right of 
                                                 
904 Quoted in fn 65, Lung-chu Chen, „Self-Determination as a Human Right‟, in Toward World Order 
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905 Ibid., p. 215. 
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self-determination prominently. Common Article 1(1) and 1(3) of the above two 
covenants state:
908
 
 
Art. 1(1) All people have the right of self-determination. By virtue of 
that right they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 
 
Art. 1(3) The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those 
having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing 
and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of 
self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with 
the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
909 
 
The Sixth General Assembly, by its resolution 545 (VI) of February 5, 1952, decided 
to include an article on the right of all peoples and nations to self-determination in the 
Covenants of Human Rights to reaffirm the principles articulated in the Charter of the 
United Nations. The resolution states: 
 
1. This article shall be drafted in the following terms: “All peoples 
shall have the right of self-determination,” and shall stipulate that all 
States, including those having responsibility for the administration 
of Non-Self-Governing Territories, should promote the realization of 
that right, in conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the 
United Nations, and States having responsibility for the 
administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories should promote 
the realization of that right in relation to the peoples of such 
territories. 
2. Requests the Commission on Human Rights to prepare 
recommendations concerning international respect for the self-
determination of peoples and to submit these recommendations to 
the General Assembly at its seventh session.
910 
  
                                                 
908 The two international covenants, ICESCR and ICCPR, have the same Article 1. The covenants 
have been ratified by at least two-thirds of the member States of the UN.  
909 The two covenants can be viewed at the following UN websites, 
  http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm. 
910 The resolution can be viewed at this website,  
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As per the above mentioned resolution, the Commission on Human Rights worked on 
drafting the two International Covenants on Human Rights and completed them at its 
tenth session, held in the spring of 1954, and presented them to the Economic and 
Social Council and the General Assembly. The Article 1 of the draft of the two 
Covenants began with this line, “All people and all nations shall have the right of self-
determination,” and went on to propose the promotion of the realisation of that right 
by all the States in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. 
After much deliberation, particularly on Article 1 of the two draft Covenants, which 
involved considerable debates whether to include the article on self-determination and 
the meaning of “peoples” and “nations,” the text was redrafted by a Working Party 
and adopted in 1966 as the first article of the two International Covenants on Human 
Rights. 
 
Phrases such as “nations” and “all people” mentioned in the Charter, the Convenants 
and the resolutions have inspired much disagreement among the delegations, scholars 
and experts on international law since its first inclusion in the United Nations Charter 
and then in the two Covenants on Human Rights. Lung-chu Chen, a Senior Research 
Associate at the Yale Law School, in his brilliant study of Self-determination, stated 
that the first clause in paragraph one of the above article “was meant to be universal”. 
“Peoples,” he writes, “was meant to refer to all peoples in all countries and territories, 
whether independent, trust, or non-self-governing. The insertion of “all nations” was 
intended to emphasize the universal character of the right of self-determination”.911 
While other scholars such as Helen Quane, a senior lecturer at the University of 
Westminster, interpreted the term used in the United Nations Charter in three different 
ways “on the basis of the language, context and object and purpose of Article 1(2) and 
55,”–referring to the States, to the inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories and 
to the inhabitants of Trust Territories,
912
 indicating a limited applicability of the 
Charter. 
 
More specific interpretations came from different delegates to the UN. For instance, 
the Pakistan delegate Mr. Waheed understood peoples as referring to “weak peoples” 
                                                 
911 Lung-chu Chen, „Self-Determination as a Human Right‟, in Toward World Order & Human 
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whereas Mr. Azkoul of Lebenon applied it to nationals of “countries that had lost their 
independence as a result of aggression”. Mrs. Roosevelt who led the United States 
delegation at the UN stated that “the principle of self-determination applied not only 
to peoples which had not yet attained their independence but also to politically 
independent States which need protection from external pressure, threats, the use of 
force, and subversive activities”. The Yugoslavian delegation proposed that “the right 
to self-determination belonged to both non-self-governing and sovereign peoples as 
long as their independence could be threatened by other States”. Yet the assertion 
made by the Polish delegate Mr. Boratynski that “the search for definitions was 
unnecessary as self-determination should be proclaimed for all” contained the 
sentiments representative of the Assembly‟s view as well as the view of all the 
minorities everywhere.
913
 Similarly, the phrase self-determination itself is cloaked in 
ambiguity, as the concept changes its meaning depending on circumstances, and has 
acquired the status of being one of the most contested political concepts of the 
twentieth century. This ambiguity has resulted in a proposition of a draft resolution in 
the General Assembly, in 1955, suggesting an establishment of an ad hoc commission 
comprising of five people selected by the Secretary General to conduct a detailed 
study of the concept of self-determination.
914
 
 
One landmark document that could be considered as a major victory and “the United 
Nations‟ most important contributions” for the principle of self-determination at the 
United Nations is the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples which was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly 
Resolution 1514 (XV) in 1960. It is worth quoting the first five proclamations of the 
Declaration: 
 
1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and 
exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is 
contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment 
to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.  
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that 
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
                                                 
913 All the quotations in this paragraph are from Clyde Eagleton‟s „Self-Determination in the United 
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their economic, social and cultural development.  
3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational 
preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying 
independence.  
4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed 
against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to 
exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, 
and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected.  
5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing 
Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained 
independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those 
territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance 
with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as 
to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete 
independence and freedom.
915
 
 
This Declaration, which was applied vigorously during the colonial period, brought “a 
legal status and meaning”916 to the principle of self-determination and became an 
effective catalyst for accelerating the decolonisation process. Over the years the 
Security Council has reaffirmed the principle on numerous occasions, starting with S. 
C. Res. 183 of 11 December 1963, S. C. Res. 301 in 1971, S. C. Res. 377 in 1975 and 
S. C. Res. 384 in 1975.
917
 
 
Similarly, the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations is yet another document that has embodied the principle of self-
determination. Adopted in 1970 this Declaration once again proclaimed the right to 
self-determination: 
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By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples 
have the right freely to determine, without external interference, 
their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in 
accordance with the provisions of the Charter. Every State has the 
duty to promote, through joint and separate action, realization of the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, in 
accordance with the provisions of the Charter, and to render 
assistance to the United Nations in carrying out the responsibilities 
entrusted to it by the Charter regarding the implementation of the 
principle, in order:  
(a) To promote friendly relations and co-operation among States; 
and 
(b) To bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to the 
freely expressed will of the peoples concerned; 
and bearing in mind that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, 
domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle, 
as well as a denial of fundamental human rights, and is contrary to 
the Charter. Every State has the duty to promote through joint and 
separate action universal respect for and observance of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the Charter. The 
establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free 
association or integration with an independent State or the 
emergence into any other political status freely determined by a 
people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-
determination by that people.  
Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which 
deprives peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present 
principle of their right to self-determination and freedom and 
independence.
918 
The above quoted resolutions, covenants, Charter and other related documents of the 
United Nations plainly and unequivocally proclaimed the right of self-determination 
to all peoples. However, there are no clear answers to some basic questions such as; 
                                                 
918 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The declaration can be viewed 
at, 
  http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/25/ares25.htm. 
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Who may make legitimate claim to the right to self-determination and under what 
circumstances? What would be the status of the principle of self-determination under 
international law–whether it is just a political principle or has it legal binding? How 
universal and practicable is the principle of self-determination? Aside from these 
issues the principle of self-determination faces numerous challenges in the actual 
application, the most common of which is rooted in the claim of “domestic 
jurisdiction” that repudiates the United Nations‟ competence to put it into practice. 
Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter asserts that “nothing contained in the 
present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members 
to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall 
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII”. Yet an 
interpretation, by the Permanent Court of International Justice, of something which is 
“solely within the domestic jurisdiction” as “an essentially relative question [that] 
depends upon the development of international relations”919 leaves some room for the 
United Nations to express its “authoritative competence” when dealing with disputes 
relating to self-determination. The successful resolution of the colonial problems 
strongly established that authority for the United Nations. However, the United 
Nations has limited success when dealing with the question of self-determination for 
people who are outside the “colonies or trust territories” because of exercising of 
extreme caution. Professor Lung-chu Chen attributed this as reflecting “a sense of 
realism and caution necessitated by the actual base values at [the United Nations‟] 
disposal” and not a representative of lack of formal authority since the United Nations 
has dismissed claims to domestic jurisdiction whenever “an important dispute 
involves genuine demands for self-determination and a significant degree of threat to 
world peace and security”.920 
 
A thorough understanding of the languages used in the United Nations‟ documents 
should allow us to answer some of the above questions. The most ambiguous 
language in the Charter and the Covenants concern the usage of the terms “people,” 
“nations” and “self-determination”. Various political scientists, international lawyers 
                                                 
919 Quoted in Lung-chu Chen‟s „Self-Determination as a Human Right‟, in Toward World Order and 
Human Dignity, p. 220. 
920 Ibid., pp. 221-222. 
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and the UN scholars have attempted to interpret and clarify the meaning of these 
words, but with not much conclusive results. One common interpretation of the word 
“peoples” in relation to them having the right to self-determination, as provided by 
Rupert Emerson,
921
 Bruno Simma and many others,
922
 concerns the circumstantial 
meanings which are history-dependent. The peoples involved with the self-
determination during the Wilsonian period were the ethnic communities and nations 
with their special attributes of common language and culture whereas the ones 
involved during the decolonisation period were the inhabitants of specific territories 
under foreign rule in which case ethnic identity essentially was irrelevant. To put it 
more succinctly the two types of peoples are the “minorities living inside a state 
territory, and colonial peoples living beyond the boundaries of the colonial power.
923
 
Another interpretation, which is wholly circumstantial, is the one provided by Helen 
Quane who understands the term peoples differently in different context. According to 
her while in the Charter it refers to the inhabitants of States, Non-Self-Governing 
Territories and Trust Territories and in the Resolution 1514 (XV) it refers only to 
colonial peoples. She also accepts a more universal definition of people based on the 
two International Human Rights Covenants and Declaration concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States.
924
 Perusing through various literatures it 
becomes apparent that “all commentators on self-determination have pointed out that 
neither „people‟ nor „nation‟ has any generally accepted meaning which can be 
applied to the diverse world of political and social reality”.925 
 
The legal status of the principle of self-determination in international law is yet 
another contentious issue. For a person with little knowledge and no experience of 
international law it is near impossible even to make an educated guess about that 
status. I, therefore, will merely present the case from various perspectives drawing 
from experts‟ opinions. Professor L. C. Green holds that in positive international law 
there is still no right of self-determination. “It is insufficient,” he says, “for a non-
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binding document to declare that the right is inherent when practice shows that has 
never been regarded as the case”.926 Similarly, Leo Gross refutes the concept of legal 
right of self-determination on the basis that the right to self-determination in the legal 
sense has not been established anywhere in the Charter. He argues that “subsequent 
practice as an element of interpretation does not support the proposition that the 
principle of self-determination is to be interpreted as a right or that the human rights 
provisions have come to be interpreted as rights with corresponding obligations either 
generally or specifically with respect to the right of self-determination”.927  
 
At the other end of the pole is Dr. Rosalyn Higgins who takes the view that “self-
determination has developed into an international legal right”928 and no longer 
remained an essentially domestic matter. She contends that considering self-
determination as mere principle just because the Assembly resolutions are not binding 
and that Article 2(7) is an effective defence against its implementation might be 
academic, but sticking to such insistence “is to fail to give any weight either to the 
doctrine of a bona fide, or to the practice of states as revealed by unanimous and 
consistent behaviour”.929 It is obvious that the principle of self-determination has been 
“affirmed and reaffirmed, and applied and reapplied” in many instruments of the 
United Nations and that it has exercised deep influences upon the creation and 
existence of states over many centuries. “In terms of both prescription and 
application,” writes Professor Chen, “the right of all peoples to „freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development‟ has 
become a basic principle of international law”.930 Yet wise are those who take 
Professor Rupert Emerson‟s counsel and exercise caution in drawing positive 
conclusions about legality of the right to self-determination in view of persisting 
oppositions.
931
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4.8.3 Self Determination in the Communist States: Russia and China 
For the Tibetans to seek the right to self-determination, it is very important to 
understand not only the right of self-determination within the context of international 
politics but also within the context of Communist politics, in general, and Chinese 
politics, in particular. Therefore, in this section I will look at the nationality policy of 
the two Communist states, their understanding and modes of application of the right 
to self-determination and secession. In both these countries the national question has 
played a pivotal and central role in their policies since in Russia other nationalities 
accounted for more than half of her population and in China more than half of its 
territory is inhabited by non-Han nationalities. 
 
4.8.3.1 Right of Self-Determination in Russia 
Lenin had pondered upon the question of nationality long before the World War. The 
problem of nationality had captured the interest of this young Socialist who regarded 
it as his mission to secure and promote the economic and cultural advance of the 
masses. Lenin understood the question of nationality lacking an independent structure. 
He viewed it as a subsidiary problem of the social revolution which could not be dealt 
with in isolation from the issues of the domination of capital, the struggle against 
imperialism, and the proletarian dictatorship. Within this network of complex, 
interconnected issues Lenin had to find a solution for the question of nationality, for 
the wider goal of liberating the oppressed masses of all nations.
932
 The right of all 
peoples to complete self-determination was his answer to the problem of nationality 
and he introduced it into the Bolshevik political agenda, when in 1903, under his 
influence the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) adopted, „The right 
of self-determination for all nations forming part of the state‟, as an important clause 
in its programme.
933
 When the Bolsheviks gained control over the multinational 
empire after the collapse of the Tsarist regime, Russia was on the brink of complete 
disintegration. It was militarily weakened, politically chaotic and socially 
discontented; a very precarious situation for an empire whose territory spanned more 
than 22.3 million square kilometres and who harboured one hundred nationalities at 
                                                 
932 Hans Kohn, Nationalism in the Soviet Union, New York: Columbia University Press, 1933, pp. 42-
43. 
933 Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National-Colonial Question: a collection of articles and speeches, 
New York: International Publishers, 1936, Note 24, p. 294. 
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the time.
934
 Minorities across the long frontier regions of Russia were demanding for 
more autonomy, separation or independence. Such was the Russia that Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks inherited, but they were comparably well equipped to deal with the 
national question owing to the works of Lenin and Stalin–who already had a well 
developed solution in the form of the national right to self-determination. Self-
determination was formally implemented with the establishment of the Russian 
Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (RSFSR) in 1917 and the establishment of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1922. Since its initial application, self-
determination has occupied a permanent place in Soviet policies and remained a core 
element of Soviet ideology.
935
  
 
Almost all communist theory had their roots deeply embedded in the writings of its 
founding fathers, Marx and Engels. Communist views on the issues of nationalism 
and self-determination are no exception. However, initially Marx and Engels paid 
only scant attention to the political necessity of developing nationhood and the 
principle of self-determination. On the contrary, Marx was distinctly opposing the 
national movements in Europe and was hostile and contemptuous towards lesser 
nationalities of Europe, particularly the Slavs.
936
 He viewed the concept nation as a 
by-product of the victory of economic development and as such any encouragement 
of nationalism as hindrance to the growth of class consciousness and the development 
of international socialist movement.
937
 Marx retreated slightly from his earlier 
position on the national question and started viewing national movement as a step 
towards the proletariat revolution and even admitted that “special regard must be paid 
to the institutions, customs, and traditions of various lands”.938  
 
Lenin, on the other hand, delved deeply into the theory of nationalism and from early 
on recognised the reality of national feeling and the potential values of such 
sentiment.
939
 Nations are artificial units which came into existence with the rise of 
                                                 
934 Ilya Levkov, „Self-Determination in Soviet Politics‟, in Yonah Alexander & Robert A. Friedlander 
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935 Ibid., p.134. 
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938 Karl Marx as quoted in Cobban, The Nation State and National Self-Determination, p. 189. 
939 Robert V. Daniels, A Documentary History of Communism, Vol. I, Communism in Russia, New 
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capitalism and must disappear when capitalism is replaced with Communism; 
nationalism is a weapon used by capitalists to keep the world proletariat divided and 
suppressed. Despite such acknowledgment and the conviction that a connection exist 
between nationalism and the rise of the middle classes to power and nationalism has a 
bourgeoisie characteristic,
940
 Lenin nevertheless supported the nationalism stating that 
“there was a democratic content in the nationalism of every oppressed nation” which 
should be supported.
941
 More importantly, Lenin viewed the national liberation 
movement, nationalism and self-determination as “tactical imperative” and 
implementation of such concepts as opportunities for the proletarian‟s seizure of 
power.
942
 There were times when Lenin proclaimed the success of the proletarian 
revolution as contingent upon the collective uprising of the oppressed nationalities:  
 
The social revolution cannot come except in...an era which links the 
civil war of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie with a whole 
series of democratic and revolutionary movements of the less 
developed, backward and oppressed nationalities, among them also 
national liberation movements.
943 
 
With the aim of forging a unity among the proletariat and promoting the interests of 
their class solidarity, Lenin formulated the principle of self-determination which 
contains three major elements: “1) no division of state and party organisations along 
national lines; 2) national self-determination in the form of secession is available but 
not advisable; and 3) full democratic and linguistic rights should be extended to all 
nationalities and ethnic groups”.944 Lenin even went to some length declaring his 
support of Finland‟s and Poland‟s independence in a speech given in May 1917, 
where he said, “If Finland, if Poland, if the Ukraine break away from Russia, there is 
nothing bad about that. Anyone who says there is, is a chauvinist”.945 To Lenin 
national freedom was not an end in itself but a desirable step towards destruction of 
                                                                                                                                            
Delhi: D. K. Agencies, 1986, pp. 46-48. 
940 Stalin was more explicit when he said that “the fate of the national movement, which is essentially 
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941 V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. IV, Cooperative Publishing Soc., 1936, p. 267.  
942 Alfred D. Low, Lenin on the Question of Nationality, New York: Bookman Associates, 1958, p. 
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943 Ibid., p. 81. 
944 Ilya Levkov, „Self-Determination in Soviet Politics‟, in Self-Determination: National, Regional, 
and Global Dimensions, pp. 138-139. 
945 V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. V, Cooperative Publishing Soc., 1936, p. 310. 
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feudalism and proletarian revolution.
946
 He perceives the right of nations to self-
determination as “the right to independence in a political sense, the right to free, 
political secession from the oppressing nation. Concretely, this political, democratic 
demand implies complete freedom to carry on agitation in favour of secession, and 
freedom to settle the question of secession by means of a referendum of the nation 
that desires to secede”.947 Yet immediately thereafter, Lenin interprets the demand for 
political secession as a mere “logical expression of the struggle against national 
oppression in every form”. Lenin argues that “the more closely the democratic system 
of state approximates to complete freedom of secession, the rarer and weaker will the 
striving for secession be in practice; for the advantages of large states, both from the 
point of view of economic progress and from the point of view of the interests of the 
masses, are beyond doubt, and these advantages increase with the growth of 
capitalism”.948 Lenin employs the rhetoric of secession and promotes the right to self-
determination “not for the purpose of introducing separation, but in order to promote 
and hasten the coalescing and harmonizing of nationalities in a democratic 
manner”.949 Hans Kohn writes that Lenin in championing the right of all nations to 
complete self-determination had no desire to divide “the surface of the earth and the 
field it offered to the economic and social activity of man into a multiplicity of rigidly 
isolated states”. Lenin wishes to achieve a rapprochement of the peoples and their 
fusion into associations and economic units of the maximum dimensions but only on 
the basis of the freedom and the voluntary adhesion of the various peoples.
950
 
 
Given Lenin‟s view on nationalism and the right of national self-determination how is 
nation defined in Communist ideology? Joseph Stalin, Lenin‟s colleague and the 
leading specialist on the issue of nationalism in the Russian Communist Party, 
provides an elaborate definition of the term “nation” in his Marxism and the National 
and Colonial Questions. In defining nation Stalin identifies four characteristic 
features of a nation without which a community cannot form a nation. He writes, “A 
nation is not a racial or tribal, but a historically constituted community of people”. 
                                                 
946 Ibid., p. 271. 
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950 Hans Kohn, Nationalism in the Soviet Union, pp. 44-45.  
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Neither is it “a casual or ephemeral conglomeration, but a stable community of 
people”.951 But it is “a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, 
economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture... It 
is only when all these characteristics are present that we have a nation”.952  
 
Understanding nation thus Stalin proclaims the right of self-determination for a 
nation. “The right of self-determination means that a nation can arrange its life 
according to its own will,” writes Stalin. “It has the right to arrange its life on the 
basis of autonomy. It has the right to enter into federal relations with other nations. It 
has the right to complete secession. Nations are sovereign and all nations are 
equal”.953 However, Stalin immediately qualifies this statement by adding that Social-
Democrats will not support every demand of a nation. He plainly puts that the aim of 
the Social-Democrats in fighting for the right of nations to self-determination is to 
terminate the policy of national oppression and clear away the grounds of hostility 
between nations.
954
 The Bolsheviks continued to propagate the right to national self-
determination however, only as a means to achieve a higher end–to win complete 
power for the working class. “The right to self-determination cannot and must not 
serve as an obstacle to the exercise by the working class of its right to dictatorship. 
The former must give way to the latter,” so writes Stalin.955 
 
Another element of the national self-determination that was equally promulgated by 
the Bolsheviks was the right to secession. Inspired by Report on the National 
Question, a report delivered at the Seventh All-Russian Conference of the RSDLP on 
April 29, 1917, in which Stalin announced that the oppressed nations under Russia 
must be allowed the right to choose to remain as a part of the Russian state or to 
separate and form an independent state, the All-Russian Party Conference resolved 
that “the right of all the nations forming part of Russia to freely secede and form 
independent states shall be recognised. To negate this right, or to fail to take measures 
guaranteeing its practical realisation, is equivalent to supporting a policy of seizure 
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and annexation”.956 In the following year, on July 10, 1918, the RSFSR constitution 
was ratified in which the right of member-republics to secede was recognised. 
However, such assertions remained primarily theoretical in form given the more 
practical considerations of not actually seceding border states for material resources 
and security reasons. Stalin laid it out thus: 
 
These nationalities mainly inhabit the border regions, which are 
most vulnerable from the military point of view; and these border 
regions abound in raw materials, fuel and food stuffs. 
Finally, these border regions are less developed than Central Russia 
(or not developed at all) from the industrial and military point of 
view, owing to which they are not in a position to defend their 
independent existence without the military and economic assistance 
of Central Russia; just as Central Russia is not in a position to 
preserve its military and economic power without the assistance of 
the border regions in the way of fuel, raw materials and 
foodstuffs.
957 
 
Irrespective of whether the right of self-determination and the right of secession are 
practicable, the Russian official documents, national reports, government statements 
and so on contained plethora of references to national self-determination and right of 
secession.  
 
4.8.3.2 Right of Self-Determination in China 
For China, a multinational state with 56 different nationalities, the national question 
was extremely and equally important, especially, considering the fact that 64 percent 
of her territory, in China‟s frontier regions, is inhabited by nationalities other than 
Han Chinese. George Moseley, the sinologist, writes, “When one realizes that more 
than half the population of Russia at the time of the October Revolution consisted of 
peoples other than the Great Russians, and that more than half the territory of China 
“liberated” in 1949-1950 was inhabited by peoples other than Han Chinese, it will be 
appreciated how immensely important that national question was to the success of 
both revolutions. The national question has been central, not peripheral, to the 
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revolutions in both countries”.958 However, the promotion of nationalism in China 
started before the Communist takeover of the country in 1949. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the 
founding founder of the Republic of China, strongly promoted a conscious feeling of 
Han nationalism in his bid to save China and preserve the Chinese race. In The Three 
Principles he drew attention to the insignificance of the number of non-Chinese 
population, ten million as compared to four hundred million Han Chinese, and instead 
highlighted the overwhelming majority of “Han or Chinese race with common blood, 
common language, common religion, and common customs–a single, pure race”.959 
Right after the 1911 Revolution Sun Yat-sen pleaded the nation to rise above narrow 
ethnic identities to create a new sense of “national people” (guomin) and form a great 
unitary nation-state.
960
 Chiang Kai-shek followed in the footsteps of Sun Yat-sen, 
embraced the same nationality policy and described the non-Han nationalities as 
“merely branches or clans of the Han people,”961 as China‟s “racial stocks” whose 
“sum-total...customs constitutes Chinese national culture, and the sum-total...modes 
of living makes up Chinese national life”.962 Both Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek 
promulgated a unified single-national China that encompasses all its nationalities 
including the frontier peoples. 
 
The concept of China as a single-national state with no distinct national minorities, as 
touted by Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, was rejected by the Communist 
leadership.
963
 The CCP leaders employed Marxist-Leninist principles and Stalin‟s 
definition of nation in understanding China‟s numerous nationalities and formulating 
nationality policies. “The distinctive attributes of a nation, as represented by modern 
scientific research,” writes Chang Chih-i, the Deputy Director of the United Front 
Work Department and an author of an important work on the national minority policy 
of the CCP,
964
 “are commonality of language, culture, customs, and historical 
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tradition; a certain stage of socioeconomic development; and a certain pattern of 
territorial distribution”.965 The Party adopted a remarkable new approach of 
identifying the national minorities as many distinct entities and not simply a 
collectivity of non-Han peoples.
966
 From early on the CCP leaders had realised the 
necessity of winning the support of other nationalities to achieve victory against the 
Nationalist forces. It had consistently recognised the major role the nationalities 
question would play in the Chinese revolution and accordingly had taken numerous 
initiatives. The CCP consistently promoted equality of all nationalities, emancipation 
of not only the Chinese people but also of the “small and weak peoples,” and 
liberation of nationalities from oppression. The Manifesto of the Second Congress of 
the Chinese Communist Party, written in July 1922, contains the following proposals 
for a federated China: 
 
3. The unification of China proper (including Manchuria) into a 
genuine democratic republic.  
4. The achievement of a genuine republic by the liberation of 
Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang.  
5. The establishment of a Chinese federated republic by the 
unification of China proper.
967 
 
In November 1931, the „Resolution of the First All-China Congress of Soviets on the 
Question of National Minorities in China‟, a Draft Constitution adopted by the 
Congress at Jiangsi, recognises Mongolians, Tibetans, Mohammedans, and so on as 
national minorities and calls on all the toiling masses of China to fight against the 
oppression of national minorities and struggle for their emancipation. Furthermore, 
the Draft Constitution states:  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Consultative Conference (CPPCC). His experiences in the United Front Work Department, which is 
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In view of this, the First All-China Congress of Soviets of Workers‟, 
Peasants‟, and Soldiers‟ Deputies declares that the Chinese Soviet 
Republic categorically and unconditionally recognises the right of 
national minorities to self-determination. This means that in districts 
like Mongolia, Tibet, Sinkiang, Yunnan, Kweichow, and others, 
where the majority of the population belongs to non-Chinese 
nationalities, the toiling masses of these nationalities shall have the 
right to determine for themselves whether they wish to leave the 
Chinese Soviet Republic and create their own independent state, or 
whether they wish to join the Union of Soviet Republics, or form an 
autonomous area inside the Chinese Soviet Republic... 
 
Therefore, the First All-China Congress of Soviets of Workers‟, 
Peasants‟, and Soldiers‟ Deputies resolves: 
(a) In the Fundamental Law (Constitution) of the Chinese Soviet 
Republic it shall be clearly stated that all national minorities within 
the confines of China shall have the right to national self-
determination, including secession from China and the formation of 
independent states, and that the Chinese Soviet Republic fully and 
unconditionally recognises the independence of the Outer 
Mongolian People‟s Republic. 
(b) The toiling masses of all national minorities on the territory of 
the Chinese Soviet Republic, especially in those areas where the 
majority of the population is Chinese, shall enjoy absolute equality 
with the latter, nor shall any of their legal rights or obligations be 
denied or abridged on account of nationality. 
968
 
 
Throughout the long and bitter fight against the Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-
shek‟s forces the CCP stuck with their propaganda to win over the minorities. 
Subsequent to the Communist forces‟ arrival in the Shensi revolutionary base after the 
Long March, the Communist Party issued a statement specifically to the people of 
Inner Mongolia asking them to join forces with the CCP to fight against their common 
enemies. Another statement issued on December 20, 1935, becomes pertinent to the 
issue at hand, especially the second and the third points, as it touches on the principle 
of nationalism and self-determination: 
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(2) We recognise the right of the people of Inner Mongolia to decide 
all questions pertaining to themselves, for no one has the right to 
forcefully interfere with the way of life, religious observances, etc., 
of the Inner Mongolian people. At the same time, the people of Inner 
Mongolia are free to build a system of their own choosing; they are 
at liberty to develop their own livelihood, establish their own 
government, unite in a federation with other peoples, or to make 
themselves entirely separate. 
(3) As for the Han, Hui, Tibet, Manchu, and other peoples found in 
Inner Mongolia, democracy must be fostered among them in 
accordance with the principal of national equality and they must be 
treated as the equals of the Mongols; moreover, they must have 
freedom to use their own spoken and written languages as well as 
freedom of religion and residence.
969 
 
A similar statement was issued to the Hui people on 25 May 1936 in which the 
Communist party proclaimed its desire to extend the fundamental policy of national 
self-determination to the Hui people, to establish Hui people‟s autonomous 
governments and to develop close relationship between the two great nations of the 
Hui and the Han.
970
  
 
The next phase in the evolution of China‟s nationality policy is marked by stark 
absence of the phrases “right to national self-determination” and “right to secession”. 
Once the Chinese Communist Party had established its rule over China it changed the 
tone of its nationality policy and started emphasising unity, regional autonomy and 
co-operation. The Common Program, adopted in 1949 by the First Plenary Session of 
the CPPCC, represents the shift in policy
971
 and becomes the primary doctrinal basis 
of Chinese Communist‟s nationality policy. The following four articles deal with the 
issue: 
 
Article 50: All nationalities within the boundaries of the People‟s 
Republic of China are equal. They shall establish unity and mutual 
aid among themselves, and shall oppose imperialism and their own 
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public enemies, so that the People‟s Republic of China will become 
a big fraternal and co-operative family composed of all its 
nationalities. Greater Nationalism and chauvinism shall be opposed. 
Acts involving discrimination, oppression and splitting of the unity 
of the various nationalities shall be prohibited. 
Article 51: Regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas where 
national minorities are concentrated and various kinds of autonomy 
organisations of the different nationalities shall be set up according 
to the size of the respective populations and regions. In places where 
different nationalities live together and in the autonomous areas of 
the national minorities, the different nationalities shall each have an 
appropriate number of representatives in the local organs of political 
power. 
Article 52: All national minorities within the boundaries of the 
People‟s Republic of China shall have the right to join the People‟s 
Liberation Army and to organise local people‟s public security 
forces in accordance with the unified military system of the state. 
Article 53: All national minorities shall have freedom to develop 
their dialects and languages, to preserve or reform their traditions, 
customs and religious beliefs. The People‟s Government shall assist 
the masses of the people of all national minorities to develop their 
political, economic, cultural and educational construction work.
972 
 
The Chinese Constitution retained the spirit of the Common Program regarding the 
national question, highlighting only the equality and unity of all nationalities and the 
rights of self-government of national regional autonomy. Article 4 of the Constitution 
clearly and emphatically reiterates: 
  
All nationalities in the People‟s Republic of China are equal. The 
state protects the lawful rights and interests of the minority 
nationalities and upholds and develops the relationship of equality, 
unity and mutual assistance among all of China‟s nationalities. 
Discrimination against and oppression of any nationality are 
prohibited; any acts that undermine the unity of the nationalities or 
instigate their secession are prohibited. The state helps the areas 
inhabited by minority nationalities speed up their economic and 
cultural development in accordance with the peculiarities and needs 
of the different minority nationalities. Regional autonomy is 
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practised in areas where people of minority nationalities live in 
compact communities; in these areas organs of self- government are 
established for the exercise of the right of autonomy. All the 
national autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People‟s 
Republic of China. 
973
 
 
The shift in policy is explained as necessary evolution of the national question as the 
Chinese revolution evolved. Chang Chih-i writes, “With each nationality in the 
country having achieved liberation, with the system of nationalities oppression 
basically abolished, and with the nationalities of our country having already entered 
the era of nationalities equality, can “national liberation” still be regarded as the task 
of each national minority? Of course, it cannot... If the people of each national 
minority seek complete liberation, they do so in order to eliminate their internal 
systems of oppression and to develop their government, economy, and culture; there 
is no other question involved”.974 The instrumental ethnic nationalism and ethnic 
support that the CCP so cleverly manipulated, to bolster their own might in wars 
against the Japanese imperialism and the Nationalist army, had become a threat to the 
unitary state, thus prompting a drastic and immediate change in the nationality policy 
which led to deemphasising of national self-determination.
975
 A cable message from 
Xinhua News Agency headquarters to a branch office in northwest China, sent in 
October 1949 reveals: 
 
During the period of civil war, for the sake of strengthening the 
minorities‟ opposition to KMT reactionary rule, we emphasized self-
determination. This was correct at the time. But today the situation has 
fundamentally changed... For the sake of completing our state‟s great 
purpose of unification, for the sake of opposing the conspiracy of 
imperialists and other running dogs to divide China‟s national unity, we 
should not stress this slogan and not allow its usage by imperialists and 
reactionary elements among various domestic nationalities.
976 
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Moreover, the CCP leaders believed that the long revolutionary struggle and the 
Party‟s slogans had strengthened the sense of mutual assistance among the 
nationalities and heightened the internationalist and patriotic consciousness so much 
so that the original situation of mutual antagonism among the nationalities was 
overcome and bonds of equality, unity and cooperation were forged. Chang writes 
further: 
 
Therefore, the establishment of a united, multinational state was the 
desire of the great bulk of people of all nationalities in our country. 
It was in accord with this noble wish of the people of all nationalities 
that the Chinese Communist Party advocated the carrying out of the 
principle of nationalities equality and national regional autonomy 
within the unity of the great family of the motherland and 
discontinued emphasizing the slogan of national self-determination 
and federalism. Consequently, the question of national division or 
national separation does not even arise in present-day circumstances: 
such schemes would inevitably meet with the violent opposition of 
the broad masses of all nationalities.
977 
 
It is obvious from Chang Chih-i‟s statements that, unlike the Russian Bolsheviks who 
provided independence to Finland and Poland and established federalism in Russia, 
the Chinese Communist Party had no intention of ever honouring the promise of self-
determination, independence and federal system it promised to its minority 
nationalities. Furthermore, a clear difference lies in resolving the national question 
between the two; whereas the Soviet Union adopted national self-determination and 
federalism to resolve the national question, the Chinese Communist Party opted not to 
employ federalism but instead practised the method of national regional autonomy.
978
 
According to Chang  Chih-i national self-determination could be interpreted in two 
different ways, “either as freedom to separate or as freedom to unite,” depending upon 
the conditions. Lenin‟s advocacy of self-determination and separatism when the 
nations of Eastern Europe were undergoing initial encounter with the oppression from 
European imperialists was an example of appropriate conditions resulting in calling 
                                                 
977 Ibid., pp. 68-69. George Moseley ascribed Mao Tse-tung‟s disfavouring of federalism for China as 
the real reason for this change in the policy. George Moseley, The Party and the National Question 
in China, fn. 18, p. 68. 
978 Ibid., p. 79. 
 278 
for self-determination, whereas Stalin‟s declaration, at the height of struggle between 
imperialism and the political power of the Soviets in 1920, that “any demand for the 
separation of frontier territories would be extremely counterrevolutionary at the 
present stage of the revolution” is a case for the latter meaning. 
 
Using the information, interpretations and explanations set up in the foregone sections 
I would like to make a case that Tibetans do fulfill the requirements of being a nation, 
despite the term‟s flexible meaning, and as such deserve the right to self-
determination, be it to form an autonomous region or an independent state. However, 
before doing that I would like to venture briefly into the views of the Chinese 
dissidents and pro-democratic activists on Tibet‟s future. I consider this important not 
because their is an influential voice at the present moment but because it could 
represent Tibet‟s future in a democratic China. 
 
4.8.4 Chinese Dissident Intellectuals and Pro-Democracy Supporters‟ Views on 
Tibet‟s Self-Determination979 
Chinese dissident intellectuals and pro-democracy supporters,
980
 although relatively 
small but growing,
981
 have become an ideologically progressive critical generation 
whose distinct thinkings, particularly on Sino-Tibet relations, warrant proper study 
from the Tibetans and the Tibet scholars. For two major reasons I propose to make 
this claim: 1) Understanding the political stand of the Chinese dissident intellectuals 
and pro-democracy supporters regarding Tibet might become a “significant pointer” 
on how Tibet would fare in a democratic China; and 2) Contrary to the belief held by 
                                                 
979 Not much has been written on the Chinese dissident scholars‟ views on Tibet as it is a relatively 
new phenomenon that started at the beginning of the 1990s. In this section I have tried to give a 
comprehensive picture of the dissidents‟ views, even at the risk of being digressive, because this 
might become an important chapter in the Sino-Tibet relation. As sources of information I rely on 
my own interviews with Chinese dissidents and pro-democracy supporters, encounters with Tibetan 
officials who have wide contact with the overseas Chinese, articles from newspapers and journals 
and limited written resources. 
980 The Chinese dissidents and pro-democracy groups primarily refer to the Chinese supporters of 
democracy outside of China. This includes Chinese intellectuals and scholars at various universities 
and academic institutions in the west and the overseas Chinese political activists primarily based in 
the US. However, I am also going to use some materials of dissidents who still reside in China. The 
list of interviewees is provided in Appendix VII. 
981 Almost all of the Chinese that I talked with unanimously claimed that there is a growing support 
for the democracy movements in China. In April 2006 I travelled to America to interview Chinese 
dissidents and pro-democracy supporters. In total I talked with sixteen Chinese dissidents among 
who were the renowned democratic activists Xu Wenli, Wei Jingsheng, Harry Wu and Chen 
Kuaide. The primary purpose of the trip was to ascertain the views of the dissidents regarding Tibet 
and her future. 
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majority of the ethnic Chinese, the Chinese dissident intellectuals and pro-democracy 
supporters who are exposed to various undistorted versions of history and the current 
empirical reality hold radically different views on Tibet‟s past, present and future, 
which James D. Seymour describes as “a third perspective”.982 Statements such as 
“Tibetans have been the victims of Chinese imperialism” and “the Chinese 
government has instructed historians to falsify Tibet‟s history in order to validate its 
domination of Tibet,”983 issued by the Chinese dissidents, challenge and question the 
authenticity of the Communists‟ assertions that Tibet is an integral part of China. For 
these two reasons I consider a detailed study of political views of the Chinese 
dissidents important and meaningful. As I go into greater detail a wide spectrum of 
views existing among the Chinese dissidents, scholars and the pro-democracy 
supporters shall be presented here based on my personal interviews with some of the 
world renowned Chinese dissidents as well as written materials authored by them and 
others.  
 
The importance of understanding the Chinese dissidents‟ views on Tibet becomes 
obvious when we look at the efforts made by the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan 
Government-in-Exile to maintain relations with the Chinese democracy supporters, 
especially after the initial interests expressed by the Chinese dissidents in setting up 
contacts with the Tibetans in the early 1990s. This interest could have been inspired 
by the Dalai Lama‟s strong and genuine denouncement of the CCP‟s brutal 
suppressions of the student demonstrations in 1989,
984
 which he issued regardless of 
the possible severe repercussions to the Sino-Tibetan negotiation efforts. Lodi Gyari, 
the then minister of the Department of Information and International Relations of the 
Tibetan Government-in-Exile, recounted the story of how the Dalai Lama was so 
disturbed by the Tiananmen massacre and felt it his moral obligation to denounce the 
Chinese Government‟s actions. Gyari writes: 
 
His Holiness was deeply moved by the Tiananmen tragedy. He was very 
saddened by what he saw. He then requested me to make a very strong 
                                                 
982 Cao Changching and James D. Seymour (ed.), Tibet Through Dissident Chinese Eyes: Essays on 
Self-Determination, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998, p. xii. 
983 Ding Zilin and Jiang Peikun, „Tibetans‟ Rights and Chinese Intellectuals‟ Responsibility‟, in Tibet 
Through Dissident Chinese Eyes: Essays on Self-Determination, p. 33. 
984 Shen Tong, „Tibet: An Unavoidable Issue‟, in Cao Changching and James D. Seymour (ed.), Tibet 
Through Dissident Chinese Eyes: Essays on Self-Determination, p. 42. 
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condemnation, the strongest condemnation possible of the Chinese 
Government‟s brutal treatment of its own people and at the same time to 
express the strongest support for the younger generation of the Chinese 
people and for the democracy movement. 
 
I felt certain this statement would definitely place in peril whatever 
relations we had with Chinese Government. I candidly said that this 
statement would definitely cause a serious setback to our efforts for a 
negotiation. It was at that time after many years of failure, that a remote 
possibility was emerging of our resuming the dialogue. In fact we were 
supposed to have a preliminary meeting in Hong Kong before the 
negotiations. 
 
His Holiness thought for a while and I was quite sure my views were 
being seriously considered by him, and I was confident that he would 
withdraw his request for such a statement. But then he came back even 
more forcefully and said, “If I fail to condemn the policies of the Chinese 
Government today, and if I fail to express my support for the people of 
China, I will then have no moral right from tomorrow on to ask of the 
world to support my people for freedom and democracy”.985 
 
The strong condemnation from the Dalai Lama inspired a sense of affinity between 
the exile Tibetan community and the Chinese dissident scholars and pro-democracy 
supporters which brought the Tibetans and the Chinese into direct contact for the first 
time.
986
 Formation of an alliance between the two parties was seen as a win-win 
strategy by both–the Tibetans saw an excellent opportunity to educate the Chinese 
masses about the true situation in Tibet and the Chinese saw a chance to forge a 
stronger common front against the Communist regime in their fight for freedom and 
democracy. In pursuance of this alliance the Dalai Lama has repeatedly emphasised 
                                                 
985 A Report: Third International Conference of Tibet Support Groups, Berlin, Germany 2000, 
Dharamsala: DIIR, Tibetan Government-in-Exile and Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, May 2001, New 
Delhi, p. 61. 
986 The initial contact between the Tibetans and overseas Chinese began in early 1990s through Ngabo 
Jigme who was then working for International Campaign for Tibet. The Tibetan Government-in-
Exile set-up a new China Desk in the Department of Information and International Relations in 
1994 with the specific aims of establishing communications with the overseas Chinese, holding 
discussions and meetings with them on Tibet issues and disseminating information on Tibet to the 
Chinese diasporas. The China Desk is currently headed by Mr. Dawa Tsering. More information 
can be accessed at: 
  http://www.tibet.net/en/diir/intrd.html. 
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the importance of interacting and exchanging ideas with the Chinese people
987
 and has 
himself met with a number of Chinese exiles, prominent among whom are Wang 
Ruowang, Fang Lizhi, Wei Jingsheng, Harry Wu, Shen Tong, Chen Yizi, Xue Wei 
and others. Subsequently, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile set up an ad hoc China 
Desk in its Department of Information and International Relations which has launched 
a bimonthly journal in Chinese, Xi Zang Tong Xun, maintained and updated Tibetan 
official websites in Chinese
988
 and translated Tibet related materials into Chinese 
language. Moreover, over a period of several years the China Desk had regularly 
invited overseas Chinese to Dharamsala, showing them the Tibetan community and 
the workings of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. Meetings with the Tibetan 
newcomers and audiences with the Dalai Lama were also arranged for the Chinese 
guests. Such initiatives have generated greater interests in and attracted wider 
participations from the Chinese on the Tibet issues, thus building a fertile ground for 
exchange of views. The two publications, Beijing Spring
989
 and Xi Zang Tong Xun, 
became the main platforms for the Chinese dissident scholars to voice their opinions 
on Tibet which eventually led to heated yet healthy debates among the Chinese and 
Tibetan communities. According to Dawa Tsering, who is the Head of the China Desk 
since its inception, the articles initially drew vociferous oppositions from various 
overseas Chinese and triggered long and fervent debates in the journals. 
Consequently, a profusion of exchanges took place which resulted in a noticeable 
increase in the number of Tibet supporters among the overseas Chinese.
990
 Another 
consequence of the alliance is the establishment of the Sino-Tibet Study Group
991
 
                                                 
987 A. A. Shiromany, ed., The Political Philosophy of His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama: Selected 
Speeches and Writings, p. 130.  
988 The Chinese language website was launched in August 2000. Thupten Samphel reported in 
„Virtual Tibet: The Media‟, Tibetan Bulletin, Vol. 8, Issue 5, 2004, that within a week of its launch, 
more than 10,000 visitors visited the website, majority of which were from China. The website can 
be accessed at: www.xizang-zhiye.org. 
989 Beijing Spring is a political journal that promotes freedom, democracy and human rights and 
serves the overall democracy movement in China. Originally published in China during the 
Democracy Wall movement in 1979 as a democracy journal, it made its debut in New York in May 
1993 in its current form. It has ever since grown to become a well-trusted journal and a major 
platform for the overseas Chinese voices. 
990 Personal interview with Dawa Tsering on 22 June 2006, TO/Tape3/DawaTsering, (TO: Tibetan 
Official).  
991 Formed on 10 December 1998, the Sino-Tibet Study Group consists of both Tibetans and Chinese. 
It was started with the primary goals of analysing the claims made by the two protagonists on 
Tibet‟s historical status and current situation, creating solidarity and reducing the feelings of enmity 
between the Tibetans and the Chinese with the ultimate goal of resolving the Tibet question in 
justified manner. To that end the members of the study group have organised symposiums and 
seminars, have actively produced numerous articles and papers which are mostly published in 
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which aims to create more awareness and clarify the distorted historical facts on 
Tibet. 
 
Furthermore, Chinese dissidents and Tibetans have sat together at numerous 
conferences and panel discussions to explore ways to resolve the Tibet issue, restore 
democracy and freedom in China, and generate mutual understanding and respect 
between the two peoples. Three major conferences at the international level have been 
held between the Chinese dissidents and the Tibetans; the first in Washington, D.C. in 
1992, the second in Bonn in 1996 and the third in London in 1997.
992
 Similarly, three 
International Sino-Tibet Conferences have been organised primarily under the 
auspices of Beijing Spring, the most recent of which was held in New York from 
March 10-12, 2007, in which about two hundred participants from various parts of the 
world including, Taiwan, Mainland China, the Tibetan exile community, and Chinese 
dissident groups from the United States took part.
993
 The Chinese dissident scholars 
and pro-democracy supporters have regularly participated in the successions of 
International Conference of Tibet Support Groups where majority of them have 
expressed their sympathy for the Tibetan struggle.
994
 Other contributions came from 
independent organisations such as the Foundation for China in the 21
st
 Century which 
has organised several Inter-ethnic Leadership Conferences at which representatives 
from China‟s minority nationalities were invited to present their case and explain their 
issues. This organisation, which is dedicated to build understanding among the 
various nationalities of China, has successfully organised a series of three conferences 
entitled Dialogue between the Dalai Lama and Chinese Scholars in which Chinese 
dissident scholars are brought together–to discuss issues ranging from the current 
situation in Tibet to its future–with the Dalai Lama. The first Dialogue between the 
                                                                                                                                            
Beijing Spring. Among the founding members of the group are many of the prominent Chinese 
dissidents including Wang Ruowang, Harry Wu, Cao Changching, Xue Wei, Zheng Yi, Xiang 
Xiaoji, David Yu and Yiu Yung-chin. Source: Interview with Dawa Tsering, 22 June 2007 and 
„Sino-Tibetan Study Group Set Up by Exiled Chinese and Tibetans‟, World Tibet Network News, 10 
December 1998, 
  http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/1998/12/10_7.html. 
992 Dawa Norbu, „Tibetan Views of Tibetan Autonomy: An Agenda for the 21st Century‟, in Tibetan 
Autonomy and Self-Government: Myth or Reality?, New Delhi: Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy 
Research Centre (TPPRC), 2000, fn. 4, p. 243. 
993 The first Sino-Tibet Conference was held in the US and the second one in London in 1997. The 
information on the latest conference held in New York can be read in Beijing Spring, Issue 167, 
April 2007. 
994 The series of International Conference of Tibet Support Groups were held in Dharamsla in 1990, 
Bonn 1996, Berlin 2000 and Prague in 2003. There were eight Chinese participants in each of the 
third and the fourth conferences. 
 283 
Dalai Lama and Chinese Scholars was held in Boston in 1995, the second in Los 
Angeles in 1996 and the latest one at Brandeis University in 1998.
995
  
 
4.8.4.1 Dissidents‟ Views on Tibet‟s Past 
Free access to information and uncensored materials has induced remarkable change 
in the outlook of the Chinese dissident intellectuals and pro-democracy supporters 
regarding Tibet. Broadly speaking three different perspectives could be discerned 
among the Chinese dissidents regarding Tibet‟s historical status: 1) Those who 
acknowledge the independent status of Tibet; 2) Those who, for the sake of 
maintaining China‟s integrity, neither acknowledge the independent status, nor 
support the Chinese Government‟s claims;996 and 3) Those who adhere to the 
Beijing‟s official views. In the first category there are only a handful of dissidents 
such as Harry Wu, Cao Changching, Xiang Xiaoji, Yiu Yung-chin and Shen Tong 
who refute the Chinese Government‟s claim over Tibet as entirely baseless, distorted 
and misinterpreted. Cao Changching,
997
 in the essay „Independence: the Tibetan 
People‟s Right‟, categorically discredits the usual line of reasoning998 employed by 
the Communist Government to claim its sovereignty over Tibet. Contrary to the 
Chinese Government‟s interpretation, Cao perceives the marriage of Tang princess 
Wen Cheng and the Tibetan king Song-tsen Gampo as “a strategic effort to secure 
peace and cooperation between the two countries” which is devoid of any basis for 
sovereignty claim by any country. Similarly, he argues that the military occupation of 
                                                 
995 The Foundation for China in the 21
st
 Century was established in 1990 by Yang Jianli and a group 
of Chinese democracy supporters. Source: http://www.china21century.org/default.asp?menu=xu. 
996 I call this group “the opaque group” since they are evasive about commenting on Tibet‟s past 
status. They uncomfortably and steadfastly avoid making statements about Tibet‟s past because 
supporting the claim of Tibet‟s independent status would go against their hopes of maintaining 
China‟s integrity and supporting the claim of Tibet as an integral part of China goes against their 
intellectual perspicuity. Confirmations for this rational guess came during my interview with the 
Chinese dissidents and Tibetan political analysers.  
997 Cao Chanching, a former deputy editor-in-chief of Shenzhen Youth Journal (which was shut down 
by the Chinese authorities in 1987 for publishing numerous articles criticising the CCP leaders) and 
the founder of Press Freedom Herald, the first newspaper run by dissident Chinese journalist, is a 
research fellow at the East Asian Institute of Columbia University in New York and at the Institute 
of Culture and Communications of East-West Center in Honolulu.  
998 Cao Changching listed six reasons upon which the Chinese Government‟s claim to sovereignty 
over Tibet depend: 1) During Tang dynasty, the Tibetan king Song-tsen Gampo married Princess 
Wen Cheng who was said to have wielded tremendous influence over Tibet; 2) During Yuan 
period, Tibet was conquered by the Mongol Empire became a part of Yuan rule: 3) During the Qing 
dynasty, the Chinese army entered Tibet several times to protect it from foreign invasions; 4) The 
title of “Dalai Lama” was bestowed by the Qing emperor; 5) Chang Kai-shek‟s government sent a 
representative to confirm the reincarnation of and host the inauguration of the fourteenth Dalai 
Lama; and 6) Tibet had no formal diplomatic relations with any other countries. 
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Tibet by the Mongolian armies in the fourteenth century cannot qualify the Chinese 
Government to make an historical claim over Tibet. If a claim could be made at all it 
should be done by the Mongols, not by the Chinese. Another reason that the 
Communist Government employs to stake their claim over Tibet was the Qing‟s 
provision of armed protections to the Tibetan nation. Cao rejects this argument by 
providing a modern day example of the United States having no claim to the 
ownership of Kuwait by virtue of sending armed forces for Kuwait‟s defence in 
1991.
999
 Harry Wu
1000
 too summoned historical facts to argue that Tibet was an 
independent country before the Chinese invasion. With a concise anecdotal account of 
his trip to the Thirteenth Laogai camp in Qinghai Province Wu writes: 
 
When I reached the crest of Mt. Riyue, beside a tent for travelers to rest I 
found a stone tablet on which was engraved a bit of history. China‟s 
Princess Wen Cheng‟s marriage to the Tibetan king, Songsten Gampo, 
had taken place in the year 641, and Princess Wen Cheng had crossed 
these mountains on her way to Tibet.  
 
“Upon arriving here, Princess Wen Cheng performed a farewell 
ceremony that included a bath, a fast, and a kowtow to the East–in 
farewell to her country and family. After the ceremony, the princess 
changed to Tibetan dress and went to Tibet escorted by a squad of guards 
of the Tibetan king”.  
 
History, as recorded on the tablet, shows that the marriage of Princess 
Wen Cheng and the Tibetan king Song-tsen Gampo was not the marriage 
of an emperor‟s daughter to a general of the emperor‟s subordinate 
province; rather, it was a political marriage between two equal countries. 
                                                 
999 Personal interview with Cao Changching on 16 April 2006, CD/Tape4/Cao, (the numbering system 
I use for my tapes include the category (CD: Chinese Dissident), tape number and the name of the 
interviewee (Cao); Cao Changching, „Independence: The Tibetan People‟s Right‟, in Tibet Through 
Dissident Chinese Eyes: Essays on Self-Determination, pp. 5-7 
1000 Harry Wu, an internationally renowned Chinese dissident, served nineteen years in the Chinese 
prison camps for criticising the Communist Party and the Soviet Invasion of Hungary in 1956. He 
left China and went to the United States in 1985. Wu is the founder and the Executive Director of 
the Laogai Research Foundation, which is now recognised as one of the primary sources of 
information on China‟s labour camp, and the Executive Director of China Information Center. Wu 
has been invited to testify about the human rights conditions in China before the United States 
Congressional committees, the United Nations, the European Parliaments, as well as the German, 
Australian and the British Parliaments. http://laogai.org/news/newsdetail.php?id=2788. 
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As I read this tablet, I realized I was standing on the old border which 
had demarcated two sovereign nations, Tibet and China.
1001 
 
Like the above two Chinese dissident scholars, Xiang Xiaoji
1002
 calls into question the 
“propaganda...[spread by the Chinese Government] that for a very long time (at least 
dating back to the Yuan dynasty) Tibet has been a part of China”. Xiang argues that 
both Tibet and China, which had remained as neighbouring countries until the 
thirteenth century, came under the control of the Mongols and became its vassals 
during the Yuan dynasty–a part of history that belonged to the Mongols and not to the 
Chinese.
1003
 On the other hand Song Liming
1004
 looks at a more recent history of 
Tibet, between1912 and 1951, to suggest that Tibet had at least enjoyed de facto 
independence during that time. Song writes that “before 1951 China had not 
controlled Tibet‟s diplomacy and national defense and therefore had no sovereignty 
over Tibet”.1005 
 
The second “opaque” group comprises of those who neither accept nor refute Tibet‟s 
independent status. Although the number of dissidents who subscribe to this mode of 
thinking is larger than the first group, it is still in minority compared with those who 
conclude that Tibet was historically a part of China.
1006
 Wei Jingsheng,
1007
 probably 
                                                 
1001 Harry Wu, „My View on the Tibet Issue‟, in Tibet Through Dissident Chinese Eyes: Essays on 
Self-Determination, p. 92. He also narrated this same story to me during our conversation in his 
Virginia office. Personal interview with Harry Wu on 18 April 2006, CD/Tape7/Wu. 
1002 Xiang Xiaoji participated in the Tiananmen democracy movement as a Coordinator of Beijing 
College Students Dialogue Delegation. After the Beijing massacre he was able to escape to the 
United States where he studied law at Law School of Columbia University.  
1003 Xiang Xiaoji, „Independence and Unification‟, in Tibet Through Dissident Chinese Eyes: Essays 
on Self-Determination, p. 100. 
1004 Song Liming had taken interest in Tibetan history for a long time. He was once a Ph.D. Candidate 
at the Department of History at Nanjing University in international relations. 
1005 Song Liming, „Reflections on the Seventeenth-Point Agreement‟, in Tibet Through Dissident 
Chinese Eyes: Essays on Self-Determination, p. 60. 
1006 These are very rough approximations of actual percentage of Chinese dissidents who support 
either independence or non-independence status of Tibet. No one has so far conducted a systematic 
and comprehensive survey to find out the Chinese dissidents‟ support for the Tibet cause. However, 
I based my claims on these sources: 1) My interview with Chinese dissidents and activists – among 
the seventeen Chinese that I interviewed three recognised Tibet‟s independent status, seven stated 
that Tibet had always been a part of China, six remained ambivalent and one refused to discuss 
Tibet‟s political issues; 2) My conversations with Tibetan intellectuals and officials confirm my 
assessment although their focus group predominantly consists of Chinese intellectuals; and 3) The 
Chinese intellectual writings and statements on the Tibet issue also exhibit this trend. 
1007 Wei Jingsheng, also known as Father of Chinese Democracy, spent more than seventeen years in 
Chinese prison for his involvement in Democracy Wall movement of 1978 and subsequent 
participations in democracy movements. In his famous essay entitled „Fifth Modernization‟, which 
he posted on the Democracy Wall on 5 December 1978, he called for institution of full democracy 
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one of the most renowned Chinese dissidents and pro-democracy supporters, is highly 
sympathetic to the Tibetans and critical of the Chinese government‟s policies and 
atrocities in Tibet, but his position on the Tibet‟s past status is ambivalent. In his 
famous letter to Deng Xiaoping, written from prison in 1992, Wei ambiguously 
describes Tibet‟s status as a unique blend of sovereignty and non-independence. 
 
Tibet‟s special status was that although Tibet did not lose its sovereignty 
it was not a completely independent country. It was not independent, but 
it was not a colony either. It was not taking care of all its affairs as an 
independent sovereign country while at the same it was not ruled as a 
province of China by the Amban [Ambassador] appointed by the [Qing] 
Court. The fact is that Tibet had total autonomy over its domestic affairs 
while being part of the Qing Court with regard to foreign affairs. It is 
because of such arrangements that many Chinese and foreigners who 
don‟t know all the facts consider Tibet a province of the Chinese Empire. 
Hardly any similar cases exist which demonstrate a unity of this kind.
1008 
 
Nevertheless, there are Tibetans who argue that Wei Jingsheng recognises Tibet‟s 
independent status based on his refutations of the historical arguments put forward by 
the Chinese Government.
1009
 However, his continuous support and frequent 
participation, particularly his constant calls for the Tibetan people‟s right to self-
determination, is well known among the Tibetans and the overseas Chinese. 
Contrarily, Hu Ping, the editor of Beijing Spring, feels it unnecessary to digress into 
the historical aspects of the two nations and regards the future as more urgent and 
important. Similar sentiments have been expressed by other dissidents such as Ding 
Zilin and Jiang Peikun
1010
 who refuse to comment on the historical aspects of the two 
                                                                                                                                            
in China. After his release in 1993, he was deported to the United States where he is currently 
living. He set up Wei Jingsheng Foundation and continues to work for democracy and freedom in 
China. For his efforts he was awarded the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, National 
Endowment for Democracy Award, and has been nominated for Nobel Peace Prize for seven times 
since 1993. 
1008 Wei Jingsheng, „Letters from Prison: To Deng Xiaoping on the Tibetan Question‟, from his book 
edited and translated by Kristina M. Torgeson (ed.), The Courage to Stand Alone: Letters from 
Prison and Other Writings, New York: Viking, 1997, pp. 180-191. 
1009 Dawa Tsering maintains emphatically that Wei Jingsheng accepts Tibet as an historically 
independent nation even though he do not use the term independence explicitly. He says, “In sum, 
he wrote that Tibet was an independent nation. He had not used the word “independence” but he 
had written that Tibet and China were equal and associated nations which meant they were two 
different entities”. Personal interview with Dawa Tsering, TO/Tape3/DawaTsering. 
1010 Ding Zilin, an assistant professor of philosophy at People‟s University of China, Beijing, and her 
husband Jiang Peikun, also a professor at People‟s University of China, lost their only son, Jiang 
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nations. They write, “It is not for us to decide whether Tibet is a part of the Chinese 
territory; this can be determined only by history. The problem is that the Chinese 
government has instructed historians to falsify Tibet‟s history in order to validate its 
domination of Tibet and thus to instil in the minds of the Chinese people the idea of 
China‟s sovereignty over Tibet. The Chinese government has used this method to 
repress dissenting views on the sovereignty of Tibet and to deprive the Tibetans of 
their right to determine their own socio-political system”.1011 Thus, to this group 
belong those dissident scholars who despite being well-versed in the historical status 
of Tibet affect a nonchalant naivete.
1012
 
 
Finally, the third group consists of the Chinese dissidents who hold the view that 
Tibet had always been an integral part of China. Among those whom I interviewed in 
April of 2006, the political activists, specifically the China Democracy Party 
(CDP)
1013
 executive members, strongly and unanimously claimed that Tibet was, is 
and will always be a part of China. Despite their ardent opposition to the Chinese 
Communist Party‟s policy, the members of the CDP seem to follow exactly the Party 
line in describing Tibet‟s historical status. They provided me with the same 
communist logic that is contained in the White Paper released by the Chinese 
Government to claim China‟s sovereignty over Tibet.1014 Other vocal proponents in 
this group are Xu Mingxu, “a so called Tibet scholar from China,” Wangxi, another 
die-hard supporter of the Chinese national unification, and so on. However, according 
                                                                                                                                            
Jielian, during the June 4 Tiananmen massacre. After the incident Ding Zilin met other bereaved 
mothers and formed a network which is now known as „Tiananmen Mothers‟. 
1011 Ding Zilin and Jiang Peikun, „Tibetan‟s Rights and Chinese Intellectuals‟ Responsibility‟, in 
Tibet Through Dissident Chinese Eyes: Essays on Self-Determination, p. 33. 
1012 Personal interview with Dawa Tsering on 22 June 2006, TO/Tape3/DawaTsering.  
1013 In America there are at least two political organisations with the name of China Democracy Party 
(CDP); one whose headquarters is in Empire State Building in Manhattan, New York and the other 
whose headquarters is in Flushing, New York. My interview was with Xie Wanjun, Yanqin Bao, 
Shan Wang, Ze Gua, Weixing Lu, Ming Lu and Baoxiang Xie of the CDP that is located in Empire 
State Building and henceforth the CDP refers to this organisation except indicated otherwise. Both 
of the CDPs claim ties with the original China Democracy Party that first emerged in China in 
1998. Although varied opinions exist among the overseas Chinese about the reputation of the CDP 
housed in Empire State Building, I interviewed the executive members of the party in order to 
gather views from all quarters of the Chinese dissident groups and understand the range of dissident 
views on Tibet. The website for the CDP based in Empire State Building is: 
http://www.cdpweb.org/english/index.htm. The organisation website for the CDP based in Flushing 
is: http://www.cdp2006.org/. 
1014 Personal interview with the China Democracy Party executive members on 2 May 2006, at their 
office in Empire State Building, CD/Tape9/CDP. 
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to Dawa Tsering,
1015
 an increasing number of overseas Chinese have begun to 
question the authenticity of the Chinese Government‟s propaganda materials on Tibet. 
Dawa Tsering recounted his own experience thus: 
 
When I first attended the meetings I constantly had arguments with the 
Chinese. Similarly, I had lots of arguments with Xu Mingxu which we 
would continue [even after the meetings] by exchanging letters. During 
the initial stage, many Chinese were on Xu Mingxu‟s side. However, 
gradually when things became clearer through consistent discussions and 
debates, more and more people started to switch side and one time Xu 
Mingxu was left to defend himself without support. One time, I did not 
get a chance to counter argue Xu Mingxu‟s statement but instead the 
Chinese themselves rose up together to argue against him. And later, 
articles written by him were rejected by others to publish in their journals 
or magazines. The support from the Chinese intellectuals has increased a 
lot. Those in abroad who are interested to know [the Tibet situation], 
know it all by now.
1016 
 
4.8.4.2 Dissidents‟ Views on Tibet‟s Future 
The Chinese dissident intellectual and pro-democracy supporters unanimously agree 
that the Communist Government has, over the past five decades, subjected the 
Tibetans to violent suppressions and horrendous brutalities. The speech given by Xue 
Wei, the manager and editor of Beijing Spring, at the Second International Conference 
of Tibet Support Groups, in Bonn, Germany, expresses the common sentiment felt by 
the overseas Chinese dissidents toward the Tibetan people.  
 
On the front line of resistance against Communist China‟s totalitarian 
rule, we and the Tibetan people are fighting allies. The Communists not 
only oppress the Tibetan people, they also oppress the Han people and 
other minorities. The sufferings of the Tibetans are also the sufferings of 
other nationalities inside China, though at the present stage, the pain of 
the Tibetans is more severe than others. We fully understand the 
                                                 
1015 Dawa Tsering is the chair of the China Desk in the Department of Information and International 
Relations, Dharamsala. Before joining the China Desk he worked for International Campaign for 
Tibet (ICT), Washington, D.C. While working at ICT he got numerous opportunities to meet with 
Chinese dissidents and later he was involved in the establishment of Sino-Tibet Study Group with 
some Chinese friends. He has attended many conferences on Sino-Tibet relations and presented 
numerous papers.  
1016 Personal interview with Dawa Tsering, TO/Tape3/DawaTsering. 
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sentiment and demands of the Tibetan people. We eagerly await the day 
when the Han and Tibetan peoples will be able to live in harmony like 
friends and brothers and sisters. 
 
For the overseas democracy dissidents and Chinese students, the 
overwhelming majority regards the suffering and human rights struggle 
of the Tibetan people with sympathy and support. Although some are 
sceptical or hold different degrees of opposition, this does not obscure 
our general support for the Tibetans‟ struggle against tyranny.1017 
 
However, regarding Tibet‟s future, especially on the two options of independence and 
autonomy, the dissidents and the pro-democracy activists choose autonomy status for 
Tibet. Except for a smattering of dissident intellectuals like Cao Changching, Harry 
Wu, Wang Ruowang, Wang Xizhe and Liu Xiaobo,
1018
 everyone else–be it the 
members of the CDP
1019
 or other intellectuals–prefer unification over secession and 
autonomy over independence, which they consider a highly inappropriate solution.
1020
 
This trend of thought could have been the result of several factors: 1) unification 
concept that has taken roots in the minds of the Chinese for over thousands of 
years;
1021
 2) the widespread concept of a “Great China;”1022 and 3) a deep sense of 
                                                 
1017 Xue Wei, „Tibet and China: Brothers or Neighbours‟, Tibetan Bulletin, September – October 
1996. 
1018 On October 1, 1996, Wang Xizhe and Liu Xiaobo urged the Beijing Government to begin 
dialogue with the Dalai Lama and give independence to Tibet, in a jointly issued “Double Tenth 
Declaration”. AFP, „Chinese Dissidents Calls on Beijing to Open Talks with Dalai Lama‟, 4 
February 1998, 
  http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/1998/2/4_1.html; Glenn Chapman, „Top dissident Wang Xizhe 
speaks out against China‟, AFP, 21 October  1996,  
 http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/1996/10/22_3.html.  
1019 As mentioned earlier, although the CDP‟s view on Tibet‟s past differ radically from the other 
intellectuals, their take on Tibet‟s future resemble other intellectuals‟ views. Personal interview 
with the CDP members; CD/Tape9/CDP. 
1020 In October 1992, an unprecedented conference on Sino-Tibetan relations and its future prospect, 
now commonly known as the Potomac Conference, was organised by the Tibet Forum and Center 
for Modern China, Princeton University, which brought together Tibetan and Chinese scholars and 
experts to discuss the relations between Tibetans and the Chinese and to improve mutual respect 
between the two peoples. The Chinese views articulated at the conference although apologetic for 
the ruthless treatments of the Tibetans by the Chinese Communist Party since 1950, nevertheless 
varied on the issue of independence of Tibet. A majority of the Chinese participants considered 
independence for Tibet to be inappropriate. A more complete viewpoints of the Chinese scholars 
and participants can be viewed at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/indiv/area/tibet-potomac/ . 
1021 Wang Lixiong, „Indirect Representation Versus a Democratic System: Relative Advantages for 
Resolving the Tibet Question‟, in Barry Sautman and June Teufel Dreyer (ed.), Contemporary 
Tibet: Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2006, p. 
108. 
1022 Wang Ruowang, „The Status of Tibet: Recalling a Visit to Lhasa‟, in Cao Changching (ed.) and 
James D. Seymour (ed.), Tibet Through Dissident Chinese Eyes: Essays on Self-Determination, p. 
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Han nationalism.
1023
 “Not only do conservative Chinese cling to anachronistic 
imperialistic notions,” writes James Seymour, “but even the democracy movement is 
comprised largely of self-styled patriots who have no desire to see the diminution of 
the territory of the PRC”.1024 They fear that a separate and independent Tibet would 
adversely affect China‟s security and encourage the Mongol and the Uighur 
nationalists to seek their independence thus creating a “domino effect”1025 that could 
lead to complete disintegration of China. This commonly held trepidation, which 
pervades among China‟s domicile as well as the exiled Chinese, is expressed 
explicitly by the Chinese writer Wang Lixiong in his article „The People‟s Republic 
of China‟s 21st century Underbelly‟. He writes: 
 
Once Tibet became independent and was forced to ally itself with India, 
India would advance thousands of kilometres without firing a shot, with 
its armed forces marching into central China, and its missiles being able 
to hit all of Chinese from the Tibetan Plateau. Without the natural 
Tibetan barrier and the time it would take to cross the Tibetan Plateau, 
war would be fought in central China, at a certainly high cost to life and 
property. So it is obvious that for China to lose such a vast barrier, which 
would expose our fatal “underbelly,”would be unacceptable from a 
national security perspective. Preparing for a possible future conflict 
with India is the bottom line as to why the Central Government cannot 
allow Tibetan independence. The Central Government cannot retreat or 
compromise on the demands for Tibetan independence or covert 
independence. 
 
There is also another related factor that we need to be clear about, or that 
any special disposition of the Tibet matter could have a chain reaction 
among other minority ethnic groups. While the Han Chinese make up 93 
percent of the Chinese population, minority ethnic regions make up 60 
percent of Chinese territory, 89.6 percent of our grasslands, 37 percent of 
our forests, 49.7 percent of our timber resources, and over 50 percent of 
our water conservancy resources. So the minority ethnic group matter 
                                                                                                                                            
73. 
1023 James D. Seymour, „Introduction‟, in Cao Changching and James D. Seymour (ed.), Tibet 
Through Dissident Chinese Eyes: Essays on Self-Determination, p. xi. 
1024 Ibid., p. xxiii. 
1025 Wei Jingsheng, The Courage to Stand Alone: Letters From Prison and Other Writings, pp. 180-
191. 
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must be one of overall consideration, which is dealt with very 
carefully.
1026
  
 
The concise security analyses by Wang Lixiong are but a reflection of a general trend 
of thought that pervades the Han Chinese mentality and obviates Tibet‟s 
independence as an option. Secession of any province from the mainland China 
conflicts with the Han nationalism which only allows a unitary “Great China” that 
must remain unified and strong. Hence, just like independence is totally unacceptable 
to the Communists, it is undesirable and impracticable to the non-Communist 
Chinese. “National unification may be the only issue on which it is difficult for 
Chinese democracy activists to speak or act contrary to the Chinese government,” 
writes Xiang Xiaoji.
1027
 However, for two reasons, this should not spell doom to the 
Tibetans who seek independence: 1) The dissidents‟ views might not eventuate in the 
near future and even if they did, in a democratic setting, there should not be any 
deterioration in the situation compared to the present state; and 2) The dissidents 
support a varying degree of autonomy that includes a confederal status which could 
eventually lead to a secession. The majority of the Chinese dissidents are constrained 
by what I call „deep psychological affinity to the concept of unification‟ which 
prevents them from venturing any further than autonomy for political solutions to 
nationality problems. Thus, to the majority of liberal minded Chinese dissidents 
autonomy would serve to fulfill their vision of unitary China and offer a reasonable 
solution to ethnic disputes including Tibet‟s lingering problem.  
 
What then is understood by the term “autonomy” in this context and by whom? To 
what degree can it be extended and can it provide solution to the Tibet question? 
Briefly speaking autonomy is a term which is loaded with various shades of meaning. 
The Chinese Communist Government uses several models of autonomy in dealing 
with its multi-ethnic autonomous regions depending largely on the power relations it 
has with its regions.
1028
 There is a Hong Kong model of autonomy, “characterised by 
                                                 
1026 Wang Lixiong, „The People‟s Republic of China‟s 21st Century Underbelly‟. This article was first 
published in Beijing Zhanlue Yu Guanli in Chinese on 2 January 1999. The English translation was 
published in the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. Accessed at 
 http://www.columbia.edu/itc/ealac/barnett/pdfs/link14-wang-lixiong.pdf. 
1027 Xiang Xiaoji, „Independence and Unification‟, in Cao Changching and James D. Seymour (ed.), 
Tibet Through Dissident Chinese Eyes: Essays on Self-Determination, p. 97. 
1028 He Baogang, „The Dalai Lama‟s Autonomy Proposal: A One-Sided Wish?‟, in Barry Sautman 
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judicial independence, an internal border and representatives in international 
organisations with regard to economic and cultural matters,”1029 which has been 
offered to Taiwan
1030
 but not to Tibet. National Regional Ethnic Autonomous status 
given to Tibet has higher degree of autonomy than that enjoyed by Xinjiang and Inner 
Mongolia. Basically, Beijing‟s autonomy is highly restricted and centralised structure 
that is “characterised by a combination of political “self-rule,” economic integration, 
cultural exchange, and ethnic intermingling”.1031 On the other hand “genuine 
autonomy” that the Dalai Lama proposes would allow Tibet to be governed by its own 
constitution with popularly elected chief executive, a bicameral legislature, and an 
independent legal system, while the foreign and military affairs would remain under 
the responsibility of the Central Government.
1032
  
 
A group of Chinese intellectuals from the PRC, Hong Kong and Taiwan formulated a 
third type of autonomy, which Dawa Norbu termed “greater autonomy,” in a 
celebrated draft proposal of the Constitution of Federal Republic of China.
1033
 
Released on 31 January 1994, the draft proposal outlines a new China that would have 
„a federal system with confederal characteristics,‟ with confederacy referring to the 
allocation of special Autonomous Statehood to Taiwan, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, 
Xinjiang, Ningxia and Guangxi (Article 28). Yan Jiaqi describes the confederation 
characteristics of the new Federal China as consisting of „loose republics‟ consisting 
of the above mentioned provinces and the „close republics‟ consisting of the rest of 
China.
1034
 The extension of autonomy is greater with the draft allowing each 
Autonomous State to make its own constitution (Article 30) and have the authority to 
exercise „any power that is not constitutionally vested in the Federal Government‟ 
(Article 29) and the authority to „make its own entry and exit regulations as warranted 
by local circumstances‟ (Article 10). Article 33 further provides the Autonomous 
                                                                                                                                            
and June Teufel Dreyer (ed.), Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development, and Society in a 
Disputed Region, p. 72. 
1029 Ibid., p. 72. 
1030 In addition to all the characteristics mentioned above the autonomy offered to Taiwan also 
include the right to maintain its armed forces. 
1031 Ibid., p. 69. 
1032 „Dalai Lama‟s Strasbourg Proposal, 15 June 1988,‟ Dharamsala and Beijing: Initiatives and 
Correspondence 1981-1993, pp. 45-49. 
1033 „Federal System: From Fantasy to Blueprint-Birth of a Proposed Draft Constitution for a Federal 
China‟, February 1994, USA.  http://www.geocities.com/capitolhill/7288/fedconn.htm. 
1034 Yan Jiaqi, „Toward the Federal Republic of China‟, China Now, no. 143, reproduced at  
 http://www.tibet.com/China/fedchina.html. 
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State with the right to „sign non-military agreements with foreign countries, and the 
right to make its own decisions about joining international organisations and setting 
up representative offices in foreign countries‟. Similarly, the small circle of dissidents 
and activists that I interviewed agreed with the core theme of the proposal and viewed 
the Dalai Lama‟s “genuine autonomy” proposal as a pragmatic, feasible and 
acceptable solution. However, when asked about the Dalai Lama‟s call for a unified 
Tibet, that will include some areas in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan, none of 
them could offer a satisfactory and systematic method to fulfil this requirement except 
for the CDP members who straightforwardly rejected the notion of a unified Tibet as 
infeasible. Nevertheless, a number of them proposed to employ self-determination as 
a means to resolve this highly sensitive issue. The draft proposal also fails to address 
the issue of reunification of Tibet and does not specify which areas Tibet would cover 
in the new Federal China. The draft does not explicitly state whether „Tibet‟ refers to 
Tibet Autonomous Region created by the CCP or to Greater Tibet as envisioned by 
the Dalai Lama which also includes Kham and Amdo. 
 
Be that as it may, as seekers of democracy and freedom the pioneering authors of the 
draft and other Chinese dissident scholars feel ideologically bound to support the 
principles of democracy and more pertinently the practice of plebiscite in determining 
the fate of the Tibetan people. “Based on the principle of democracy, we believe the 
Tibetan people have the right to decide their own fate and way of life. The right to 
self-determination is affirmed; other nationalities cannot decide for them,” writes 
Xiang Xiaoji. One after the other, Wei Jingsheng, Cao Changching, Chen Kuaide, 
Harry Wu and Hu Ping expressed that they feel strong moral obligations to support 
the Tibetan peoples‟ right to self-determination in determining the future status of 
Tibet. On the other hand Xu Wenli, Chen Pokong and Lian Shengde asserted that 
while cherishing the right to self-determination, they feel that its scope of application 
should be limited only to determine the issue of reunification of the three provinces of 
Tibet, viz U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo and should not be extended to the question of 
the future status. Irrespective of what ultimate goal they choose to see for the 
Tibetans, these more liberal dissidents feel that it is Tibetan peoples‟ democratic right 
to decide not only their economic, cultural, religious lifestyle but also their political 
status. Wei Jingsheng puts it in nice theoretical form from prison: 
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The will and aspiration of the people are the main constituting factor of 
sovereignty. Part of sovereignty would be lost with the loss of the 
aspiration for self-rule of a certain portion of the people. Other 
conditions as defined by the so-called “law of sovereignty” must be 
based on people‟s aspiration for self-rule and national self-
determination. Without this most important basis, other forms of 
sovereignty will eventually lose validity.
1035 
 
Although the term self-determination was not used in the draft proposal, it does make 
special provisions for Tibet, by respecting the status quo and respecting Tibet‟s 
history,
1036
 and suggested the use of referendum to decide the fate of Tibet. Article 39 
of the draft proposal recognises Tibet‟s unique status and accordingly addresses the 
issues exclusively relevant to Tibet: 
 
The Autonomous State of Tibet is a national nature conservation area, 
where the testing of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the 
storage of nuclear wastes are prohibited.  
The Autonomous State of Tibet is financially independent and not 
required to pay federal tax.  
The Autonomous State of Tibet has the right to set up its state court of 
final appeal. 
 
The position of the Autonomous State of Tibet will be reviewed 25 years 
after this Constitution is promulgated. The review will be in the form of a 
referendum by the citizens in the state and not subject to Article 36 of 
this Constitution.
1037 
 
The last clause of this article contains that most significant concession given to the 
Tibetan people by the drafters–a right to decide, through referendum, whether to 
secede or stay with Federal China after twenty five years of staying in the federation. 
                                                 
1035 Wei Jingsheng, The Courage to Stand Alone: Letters From Prison and Other Writings, pp. 180-
191. 
1036 Yan Jiaqi, „Federal System: From Fantasy to Blueprint – Birth of a Proposed Draft Constitution 
for a Federal China‟, unpublished paper, 8 February 1994, USA,  
 http://www.geocities.com/capitolhill/7288/fedconn.htm, See also Dawa Norbu, China‟s Tibet 
Policy, p. 440. 
1037 „Federal System: From Fantasy to Blueprint-Birth of a Proposed Draft Constitution for a Federal 
China‟, February 1994, USA. http://www.geocities.com/capitolhill/7288/fedconn.htm. 
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In so doing, they might have offered a solution that could satisfy those who seek 
genuine autonomy as well as those who strive for complete independence. As such the 
draft Constitution for a Federal China symbolises a far-sighted political undertaking 
by the liberal Chinese intellectuals who had the courage to acknowledge the “hidden 
forces of history and society” that are structured by sharp ethnic differences and 
dominated by Han hegemony. Judging by the CCP‟s waiting game tactics, the 
protracted nature of the Sino-Tibetan dialogues and the Chinese government‟s 
hesitations even to recognise the five rounds of dialogues as high-level discussions, 
the resolution of the Tibetan problems is clearly not in sight. Perhaps, the hope for the 
Tibetans lies with the Chinese liberals who despite their conflicting voices remain 
devoted to the concept of self-determination and open to possibilities of intimate 
discussions. Yet, the biggest challenge in realising this solution is the democratisation 
of China which may probably take an equally long time. 
 
4.8.5 Self Determination: the Legitimate Right of the Tibetan People 
 
4.8.5.1 Self-Determination: The Right Option to Resolve Tibet‟s Issue 
Irrespective of what political status one seeks for Tibet, self-determination, through 
plebiscite, should be the means to ascertain the aspirations of the Tibetan people. It 
would not only guarantee a genuine democratic approach with maximum 
representation that would embody the true will of the Tibetan people, but also reduce 
any possibility of dissensions caused by unequal representations. Secondly, 
implementation of the right to self-determination could allow the two parties to avoid 
revisiting history, which until now has proven to be a major source of contention. 
Furthermore, invoking the United Nations‟ fundamental principles enshrined in the 
Charter and other human rights covenants would have the added advantage of 
involving the international organisation, whose support would be instrumental in 
successful application of this principle and also ensuring compliance from China who 
is not just a member of the United Nations but also a member of the Permanent 
Security Council. However, despite these advantages, it is essential to crosscheck 
whether Tibetans fulfill the criteria for demanding the right to self-determination. 
 
What then are the determining factors that allowed many peoples and nations to 
utilise the right to self-determination over its entire history? The principle of 
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nationality appears to be one ever-present factor in granting of self-determination 
throughout its history. In the early stages of its development the principle of self-
determination was put into practice in European regions, starting in the late eighteenth 
century, in the form of plebiscites–the first of which were conducted in Avignon, the 
Comtat Venaissin, Savoy, Nice and the Italian regions. The growing ideas of the time, 
that the consent of the governed was essential in deciding people‟s fate, could have 
been strong inspiration for allowing people to decide their future status. However, in 
the pre-World War I era, the element of nationalism was vaguely apparent in the 
expression of self-determination in the form of close historical, racial and linguistic 
ties and people‟s consent that were necessary conditions for granting of self-
determination. Decades later, the rising nationalism of the early twentieth century had 
compelled the Allied powers, especially at the end of the First World War, to give due 
considerations to the nationality element in finding solutions to territorial 
problems.
1038
 The disintegration of Austrio-Hungarian and Ottoman empires and 
subsequent secession of many new states such as Czechoslovakia, State of Slovenes, 
Croats and Serbs were driven largely by nationalism. Within this period, Soviet 
Russia granted independence to Poland and Finland. It is a little trickier to list the 
main factors for granting self-determination in these cases because self-interests on 
the part of the victorious Allied powers played prominent roles in the process of 
redrawing new maps of Europe. Moreover, lack of clear-cut and “generally valid 
definition of the conditions a nation should satisfy before it could legitimately claim a 
right of self-determination” stood as a major obstacle for the practical application of 
the principle of self-determination.
1039
 Be that as it may, it was obvious that the right 
of nationalities was considered and the consent of the governed sought in granting the 
right to self-determination.
1040
 
 
In its latest developmental phase–the post-war UN era–self-determination was 
elevated from being a mere principle to “a universally applicable right”.1041 The UN 
Charter and other important human rights covenants proclaimed “people” as the 
recipient of the right to self-determination. An abundant number of nations gained 
independence invoking the right to national self-determination after the Second World 
                                                 
1038 D. Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties I, pp. 31-32. 
1039 Alfred Cobban, The Nation State and National Self-Determination, p. 68. 
1040 Derek Heater, National Self-Determination, p. 37. 
1041 Ibid., p.207. 
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War, especially during the decolonisation period. Yet a clear definition of people was 
missing in the UN instruments for a long time, which left room for various 
interpretations and thus enabled many “to read into it whatever meaning serves their 
purposes”.1042 In the words of Professor Rupert Emerson: “[W]hile the concept lends 
itself to simple formulation in words which have a ring of universal applicability and 
perhaps of revolutionary slogans, when the time comes to put into operation it turns 
out to be a complex matter hedged in by limitations and caveats”.1043 However, in 
1990, Experts Committee on People‟s Rights released a UNESCO report, which 
provides “the most exhaustive attribute list” to define people who deserve the right to 
self-determination. This is not without precedence, at least at a national level, as both 
Soviet Russia and China had provided quite elaborate definitions to the term nation in 
order to formulate their nationality policies, which at certain historical point also 
included self-determination for both the states. Comparison of the three reveals 
several common characteristics, which could be used to rationalise the 
interchangeability of the term people and nation. 
 
Both the Marxist-Leninist tradition of the Soviet Union and the Maoist tradition of 
Communist China defined nation with almost the same attributes, namely 
commonality of language, historical tradition, culture, a certain stage of socio-
economic development and a certain pattern of territorial distribution as distinctive 
attributes of a nation.
1044
 The UNESCO report, however, included racial or ethnic 
identity and religious or ideological affinity on top of the attributes found in the 
Chinese and the Soviet list. The UNESCO report goes: 
 
A people for the rights of people in international law, including the right 
to self-determination, has the following characteristics: {1} A group of 
individual human beings who enjoy some or all of the following 
common features: (a) A common historical tradition; (b) Racial or ethnic 
identity; (c) Cultural homogeneity; (d) Linguistic unity; (e) Religious or 
ideological affinity; (f) Territorial connection; (g) Common economic 
                                                 
1042 Lung-chu Chen, „Self-Determination as a Human Right‟, in Toward World Order and Human 
Dignity, p. 199. 
1043 Rupert Emerson, „Self-Determination‟, The American Journal of International Law, vol. 65, no. 
3, July 1971, p. 459.  
1044 For a detail Soviet definition of nation see, J.V. Stalin, Marxism and National-Colonial 
Questions, pp. 5-13. The Chinese Communist definition of nation Moseley, The Party and the 
Nationalism Question in China, pp. 29-45. 
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life. {2}The group must be of a certain number who need not be large 
(e.g. the people of micro States) but must be more than a mere 
association of individuals within a State; {3} The group as a whole must 
have the will to be identified as a people or consciousness of being a 
people–allowing that groups or some members of such groups, though 
sharing the foregoing characteristics, may not have that will or 
consciousness; and possibly; {4} The group must have institutions or 
other means of expressing its common characteristics and will for 
identity.
1045 
Despite the differences in language employed, it is apparent that all three had viewed 
a common historical tradition, language, culture, territorial contiguity, and common 
economic life as important attributes. Using the broader characteristics identified in 
the UNESCO report, which incorporates the attributes laid down by the Soviets and 
the Chinese, as a yard stick I will examine the Tibetans claim for their right to self-
determination on the basis of being a people/nation. 
 
1) Historical Tradition: Tibetan people share a long and rich common historical 
tradition that had spanned for thousands of years. Experts assumed that written 
records in Tibet date back to the time of old Tibetan empire which might have 
emerged as administrative record-keeping, correspondences within the nation and 
between nations and might have received influences to certain degree from Chinese 
and Indian recording keeping practices.
1046
 Although the written historical records 
came into existence after the invention of Tibetan writing system, one would assume 
that some form of oral tradition must have existed prior to it as accounts of Tibet‟s 
earliest kings had come down in considerable detail. Generally, Tibetan historical 
records come in several different genres prominent among which are the annals (Deb-
Ther), royal chronicles (Gyal-rab),
1047
 origin of religion (Choe-jung), and exemplary 
biographies (Nam-thar). The earliest of the known annal is Mani-kabum, which is 
attributed as the work of Tibetan King Song-tsen Gampo of the seventh century. This 
                                                 
1045 International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Rights of the Peoples: Final Report and 
Recommendations, Paris: UNESCO, 1990, pp. 7-8. Document number: SHS-89/CONF.602/7. 
Accessed from the UNESCO archive with online access at:  
 http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0008/000851/085152eo.pdf  
1046 Matthew T. Kapstein, The Tibetans, MA: Blackwell Publishing, Malden, 2006, p.24. 
1047 The standard way of transliterating a Tibetan word is using the Wylie transliteration system. 
However, for the sake of easier pronunciation, especially for readers who are not familiar with the 
language, I will follow the less standard system of reproducing the sounds of the Tibetan words. 
Thus, Gyal-rab, meaning history, in Wylie scheme is written as rGyal Rabs, Choe-jung as Chos-
‟byung, Nam-thar as rNam-thar, and so on. 
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text, which contains clear accounts of the origin of the Tibetan race and the biography 
of the king himself, was discovered and excavated
1048
 by Drupthob Ngodup at the 
Trul-nang Temple in Lhasa.
1049
 Other annals include Deb-ther ngon-po (Blue 
Annals), which is composed by Lotsawa Shon-nu-pal in 1478 and is considered as 
one of the foremost among the historical literatures of Tibet, Deb-ther mar-po (Red 
Annals) by Tshal-pa Kunga Dorje (1346-1363), which is a history of the early kings 
of Tibet, and more recently Deb-ther kar-po (White Annals) by Gedun Choephel, 
which details the reigns of Song-tsen Gampo and Trisong Detsen.
1050
 Royal 
chronicles or Gyal-rabs are closer to the traditional historical accounts of kings, 
rulers, leaders and their achievements and policies. Well known amongst a gamut of 
royal chronicles in Tibetan language are Clear Mirror of the Royal Chronicle and 
Origin of the Doctrine written by Sonam Gyaltsan, Zog-dan Shon-nui Ga-ton by the 
Great Fifth Dalai Lama Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso in 1643, Regent Sangye Gyatso‟s 
White Lapis Lazuli, which was written in 1687.
1051
  
 
The next genre of historical tradition is the so-called Choe-jung or Origin of the 
Doctrine, which primarily relates to the origin and spread of Buddhism, particularly in 
India and Tibet. With the wide spread of Buddhism throughout Tibet, Choe-jung 
eventually developed into a new and sophisticated genre for narrating cultural and 
religious history. The most popular Choe-jung are Buton Choe-jung, penned by one of 
the most prolific Tibetan writers Bu-ton in 1322, Pema Karpo‟s Choe-jung and Gya-
gar Choe-jung (History of Buddhism in India)
1052
 by Taranatha in 1608.
1053
 For more 
specific study of historical episodes, particularly the period following the restoration 
of Buddhism in Tibet, we turn to the multitude of Nam-thar or biographies of 
renowned Tibetan Buddhist teachers, which have served as rich sources of historical 
information. Examples include biography of Ra Lotsawa, biography of Rinchen 
                                                 
1048 In the Tibetan literature there is a group of texts known as terma or hidden treasures, which are 
believed to be philosophical and religious works by past masters. Interestingly, these masters bury 
the work once it was completed for various reasons as treasure for posterity. These buried treasures 
were discovered and excavated by adepts with special skill known as terton.  
1049 Dan Martin, Tibetan Histories: A Bibliography of Tibetan-language Historical Works, London: 
Serindia, 1997, p. 16. 
1050 Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History, p. 336.  
1051 Georges De Roerich, „The Historical Literature of Tibet‟, in S. K. Sharma & Usha Sharma, 
Encyclopaedia of Tibet Series 1: History and Geography of Tibet, New Delhi: Anmol Publications 
Pvt. Ltd., 1997, pp. 46-54. 
1052 Taranatha‟s Chos-‟byung had been translated into German by A. Schiefner. 
1053 Georges De Roerich, „The Historical Literature of Tibet‟, in Encyclopaedia of Tibet Series I: 
History & Geography of Tibet, p. 51. 
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Sangpo,
1054
 biographies of various Dalai Lamas. The shared historical experiences of 
the reigns of Tibetan kings, the rule of Sakya leaders and the leadership of the Dalai 
Lamas testify to a common historical understanding of the Tibetan people.  
 
2) Racial Identity: The understanding of racial identity has evolved with the 
development in sociological theories. Experts now consider racial identity as a social 
construction, which “refers to a sense of group or collective identity based on one‟s 
perception that he or she shares a common heritage with a particular racial group”.1055 
Despite the fact that the Tibetans and Chinese belong to the same Mongoloid race and 
share vague similarities in physiological characteristics,
1056
 it is obvious that the two 
peoples have a very distinct and separate sense of racial identity. Irrespective of age, 
location, educational or social background, Tibetans consider themselves racially 
distinct from the Chinese based on their understanding of unique racial origins, 
common heritage and cultural identifications. Tibetans share few ethnogenic myths 
about the origin of their race, which are entirely different from the numerous Han 
Chinese myths, be it “„creation legend‟ of P‟an Ku,” the ethnic ancestor Hou Chi or 
the myth of Huang Ti, the “Yellow Emperor”.1057 The more indigenous Bon myth 
about the origin of Tibetan race mentions the story of cosmic eggs from which the 
first progenies of Tibetan race evolved.
1058
 However, the most popular Tibetan 
ethnogenic myth involves the mating of a monkey and a rock ogress
1059
 in the fields 
of Tsethang, which is located in the fertile valley of Yarlung. The Tibetans of all ages 
identify themselves with the story of the monkey and the ogress (pha spre-rgan 
byang-chub sems-pa dang ma brag srin-mo) and more importantly, to the two deities, 
Avalokiteshvara and Tara, who manifested themselves into those two beasts. Yet a 
third mythical origin depicts an Indian ancestry to the Tibetan race according to the 
contemporary Tibetan historian Shakabpa. He wrote that based on writings by Indian 
                                                 
1054 Ibid. p. 51. 
1055 Janet E. Helms, Black and White Racial Identity: Theory, Research and Practice, New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1990, p. 3. 
1056 According to Shakabpa no major scientific research has been conducted to study the closeness of 
the Tibetan and the Mongoloid race. Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History, pp. 5-6.  
1057 Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, p. 282. 
1058 Tsung-lien Shen and Shen-chi Liu, Tibet and the Tibetans, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1953, p. 18. 
1059 In this myth the monkey was believed to be a manifestation of Avalokiteshvara, the Buddha of 
Compassion, who is considered the patron deity of Tibet, and the ogress was said to be a 
manifestation of Tara, the Buddha of Activities. Hence, these deities are intimately close to the 
hearts of Tibetan people, who daily recite the six-syllable mantra of Avalokiteshvara and frequently 
read the Twenty One Praises of Tara.  
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Pandit Shankara Pati a large number of learned Tibetans claimed that Rupati, a 
military commander of Kaurava army, and his followers fled to Tibet and populated 
the land after their defeat in a war with Pandavas.
1060
 These mythical stories, which 
are deeply embedded in the Tibetan people‟s psyche, provide concrete psychological 
base for the Tibetans to develop an enduring sense of their distinct ethnicity and racial 
identity. 
 
3) Common Culture: Looking across the widespread ethnic Tibet it is easily 
noticeable that Tibetans have a sophisticated, fully developed pan-Tibetan culture that 
is rooted deeply in Tibetan Buddhism and Bon practices. Since the medieval times the 
Tibetan culture, primarily in the form of religious practices and Buddhist 
philosophical understanding, has spread and been assimilated into a multiple of 
neighboring cultures thus acquiring “an element of universality”.1061 “Lamaism,” 
writes Professor Nakamura of Tokyo University, “had some influence upon the vast 
inland area of Asia covering the interior of China proper, Mongolia, Manchuria, and 
Central Asia”. This fact, he considers, quite remarkable when compared with what 
little influence Japanese religion has had upon foreigners.
1062
 Tibetans have preserved 
and developed this Buddhist culture, in its entirety and somewhat integrated form, in 
large and small monasteries and nunneries that dotted the country. Especially unique 
is the full fledged Tantric Buddhist culture that is found almost exclusively on the 
Tibetan plateau.
1063
 Distinctiveness of the culture is not just confined to the religious 
sphere but its manifest in secular cultural expressions such as food, dress, wedding 
ceremonies, medical practice, birth and death rituals are widespread. Obviously, like 
any other country Tibet too has received cultural influences from her neighbouring 
countries particularly, India, China and Mongolia. However, qualities that give 
“Tibetanness” to her culture have not been compromised in the assimilation 
processes. Tibet‟s isolation for many centuries and harsh terrains had preserved the 
purity of Tibetan culture. “Tibet is not only an ethnic group but a civilisation. The 
Tibetans stand distinctly from the Chinese, with whom they have nothing in 
                                                 
1060 Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History, p. 5. 
1061 Hajime Nakamura, Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India-China-Tibet-Japan, Honululu, 
Hawaii: East-West Center Press, 1964, p. 298. 
1062 Ibid., p. 298. 
1063 Giuseppe Tucci, Tibet: Land of Snows, New Delhi: Oxford and IBC, 1967, p. 12. 
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common,” observed a French Tibetologist Michel Peissel.1064 For instance, the staple 
diet of Tibetans is tsampa, roasted barley flour, supplemented by dried yak meat and 
salted butter tea whereas the Chinese‟s is rice. Similarly, the traditional Tibetan dress 
is chupa–a thick, long, coarsely woven woolen gown with wide pleats and tied at the 
waist with long-sash–that effectively provides protection against Tibet‟s cold 
climate.
1065
 In other cultural avenues too we can find distinctive Tibetan flavour such 
as in the wedding practice, which involves the groom‟s family paying the bride‟s 
mother a certain sum of money known as nu-rin or breast-price, and the bride hoisting 
prayer flag and pronouncing her equal rights in the new family.
1066
 Such display of 
respect and equality for the wife was almost non-existent in the cultures surrounding 
Tibet. Festive occasions such as Losar or the Tibetan New Year, Monlam–the biggest 
religious festival in Tibet and Shoton or the dance festival are unique to the Tibetan 
world. Thus, the pervading commonality in culture provides Tibetans with a deep 
sense of social unity and cultural homogeneity.  
 
4) Linguistic Unity: The language that Tibetan people use, both in spoken and written 
form, throughout Tibet is known as bhod-skad and bhod-yig respectively, or simply 
Tibetan in English. Linguists have classified Tibetan as belonging to Tibeto-Burman 
family because of its close resemblance to Burmese and other languages spoken in the 
Himalayan regions. However, in 1950s a theory that the Tibeto-Burman family is a 
subgroup of a larger language family known as Sino-Tibetan had been floated. Yet 
this theory has been contested by many linguists who claimed that “the available 
evidence does not demonstrate an actual filiation between Tibeto-Burman and the 
Sinitic languages,” other than ancient contacts with the Chinese cultural sphere which 
had produced old loan-words.
1067
 According to Dr. Stephan Beyer, an expert linguist, 
“Tibetan is more distantly related to Burmese; even more distantly to languages 
spoken by Naked Nagas and other hill tribes of Assam; and more distantly still to 
Chinese. Tibetan has had a writing system since the seventh century, borrowed from 
an Indian prototype. India, in fact, has had a massive cultural impact on Tibet; but 
Tibetan itself is unrelated to Sanskrit or any other Indic language”.1068 
                                                 
1064 Tibetan Review, vol. 8, no. 5, May-June, 1973. 
1065 Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History, p. 20. 
1066 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
1067 Matthew T. Kapstein, The Tibetans, p. 20. 
1068 Stephan V. Beyer, The Classical Tibetan Language, Albany: State University of New York Press, 
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Although the spoken languages differ from region to region, they can all be 
considered as variations of the same Tibetan language. In fact “most types of Tibetan 
spoken today may be generally classified into one or another of four major dialect 
groups, corresponding to Western Tibet, Central Tibet, Kham and Amdo, but many 
local variations of each of these, as well as dialects that do not fit comfortably into 
such a scheme, are also known”.1069 However, the classical written Tibetan, used 
throughout the nation, has served as the only literary language for the Tibetans for 
more than a millennium. In this written language exists the entire spectrum of Tibetan 
literature ranging from the translation of the whole set of Buddhist canons known as 
kagyur (translation of Buddha‟s words) and tangyur (translation of commentaries by 
Indian Buddhist scholars), to philosophical and epistemological exegeses by Tibetan 
masters, from treatises on medicine, astrology, poetry to plays, epics and folk stories. 
United by such a profound and intricate language, Tibetans throughout ethnic Tibet 
invariably manifest close cultural connections and a strong sense of racial 
identification. 
 
5) Religious or Ideological Affinity: Long before Buddhism was brought to Tibet in 
the seventh century, the Bon religion of Shang-shung was prevalent in the country, 
which even to this day is a living tradition. Initially brought to Tibet during the reign 
of King Song-tsen Gampo (617-649 C.E.), Buddhism slowly diffused throughout 
Tibet and by the thirteenth century had almost completely supplanted the local Bon 
religion. Tibetan Buddhism has evolved into four main schools,
1070
 which Professor 
Dawa Norbu regarded as “„Tibetanization‟ of Buddhism” with unique Tibetan 
characteristics,
1071
 that are generally differentiated by guru lineage, philosophical 
interpretations, ritual practices, dress codes, etc. Among the leading figures of each 
school there are multitudes who perform and encourage cross-religious practices. For 
instance, the Dalai Lama, who is commonly considered as belonging to the Yellow 
Hat School, receives important teachings, transmissions and instructions from masters 
of other schools. This blending of different schools is even more prevalent among the 
                                                                                                                                            
1992, pp. 7-8. 
1069 Matthew T. Kapstein, The Tibetans, p. 21. 
1070 The four schools in order of formation are rnying-ma or the Old Translation School (9
th
 century), 
sa-kya or the White Earth School (11
th
 century), bka‟-brgyud or the Instruction Lineage School 
(11
th
 century), and dGe-lugs or the Yellow Hat School (14
th
 century). 
1071 Dawa Norbu, Tibet: The Road Ahead, p. 383. 
 304 
lay Tibetans who listen to teachings from all the Tibetan Buddhist lineages and have 
equal reverence for the four schools. Geographically too, the distribution of the four 
schools across the high plateau is approximately uniform with different monasteries 
lying in close proximity to each other. The theory and practice of choosing 
reincarnation is yet another unique aspect of Tibetan Buddhism. No other country but 
Tibet has a fully developed system of discovering, recognising, and installing of 
reincarnated masters. Started in the thirteenth century with the recognition of Karma 
Pakshi
1072
 as the reincarnation of Dusum Khyenpa,
1073
 this tradition was eventually 
borrowed by the remaining three schools of Tibetan Buddhism. Throughout history 
and more so in the present, Tibetan Buddhism has constituted the cement of the 
society and performed a very intimate and important role in the daily lives of majority 
of the Tibetans. Thus, religious affinity has remained one of the strongest bonds that 
bind Tibetans into a very cohesive force. 
 
6) Territorial Connection: Nestled high above the world and guarded by gigantic 
Himalayan ranges to the south, the Karakoram and Kun Lun ranges to the west and 
the Altyn Tagh ranges to the north, the Tibetan plateau has sustained the strong yet 
gentle Tibetan race since the beginning. Within her tough terrains and harsh climatic 
conditions, in the fertile valleys and desolate grasslands, Tibetan civilisation evolved 
and thrived; flowering into one of the most sophisticated cultures in the world. Known 
to the world as Tibet and Bod Gangs-chan ljongs (the land of snow) to the Tibetans, 
the land has been the homeland for the fierce and aggressive kham-pa, gentle and 
graceful dbus-pa, and hardworking and honest amdo-wa. Earliest mentions of this 
high plateau could be found in Western writings of Herodotus, the Father of History, 
of the fifth century B.C.
1074
 Several centuries later Marco Polo, who lived in the 
Mongol Empire for two decades, provided more reliable and detailed information 
about Tibet and her people who, he wrote, had “a language of their own and liv[ed] in 
a great country embracing eight kingdoms and a vast number of cities and 
villages”.1075 At an average elevation of 4000 metres above sea level Tibet‟s 
landlocked territory towers above her neighbouring countries; India, Nepal and 
                                                 
1072 Karma Pakshi (1203-1300), the second Karmapa, was identified as the reincarnation of the first 
Karmapa Dusum Khyenpa. 
1073 Dusum Khyenpa (1110-1193) was the first in the Karmapa lineage. 
1074 Charles Bell, Tibet: Past and Present, p. 22. 
1075 Tsung-lien Shen & Shen-chi Liu, Tibet and the Tibetans, p. 5.  
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Bhutan to the south, Russia and Mongolia to the north, China to the east and Persia 
and Afghanistan to the west. 
 
7) Common Economy: Traditionally, two important sections of the Tibetan 
community comprised the main force behind the nation‟s economy: 1) cattle-breeders 
who wandered across Tibet‟s wide grasslands and practised traditional animal 
husbandry; and 2) farmers who led sedentary lives and grew high altitude crops, 
primarily barley. The first group of people is known throughout the country as drog-
pa and the second as shing-pa. Yet, there is a third group known as samadrok who 
practices a mixture of agriculture and animal husbandry. Clearly, “the basic economy 
of Tibet derives from patterns of cereal agriculture and animal husbandry developed 
by the early civilizations of the Near East, with a few variations that can be best 
explained in terms of the high-altitude environment”.1076 The extensive pastoral 
regions of Tibet supported a huge number of livestock and as much as 48 per cent of 
the people were nomads. Traders and agriculturists make up 32 per cent and the rest 
are monks and nuns.
1077
 Crops that can grow in the harsh and cold climatic conditions 
of Tibet are barley,
1078
 buck wheat, wheat, mustard, peas, and radishes.
1079
 The 
important domesticated animals upon which Tibetans rely heavily for their living are 
sheep, goat, yak and cattle. The usefulness of some of these animals such as yak and 
sheep is surprisingly versatile. Yaks are not only the source of meat and dairy 
products which are essential parts of Tibet‟s diet, but its skin is used to build coracles, 
hair for making tents, ropes, and clothes, bones for other implements. It is also the 
most commonly used beast of burden. The distinctiveness of Tibet‟s economy is 
prominently shaped by her geographical location and the climatic conditions. 
 
The descriptions above clearly demonstrate that Tibetan people not only have a shared 
perception of people-hood–they know themselves as bodpa and the Chinese as 
gyami
1080–but also possess objectively verifiable common characteristics such as 
                                                 
1076 Pedro Carrasco, Land and Polity in Tibet, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1959, pp. 4-5. 
1077 Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History, p. 6. 
1078 Barley with its ability to grow at a very high altitude of up to fourteen thousand feet is the most 
suitable crop for Tibet‟s high elevation. It has become the nation‟s staple diet usually consumed as 
roasted grounded flour known all Tibetan as Tsampa. Tibetans are commonly referred to as „red-
faced nation‟ and „the tsampa-eaters‟.  
1079 Matthew T. Kapstein, The Tibetans, p. 11. 
1080 The Tibetan King Trisong Detsen had made clear-cut distinctions between the two nations by 
declaring on a historic stone pillar, which stands near the Temple in Lhasa, thus: “All to the east of 
 306 
historical tradition, ethnicity, language, and so on that make Tibetans a distinct 
people, separate from the Chinese. Also numerous legal experts have established the 
distinctiveness of the Tibetans people based on the criteria set forth by the 
UNESCO.
1081
 A preliminary report released by the International Committee of 
Lawyers for Tibet
1082
 makes a case for Tibetans as qualifying as people thus: 
 
The Tibetan people meet all the relevant tests of peoplehood. Tibetans 
are a distinct racial or ethnic group. Their language, Tibetan, is a Tibeto-
Burmese language distinct from the Indian and Chinese languages and 
dialects. Tibetans are bound by their religion (Tibetan Buddhism) which 
is inextricably linked to the people‟s cultural, social and historic 
development. The Tibetans have a unique culture, passed down and 
developed through many thousands of years of separate and distinct 
history as expressed in the development of Tibetan fine art, literature, 
architecture, dress, dance, drama, medicine and way of life. They have 
an identifiable territory, Tibet (referred to by most Tibetans as 
Cholkhagsum, the three regions of Tibet) geographically and 
geologically distinct from China.
1083 
 
In January 1993, a group of legal experts, law professors and chief justices assembled 
in London to participate in an international conference of lawyers to investigate the 
controversial case of Tibet‟s position in international law. The five-day conference 
concluded with the release of „The London Statement on Tibet,‟ and numerous 
recommendations to the United Nations and free nations of the world. Employing the 
set of criteria formulated by UNESCO to define a „people‟, the Conference of 
International Lawyers concluded that the “Tibetan people satisfied the requirement 
                                                                                                                                            
the frontier is the country of Great China. All to the west is certainly the country of Great Tibet... At 
Che-shung-shek Chinese territory is met; below this China will show respect. At Tsen-shu-hwan 
Tibetan territory is met; above this Tibet will show respect...Tibetans shall be happy in Tibet and 
the Chinese happy in China”. The entire translations of the inscriptions on the stone pillars in Lhasa 
are provided in Tibet: Past and Present by Charles Bell, pp. 271-272. 
1081 The Permanent People‟s Tribunal, the Conference of International Lawyers, International 
Committee of Lawyers for Tibet and the Conference on the Question of Self-Determination of East 
Timor, Tibet, and Western Sahara all have concluded that the Tibetans are a distinct people with the 
right to self-determination. I will discuss some of these in greater details in the next section. 
1082 International Committee of Lawyers for Tibet was established in 1989 by a group of committed 
human rights lawyers to work on issues relating to international law that could affect the Tibetan 
people. It changed its name to Tibet Justice Center in 2001 and under this name the group has 
organised and hosted various conferences on Tibet, published a series of reports on the current 
situation in Tibet. The official website of the TJC is http://www.tibetjustice.org/. 
1083 International Committee of Lawyers for Tibet, The Right of the Tibetan People to Self-
Determination: A Preliminary Report, San Francisco, 1991, p. 26. 
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and are a „people‟ for international law purposes” and hence are “entitled, in the 
manner and to the extent allowed by international law, to the exercise of the right to 
self-determination”.1084 The Conference also noted that the PRC Constitution and 
legislation recognised the Tibetan people as a separate and distinct nationality and 
accorded an „autonomous status‟.1085 Aside from those international legal experts, 
various governments and parliaments have also identified the Tibetans as a distinct 
people under the international law, which I shall discuss later. Thus, exhibiting all the 
characteristics of being a „people‟, Tibetans are no more or no less a people than the 
British, the French or the Chinese whose people-hood is characterised by the same 
attributes mentioned above. 
 
4.8.5.2 Is China Legally Bound to Bestow the Right to Self-Determination? 
Having mentioned that the Tibetans posses all the attributes of people-hood and, 
therefore, have the right to self-determination as pronounced by the United Nations 
Charter and the Human Rights Covenants, a second question arises: Is China legally 
bound to bestow the right to self-determination to the Tibetans? In general, 
disagreements exist about the legality of the United Nations Charter. However, even 
those legal experts, who believe that the United Nations Charter is a mere set of moral 
principles and guidelines that do not have any binding effect on the signatory States, 
accept that international covenants and human rights instruments acquire legally 
binding status once a State had signed and ratified them. The Chinese Government, 
having signed and ratified the International Covenant of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) on 29 October 1997 and 27 March 2001 respectively,
1086
 is 
legally bound to observe all the articles in the covenant including Article 1 which 
categorically states that all peoples have the right to self-determination and by virtue 
of it they freely determine their political status and pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development. Gerald Schmitz writes: 
 
Die beiden internationalen Menschenrechtspakte über bürgerliche und 
politische Rechte (CCPR) sowie über wirtschaftliche, soziale und 
                                                 
1084 Robert McCorquodale and Nicholas Orosz (eds.), Tibet: The Position in International Law, p. 
146. 
1085 Ibid., p. 146. 
1086 The Chinese Government signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights on 29 October 1997 and ratified on 27 March 2001, 
 http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/3.htm. 
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kulturelle Rechte (CESCR) enthalten in ihrem gleichlautenden Artikel 1 
das Recht aller Völker auf Selbstbestimmung. Dabei ist unbestritten, daß 
durch diese Artikel echte völkerrechtliche Anspruchsnormen begründet 
wurden… Damit haben Völker unter Fremdherrschaft gegen den Staat, 
der diese Fremdherrschaft ausübt, jedenfalls dann einen Rechtsanspruch, 
wenn dieser Staat einem der beiden Verträge beigetreten ist.
1087 
 
However, instead of observing the articles of ICESCR, China strongly opposes the 
minority people‟s right to self-determination, especially at the United Nations, 
claiming any such actions as tantamount to interfering with the Chinese internal 
affairs and its right to territorial integrity, which they claim the United Nations‟ 
Charter guarantees to each and every Member State. By invoking Article 2 (7) of the 
Charter, China has successfully dodged allegations of denying the right to self-
determination to the Tibetans and other minority peoples. A Chinese delegation to the 
United Nations puts it thus, “The right could not be interpreted as authorizing or 
encouraging any actions that dissolved or violated the territorial integrity and political 
unity of sovereign States, so long as those States acted properly and had governments 
representing all the people within their territories”.1088 However, this apparent conflict 
between the principle of self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity, 
which China exploits frequently, has been done away by the Vienna Declaration 
which maintains that only those States who comply with the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples have the right to call for territorial integrity. Both 
the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and 
the Vienna Declaration contain the same clause which states: 
 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in 
                                                 
1087 Gerald Schmitz, Tibet und das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker, Berlin, Germany: Walter de 
Gruyter Gmbh & Co., 1998, pp. 33-34. A rough translation of the above passage is provided here: 
“An identical article 1 of two international human rights covenants, viz., International Covenant of 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), contains the right of all peoples to self-determination. The articles indisputably 
justified the standards of genuine international law requirements. In 1966, the UN General 
Assembly adopted the covenants and, in 1976, with its ratification the instrument became legally 
binding. Thus, people under a foreign rule have the legal right to make claims against the foreign 
ruler if the State has joined either of the two covenants”. Translated by Tsetan Dolkar. 
1088 Statement of Wang Min (China), UN Press Release HR/CN/880, 24 March 1999. This press 
release can be viewed at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990324.hrcn880.html. 
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part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described 
above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or 
colour.
1089 
 
The Declaration, thus, accords the right to claim territorial integrity as against claims 
of self-determination only to those States who conduct themselves as per the 
principles of equal rights, fundamental freedom, human rights and self-determination 
of peoples. Therefore, any State who violates or fails to uphold these principles loses 
its legitimacy to claim the right to territorial integrity.
 China‟s poor human rights 
records and the practice of genocidal policy in Tibet, thus, nullify its right to use 
territorial integrity as defence against the self-determination.  
 
4.8.5.3 International Recognition for Tibet‟s Right to Self-Determination 
Hannum Hurst maintains that the fulfillment of the right to self-determination 
depends “to a great extent on the external support from one or more of the Great 
Powers”. Although Tibetans have not received that external support from any of the 
Super Powers, international recognition for the Tibetan people‟s right to self-
determination has been relatively consistent. Beginning with the United Nations‟ 
response to Chinese invasion of Tibet and brutal suppression of the Tibetan people 
thereafter, many States have criticised China for its brutality in Tibet. The UN 
General Assembly passed three resolutions, one each in 1959, 1961 and 1965, 
expressing grave concerns over the violations of fundamental human rights and the 
infringement of right to self-determination in Tibet.
1090
 Because of its importance and 
pertinence I will quote here the Resolution 1723 of 1961 which unambiguously states: 
 
Gravely concerned at the continuation of events in Tibet, including the 
violation of the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and the 
                                                 
1089 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G. A. Res. 2625, 25 GAOR, 
Supp. 28, U.N. Doc A/8028, The declaration can be viewed at, 
 http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/25/ares25.htm. 
1090 The three resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly are G.A. Res. 1353 passed on 21 
October 1959, G.A. Res. 1723 passed on 20 December 1961 and G.A. Res. 2079 passed in 1965 
which reaffirms the previous two resolutions.  
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suppression of the distinctive cultural and religious life which they have 
traditionally enjoyed,  
Noting with deep anxiety the severe hardships which these events have 
inflicted on the Tibetan people, as evidenced by the large-scale exodus of 
Tibetan refugees to the neighbouring countries,  
Considering that these events violate fundamental human rights and 
freedoms set out in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, including the principle of self-
determination of peoples and nations, and have the deplorable effect of 
increasing international tension and embittering relations between 
peoples,  
1) Reaffirms its conviction that respect for the principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
is essential for the evolution of a peaceful world order based on the rule 
of law;  
2) Solemnly renews its call for the cessation of practices which deprive 
the Tibetan people of their fundamental human rights and freedoms, 
including their right to self-determination;  
3) Expresses the hope that Member States will make all possible efforts, 
as appropriate, towards achieving the purposes of the present 
resolution.
1091
 
Four years later, in 1965, the third United Nations resolution on Tibet (G.A. Res. 
2079), which was supported by sixty countries including India, reaffirmed the 
previous two resolutions, viz., G.A. Res. 1353 (XIV) passed on 21 October 1959 and 
G.A. Res. 1723 (XVI) passed on 20 December 1961. Thereafter, no other resolutions 
on Tibet have been passed in the General Assembly. However, various organisations 
under the United Nations have dealt, discussed and debated Tibet issues in relation to 
inter alia human rights, fundamental freedom and the right to self-determination. The 
UN Secretary General‟s report on “the Situation in Tibet,” which was presented to the 
48
th
 Session of the Commission on Human Rights in February 1992, distinctly 
acknowledged Tibetan people‟s legitimate claim to self-determination and viewed it 
as the necessary condition for the improvement of human rights situation in Tibet. 
The report maintains that “it is apparent that the Tibetan people have a legitimate 
claim to self-determination, and that the human rights situation in Tibet will not 
                                                 
1091 DIIR, International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 to 2004, p. 5. 
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significantly improve until the Tibetan people are accorded the opportunity to 
exercise their right to self-determination”.1092 In that same year, on 20 November, the 
Permanent Tribunal of Peoples (PTP)
1093
 held a special meeting on Tibet in 
Strasbourg, France. The Tribunal, after examining the submitted evidences, concluded 
that the Chinese Government has consistently and continuously deprived the Tibetan 
people of their right to self-determination since 1950. Furthermore, the PTP branded 
the PRC Government‟s massive population transfer policy and the regional territorial 
splitting policy as purposely undermining the ethnic and cultural distinctiveness and 
the unity of the Tibetan people.
1094
  
 
Perhaps, the most prominent and credible non-governmental group to have voiced 
criticism against the gross violation of human rights, including suppression of 
freedom and denial of the right to self-determination in Tibet, is the International 
Commission of Jurists (ICJ) whose publication of several reports gave credence to the 
allegations made by the Tibetans. The ICJ has so far conducted four detailed studies 
on the Chinese Government‟s policy and the Rule of Law in Tibet, examining 
specifically whether the Chinese Government has committed acts of genocide in Tibet 
and what status Tibet holds in International law. The findings were reported to the 
United Nations and other interested international organisations.
1095
 In its first 
preliminary report, the ICJ had drawn prima facie conclusions, based on evidence 
gathered from Tibetan refugees, that the Chinese had attempted to commit cultural 
genocide in Tibet.
1096
 The ICJ further asserted that China had violated at least 
eighteen of the thirty articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
Tibet.
1097
 Regarding the status of Tibet in the International Law the report concluded 
                                                 
1092 Tibet Justice Center, „Secretary-General‟s Report: Situation in Tibet‟, Legal Materials on Tibet, 
Second edition, May 1997, p. 13. Also available at: 
 http://www.tibetjustice.org/materials/un/un8.html. 
1093 The Permanent People‟s Tribunal was founded in Bologna, Italy, on 26 June 1979, by a group of 
law experts, writers and intellectuals, for the purpose of looking beyond the States to the people of 
the world to examine their complaints and listen to their cases. Its members consist of international 
legal experts from Europe, Africa, Asia and America. 
1094 „Permanent Tribunal of Peoples: Session on Tibet Verdict‟, Strasbourg, France, 20 November 
1992, http://www.tpprc.org/documents/resolutions/others/Tribunal_20nov1992.pdf . 
1095 Till date there have been three publications of the findings by International Commission of Jurists 
on Tibet, viz., The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law (1959), Tibet and the Chinese People‟s 
Republic: A Report to the International Commission of Jurists (1960), and Tibet: Human Rights 
and the Rule of Law (1997). 
1096 International Commission of Jurists, The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law, pp. 68-71. 
1097 Ibid., p. 58-59. 
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that “the matter cannot be dismissed out of hand as falling exclusively within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the People‟s Republic of China”.1098 A subsequent full report 
was compiled by the Legal Inquiry Committee on Tibet
1099
 and published a year later 
in 1960, in which the Committee confirmed that “acts of genocide had been 
committed in Tibet in an attempt to destroy the Tibetans as a religious group, and that 
such acts are acts of genocide independently of any conventional obligation”.1100 The 
Legal Inquiry Committee considered Tibet, “at the very least, a de facto independent 
State when the Agreement on Peaceful Measures in Tibet was signed in 1951, and the 
repudiation of this agreement by the Tibetan Government in 1959 was found to be 
fully justified”. 1101 Responding to tragic reports of continuous deterioration of human 
rights in Tibet from organisations such as the Sub-Commission on Prevention and 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, the ICJ once again carried out an in-
depth study on the human rights situation and the rule of law in Tibet. The findings 
were published in its third report, Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law, which 
exposed in great detail the gross human rights violation taking place in Tibet with a 
plethora of cases. It asserts that the “Tibetans are a „people under alien subjugation‟, 
entitled under international law to the right of self-determination, by which they freely 
determine their political status. The Tibetan people have not yet received this right, 
which requires a free and genuine expression of their will”. The report earnestly calls 
upon the United Nations and nations everywhere “to pay heed to the plight of Tibet 
and to come to the defence of the fundamental principles of international law which 
have been trampled upon”. 
 
Supports also came from other governmental and non-governmental institutions and 
groups for the Tibetan people‟s right to self-determination, especially, in the 1990s. 
Parliaments from various parts of the world including the European Parliament, the 
US Senate and Congress, the German Bundastag, the Australian, Belgian, Swiss and 
Liechtenstein parliaments have passed resolutions urging the Chinese government to 
                                                 
1098 Ibid., p. 99. 
1099 Legal Inquiry Committee on Tibet, composed of well-known judges, professors and law 
practitioners of high standing, was an independent committee set up by International Commission 
of Jurists to further investigate the events that occurred in Tibet after the Chinese military force 
entered Tibet “in a detached and judicial manner”.  
1100 Legal Inquiry Committee on Tibet, Tibet and the Chinese People‟s Republic: A Report to the 
International Commission of Jurists, pp. 3-6. 
1101 Ibid., p. 5. 
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grant self-determination to the Tibetan people. The European Parliament, in its 
Resolution A3-0369/92 of 15 December 1992 and Resolutions B4-0768/95/RCI and 
0826/95/RCI of 17 May 1995, explicitly states that the Tibetans are a people under 
international law and that “in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the UN 
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
they have a right to self-determination”.1102 Furthermore, the resolutions earnestly 
called on the Chinese Government to consider “genuine self-determination” in the 
negotiation process.
1103
 In a much bolder stance the Conference of European 
Parliamentarians, in their Statement of Action, affirmed China‟s illegal occupation of 
Tibet as the root of Tibet‟s problems and declared China‟s repeated assertions of 
Tibet being an integral part of the motherland as nothing but false. More importantly, 
the European Parliament recognised the independent status of Tibet prior to its 
occupation and called for the restoration of Tibet‟s Human Rights, including the right 
to self-determination.
1104
 Subsequent resolutions of the European Parliament 
continued to reaffirm “the illegal nature of the invasion and occupation of Tibet,” the 
absence of genuine autonomy in Tibet, and Tibetan people‟s right to self-
determination.
1105
 
 
The United States Congress has since 1991 passed a series of resolutions that 
categorically proclaimed Tibet as an illegally occupied country with “distinctive 
national, cultural, and religious identity separate from that of China,” and possessing 
all the attributes of statehood under the international law at the time of its occupation. 
The Congress has strongly called for “the restoration of human rights of the Tibetan 
people and their natural right of self-determination”.1106 Similarly, the German 
Bundestag has passed three resolutions concerning the human rights violations in 
Tibet in 1987, 1996 and 2002. The latest resolution, passed on 14 March 2002, while 
acknowledging China‟s ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, 
                                                 
1102 DIIR, International Resolutions and Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 to 2004, p. 14 & 30. 
1103 Ibid., p. 20. 
1104 Ibid., p. 21. 
1105 These resolutions, which I have listed here, are provided in International Resolutions and 
Recognitions on Tibet: 1959 to 2004. Resolution on the situation in Tibet and the disappearance of 
the six-year old Panchen Lama (Res. B4-0963, 0979, 0983, 1003, 1007 and 1011/95), 13 July 1995, 
pp. 35-36; the European Parliament Resolution of 13 March 1997, p. 45; European Parliament 
resolution on the Western China Poverty Reduction Project and the future of Tibet (Res. B5-0608, 
0610, 0617, 0621 and 0641/2000), 6 July 2000, pp. 71-73.  
1106 Ibid., H. Con. Res. 145 of 21 May 1991, pp. 102-3; S. Res. 169 of 8 September 1995, pp. 112-3; 
United States Public Law 102-138: Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, 28 December, 1991, pp. 165-6. 
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Social and Cultural Rights requested the Chinese Government to bring about a 
systematic implementation of the covenant and initiate a direct dialogue with the 
Dalai Lama to negotiate a Statute on Tibet that would be founded on Tibetans‟ right 
to self-determination.
1107
 Likewise, the Australian Parliament has endorsed the three 
resolutions passed by the United Nations General Assembly in the early years of 
China‟s occupation of Tibet and considered them still applicable and pertinent.1108 
 
Despite these factors the Tibetan people‟s right to self-determination has remained a 
right unrealised. I attribute this to three main reasons–the Communist Party‟s 
disregard of minority people‟s rights, lack of practical and consistent support from the 
super powers and intermittent efforts by the Tibetans in demanding this right. As I 
have discussed earlier the CCP changed its nationality policy when they came to 
power and rejected the right to national self-determination in favour  of national unity, 
claiming that “the self-determination of the ethnic minorities had been achieved 
because of the liberation of all the Chinese people, including the ethnic minorities, 
from the domination of foreign imperialism after the founding of the PRC”.1109 This 
adherence to the concept of national unity over the minority rights prompts the CCP 
to object the Tibetan people‟s right to self-determination. Therefore, China has always 
responded vociferously whenever the issue of Tibet is raised in the United Nations. 
Notably, the three General Assembly resolutions on Tibet, two of which asserted 
Tibetan people‟s right to self-determination, were passed before the PRC became a 
member of the United Nations. Secondly, the combination of the rigid Chinese 
oppositions and the insufficient support from the superpower nations has rendered any 
discussions on Tibet at the UN practically unproductive. Hurst correctly states that the 
bestowal and the practical implementation of the right is dependent on the external 
support of Great Powers and in Tibet‟s case not only is there no superpower 
supporting her claim to self-determination but on the contrary there is China who has 
the power to veto and block any such resolutions. Thirdly, the Tibetans have not 
earnestly pursued self-determination as an alternative means to resolve their issue. 
Aside from the regular calls for the right to self-determination by the Tibetan 
                                                 
1107 Ibid., „Human Rights and Development in Tibet‟, German Bundestag, Berlin, 18 April 2002, pp. 
216-219. 
1108 Ibid., This resolution was passed by the Australian Senate on 6 December 1990 and by the House 
of Representative on 6 June 1991, pp. 198-199. 
1109 Suisheng Zhao, A Nation State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism, pp. 
174-175. 
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Government-in-Exile and organisations such as the Tibetan Youth Congress, the only 
time self-determination was seriously considered as an alternative path was in 1997 
when it was put forward as one of the four options for Referendum to decide the 
future course of the Tibetan struggle. However, due to popular support for the Middle 
Way Approach, the referendum was not conducted and self-determination was not 
manifested in any practical policy. Therefore, in the Tibetan Government-in-Exile‟s 
political mechanism self-determination has neither been structured to suit the unique 
Tibetan case, nor has its possibilities been explored to fit the Tibetan needs. Yet, as 
Richard Falk writes, the right to self-determination is to be won “on the concrete 
plane of political struggle”1110 and, therefore, the Tibetan struggle should encapsulate 
self-determination as an effective means and compel the United Nations to guarantee 
this right to the Tibetan people. Moreover, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile‟s 
aspirations to establish a democratic system of government in Tibet resonates well 
with the ideals of self-determination, which encourages open competition and 
participation of maximum amount of population in the process of political decision-
making. Furthermore, the principles of self-determination embodies “basic civil 
liberties, such as freedom of information and organisation, and a political order that 
guarantees and maintains the rule of law to make regular political contestation and 
participation possible and meaningful”.1111 These characteristics–that of open 
competition, highest possible societal participation in political decision-making and 
basic civil liberties–that the principle of self-determination so thoroughly represents, 
constitute the three dimensions of the “root concept” of democracy according to 
Philipps University‟s Professor Dirk Berg-Schlosser.1112 Hence, the actual 
implementation of self-determination will have the potential to lay the bedrock for a 
democratic Tibet, which is also the core aspiration of the Middle Way Approach. 
 
Given the feasibility of the right to self-determination, several practical issues must be 
considered in the conduct of plebiscite to determine the aspiration of the Tibetan 
mass–issues such as who will participate in it, what choices will be offered and under 
whose auspices it will be conducted. I will briefly venture into these issues here. The 
                                                 
1110 Richard Falk, „The Content of the Right of Self-Determination‟, in Robert McCorquodale and 
Nicholas Orosz (eds.), Tibet: The Position in International Law, p. 81. 
1111 Dirk Berg-Schlosser, „Concepts, Measurements and Sub-Types in Democratization Research‟, 
Dirk Berg-Schlosser (ed.), Democratisation: The State of the Art, Wiesbaden, Germany: VS Verlag 
für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004, p. 52. 
1112 Ibid., p. 53. 
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answer to the first question is quite obvious. All the Tibetans from entire ethnic 
Tibetan areas, including the compact Tibetan communities from Qinghai, Gansu, 
Sichuan and Yunnan provinces, will have the right to vote in a plebiscite as they all 
share same culture, language, religion, historical traditions and hence constitute the 
collective Tibetan race. For various reasons the UN is the most natural choice for the 
organisation, which will oversee the actual conduction of plebiscite. Because of its 
impartiality it could represent a fair and reliable process, because of its monitoring 
experiences in East Timor and other regions the process could run smoothly and 
because of the sanctity of the organisation it could generate trust in the hearts of the 
Tibetan people which is essential for the process. The second question warrants much 
more considerations and a careful approach. “Genuine autonomy” and the status quo 
are two obvious choices. However, the question of whether to include independence 
as an option is very tricky since including it in the options might cause the Chinese to 
reject the plebiscite outright and hence, prevent the plebiscite from ever taking place, 
but excluding independence as an option would mean offering only a partial self-
determination. Hurst Hannum speaks of a new definition of self-determination in the 
twenty-first century which “exclude[s] the possibility of unilateral, nonconsensual 
secession,”1113 but he asserts the importance of the “need to recognise the 
international preference for solutions that put people first, rather than borders”.1114 In 
a similar tone Lung-chun Chen writes that “if blind adherence to „territorial integrity‟ 
results only in massive deprivations of human rights in that territory, the regime has 
already lost its raison d‟être. Without the allegiance of the people living in the 
territory, „territorial integrity‟ is hollow and empty”.1115 Thus, irrespective of what 
options are listed, there is a consensus among the scholars that bestowal of the right to 
self-determination primarily considers the protection of human rights, human dignity 
and welfare of the people. 
 
Conclusion 
To sum up, the Tibetan struggle has passed through at least several phases and its 
policy has undergone a few major changes during the past forty eight years. The first 
                                                 
1113 Hurst Hannum, „Self-Determination in the Twenty-First Century‟, in Hurst Hannum and Eileen F. 
Babbit (ed.), Negotiating Self-Determination, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006, p.61. 
1114 Ibid., p. 77. 
1115 Lung-chu Chen, „Self-Determination as a Human Right‟, in Toward World Order and Human 
Dignity, p. 242. 
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two decades of their struggle, from 1959 to the late 1970s, constituted the initial phase 
of the struggle, which focused primarily on infrastructure building and awareness 
raising. The overarching goal of the Tibetan struggle then was complete independence 
of Tibet. In 1979, the deliverance of Deng Xiaoping‟s message to the Tibetan 
leaderships stating that except for independence everything else was negotiable 
initiated a major change in the Tibetan political struggle, which for the first time 
deviated from the path of independence. However, this compromised policy did not 
succeed in procuring positive responses from the PRC partly because China was 
experiencing internal power struggle, which eventually led to a dramatic change in 
Chinese leaderships and sacking of Hu Yoabang and other like-minded Chinese 
leaders, and partly because of the shifting geopolitical necessities. This period could 
be considered as constituting the second exploratory phase of the Tibetan struggle. 
The internationalisation of Tibet issue and the formulation of Middle Way Approach 
comprised the next phase in the Tibetan struggle. The announcement of the Five Point 
Peace Plan on 21 September 1987 and the Strasbourg Proposal on 15 June 1988 by 
the Dalai Lama, appealing to the world community for support in resolving the Tibet 
issue and in protecting Tibet‟s unique culture and fragile environment, heralds the 
internationalisation phase. The Strasbourg Proposal clearly laid out the political 
model that the Dalai Lama envisioned–essentially a unified Tibet governed by the 
Tibetans based on genuine democratic system with the foreign affairs and defence 
under the administration of the PRC Central Government. Based on the principles of 
the Strasbourg Proposal, the Middle Way Approach was developed into a 
comprehensive policy of negotiation, which by winning unanimous support from the 
Tibetan communities became the official stand of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile in 
1997. Recent significant events in this Middle Way phase are the six rounds of talks 
between the Special Envoys of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Government 
representatives, all of which have been devoted to creating conducive environment, 
establishing a climate of openness and promoting understanding of each other‟s 
positions. The differences in viewpoints that each side has discovered so far are 
“numerous, large and fundamental” that would take considerable efforts to resolve.1116 
 
                                                 
1116 Testimony of Lodi G. Gyari, Special Envoy of H.H. the Dalai Lama, at US Congress‟ House 
Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on Status of Tibet Negotiations held on 13 March 2007 in 
Washington, D.C., http://www.tibet.net/en/diir/sino/sstd/envoystat.html#11. 
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Inside Tibet, the decade of 1990s was marked by increased severity of Chinese 
policies in Tibet. The PRC Government intensified and expanded its previous 
economic reforms and accredited the economic development as the best tool of 
maintaining social and political stability in Tibet. The implementation of 62 
development projects by the Third Work Forum on Tibet, which targeted the 
expansion of energy transportation, telecommunication networks, agriculture and 
water conservancy, produced adverse results of increasing the number of Chinese 
immigrants in Tibet, exploitation of Tibet‟s mineral resources and destruction of 
Tibet‟s ecology. The new development projects and construction works created after 
the Third Work Forum facilitated an onrush of Chinese immigrants that greatly 
changed the demographic makeup of Tibet. More importantly, the Third Work Forum 
attacked the core beliefs of the Tibetan people by launching a re-education campaign 
in the monastic institutions across Tibet, limiting religious activities, and conducting 
denunciation campaigns against the Dalai Lama. The Strike Hard campaign, yet 
another direct consequence of the Third Work Forum, was especially designed to 
destroy the link between religion and the Tibetan nationalism and to uproot the 
influence of the Dalai Lama. Thus, the PRC‟s Tibet policy in the last decade of the 
last century was exceptionally severe on the religious freedom of the Tibetan people 
and intensely assimilatory in nature. Furthermore, the Tenth Five Year Plan (2001-
2005) bolsters these objectives even further and reveals China‟s relentless efforts at 
reducing the Tibetan population inside Tibet to an insignificant minority and 
undermining the distinct Tibetan national identity. 
 
The situation inside Tibet continues to deteriorate with China totally disregarding all 
international hues and cries. In Tibet human rights violations continue unabated: 
arbitrary arrests and detentions of politically conscious and vocal Tibetans, harsh 
reprisals against those who dare to criticise the government, severe restrictions and 
interference by the State in religious matters, implementation of population transfer 
policy on a much broader scale are taking place. With their struggle in stalemate and 
China getting ever more suppressive, belligerent and caustic, indications of 
restlessness and aggressiveness amongst the Tibetans are on the rise. The recent 
historic Tibetan Mass Movement of August 2007, which gathered an unprecedented 
20,000 Tibetan demonstrators and the indefinite hunger strikes in New Delhi are signs 
of pent up frustrations bursting at the seams of national tolerance. Inside Tibet, even 
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after fifty years of Chinese occupation, Tibetan masses continue to express their deep 
resentment against the PRC Government for denying the Tibetan people their basic 
human rights. Songs, which had been one of the most effective socio-political forms 
of expression for the common Tibetan populace, are employed more and more 
frequently by the Tibetans to convey dissatisfactions and frustrations with the 
authorities. In the last couple of decades many songs have crossed the Himalayas–
carrying messages of a resilient people languishing immensely under the draconian 
rule of the CCP. The famous Drapchi singing nuns voiced their daily experience of 
pain from prison: 
 
1) Song of sadness in our hearts 
We sing this to our brothers and friends 
What we Tibetans feel in this darkness will pass 
The food does not sustain body or soul 
Beatings impossible to forget 
This suffering inflicted upon us 
May no others suffer like this 
In the heavenly realm, the land of snows 
Land of unending peace and blessings 
May Avalokiteshvara Tenzin Gyatso 
Reign supreme throughout all eternity.
1117
 
 
2) We‟ve sung a song of sadness 
We‟ve sung it from Drapchi prison 
Like the happy and joyful snow mountains 
We‟ve sung this song for the sake of freedom 
Previously, a spiritual realm of dharma 
Now, [it] is changed to a barbaric prison ground. 
Even at the cost of our lives, we Tibetans, 
Will never lose our courage. 
O, what a sad fate we Tibetans have! 
To be tortured mercilessly by barbarians. 
We don‟t have freedom 
Under the yoke of these barbarians. 
 
                                                 
1117 Appendix 12 contains several sample contemporary songs from Tibet and one common element 
they all possess is the lyrics that are nationalistic in their content. 
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Popular Tibetan singers too have reflected the deep yearnings of Tibetan people in 
their songs. The band Tsanpoi Metag sings:  
 
Tibet, the Snow Land, this realm of joy,  
For long is captured by the vicious Chinese. 
Tibetan people‟s suffering is ever increasing 
It is time to give freedom to Tibet. 
Tibet, the Snow Land, that repository of knowledge 
For long is possessed by the barbaric Chinese 
Tibetan cultural rights are ever diminishing 
It is time to give freedom to Tibet. 
Tibet, the Snow Land, this land of spirituality, 
For long is ruled by the savage Chinese 
Tibetan religious value is ever dwindling 
It is time for our Supreme Lama to return to Tibet. 
Tibet, the Snow Land, this treasure trove of rich minerals 
For long is used by the wild Chinese 
The treasure trove is robbed nearly empty 
It is time for the Tibetans to take charge. 
 
These songs represent the true yearnings for freedom that majority of the Tibetan 
people share. It is the basic right of each and every one of the Tibetan people to 
choose their aspirations, which could only be fulfilled by some form of plebiscite or 
referendum conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. Such a referendum 
may yield either independence, genuine autonomy or some other form of political 
solution, even including the current status quo, as the aspiration of the majority of the 
Tibetan people. This practice will be in concordance with the thinking of the Dalai 
Lama and his Exile Government as they have reiterated over and again that the six 
million Tibetans will make the ultimate decision. It will have an added benefit of 
laying to rest the Chinese Government‟s suspicion that it is only the Dalai Lama and 
few Tibetan elites who, in their desire to bring back the old system, are struggling 
against the Chinese Government and bring true understanding of the Tibetan people‟s 
aspirations. The UN recognition of the Tibetan people as deserving the right to self-
determination provides an excellent foundation, which is further bolstered by 
recognitions from various government and parliaments. Support for the Tibetan 
people‟s right to self-determination also exists among the Chinese pro-democracy 
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groups, which I think will prove to be an essential factor in a democratic China. More 
significantly, China‟s ratification of the ICESCR situates it in a legally bound position 
to provide the right to self-determination to its people and assist the UN in 
implementing this right. Yet until now, the PRC Government has remained resolute in 
their objection against any attempts at discussing the issue at the UN. The intense 
inflexibility and intolerance to any other political groups displayed by the Chinese 
Communist Party to retain its powers and the CCP‟s reluctance to make even a slight 
compromise have stood as the biggest obstacles in resolving the Sino-Tibetan conflict. 
These standpoints will also hinder the bestowal and implementation of the right to 
self-determination. Therefore, complete democratisation of China will certainly 
facilitate these processes. However, instead of proposing a radical change of 
government I recommend a certain degree of political leniency on the part of the 
Chinese Communist Government, especially regarding Tibet, so as to facilitate the 
resolution of the protracted Sino-Tibet conflict for the mutual benefits of Tibetan 
people as well as Chinese people. 
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TN/Dharamsala/Tape1 
2. Tibetan Newcomers (TN)/Nepal, July-August 2005 
 1. Yama Gonpo, age 24 from Kacha Dewa, Karze district, TN/Nepal/Tape1 
2. Tashi, age 42 from Lhasa, TN/Nepal/Tape2 
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22. Gonpo Dhundup, age 13 from Rupa Tso, Karze district, TN/Nepal/22 
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APPENDIX 1 
Agreement of the Central People‟s Government and the Local Government  
of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet,  
“Seventeen-Point Agreement”, 23 May 1951 
 
The Tibetan nationality is one of the nationalities with a long history within the 
boundaries of China and, like any other nationalities, it has performed its glorious 
duty in the course of the creation and development of our great Motherland. But over 
the last one hundred years or more, imperialist forces penetrated into China, and in 
consequence also penetrated into the Tibetan region and carried out all kinds of 
deceptions and provocations. Like previous reactionary governments, the Kuomintang 
reactionary government continued to carry out a policy of oppression and sowing 
dissension among the nationalities, causing division and disunity among the Tibetan 
people. And the local government of Tibet did not oppose the imperialist deceptions 
and provocations, and adopted an unpatriotic attitude toward our great Motherland. 
Under such conditions, the Tibetan nationality and people were plunged into the 
depths of enslavement and suffering.  
 
In 1949, basic victory was achieved on a nation-wide scale. In the Chinese People‟s 
War of Liberation, the common domestic enemy of all nationalities-the Kuomintang 
reactionary government –was overthrown, and the common foreign enemy of all the 
nationalities- the aggressive imperialist forces-was driven out. On this basis, the 
founding of the People‟s Republic of China and of the Central People‟s Government 
was announced. In accordance with the Common Program passed by the Chinese 
People‟s Political Consultative Conference, the Central People‟s Government 
declared that all nationalities within the boundaries of the People‟s Republic of China 
are equal, and that they shall establish unity and mutual aid and oppose imperialism 
and their own public enemies, so that the People‟s Republic of China will become a 
big fraternal and co-operate family, composed of all its nationalities, that within the 
big family of nationalities of the People‟s Republic of China, national regional 
autonomy shall be exercised in areas where national minorities are concentrated, and 
all national minorities shall have freedom to develop their own spoken and written 
languages and to preserve or reform their customs, habits, and religious beliefs, while 
the Central People‟s Government shall assist all national minorities to develop their 
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political, economic, cultural and educational construction work. Since then, all 
nationalities within the country, with the exception of those within the areas of Tibet 
and Taiwan, have gained liberation. Under the unified leadership of the Central 
People‟s Government and the direct leadership of higher levels of People‟s 
Government, all national minorities are fully enjoying the right of national equality 
and have established, or are establishing, national regional autonomy. 
 
In order that the influences of aggressive imperialist forces in Tibet might be 
successfully eliminated, the unification of the territory and sovereignty of the People‟s 
Republic of China accomplished, and national defence safeguarded; in order that the 
Tibetan nationality and people might be freed and return to the big family of the 
People‟s Republic of China to enjoy the same rights of national equality as all other 
nationalities in the country and develop their political, economic, cultural and 
educational work, the Central People‟s Government, when it ordered the People‟s 
Liberation Army to march into Tibet, notified the local government of Tibet to send 
delegates to the central authorities to conduct talks for the conclusion of an agreement 
on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet. 
 
In the latter part of April 1951, the delegates with full powers of the local government 
of Tibet arrived in Peking. The Central People‟s Government appointed 
representatives with full powers to conduct talks on a friendly basis with the delegates 
with full powers of the local government of Tibet. As a result of these talks, both 
parties agreed to conclude this agreement and guarantee that it will be carried into 
effect. 
 
1. The Tibetan people shall unite and drive out imperialist aggressive forces from 
Tibet: the Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the Motherland-the 
People‟s Republic of China. 
2. The local government of Tibet shall actively assist the People‟s Liberation 
Army to enter Tibet and consolidate the national defence. 
3. In accordance with the policy toward nationalities laid down in the Common 
Program of the Chinese People‟s Political Consultative Conference, the Tibetan 
people have the right of exercising national regional autonomy under the 
leadership of the Central People‟s Government. 
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4. The Central Authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet. The 
Central Authorities also will not alter the established status, functions, and 
powers of the Dalai Lama. Officials of various ranks will hold office as usual. 
5. The established status, functions, and powers of the Dalai Lama and the 
Panchen Ngoerhtehni shall be maintained. 
6. By the established status, functions, and powers of the Dalai Lama and of the 
Panchen Ngoerhtehni are meant the status, functions and powers of the 
Thirteenth Dalai Lama and the Ninth Panchen Ngoerhtehni when they were in 
friendly and amicable relations with each other. 
7. The policy of freedom of religious belief laid down in the Common Program of 
the Chinese People‟s Political Consultative Conference shall be carried out. 
The religious beliefs, customs, and habits of the Tibetan people shall be 
respected, and lama monasteries shall be protected. The central authorities will 
not effect a change in the income of the monasteries. 
8. Tibetan troops shall be reorganised by stages into the People‟s Liberation 
Army, and become a part of the national defence forces of the People‟s 
Republic of China. 
9. The spoken and written language and school education of the Tibetan 
nationality shall be developed step by step in accordance with the actual 
conditions in Tibet. 
10. Tibetan agriculture, livestock raising, industry, and commerce shall be 
developed step by step, and the people‟s livelihood shall be improved step by 
step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet. 
11.  In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on 
the part of the central authorities. The local government of Tibet should carry 
out reforms of its own accord, and when the people raise demands for reform, 
they shall be settled by means of consultation with the leading personnel of 
Tibet. 
12.  In so far as former pro-imperialist and pro-KMT officials resolutely sever 
relations with imperialism and the KMT and do not engage in sabotage or 
resistance, they may continue to hold office irrespective of their past. 
13.  The People‟s Liberation Army entering Tibet shall abide by all the above 
mentioned policies and shall also be fair in buying and selling and shall not 
arbitrarily take a single needle or thread from the people. 
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14. The Central People‟s Government shall conduct the centralised handling of all 
external affairs of the area of Tibet; and there will be peaceful coexistence with 
neighbouring countries and establishment and development of fair commercial 
and trading relations with them on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, and 
mutual respect for territory and sovereignty. 
15. In order to ensure the implementation of this agreement, the Central People‟s 
Government shall set up a military and administrative committee and a military 
area headquarters in Tibet, and apart from the personnel sent there by the 
Central People‟s Government, shall absorb as many local Tibetan personnel as 
possible to take part in the work. Local Tibetan personnel taking part in the 
military and administrative committee may include patriotic elements from the 
local government of Tibet, various districts, and leading monasteries; the name 
list shall be drawn up after consultation between the representatives designated 
by the Central People‟s Government and the various quarters concerned , and 
shall be submitted to the Central People‟s Government for appointment. 
16. Funds needed by the military and administrative committee, the military area 
headquarters, and the People‟s Liberation Army entering Tibet shall be 
provided by the Central People‟s Government. The local government of Tibet 
will assist the People‟s Liberation Army in the purchase and transport of food, 
fodder, and other daily necessities. 
17. This agreement shall come into force immediately after signature and seals are 
affixed to it.1118 
                                                 
1118 “Text of Agreement on Measures for Peaceful Liberation of Tibet,” NCNA, 27 May 1951, in 
Survey in China Mainland Press.  
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APPENDIX 2 
United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 1353 (XIV), 
21 October, 1959 
 
The General Assembly 
Recalling the principles regarding fundamental human rights and freedoms set out in 
the Charter of the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
adopted by the General Assembly on 10 December 1948, 
Considering that the fundamental human rights and freedoms to which the Tibetan 
people, like all others, are entitled include the right to civil and religious liberty for all 
without distinction, 
Mindful also of the distinctive cultural and religious heritage of the people of Tibet 
and of the autonomy which they have traditionally enjoyed, 
Gravely concerned at reports, including the official statements of His Holiness the 
Dalai Lama, to the effect that the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the 
people of Tibet have been forcibly denied them, 
Deploring the effect of these events in increasing international tension and embittering 
the relations between peoples at a time when earnest and positive efforts are being 
made by responsible leaders to reduce tension and improve international relations, 
1. Affirms its belief that respect for the principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is essential for the 
evolution of a peaceful world order based on the rule of law; 
2. Calls for respect for the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and 
for their distinctive cultural and religious life. 
1119 
                                                 
1119 ICJ, Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law, 1997, p. 359. 
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APPENDIX 3 
United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 1723 (XVII), 
20 December 1961 
 
The General Assembly, 
Recalling its Resolution 1353 (XIV) of 21 October 1959 on the question of Tibet, 
Gravely concerned at the continuation of events in Tibet, including the violation of 
the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and the suppression of the 
distinctive cultural and religious life which they have traditionally enjoyed, 
Noting with deep anxiety the severe hardships which these events have inflicted on the 
Tibetan people, as evidenced by the large-scale exodus of Tibetan refugees to the 
neighbouring countries, 
Considering that these events violate fundamental human rights and freedoms set out 
in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
including the principle of self-determination of peoples and nations, and have the 
deplorable effect of increasing international tension and embittering relations between 
peoples, 
1. Reaffirms its conviction that respect for the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is essential 
for the evolution of a peaceful world order based on the rule of law; 
2. Solemnly renews its call for the cessation of practices which deprive the 
Tibetan people of their fundamental human rights and freedoms, including the 
right to self-determination; 
3. Expresses the hope that Member States will make all possible efforts, as 
appropriate, towards achieving the purposes of the present resolution.
1120
                                                 
1120 ICJ, Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law, 1997, p. 360. 
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APPENDIX 4 
United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 2079 (XX),  
18 December 1965 
 
The General Assembly, 
Bearing in mind the principles relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms set 
forth in the Charter of the United Nations and proclaimed in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 
Reaffirming its resolutions 1353 (XIV) of 21 October 1959 and 1723 (XVI) of 20 
December 1961 on the question of Tibet, 
Gravely concerned at the continued violation of the fundamental rights and freedoms 
of the people of Tibet and the continued suppression of their distinctive cultural and 
religious life, as evidenced by the exodus of refugees to the neighbouring countries, 
1. Deplores the continued violation of the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
the people of Tibet; 
2. Reaffirms that respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations 
and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is essential for the 
evolution of a peaceful world order based on the rule of law; 
3. Declares its conviction that the violation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in Tibet and the suppression of the distinctive cultural and religious 
life of its people increase international tension and embitter relations between 
peoples; 
4. Solemnly renews its call for the cessation of all practices which deprive the 
Tibetan people of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which they 
have always enjoyed; 
Appeals to all States to use their best endeavors to achieve the purposes of the 
present resolution.
1121
 
                                                 
1121 ICJ, Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law, 1997, p. 361. 
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APPENDIX 5 
Party Secretaries and Chairman of the TAR 
(Information to create this list are gathered from Who's Who in China's Leadership: 
Local Government which can be accessed at  
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/leadership/87033.htm, Resistance and 
Reform in Tibet, Robert Barnett and Shirin Akiner (ed.), and ChinaVitae, available at 
http://www.chinavitae.com/location/9560.034.)  
 
Party Secretaries in the TAR 
November 1951–August 1965. Zhang Jingwu (Chang Ching-wu). First Secretary of 
the Tibet Work Committee of the CCP. 
November 1960–September 1965: Tan Guansan, may have been acting First Party 
Secretary or a  high ranking Deputy Secretary. 
September 1965–September 1967: Zhang Guohua, Party Secretary of the TAR, 
Commander of the Tibet Military Region, October 1951 to September 1967.  
September 1968–August 1971: Zeng Yongya, Chairman of the Tibet Revolutionary 
Committee, Commander of the Tibet Military Region from February 1964 until 
January 1968. 
August 1971–May 1980. Ren Rong, the TAR Party Secretary and Chairman of the 
Tibet Revolutionary  Committee.  
May 1980–1985: Yin Fatang, Political Commissar of the Tibet Military District and 
Party Secretary of the TAR.  
1985–July 1988: Wu Jinghua (Yi nationality), Party Secretary of the TAR.  
December 1988–1992: Hu Jintao, Party Secretary of the TAR.  
December 1992–Autumn 2000: Chen Kuiyuan, Deputy Secretary and Secretary of the 
TAR CPC.  
Autumn 2000–Dec 2004: Guo Jinlong, Party Secretary of the TAR CPC. 
Dec 2004–2006: Yang Chuantang, Party Secretary of the TAR CPC. 
Nov 27, 2005: Zhang Qingli, Acting Party Secretary of the TAR CPC. 
May 2006: Zhang Qingli, Party Secretary of the TAR CPC. 
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Chairmen of the TAR 
1951–1959: the 14th Dalai Lama, Head of Local Government. 
1959–1964: Panchen Lama, Acting Director of the PCART, March 1959 to December 
1964; Deputy Director, May 1956 to March 1959. 
March 1965–September 1967: Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, Acting Director of the 
PCART, March to September 1965; First Chairman of the TAR from September 1965 
to September 1967; Deputy Chairman of PCART, March 1959 to March 1965. 
September 1968–August 1971: Zeng Yongya (Tseng Yung-ya), Chairman of the 
Tibet Revolutionary Committee. 
June 1971–August 1979: Ren Rong, Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee Party 
Secretary. 
September 1979–February 1981: Tian Bao alias Sangye Yeshe, Chairman of the 
TAR. Vice-Governor of Xikang (Sikang) from November 1950 to January 1953. 
Vice-Governor of Sichuan from December 1955 to May 1967. Vice-Chairman of the 
Tibet Revolutionary  Committee from 1968 to 1969. Deputy Party Secretary of the 
TAR from August 1971 to August 1978. Deputy Political Commissar of the Tibet 
Military Region from May 1970 to June 1971. Second Political Commissar of the 
Tibet Military District from 1973 to February 1981. Deputy Party Secretary of 
Sichuan from 1981-1982. 
April 1981–August 1982: Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, Second term as Chairman of the 
TAR. Remained Chairman of the TAR People‟s Congress; later became a Vice-
Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People‟s Congress.  
April 1983–1985: Dorje Tseten, Chairman of the TAR; Vice-Chairman of the TAR 
People‟s Congress for six months in 1981. 
1985–April 1990: Dorje Tsering, Chairman of the TAR. 
May 1990–May 1998: Gyaltsen Norbu, Chairman of the TAR; Deputy Party 
Secretary. 
May 1998–May 2003: Legqog, Chairman of the TAR. 
May 2003– Jampa Phuntsok, Chairman of the TAR. 
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APPENDIX 6 
Interviews Conducted in Nepal and Dharamsala, SUMMER 2005 
No.  Names  Age 
/ Sex 
Origin Occupation Days 
since 
arrival 
1. Yama 
Gonpo 
24/m Kacha village, Karze district, Kham, 
Sichuan. (Ch: Luhuo) 
Monk from 
Mi-nyak 
monastery. 
3 weeks 
2.  Tashi 42/m Sahidewa village, Sangchu district, 
Kanlho TAP. (Ch: Xiahe) 
Butter seller 
in Lhasa. 
1 week 
3. Jigme 
Gyamtso 
26/m Bharma Dewa, Machu district, Kanlho 
TAP. (Ch: Maqu) 
- 2 weeks  
4. Gonpo Tashi 24/m Jatsa Dewa, Machen district, Golog 
TAP. (Ch: Maqin) 
- 1 month 
5. Lhakpa 
Bhuti 
21/f Dickyi Tsoe, Tingkye district, 
Shigatse, TAR. (Ch: Dingjie)  
Road 
construction 
worker 
1 month 
6. Paldon 27/f Dickyi Tsoe, Tingkye district, 
Shigatse, TAR. (Ch: Dingjie) 
Road 
construction 
worker 
1 month 
7. Dickyi 
Tsomo 
17/f Dingri district, Shigatse, TAR. (Ch: 
Dingri) 
Farmer 2 weeks 
8. Ngawang 
Gyurmey 
25/m Kyido village, Jomda district, 
Chamdo, TAR. (Ch: Jiangda) 
Monk at 
Zigar 
Monastery 
1 day 
9. Jayang 
Sangmo 
21/f Cikodrong, Jomda district, Chamdo, 
TAR. (Ch: Jiangda) 
Farmer 2 weeks 
10.  Jayang 
Lodoe 
24/m Cikodrong, Jomda district, Chamdo, 
TAR. (Ch: Jiangda) 
Farmer 2 weeks 
11. Pa Tsering 25/m Karze District, Karze TAP, Kham. 
(Ch: Ganzi) 
Farmer 1 month 
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12. Chang 
Drang 
30/m Dramad village, Yushul/Kyegudo 
district, Yushul TAP, (Tsongon 
Shingchen). (Ch: Yushu/Jiegu) 
Nomad/nun 1 Week 
13. Dechen 
Pema 
16/f Lhasa, TAR Nun Shugseb 
Nunnery 
1 Week 
14. Lobsang 
Norbu 
25/m  Monk 1 Week  
15. Tenpa 20/m Gyalsa Dewa, Machen district, Golog 
TAP, Amdo Tsongon. (Ch: Maqin) 
Nomad 22 days 
16. Lhagon 25 Sershul district, Karze TAP, Sichuan. 
(Ch: Shiqu) 
Monk/Nomad 1 day 
17. Tselho 29/f Shagtsa Drong, Sershul district, Karze 
TAP, Sichuan. (Ch: Shiqu) 
Monk 2 days 
18. Yangmo Tso 24/f Sanak Dewa, Tsegor Thang district, 
Tsolho TAP, Amdo Tsongon 
Shingchen. (Ch: Xinghai) 
Nomad 3 months 
19. Tsomo Thar 23/f Nyinpa Dewa, Yadzi district, Tsoshar 
TAP, Amdo Tsongon Shingchen. (Ch: 
Xunhua) 
Singer 1 day 
20. Tsering 
Gonpo 
24/m Drelung Dewa, Yushul/Kyegudo 
district, Yushul TAP, Tsongon 
Shingchen. (Ch: Yushu/Jiegu) 
Monk 5 Months 
21 Anonymous
*
 41 Langgora, Gonjo district, Chamdo 
TAR. (Ch: Gongjue) 
- 25 days 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
* Some interviewees wanted to remain anonymous for security reason and as such very little personal 
information was divulged. 
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Interviews with Tibetan Children in Nepal, Summer 2005 
No. Name Age Origin Occupation Days 
since 
arrival 
1. Gonpo 
Dhundup 
13 Rupa Tso, Karze district, Karze TAP, 
Kham. (Ch: Ganzi) 
student 9 days 
2. Tenzin 
Yutso  
8 Rupa Tso, Karze district, Karze TAP, 
Kham. (Ch: Ganzi) 
student 9 days 
3. Kelsang 
Gonpo 
6 Rupa Tso, Karze district, Karze TAP, 
Kham. (Ch: Ganzi) 
student 1 month 
4. Chontso 13 Tashi Dewa, Jomda district, Chamdo, 
TAR. (Ch: Jiangda) 
student 9 days 
5. Tashi 
Choephel 
11 Mi-nyak, Karze District, Kham, 
Sichuan. (Ch: Luhuo) 
student 1 month 
6. Tashi 
Dhondup 
11 Lhasa, TAR. student 20 days 
7. Tenzin 
Yangphel 
12 Suthonda Dewa, Karze district, Kham, 
Sichuan. (Ch: Luhuo) 
student 5 days 
8.  Sonam 
Lhundup 
9 Zongkha Dewa, Gonjo district, 
Chamdo, TAR. (Ch: Gongjue) 
student 4 days 
9. Lhamo 10 Zomey Dewa, Gonjo district, 
Chamdo, TAR. (Ch: Gongjue) 
student 7 days 
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Interviews with Four Political Prisoners in Dharamsala, July 2005 
No. Name Age Origin Occupation 
1. Anonymous
*
 - Medogyama village, Medogang xian - 
2 Anonymous - Tolung Monastery, Medogyama 
village, Medogang xian 
Monk 
3 Anonymous -  - 
4 Anonymous -  - 
 
                                                 
* These political prisoners who escaped Tibet in the June/July 2005, wanted to remain anonymous for 
security reason and as such very little personal information was divulged. However, they provided 
accounts of their experience in Chinese prisons and political and human rights conditions in Tibet. 
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APPENDIX 7 
Chart Representing the Arrival of New Tibetan Refugees (from 1990 to 2000) 
 
(Chart designed and prepared by Tsetan Dolkar based on information provided by Tibetan Refugee 
Welfare Office, Kathmandu, Nepal.) 
Month/ 
Year 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total 
January 0 134 174 269 213 164 129 140 204 192 216 1835 
February 0 73 92 176 101 118 57 35 70 122 104 948 
March 0 71 37 154 162 53 64 104 102 66 222 1035 
April 0 44 60 276 273 94 173 219 215 50 162 1566 
May  0 88 129 299 270 67 114 156 225 235 129 1712 
June 0 33 156 559 166 59 188 187 237 120 155 1860 
July 0 210 211 162 130 53 85 94 183 98 104 1330 
August 89 152 216 168 103 98 131 176 113 88 110 1444 
September 107 303 250 303 169 92 242 119 336 165 187 2273 
October 189 284 279 258 236 240 147 386 444 205 268 2936 
November 360 297 413 571 379 159 469 449 570 449 422 4538 
December 642 357 418 502 340 159 326 171 410 392 240 3957 
Yearly 
Total 
1387 2046 2435 3697 2542 1356 2125 2236 3109 2182 2319  
Note: 1. As the chart indicates the escapees generally choose the winter season to 
escape from Tibet as the border control is comparatively more relax during the season 
due to extremely cold weather over the Himalayas.  
 2. Tibetan Refugee Welfare office, Nepal started keeping the records of the 
newcomers in  only in August, 1990. 
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APPENDIX 8 
Length of Transportation Routes in the TAR and Ethnic Tibetan Regions. 
 
Region Year Total Highways and the 
Total National percentage 
Paved 
(km) 
Non-Paved 
(km) 
National 1995 1157009 1043390 113619 
 2000 1402698 1216013 186685 
2005 1870661 1515826 354835 
THE TAR 1995 22391 (1.93%) 8234 14157 
 2000 22503 (1.6%) 10647 11856 
2005* 42203 (2.25%) 10131 32072 
QINGHAI 1995 17223 (1.48%) 14887 2336 
 2000 18679 (1.33%) 15178 3501 
2005 28059 (1.49%) 25322 2737 
GANSU 1995 35194 (3.04%) 28345 6849 
 2000 39344 (2.8%) 29393 9951 
2005 40751 (2.17%) 31613 9138 
SICHUAN
*
 1995 100724 (8.7%) 94490 6234 
 2000 90875 (6.47%) 69723 21152 
2005 113043 (6.04%) 76402 36642 
YUNNAN 1995 68236 (5.89%) 64483 3753 
 2000 109560 (7.81%) 102550 7010 
2005 167050 (8.92%) 110876 56174 
 
Source: From the website of the Chinese Government National Bureau of Statistics; 
  http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/.  
 
Note: * In the TAR the length of roads almost doubled from 2000 to 2005. The 
increase in the road length seems to be primarily due to the almost trebling of 
unpaved roads. 
                                                 
* Apparently, the total length of the transportation routes in Sichuan as well as the paved roads for the 
year 2000 have some anomaly as the figures indicated a decrease in both the total and the paved 
road. It could be due to statistical error! 
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APPENDIX 9 
TRAIN SCHEDULE 
 
Train Train no. 
(to Lhasa) 
Train 
no. 
(from 
Lhasa) 
Route Distance 
(km) 
Time 
Taken 
Beijing-
Lhasa Train 
T27 T28 Beijing, Shijiazhuang, 
Xi'an, Lanzhou, Xining, 
Geermo 
(Gormo/Golmud), Naqu 
(Nagqu) and Lhasa 
4,064 47h 
30m 
Chengdu-
Lhasa Train 
T22/23 T24/21 Chengdu, Guangyuan, 
Baoji, Lanzhou, Xining, 
Golmud, Nagu (Nagqu) 
and Lhasa 
3,360 48h 
10m 
Lanzhou-
Lhasa Train 
K917 K918 Lanzhou, Xining, Haergai 
(Hairag), Keke (Hoh 
Yanchang), 
Delinga, Golmud, 
Tuotuohe, Anduo 
(Amdo), Naqu (Nagqu), 
Dangxiong (Damxung) and 
Lhasa 
2,188 28h 
45m 
Xining-
Lhasa Train 
N917 N918 Xining, Haergai (Hairag), 
Keke (Hoh Yanchang), 
Delingha, 
Golmud, Tuotuohe, Anduo 
(Amdo), Anduo 
(Amdo), Naqu (Nagqu) and 
Dangxiong (Damxung) and 
Lhasa 
1,972 26h 
23m 
Chongqing-
Lhasa Train 
T222/T223 T224/T2
21 
Chongqing, Guang'an, 
Dazhou, Xi'an, Baoji, 
Lanzhou, Xining, 
Golmud and Naqu 
(Nagqu), Lhasa. 
3,654 47h 8m 
Shanghai-
Lhasa Train 
T164/T165 T166/T1
63 
Shanghai, Wuxi, Nanjing, 
Bengbu, Zhengzhou, Xi'an, 
Lanzhou, Xining, Golmud 
and Naqu 
(Nagqu) and Lhasa. 
4,373 51h 
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Guangzhou-
Lhasa Train 
T264/265 T266/26
3 
Guangzhou, Changsha, 
Wuchang, Zhengzhou, 
Xi'an, Lanzhou, 
Xining, Golmud and Naqu 
(Nagqu) and 
Lhasa. 
4,980 58h 
 
Source: Chinese official websites, 
http://tibet.cn/en/newfeature/qtrailway/about/t20060628_127365.htm 
http://english.gov.cn/special/2006-06/26/content_320460.htm  
http://www.chinatt.org/Lhasa.htm. 
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●
Dingri ●
Tingkye
●
Gonjo
Kyegudo
●
Sershul
●
Jomda
●
Karze
●
Xunhua
●
Tsegorthang
●
Sangchu
●
Machu
●
Machan
Lhasa
●
●
APPENDIX 10 
The Map of the TAR and Surrounding Tibetan Areas Identifying the Districts 
from where the Interviewees Came 
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APPENDIX 11 
Chinese Interviewees, Spring 2006 
 
Names Date Location 
Xu Wenli 7 April 2006 Rhode Island 
Wei Jingsheng 15 April 2006 Washington 
Shengde Lian 15
 
April 2006 Washington 
Cao Changching 16 April 2006 New York  
Dana Cheng 17 April 2006 Connecticut 
Chen Kuide 18 April 2006 Virginia 
Harry Wu 18 April 2006 Virginia 
Chen Pokong 2 May 2006 New York 
China Democracy Party 
 Xie Wanjun (President) 
 Yanqin Bao 
 Shan Wang 
 Ze Gua  
 Weixing Lu  
 Ming Lu  
 Baoxiang Xie 
2 May 2006 Empire State Building, Manhattan 
Hu Ping 3 May 2006 New York 
 
Tibetan Interviewees 
Tashi Wangdu 11 April, 2006 New York 
Tsewang Phuntsok 11 April, 2006 New York 
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APPENDIX 12 
Song from Tibet 
 
1 .  Returning in Thought 
1122
 
Lyric: Drug-gyang, Melody: Tashi Dorje, Singers: Yadong, Kunga, Gangshug, 
Tsewang 
Translated by Tsetan Dolkar 
 
Snowy hills loom as heavenly fence  
Pure blue rivers sparkle as fripperies of moon and sun  
Soft carpets of stars are but meadows immense  
High above in sky is this unexcelled dwelling own,  
Land of Snow, the treasure filled roof of the world,  
Is our father-land, ye Tibetans behold.  
Oh! Land of Snow, our mother strong;  
I came feeling the warmth of your womb  
And from your lap, this day, shall I sing a song.  
Oh! Land of Snow, our mother strong;  
Listen, you taught us this auspicious chant,  
A gift garnered traveling across our father-land.  
Six sentient beings are our parents dear  
Ahimsa, peace and joy are mental wealth we bear  
[In us runs] blood that could inspire wisdom and courage  
We are the people who dwelled on the Land of Snow  
We are the settlers who staked the first claim on these high ranges  
We are Tibetan, the red-faced nation.  
Oh! Tibetan brothers and sisters  
I came recalling your love profound  
Today shall I dance in your delightful presence.  
Look, this is the circle dance that you passed down  
To you we offer this gift in joyful union.  
To you we offer this gift in joyful union.  
                                                 
1122
 The translation of the song was first published in Chökor, TIBETHAUS-Journal, Frankfurt, 
Ausgabe Nr. 43, Juli 2007. 
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nZv67scGLjs 
 
2. Mirror Reflecting True Words 
Lyric, Melody, Singer: Tsan-poi Me-tag 
Translated by Tsondue Samphel 
 
Tibet, the Snow Land, this realm of joy, 
For long is captured by the vicious Chinese. 
Tibetan people's suffering is ever increasing 
It is time to give freedom to Tibet. 
 
Tibet, the Snow Land, that repository of knowledge 
For long is possessed by the barbaric Chinese 
Tibetan cultural rights are ever diminishing 
It is time to give freedom to Tibet. 
 
Tibet, the Snow Land, this land of spirituality, 
For long is ruled by the savage Chinese 
Tibetan religious value is ever dwindling 
It is time for our Supreme Lama to return to Tibet. 
 
Tibet, the Snow Land, this treasure trove of rich minerals 
For long is used by the wild Chinese 
The treasure trove is robbed nearly empty 
It is time for the Tibetans to take charge. 
 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oIu2rTjDB1A 
 
3. Snowlanders 
Singer: Dolma Kyab 
Translated by Tsondue Samphel 
 
An affectionate people who has walked across the eastern part of world 
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After reaching the peaks of Snow Mountains they gazed far at the Land of Pure Bliss 
Even though the gale blows my life like sands in the desolate place of samsara  
The heart is still spacious and big to hold the six mother sentient beings. 
[We are] the descendant of ancient kings 
We are Tibetans, the Snow Landers. 
To you I tell my stories when I am happy 
To you I share my melancholic songs. 
Riding high on the horns of powerful Yak is the red-faced nation 
On the banks of Yarlung Tsangpo we rode, the galloping sound carried to four 
directions. 
The fate of the Three Cholkha is written in wrinkles on the face of our mothers old 
 
From the pure ancestral land rise songs to the blue expanse of space 
 
[We are] the descendant of ancient kings 
We are Tibetans, the Snow Landers. 
To you I tell my stories when I am happy 
To you I share my melancholic songs. 
The Snow Landers 
[We are] the descendant of ancient kings 
We are Tibetans, the Snow Landers. 
The Snow Landers 
The Snow Landers. 
 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r8GL8UQkXC0 
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